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ABSTRACT 
Cooktown today is a small, somewhat isolated town on the eastern 
coast of Far North Queensland. Its main functions are as the service centre 
for a variety of properties and settlements on Cape York Peninsula, and as a 
tourist gateway both to the Cape and the nearby Great Barrier Reef. But in 
its heyday, in the mid 1870s, Cooktown was a bustling frontier town, provid-
ing the entry point and service centre for the Palmer River goldfields. At its 
peak, it boasted a population of some 4,000 people and was not infrequently 
touted as the potential capital of Far North Queensland. 
This thesis examines why Cooktown failed to live up to its expectations 
and why, by the mid 1880s, the town had become but a shadow of its former 
self. The hypothesis is that many of Cooktown's early settlers, who were 
typically small-scale European merchants or artisans, were attracted to the 
town by the prospect of making a quick fortune from the passing trade of 
would-be miners en route to the Palmer River goldfields. Once established as 
part of the Cooktown business community, the more successful businessmen 
(and there were almost no women) found that their relative prosperity 
brought with it a degree of social and civic respectability generally far beyond 
anything they could have aspired to in larger, southern towns. 
Very few of the town's early key figures, though, had the entrepre-
neurial skills or vision to see beyond their own limited achievements or that 
of Cooktown as the service centre for the Palmer River goldfields. Moreover, 
early Cooktown's civic leaders tended to be those with the time and social pre-
tensions to be involved, rather than those best able to represent the longer-
term interests of the town. The result was that few efforts were made to 
diversify the town's economic base, beyond its commercial links with the 
Palmer. So once the Palmer slid into decline, in the late 1870s, Cooktown 
followed. 
It is, of course, easy to be wise with the benefit of hindsight, and to be 
critical of individuals who were no doubt doing what they thought best at the 
time. It is also true that there were probably only limited diversification 
opportunities in the 1870s and 1880s for a small coastal settlement like Cook-
town. Less easily explained is why the authorities in Brisbane seem 
generally to have been taken in by the hyperbole coming from 'boosters' in 
Cooktown, years after the town was already in decline, and why the Grovem-
ment continued to expend money on what proved to be ill-fated ventures, 
notably the railway line to Laura. The most likely explanation would seem to 
be that it was because of the 'tyranny of distance', combined with bureau-
cratic inertia. 
IV 
In pursuing its central theme, the study also addresses a range of other 
issues relating to the early development of Cooktown. They include early 
European contact and subsequent relations with the Aboriginal population of 
the area; the physical growth of Cooktown and its business community; the 
sociological formation and development of the town community; the economic 
nexus between Cooktowrn and the Palmer River goldfields; and the role played 
by Cooktown in the wider development of Queensland during the 1870s and 
early 1880s. In considering such issues, the study does not pretend to provide 
a comprehensive account of early CooktoMm. Rather, it attempts to determine 
the extent to which the Cooktown experience 'fits' the wider, traditional 
interpretations of local, regional and Queensland history. It also attempts to 
identify themes or trends not previously articulated, but which may have 
relevance beyond Cooktown. 
Probably the most significant conclusion to emerge is the under-rated 
role of the Chinese in the early development of Cooktown. Certainly, there 
are numerous, popular accounts of Chinese miners flocking to the Palmer 
River gold-rush. But less well known is that the Chinese at times made up at 
least one third of the population of Cooktown. And for several critical years, 
Chinese merchants, shop-keepers and small-businessmen played a key role in 
the town's commercial life. The study concludes that around 60 per cent of 
the value of gold mined at the Palmer between 1873 and 1885 ended up in 
Chinese hands, either in Cooktown or in China itself. 
More generally, the study suggests that early Cooktown was typical of 
many other small coastal towns, both in Queensland £uid elsewhere in 
Australia. Indeed, one of the key aims of the study has been to analyse early 
Cooktown in terms of experiences elsewhere, in order to enable some mean-
ingful comparisons to be made. Moreover, through the use of quantification, 
the study attempts to provide some benchmarks to support such comparative 
analyses. Clearly, early Cooktown was only one of a number of settlements 
contributing to the wider development of Queensland in the 1870s and 1880s. 
This study hopefully enables its relative importance to be better understood 
within that larger context. 
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PREFACE 
A number of people have asked me over the past several years why I 
chose early Cooktown as the subject of this thesis — many presumed that I or 
my forebears came from the town, or that I had some recent association with 
it. My answer has been neither. Rather, my interest in Cooktown developed 
dimng the course of my undergraduate and post-graduate studies in Austral-
ian history at the University of Queensland, dating from 1980. One of my 
earliest assignments — on the broad subject of the expansion of'civilisation' 
into Queensland — was on early exploration work in Cape York Peninsula. 
It then seemed a logical progression, in a subsequent assignment on early 
race relations, to contrast the experience of Ludwig Leichhardt in 1848 with 
that of the Jardine brothers in 1865-66 in their contact with the Aborigines of 
Far North Queensland. Having developed such 'expertise', on the basis of two 
1500-word essays, it then seemed even more logical to continuing specialising 
in the Cape York region! 
The other reason for choosing Cooktown is that it is one of the few 
towns in Queensland which has not been the subject of a detailed academic 
study or popular account — somewhat surprisingly given its flamboyant past 
and its relative proximity to the James Cook University in Townsville. One 
explanation could be that Cooktown today bears little resemblance, in a 
physical or socio-economic sense, to the bustling community of its heyday. 
Another is that the history of early Cooktown is t3T)ically overshadowed by 
the more exciting story of the Palmer River goldfields, and the associated 
influx of Chinese to Far North Queensland. Another is the perception in 
academic circles, at least, that very little primary-source material relating to 
Far North Queensland has survived the cumulative ravages of a tropical 
climate, cyclones, fires and an early bureaucracy little interested in the 
archival preservation of official records. 
Certainly, there is little primary-source material relating to the 1870s 
and early 1880s to be found in Cooktown today. The one important exception 
is the well-preserved register of births, deaths and marriages from the period, 
held in the Cooktown court-house. The absdurdity — from an historian's 
viewpoint — is that current state legislation prohibits general access to the 
document, on the basis of concerns for the privacy of individuals from 120 
years ago. Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of primary-source 
source material still available, as discussed in more detail in the introductory 
chapter, notably in the Queensland State Archives and the National Library 
in Canberra. Indeed, one of the dilemmas in this study has been to place 
bounds on its scope, while maintaining a balance between detailed analysis 
and generalisations with broader implications at the regional and 
Queensland-wide level. 
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CHAPTER 1 - THE STUDY OF A FRONTIER TOWN 
Cooktown, in Far North Queensland, is today a small town vdth a 
population of aroimd 1200 people. It is the most northerly of the seaport 
towns on Queensland's eastern coast, located 170 kilometres north of Cairns 
and about 1600 kilometres from Brisbane. The town attracts some of the 
tourists visiting Queensland's tropical north, mainly in the form of day-
trippers from Cairns. It is also the gateway for vehicle-borne 'adventure 
safaris' into Cape York Peninsula, and cruises and underwater excursions to 
the adjoining Great Barrier Reef Cooktovni is also the service centre for a 
number of cattle stations on Cape York Peninsula, as well as the Aboriginal 
community at Hope Vale (fifty kilometres to the north). 
Many of the town's adult residents are involved in the tourism and 
hospitality industries. There are, for example, four hotels in the town, 
several motels and other establishments offering accommodation, a handful 
of restaurants, a variety of shops and three or four entry-charging tourist 
attractions, including the impressive James Cook Historical Museum 
(operated by the National Trust). Of the remaining population, most are 
employed either by the Queensland Government or the local Cook Shire, 
which has its headquarters in Cooktown. As could be expected from a town 
in tropical North Queensland, Cooktown also has its share of retirees and 
semi-permanent unemployed. 
Like most other non-capital city communities in Australia, 
Cooktown has also suffered over the years from 'urban drift', particularly to 
Cairns and Townsville. Indeed, those two cities, with populations of 70,000 
and 90,000 respectively, are seen as the 'bright lights' for those in Cooktown 
aspiring to 'greener pastures'. The irony is that 120 years ago, as European 
civilisation first spread into North Queensland, it was Cooktown — in 
competition with Cairns and Townsville — that lay claim to 'the capital of 
the north' and potential Singapore of the South Pacific.^ 
1 See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser 
(CHPRA), 17 October 1874, p. 2 contending that 'there is no other town on the east 
coast with any pretensions, whatever, except Cooktown [to the mantle of capital of 
the north]'. 
Moreover, Cooktown in the mid 1870s had the credentials to 
support such claims. In 1876, Cooktown's population of around 2400 was 
supporting a workforce on the Palmer River goldfields of some 15,000 
Eiu-opean and Chinese miners. Its port was widely regarded as 'one of the 
finest in the colonies'.^ The volume of traffic through the port in the years 
1875-77 was second only to Brisbane (among Queensland ports), with 
Cooktovni often the first AustraHan port of c£dl for ships from Hong Kong 
and Singapore.3 
Revenue generated from customs duties was similarly second only 
to Brisbane across the years 1875-77 (although Rockhampton narrowly 
'pipped' Cooktown in some individual quarterly reporting periods).^ Even 
more impressive was the value of gold exports shipped through Cooktown 
from the Palmer River goldfields diuing the mid 1870s. Between 1874 and 
1877, some 839,000 ounces of gold, valued at nearly £3 million, passed 
through Cooktov^Ti.^  That was almost 30 per cent more than the Charters 
Towers' fields had produced in six years and 25 per cent more than Gjnnpie 
had produced in ten years.^ In 1877 alone, the Palmer River goldfields 
produced 159,571 ounces of gold, representing 45 per cent of the Queensland 
total.7 
Beyond the straightforward economic contribution of gold 
production and customs revenue was the catalytic effect that the success of 
Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields had upon the overall Queensland 
economy in the 1870s and early 1880s.^ Whereas the discovery of gold at 
^ See, for example, CHPRA, 17 October 1874, p. 2 and the assessment of a visitor 
from Townsville in The Brisbane Courier, 27 April 1874, p. 3 describing the port at 
the Endeavour River as 'one of the finest north of Sydney*. 
^ In 1876, for example, Brisbane was visited by 333 ships, Cooktown 115 and 
Townsville 109: see official interchange statistics as published in The Cooktown 
Courier, 6 December 1876, p. 3. 
* Cooktown was second to Brisbane in the twelve months to July 1875 and 
30 September 1877, while Rockhampton narrowly edged out Cooktown in the 
quarter ending 30 September 1875: see CHPRA, 18 August 1875, p. 2; 20 October 
1875, p. 2 and 24 October 1877, p. 2. 
5 From the statistics of gold production in Votes and proceedings of the Legislative 
Assembly of Queensland [QVP)] 2, 1886, p. 263. 
6 Calculated from the statistics in QVP, 2, 1886, p. 263. 
^ See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 10 August 1878, p. 2. 
^ See J.R. Laverty, The Queensland economy 1860-1915' in D.J. Murphy (ed.), 
Prelude to power: the rise of the Labor Party to power in Queensland, 1815-1915, 
Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1970, p. 30. 
Gympie in 1867 had rescued the ailing Queensland economy from severe 
recession, the discovery of alluvial gold in Far North Queensland not only 
climaxed public optimism within Queensland itself but triggered a wave of 
inunigration and overseas investment, thereby setting the stage for the 
boom of the early 1880s.^ 
At a more philosophical level, Cooktown in the 1870s played a not 
insignificant role, together with other fi-ontier mining towns, in the 
development of a number of attitudes and beliefs which became pre-eminent 
in the ethos of later generations of Queenslanders. They included the 
willingness of individuals to set forth into the 'unknown' in pursuit of their 
fortune, the ideal of being one's own boss as opposed to being employed, the 
somewhat ambiguous attitudes towards mateship and individualism, the 
attitude towards Aborigines ranging from intolerance to outright hostility, 
the 'keep Australia white' attitude based upon beliefs of racial superiority 
and fears of living standards being undermined by cheap Chinese and 
Melanesian labour, and cjniicism regarding the willingness of the 
government to promote rural development in other than the pastoral 
industry. 
Given such impressive antecedents, the obvious question is what 
caused Cooktown's demise? The simple answer would seem to be that 
Cooktown's viability was inextricably linked to the viability of the Palmer 
River goldfields. Once the Palmer slid into decline from about late 1877 
onwards — as its alluvial deposits were worked out — Cooktown followed 
suit, having failed to diversify as a market outlet or processing or service 
centre for other industries or settlements.^"^ 
During its slide into decline, though, Cooktow^n did in fact continue 
to attract government funding for major public works expenditure, most 
notably on the ill-advised and ill-fated railway line to Laura. The reason for 
that continuing support would seem to be that successive governments in 
^ By the early 1880s, Queensland's popularity with British emigrants was such that 
the Agent General in London suspended free and assisted passages in order to 
accommodate persons prepared to pay their full fare: see T.A. Coghlan, Labour and 
industry in Australia, Vol. 3, Oxford University Press, London, 1918, p. 1295. 
^^ Cooktown's failure to diversify needs to be seen in the context of the region's 
exploitable economic potential, an issue addressed in Chapter 8. 
Brisbane allowed the hyperbole coming fi-om business and civic leaders in 
CooktowTi to cloud the reality of the town's tenuous raison d'etre. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that policy-makers and 
those controlling the purse-strings in Brisbane failed to detect the demise of 
the town until it was almost a fait accompli. Yet had Cooktown's demise 
been detected earlier, it might have saved much wasted expenditiu*e. At 
best, it may have resulted in funding in lieu for the establishment of an 
industry or service — if indeed one or more could have been identified — 
which offered Cooktown some better prospect of surviving in the longer 
term. 
An associated issue is why business and civic leaders in Cooktown 
continued to argue throughout the late 1870s and early 1880s that the 
town's longer-term prospects were linked to the goldfields and that the 
goldfields had a sustainable future. One explanation is that many of the 
early European settlers in Cooktown had no intention of staying for a long 
period but merely hoped to make their fortune before retiuning to the 
'civilised' parts of Queensland or the southern states. A number of them, 
however, would have found that prosperity brought with it a degree of social 
respectability considerably beyond that to which they could aspire in the 
south. They often remained, therefore, in frontier towns like Cooktown for 
many years, enjojdng their prosperity and providing the communal 
framework for ongoing urban development. 
Moreover, so long as the goldfields provided the lure, the 
continuing throughput of 'hopefuls' would have been sufficient to ensure the 
commercial viability of the 'persisters'. Once the Palmer slid into decline, 
however, and the flow of hopefuls dried up, the persisters — many of whom 
were service providers — would have been in financial straits. Their 
recourse, short of quitting the town was to talk up the prospects of the 
goldfields and to agitate for the accoutrements of 'civiHsed society, such as 
paved roads, bridges, botanical gardens, railways etc, on the perceived basis 
that such trappings would demonstrate to would-be hopefuls the longer-
term viability both of Cooktown and its hinterland. In retrospect, the better 
course for such ^boosters' would have been to identify and develop an 
alternative and long-term industry or service for the region. 
Both these issues — the h5T)erbole coming fi-om the town's 
business commiuiity and the apparent inability of successive governments 
to detect the imminent demise of Cooktown — are discussed later in this 
chapter luider the heading 'An Approach to the Study*. Firstly, though, it 
would seem useful to examine previous research material on early 
Cooktown and its surrounds. 
Previous Research on the Subject 
Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no comprehensive account 
written of the history of Cooktown. The nearest has been Holthouse's River 
of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, first published in 1967.^^ It 
provides a sensationalised (and often exaggerated) account of Cooktown in 
the 1870s, in the context of the town's role as the entry point and service 
centre for the Palmer River goldfields. Edwina Toohey^s more recent Kie 
daudai: notes and sketches from Cape York includes a chapter on early 
Cooktov^Ti, but is written somewhat superficially and without reference 
sources.12 The remaining material is a fi-agmentary, mosaic-like collection 
of primary and secondary works, ranging from the journals and reports of 
early white explorers to the studies published in recent years by James 
Cook University of North Queensland, primarily on early race relations in 
Far North Queensland. 
The Records of Early White Explorers 
The journals, diaries, reports and narratives of the early European 
explorers into the region might be considered by some to be source 
documents, rather than previous research. Most of them, however, in the 
literary traditions of the nineteenth century, provide more than a simple 
narration of progress or miuidane description of the terrain or flora and 
fauna. Indeed, most contain a wealth of observations which usefully 
establish some preliminary benchmarks for such issues as the role of 
explorers in opening up new 'frontiers', the role of government in the spread 
of European civilisation, early race relations, white attitudes towards the 
^^ H. Holthouse, River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1967. 
^^ E. Toohey, Kie daudai: notes and sketches from Cape York, E. Toohey, Ravenshoe, 
1994. 
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land and its resources, the nexus between explorers and settlers, and the 
effects on fines of communication imposed by distance and terrain. 
The various edited versions of Captain Cook's journal, for example, 
provide an authoritative accoiuit of the first recorded visit by whites to the 
Endeavour River, from 14 June to 4 August 1770.^^ During that time. Cook 
was understandably pre-occupied with the repairs to his ship, which had 
been seriously damaged after running agroiuid on the Great Barrier Reef. 
His entries for the period of his enforced stay at the Endeavoiu* River 
accordingly lack the careful description of local conditions and perceptive 
analysis tj^Dically foiuid elsewhere in his journals. Indeed, on several 
lifestyle issues in relation to the local Aboriginal inhabitants, it is evident 
that Cook 'got it wrong'. ^ "^  
Fortunately, Cook's somewhat scant accoimt is augmented by the 
more detailed observations of Joseph Banks. Banks obviously spent much 
of his forty-eight days at the Endeavour River ashore, either exploring the 
local countryside or venturing further afield, such as his brief expedition to 
Lizard Island (thirty kilometres off Cape Flattery to the north).^^ While 
most Australians would normally associate Banks with his botanical 
studies, his major contribution to the history of Far North Queensland was 
arguably his description and observations of the local Aborigines around the 
Endeavour River. Indeed, his comprehensive account of them takes up 
fifteen pages of Beaglehole's edited version of his journal and includes not 
only a rudimentary dictionary of the local dialect but some very useful 
observations on what was later to be recognised by anthropologists as the 
Aboriginal system of reciprocity. ^ ^ 
^ See, for example, J. Hawkes worth, An account of the voyages undertaken by order of 
his present Majesty for making discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, Vol. 4, 
Strahan and Cadell, London, 1783; J.C. Beaglehole (ed.). The journals of Captain 
James Cook on his voyages of discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1955 and A.W. Reed (ed.), Captain Cook in Australia, Reed, Sydney, 1969. 
^* These issues, the ability of mainland Aborigines to venture offshore in outrigger 
canoes and their utilisation of marine resources for food, are discussed further in 
Chapter 3 under the heading 'The Traditional Aboriginal Lifestyle'. 
^^ See J.C. Beaglehole (ed.). The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771, Vol. 
2, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1962. His observations in relation to mainland 
Aborigines having also visited Lizard Island are discussed in Chapter 3 under the 
heading The Traditional Aboriginal Lifestyle'. 
^^ See Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, pp. 122-37. 
In the follovdng 100 years, very Httle of direct relevance to 
Cooktown was published, simply because no-one visited the area for any 
length of time. Lieutenant Phillip King, in command of HM Cutter 
Mermaid, called at the Endeavour River from 28 June to 12 July 1819 and 
again on his return journey on 27 July 1819. The most notable aspect of his 
visits was a clash v^th local Aborigines over the issue of reciprocity on 2 
July 1819. '^^  Apart from his report of that clash, his journal entries contain 
little other useful material. 
The journals of the early land explorers into Cape York Peninsula 
— Ludwig Leichhardt in 1844-45, Edmund Kennedy in 1848 and the 
Jardine brothers in 1864-65 — similarly have little direct relevance to the 
Cooktown area, simply because their routes took them nowhere near the 
Endeavoiu* River. ^ ^ Their journals do, however, provide some very useful 
insights into a number of the more general issues mentioned beforehand 
(the role of explorers, the role of government, early race relations etc). 
Indeed, the observations in Leichhardt's journal, in particular, 
establish a niunber of useful benchmarks on white attitudes towards the 
land and early race relations.^^ They also reveal, inter alia, how changing 
intellectual fashions and the influence of colonial life in Australia had 
quickly eroded the ideas of 'noble savagery* which were fashionable in 
educated circles in England at the time of Cook's visit.^o 
Of more direct relevance to Cooktown are the joiu-nals and reports 
of the explorers and prospectors who ventured into the south-eastern 
quadrant of Cape York Peninsula in the early 1870s, following the discovery 
of gold at the Gilbert River. They included William Hann in early 1872 (to 
the Annan River, south of Cooktov^Ti, and its hinterland), James Venture 
Mulligan in June 1873 (to the Palmer River) and G.E. Dalrymple in 
•'•^  For an account of the incident, discussed further in Chapter 2 under the heading 
'Further Maritime Visitors', see R.L. Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 1, Robertson, 
Melbourne, 1922, p. 149. 
^^ Kennedy, who came closest, passed some 120 kilometres to the west: see Map 2.2 
The Routes of Early Land Explorers Into Far North Queensland' at page 51 in 
Chapter 2 under the heading 'The Early Land Explorers of Far North Queensland'. 
^^ See L. Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition in Australia, Boone, London, 
1847. 
This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 under the heading 'Stereotyping 
Aborigines as Black Savages'. 
m 
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September 1873 (from Cardwell by sea to the Endeavour River). All three 
are particularly useful for their observations on the terrain and their 
clashes with local Aborigines. 
On the issue of terrain, for example, there are evident 
contradictions between the favourable reports of sea-borne explorers, like 
Dalrjmiple, who saw the land from the security of their ship and recorded 
exotic descriptions of the tropical jungle, against the sombre reports of those 
— like Hann and Mulligan — who physically confronted the leeches, tree 
ants, sandflies and mosquitoes, while hacking their way through the same 
dense, dark, sodden tropical jungle.^^ 
On their clashes v^th local Aborigines, the common thread in all 
three is that racial confrontation and violence was an almost daily 
occiurence. Gone, it seems, was any suggestion that the two cultures could 
co-exist or, at least, that an encounter between Europeans and Aborigines 
could be resolved peacefully. Moreover, Dalrymple, in particular, seemed 
intent on portrajdng the Aborigines he encountered in pejorative, 
dehumanising terms, emphasising either their physical repulsiveness or 
their depraved, cannibalistic habits.^ The unstated conclusion is that an 
escalating cycle of racial conflict was well underway in Far North 
Queensland even before the first white settler stepped ashore at the future 
site of Cooktown in October 1873. 
The Reminiscences of Early White Visitors 
Once the township of Cooktown was established, a number of early 
visitors, officials and business-men committed to paper their experiences 
and recollections of life on the Far North Queensland frontier. Examples 
include Allen's A visit to Queensland and her goldfields;^^ Binnie's My life 
2^ See, for example, the lavish account of G.E. Dalrymple, 'Narrative and reports of 
the Queensland North-East Coast Expedition 1873', QVP, 2, 1874, p. 643 against 
the descriptions of a land explorer in J.V. Mulligan, 'Expedition in search of gold 
and other minerals in the Palmer districts by Mulligan and party', QVP, 1, 1876, 
pp. 3-4. 
^2 See, for example, Dalrymple, 'Narrative', pp. 633-4 describing the 'blood-thirsty, 
bullying scoundrels ... with the most ferocious expression of countenance ... [who 
engaged in the practice of] wholesale habitual cannibalism'. 
^^ See C.H. Allen, A visit to Queensland and her goldfields, Chapman and Hall, 
London, 1870. 
& 
on a tropic goldfield;'^^ Palmer's Early days in North Queensland;'^^ 
Corfield's Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-1899-^ and Hill's Forty-five 
years' experiences in North Queensland. 7^ 
Practically all of these contemporary accounts were written in a 
Boys Own journalistic style, usually emphasising in exaggerated and 
sensationalised terms the 'heroic' exploits of brave and hardy Europeans 
existing under great hardship and personal danger at the edges of white 
civilisation. Certainly, their tone was markedly different to the official 
reports of earlier white explorers, whose reporting style was usually one of 
modest understatement. 
The accounts of most early visitors were also largely seen from the 
racist and gender-biased perspective of a white male of nineteenth-century 
British background. Allen, for example, while noting that 'white suits are 
considered the correct thing in towns', went on to advise potential British 
visitors that 'flannel is far more healthy in hot climates than either linen or 
cotton [and] ... Crimean shirts are the best wear ... in the bush, where coat 
and vest are rarely seen'.^^ On the subject of Aborigines, Allen echoed the 
prevailing view in his assessment that 
no race of savages can be imagined more hideously 
ugly .... [Moreover] they have the very smallest 
intellectual development.^^ 
That is not meant to be unduly critical or dismissive of such 
contemporary accounts. In terms of their views on race relations, in 
particular, most were simply a product of their time. Moreover, behind the 
exaggerations and sensationalism, several of the reminiscence-style 
accounts provide some very useful insights into the European lifestyle in 
Cooktown, the routine of carriers on the Cooktown-Palmer track and the 
prevailing white view on race relations, both in relation to Aborigines and 
•^^  See J.H. Binnie, My life on a tropic goldfield, Penguin, Melbourne, 1944. 
^^ See E. Palmer, Early days in North Queensland, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1983. 
2^ SeeW.H. Corrie]d, Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-1899, Prater, Brisbane, 1921. 
2"^  See W.R.O. Hill, Forty-five years' experiences in North Queensland, Pole, Brisbane, 
1907. 
^° Allen, A visit to Queensland, p. 161. 
^^ Allen, A visit to Queensland, p. 181. 
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Chinese. Hill, in his capacity as a mining warden on the Palmer River 
goldfields, and Corfield, as a teamster on the Cooktown-Palmer track, also 
provide explanatory accounts of several otherwise hazy incidents which 
occurred in the Cooktown-Palmer area in the early 1870s.^^ 
The Studies by Anthropologists 
The first 'academic' research on early Cooktown and its surrounds 
was the series of studies conducted in the 1890s by the noted anthropologist 
Walter Edmond Roth (who in 1897 was appointed by the Government as the 
first Protector of Aborigines in Queensland). Operating from his base in 
Cooktown, Roth conducted a number of surveys of the Aboriginal groups 
living between the Daintree River to the south and Princess Charlotte Bay 
to the north. 
Interestingly, however, only one of the forty-odd research papers 
produced by Roth related to the Aborigines of Cooktown.^^ That presumably 
was a reflection of the reality that the tribal groups of the Cooktown area 
had by the 1890s been reduced to a pitiful remnant, numbering probably 
only several hundred, and not particularly representative of traditional 
Aboriginal society.32 Moreover, most of Roth's other research papers were 
extremely specialised, technical studies and of marginal interest to other 
than fellow anthropologists. Indeed, there is very little to be gleaned from a 
reading of Roth's publications of any relevance to the broader subject of 
early Cooktown.^^ 
Of greater use are the more general studies of anthropologists 
from the 1930s onwards. They include Davidson's A preliminary register of 
^^ Corfield's account of the killing by Aborigines of the Strau family in October 1874, 
for example, tends to refute the allegations that the woman and daughter were 
sexually abused by their killers: see the discussion on 'The Alleged Violation of 
White Women' in Chapter 3. 
^^ See W.E. Roth, The structure of the Koko-Yimidir language', North Queensland 
Ethnography, Bulletin No. 2, Brisbane, 1901. 
"^ The impact on Aboriginal society of'the coming of the white man' to the Cooktown 
area is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Roth's papers do not, for example, identify the local tribes of the Cooktown-Palmer 
River area. Rather, they concentrate on such specialised subjects as tribal totems, 
initiation rites, matriarchal linkages and dialect variations. 
SB 
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Australian tribes and hordes^ (1938), McConnel's 'Social organisation of the 
tribes of Cape York Peninsula'35 (1939-40), Craig's Cape York^^ (1967), 
Elkin's The Australian Aborigines^'^ (1974) and Tindale's A6orJ^t/iaZ Tribes 
of Australia^^ (1974). Together, those studies provide a reasonably 
comprehensive account of the Aborigines of the Cooktown-Palmer River 
area pre-1770, including the names of the tribal groups and certain clans, 
the delineation of tribal areas and a description of the traditional Aboriginal 
lifestyle. Certainly, the cited work of the anthropologists is extremely 
useful in appreciating how the original inhabitants of the area lived before 
the arrival of Europeans, as well as establishing a benchmark for the 
discussion and analysis of later race relations. 
The Recent ^Popular* Histories 
Mention has already been made of Holthouse's River of gold, 
published in 1967. To his credit the book is entertaining, easy to read and 
informative. It does contain, however, munerous accounts which are clearly 
exaggerated or sensationalised. There is, for example, no evidence to 
support Holthouse's assertion that 'hundreds of Chinese and whole tribes of 
blacks' were killed in racial violence in the Cooktown-Palmer River area in 
the 1870s.^^ Similarly, in the absence of footnotes, one is left to wonder 
where Holthouse derived his information on the boisterous nightlife of 
Cooktown, with his accoimts of'women ... ready to flash a silk-clad thigh or 
loosely-laced bosom in whatever direction the gold was drifting'.^o 
Glenville Pike has also written numerous accounts of the early 
history of Far North Queensland. Of relevance to CooktowTi are his 
publications on Queen of the north: a pictorial history of Cooktown and 
'^* See D.S. Davidson, A preliminary register of Australian tribes and hordes, American 
Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1938. 
®" See U.H. McConnel, 'Social organisation of the tribes of Cape York Peninsula' in 
Oceania, 10, 1, 1939, pp. 54-72 and 10, 4, 1940, pp. 434-55. 
See B.F. Craig, Cape York: occasional papers in Aboriginal studies Number 9, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra, 1967. 
^^ See A.P. Elkin, The Australian Aborigines, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1974. 
^^ See N.B. Tindale, Aboriginal tribes of Australia, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974. 
^^ Holthouse, River of gold, p. 36. This issue is discussed in more detail under the 
heading The Balance Sheet of Losses' in Chapter 3. 
*^ Holthouse, River of gold, p. 54. 
36 
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Cape York Peninsula^^ (1979), Queensland frontier^^ (1982), The last 
frontier^^ (1983), Cape York Peninsula, North Queensland: a guide and 
historical map'^ (1984) and Chasing the rainbow: the golden gullies of the 
Palmer^ (1993). Pike's work, however, has very little analytical content 
and consists largely of colourful (but luicritical) accounts drawn from a 
range of readily-av£dlable sources. Without wishing to denigrate the work 
of an obvious enthusiast, Pike's accounts — in the context of their value as 
previous research on the subject — are somewhat lightweight. 
Recent Serious Research 
In terms of providing sustainable interpretations on a number of 
the wider issues relevant to the early development of North Queensland, the 
more important recent studies include Geoffrey Bolton's A thousand miles 
away: a history of North Queensland to 1920^ (1963), Ray Evans' 
Exclusion, exploitation and extermination: race relations in colonial 
Queensland'^^ (1975 and 1993), and Geoffrey Blainey's The rush that never 
ended: a history of Australian mining'^ (1978). Two other important works, 
albeit with a neirrower focus, are Denis Murphjr's Prelude to power: the rise 
of the Labor Party to power in Queensland, 1815-1915^^ (1970) £ind Henry 
RejTiold's Race relations in North Queensland^ (1978). 
The James Cook University of North Queensland, located in 
Townsville, has also published a number of specialised studies on Far North 
^^ See G. Pike, Queen of the north: a pictorial history of Cooktown and Cape York 
Peninsula, Pinevale, Mareeba, 1979. 
*^ See G. Pike, Queensland frontier, Pinevale, Mareeba, 1982. 
*3 See G. Pike, The last frontier, Pinevale, Mareeba, 1983. 
^ See G. Pike, Cape York Peninsula, North Queensland: a guide and historical map, 
Pinevale, Mareeba, 1984. 
^^ See G. Pike, Chasing the rainbow: the golden gullies of the Palmer, Pinevale, 
Mareeba, 1993. 
*^ See G.C. Bolton, A thousand miles away: a history of North Queensland to 1920, 
Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1963. 
'*' See R.L. Evans et al, Exclusion, exploitation and extermination: race relations in 
colonial Queensland, ANZ Book Company, Sydney, 1975 (and the 1993 edition). 
*° See G. Blainey, The rush that never ended: a history of Australian mining, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1978. 
*^ D. Murphy et al, Prelude to power: the rise of the Labor Party to power in 
Queensland, 1815-1915, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1980. 
'** See H. Reynolds (ed.). Race relations in North Queensland, James Cook University, 
Townsville, 1978. 
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Queensland concentrating, in particular, on mining and early race relations. 
In addition to Reynold's Race relations in North Queensland, they include 
the foiu- general series o^Lectures on North Queensland history^^ and Kett 
Kenned/s Readings in North Queensland mining history.^'^ Within those 
publications are the noteworthy contributions on race relations by Henry 
Reynolds, Noel Loos, Cathie May and Noreen Kirkman.^^ 
A number of very useful academic theses, of relevance to Cooktown 
and its surrounds, have also been written over the past decade or so, with 
several subsequently published. They include Bamett's 'A study of the 
Queensland Native Mounted Police in the 1870s',5'* Bell's 'Housing and 
mining settlement in North Queensland 1861-1920',^^ Browni's 'A history of 
the Gilbert River goldfield 1869-1874',56 Famfield's 'George Elphinstone 
Dalrymple - his life and times in Queensland 1859-74',^'' Lewis' 'A history of 
the ports of Queensland 1859-1939',^^ Stoodley's 'The Queensland goldminer 
in the late nineteenth century: his influence and interests'^^ and Wegner's 
'The Etheridge: a study of the history of the Etheridge shire and goldfield 
1875-1960'.60 
^^ See Lectures on North Queensland history, 1st series, James Cook University of 
North Queensland, Townsville, 1974 (and 2nd series 1975, 3rd series 1978 and 4th 
series 1984). 
^ See K.H. Kennedy (ed.), Readings in North Queensland mining history. Vol. 1, 
James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 1980 (and Vol. 2, 1982). 
^ Reynolds and Loos, in particular, have other important publications in H. Reynolds, 
The other side of the frontier: Aboriginal resistance to the European invasion of 
Australia, Penguin, Ringwood, 1982 and N.A. Loos, Invasion and resistance, ANU 
Press, Canberra, 1982. 
^4 S. Bamett, 'A Study of the Queensland Native Mounted Police in the 1870s', BA 
(Hons) thesis, University of Queensland, 1975. 
^ P. Bell, 'Houses and mining settlement in North Queensland 1861-1920', PhD 
thesis, James Cook University, 1982. 
^ R.B. Brown, 'A history of the Gilbert River goldfield 1869-1874', BA (Hons) thesis, 
James Cook University, 1974. 
®' D.J. Farnfield, 'George Elphinstone Dalrymple - his life and times in Queensland 
1859-74', PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 1968. Since published as 
J. Farnfield, Frontiersman: a biography of G.E. Dalrymple, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 1968. 
^ G. Lewis, 'A history of the ports of Queensland 1859-1939: a study in Australiein 
economic nationalism', PhD thesis, University of Queensland, 1971. Since 
published as G. Lewis, A history of the ports of Queensland, Queensland University 
Press, Brisbane, 1973. 
J. Stoodley, The Queensland goldminer in the late nineteenth century: his 
influence and interests', MA thesis, University of Queensland, 1964. 
J. Wegner, 'The Etheridge: a study of the history of the Etheridge shire and 
goldfield 1875-1960', BA/BEd (Hons) thesis, James Cook University, 1980. Since 
published as J. Wegner, The Etheridge, James Cook University, Townsville, 1990. 
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What emerges from the preceding paragraphs is that 
notwithstanding the voliune of recent research material on Far North 
Queensland, very httle has been vmtten on the development of Cooktown 
itself or on the strategic relationship between Cooktov^oi and the Palmer 
River goldfields. Yet in its composite form, the literature on Far North 
Queensland reveals that a number of the themes of regional, Queensland 
and national history have been assumed to fit the Cooktown experience. 
It seems useful, therefore, to identify and discuss those themes 
wdth a view to establishing where, in reality, the history of Cooktown 
challenges the current interpretations on, for example, urbanisation, 
mining, race relations and the development of a Queensland or national 
ethos. It could also be expected that additional interpretations would 
emerge fi-om a detailed study of Cooktown — such as the earlier discussion 
on the failure of the town to diversify — which might have v^der 
significance elsewhere. 
The Traditional Interpretations 
There is, of course, no definitive list of either the narrower or 
wider interpretations which traditionally have been applied to Cooktown. 
At least fifteen general interpretations seem obvious, which can be grouped 
for the purposes of discussion under the broad headings of early race 
relations in Far North Queensland, the raison d'etre of a frontier mining 
town, the process of small town urbanisation, the role of mining towns in 
the wdder development of Queensland, the issue of Chinese immigration, the 
development of a Queensland or national ethos and the structiu^al viability 
of coastal towns in Queensland. 
Early Race Relations 
One interpretation or traditional assiunption has been that the 
physical environment in the vicinity of the Endeavour River landing was 
pristine and largely untouched by Europeans prior to the arrival of the 
15 
expedition of Howard St George and A.C. Macmillan in late October 1873.^1 
The corollary has been that racial violence in the Cooktown-Palmer River 
area began with the influx of Eiu"opean settlers to Cooktown and was 
exacerbated by the passage of white and Chinese miners to the Palmer 
River goldfields. Cilento's account of racial conflict in the area, for example, 
begins with the statement that *[t]he first party of miners who set out fi-om 
Cooktown were ambushed by blacks'.^^ 
The obvious weakness in this interpretation is that it overlooks the 
deleterious role of early white explorers in 'setting the stage' for later race 
relations. It also takes insufiicient account of the ongoing exploitation of 
Aborigines in the beche-de-mer industry, which began at least a decade 
before the arrival of the first white settlers at the Endeavour River.^ 
A second interpretation has been that racial conflict in the 
Cooktown-Palmer area was more violent, and with an Aboriginal response 
more purposeful, than arguably anywhere else in Australia.^^ While the 
assertion itself undoubtedly has some basis, the reasons for it are less 
developed. One early explanation was advanced by the explorer Dalrymple, 
who suggested that the ^blood-thirsty bullying scoundrels' he clashed with 
may have come originally from the same ethnic stock as their more warlike 
Pol3Tiesian and Papuan neighbours.^^ 
More recently. Loos has suggested that it was the terrain of the 
dense tropical rainforest to the east of the Great Dividing Range which 
facilitated Aboriginal resistance, by providing a refuge against the superior 
technology and political organisation of the white invaders.^ A further 
explanation would seem to relate to the imusually long period of 
"•^  The Cooktown Herald, for example, maintained that 'we have it on record that the 
only actual pioneers who landed after Captain Cook were ... Messrs Howard 
St George ... and Macmillan': see CHPRA, 28 October 1876, p. 2. 
See R. Cilento, Triumph in the tropics, Smith and Paterson, Brisbane, 1959, p. 203. 
Other reports suggest that it was whites who initiated this particular clash: see 
The Arrival of Miners and Settlers' in Chapter 3. 
For an account of the exploitation of Aborigines on the sea frontier, see Loos, 
Invasion and resistance. Chapter 5, pp. 118-59. 
®^  See N. Loos, 'A chapter of contact: Aboriginal-European relations in North 
Queensland 1606-1992' in Reynolds, Race relations, p. 8 and Reynolds, The other 
side of the frontier, p. 198. 
^^ See Dalrymple, 'Narrative', p. 631. 
See Loos, 'A chapter of contact', pp. 16-7. 
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intermittent contact between Europeans and Aborigines in the Cooktov^oi-
Palmer area, which spanned close to 100 years, and which may have led the 
local Aborigines to believe that they were able to keep out the white 
'invaders'. 
A third traditional interpretation has been that the number of 
Aborigines, Europeans and Chinese killed in racial conflict in the area 
totalled many hundreds, if not thousands. Mention has already been made 
of Holthouse's assertion of'hundreds of Chinese and whole tribes of blacks' 
being killed. Cilento similarly claims that 'the blacks killed every white 
man they trapped ... [whilel miners and packers shot every black on sight'.^'^ 
Cilento also asserts that 
[tlhousands of... [Chinese] were killed and eaten by 
the ferocious myalls of the Palmer, whose epiciu-ean 
taste considered them equal to the choicest bandicoot.^^ 
Intuitively, such versions of racial conflict in the Cooktown-Palmer 
area seem grossly exaggerated. Certainly, there is very little evidence to 
support Holthouse's assertion of 'hundreds of Chinese' being killed by 
Aborigines.^9 There is also no convincing account of a single European or 
Chinese miner or carrier being eaten by Aborigines in the Cooktown-Palmer 
area.70 The challenge in refuting such claims is being able to quantify a 
more plausible account of the losses sustained by both sides, particularly in 
the 'frontier' years of the 1870s. 
The Raison D'etre of a Frontier Mining Town 
A fourth interpretation has been that the township of Cooktown 
was established, on the instructions of the authorities in Brisbane, as the 
69 
^^ Cilento, Triumph in the tropics, p. 203. 
^^ Cilento, Triumph in the tropics, p. 203. Somewhat more conservatively, Holthouse 
asserts that 'hundreds [of Chinese] were eaten': see Holthouse, River of gold, p. 94. 
A detailed study by Loos, for example, put the number of Chinese killed between 
1873 and 1880 at ten confirmed, five probable and a further seven possible: see 
Loos, Invasion and resistance. Appendix B 'Settlers and their employees reportedly 
killed as a result of Aboriginal resistance in North Queensland between 1861 and 
1897', pp. 194-247, although Loos concedes that there undoubtedly were more 
unrecorded deaths. 
See E.G. Heap, 'Some notes on cannibalism among Queensland Aborigines, 1824-
1900' in Queensland Heritage, 1, 7, November 1967, p. 27. 
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service centre and market outlet for the Palmer River goldfields.^^ The 
corollary is that the townspeople of Cooktown could then have reasonably 
expected an equitable share of government funding and other resources, 
especially in the formative years of the town. 
An alternative view is that the Government initially saw 
Cooktown as a temporary resupply port for the Palmer River goldfields with 
its raison d'etre being primarily to avoid an embarrassing repeat of what 
had occurred at the Canoona gold rush, in the Port Curtis district, in 1858.^ ^^ 
If that interpretation is correct, the Government had probably given no 
particular thought — or financial conunitment — to the longer-term future 
of the settlement, nor would it have been particularly inclined to do so in 
the months that followed. 
A fifth traditional interpretation has been the associated view 
that Cooktov^n's inability to attract its 'fair share' of resoiu'ces was largely a 
reflection of the unvdllingness of successive governments in Brisbane to 
promote rural regional development.''^ Certainly, in the early to mid 1870s, 
the issue was a driving force behind the movement calling for the separation 
of North Queensland, vdth its lively debate over which of the coastal towns 
should become the 'capital of the north'.74 
The unresolved question is whether the authorities in Brisbane 
were really biased against rural development. Was it rather that successive 
^1 Bailliere's Guide of 1876, for example, described Cooktown as 'the seaport... [and] 
centre ... [for] alluvial gold mining ... at Normanby ... and the Palmer': see R.P. 
Whitworth (ed.), Bailliere's Queensland gazetteer and road guide, Bailliere, 
Brisbane, 1876, p. 52. 
^* At Canoona, thousands of would-be miners, who had rushed to the district on the 
strength of exaggerated reports of an otherwise modest gold discovery, were left in 
desperate straits when their money and rations ran out: see J.F. Hogan, The 
Gladstone colony: an unwritten chapter of Australian history, Brooks, Sydney, 
1987, p. 125. 
^^ See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Herald bemoaning that '[t]he 
government have done nothing for us; they have retarded rather than assisted the 
progress of the town': CiiPilA, 25 November 1874, p. 2. Earlier at Gympie, the 
attitude of the government similarly appeared to be that development was up to 
individual enterprise and self-help: see W.R. Johnston, The call of the land: a 
history of Queensland to the present day, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1982, p. 78. 
^* See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 17 October 1874, p. 2. See also the 
editorial of 9 December 1874 accusing the government of being '[p]rofuse in 
promises ... when such expenditure is to be made in the South': CHPRA, 
9 December 1874, p. 2. 
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governments were simply cjniical as to the longer-term viabiUty of frontier 
mining towns, having already experienced the demise of Gilberton and its 
associated fields, and the earUer exhaustion of the goldfields at Moimt 
Wyatt, near Bowen, and Cape River, near TownsviUe?''^ 
The Process of Small Town Urbanisation 
A sixth interpretation has been that Cooktovvni started life as a 
fledgling township, with A.C. Macmillan advising the Secretary for Works 
on 30 October 1873 that 'I have chosen the immediate neighbourhood of 
Captain Cook's landing for the TovvTiship'.^ ^ The reasonable assumption 
would be that Cooktown would then have acquired, over the ensuing 
months, a reasonable array of government representation and services, and 
that its growth would have been in broad conformity with the physical 
patterns of urbanisation elsewhere. 
Early descriptions of the settlement, however, indicate that official 
representation related primarily to the collection of customs revenue 
through the port.^^ Moreover, the physical configuration of the township 
was very linear, with a single main street — lined with businesses — 
stretching from the vicinity of the harbour southwards along the track 
towards the Palmer River.^s Although Cooktown was not unique in this 
regard, the obvious question is whether a single street, catering primarily 
for the needs of would-be miners and visitors from the goldfields, was a 
viable configuration for an aspiring business community, in terms of the 
necessary interfaces between the wharf area, wholesale and retail outlets, 
the tertiary services, government services, local residents and the passing 
trade. 
'^ Note also that on several occasions in the 1870s, public expenditure on facilities in 
North Queensland was opposed by southern interests on the grounds that it would 
only benefit the Chinese: see C.R. May, 'Chinese-European relations in Cairns 
during the 1890s' in Lectures on North Queensland history, 3rd series, James Cook 
University, Townsville, 1978, p. 160. 
'^ AC. Macmillan to the Secretary for Works, despatch 30 October 1873, in-letter 
4598/73 of 1873, WOR/A74, Queensland State Archives (QSA). 
See, for example, the editorial of 25 November 1874 accusing the government of 
being '[a]nxious only to collect the revenue of the port': CHPRA, 25 November 1874, 
p. 2. 
See the description that 'Cooktown consists of one long irregular street stretching 
from the government reserve for about half-a-mile': The Brisbane Courier, 
27 February 1874, p. 3. 
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A seventh traditional interpretation has been that the early 
settlers in Cooktown attempted to replicate urban infrastructure and 
building design fi-om their home villages and towns in the United Kingdom. 
Stephens, for example, notes in his account of the early history of Cooktown 
'the adoption of English customs including a town crier ... [andl stone 
pitching, curbing and channelling, another Enghsh practice'.''^ Similarly, 
Bell has asserted that 'the natiu-e of housing [in North Queensland] was 
determined by the origins of the immigrant population .... [while] adaption 
to the physical environment was a secondary concern'.^ 
Any number of photographs of early Cooktown, however, show a 
distinctly Australian house-form in many of the buildings, that is, timber-
framed, weatherboard-clad structures with an iron roof.^ ^ Moreover, the 
prevalence of verandahs and the use of stiunps to raise buildings above 
ground level would tend to indicate that adaptation to the physical 
environment, in Cooktown anyway, was perhaps more common than Bell's 
conclusion may suggest. In relation to the use of stone for road-works, the 
question would seem to be whether the local authorities were slavishly 
copying British practices, or simply making good use of a readily-available 
local resource. 
The Wider Role of Mining Towns 
An eighth interpretation has been that the discovery of alluvial 
gold at the Palmer River was an important factor in attracting population 
both to Far North Queensland and to Queensland as a whole in the 1870s 
and early 1880s.^2 An editorial in The Brisbane Courier in January 1874, 
for example, noted that 
the chief benefit the colony derives is ... the ultimate 
certainty that gold in the north of Queensland ... 
^^ S.E. Stephens, 'The Endeavour River and Cooktown', Queensland Heritage, 2, 2, 
May 1970, p. 24. 
Bell, 'Houses and mining settlement', p. iii. 
For a discussion of the Australian house-form in North Queensland, see R. Sumner, 
'Pioneer homesteads of North Queensland' in Lectures on North Queensland history, 
1st series, James Cook University, Townsville, 1974, pp. 47-62. 
°^ See, for example, Holthouse, River of gold, pp. 1-2. 
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will prove the first attraction ... [to a] population ... 
[that will eventually] settle downi to other pursuits 
and promote the permanent settlement of the country. ^ ^ 
Official statistics show that the population of Queensland 
increased rapidly from 125,000 in 1871 to aroimd 180,000 in 1875, and then 
to 226,000 by 1880.^ Moreover, close to 60 per cent of the new arrivals 
between 1874 and 1880 were from overseas, as opposed to arrivals fi-om 
other Australian colonies.^ The importance of the discovery of gold in 
attracting immigrants, though, probably should not be overstated and needs 
to be seen in the context of the Queensland Government's active program of 
assisted immigration and other inducements already in operation across the 
period.^ 
It is also not particularly clear, from the traditional interpretation, 
as to the place of origin of new settlers to Cooktown and would-be miners 
bound for the Palmer. It is conventional wisdom that most of the Chinese in 
Far North Queensland came directly from Hong Kong or Canton. But how 
many Chinese came also fi-om other Australian colonies or from an 
indentured work-place elsewhere? Similarly, how many of Cooktown's 
residents came from elsewhere in Queensland or from other Australian 
colonies, against direct arrivals from overseas? Conversely, how long did 
most people stay in Cooktown and where did they move to when they 
departed? 
A ninth and associated interpretation, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, has been that the discovery of gold in Far North Queensland 
fuelled public optimism and contributed significantly to the economic 
development of Queensland into the 1880s.^'' Less developed is the extent to 
^3 The Brisbane Courier, 29 January 1874, p. 3. 
®^  See reports of the Registrar-General in QVP, 2, 1874, p. 7; QVP, 2, 1876, p. 376 and 
QVP, 1, 1881, p. 873. 
^^ Immigrants comprised 79,736 of the overall population increase of 133, 551 between 
1874 and 1880: see the discussion by Coghlan, Labour and industry in Australia, 
p. 1294. 
See, for example, Johnston, The call of the land, p. 90 and J.C.R. Camm, 'The hunt 
for muscle and bone: emigration agents and their role in migration to Queensland 
during the 1880s\ Australian Historical Geography Bulletin, February 1981, 
pp. 7-29. 
°' See, for example, Laverty, The Queensland economy', p. 30. 
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which the discovery of gold was successful in attracting investment capital 
to Cooktown and the Palmer River (and Hodgkinson) goldfields. 
Between 1875 and 1880, for example, the value of mining 
equipment in Far North Queensland increased fi-om £5000 to £70,500.^ Yet 
civic leaders in Cooktown spent much of their time at pubhc meetings in the 
late 1870s blaming the imminent demise of the goldfields on the lack of 
investment capital.^^ The obvious question is why were Cooktown and the 
Palmer able to trigger an investment boom but were themselves unable to 
access the spoils? Was it because of the lack of investment, or the absence 
of readily-discoverable reef gold and other exploitable resources? 
The Issue of Chinese Immigration 
A tenth traditional interpretation has been that the 20,000 or 
more Chinese miners who flooded into the goldfields of Far North 
Queensland between 1874 and 1877 not only rapidly denuded the region of 
its alluvial gold but took back to China the bulk of the gold they won, with 
little or no return to the people or government of Queensland.^^ An editorial 
in The Cooktown Herald of May 1876, for example, complained that the 
Chinese 
enjoy all the rights and privileges of the European 
... supplied at the expense of the State ... [but they] 
then return to their native land, vdthout having in 
the least contributed to the benefit of the country, 
fi-om which they have obtained such tangible benefits.^^ 
The assiunption behind this interpretation would seem to be that 
almost all the costs associated with the production of gold by Chinese 
miners were also in the hands of Chinese financiers or businessmen. Yet 
Chinese businessmen would obviously have paid customs duties on goods 
^ See, QVP, 2, 1876, p. 713 and QVP, 1, 1885, p. 1085. 
°® See, for example, the report of the public meeting of 30 April 1879 in The Cooktown 
Courier, 3 May 1879, p. 2 and the editorial of 24 December 1879 asserting that 
'[clapital and labour are alone required to develope [sic] this district in all its 
importance': The Cooktown Courier, 24 December 1879, p. 2. 
See, for example, Holthouse, River of gold, p. 140 asserting that gold valued at 
£400,000 went to China in 1876-77 and that 'the amount smuggled out... must have 
been much more'. 
^1 CHPRA, 17 May 1876, p. 2. 
00 
22 
imported from China, while Chinese miners would have paid hcence fees. 
Nevertheless, there has been very little research done on the arrangements 
for the shipping of would-be Chinese miners to Cooktown, on their initial 
provisioning or on their subsequent maintenance and resupply whilst at the 
goldfields. How extensive (and influential in civic affairs), for example, 
were the Chinese business commimities in Cooktown and at the Palmer, 
and to what extent did the Chinese actively engage in the carrying trade 
between the two centres? 
There is also the inference in the interpretation that if the Chinese 
had been excluded from Far North Queensland, a lesser niunber of 
European miners could have gained remunerative employment on the 
goldfields for many more years, thereby prolonging the commercial viability 
of Cooktown.92 The rejoinder would be that the Chinese were generally not 
interested in prospecting but concentrated their efforts on alluvial workings 
discarded by European miners in their pursuit of richer fields.^-^ Whether or 
not European miners would have been prepared to re-work alluvial deposits 
for a second, third or even fourth time — as were the Chinese — is a moot 
point. 
An eleventh interpretation has been that the anti-Chinese 
sentiment which evolved in Cooktown (and other northern tovvms) during 
the 1870s and early 1880s was an important factor in the development of 
unionism and union attitudes in Queensland, as well as in Australia's post-
Federation restrictive inunigration policy.^^ When a number of Chinese 
immigrants arrived in Cooktown in July 1874, they were cautiously 
welcomed with one of the local newspapers asserting that 'we are pleased to 
see [these] new arrivals'.^^ gy i^te 1876, the public image of the Chinese 
®^  This line of reasoning appeared frequently in contemporary discussions of Chinese 
immigration to Queensland: see, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Herald 
of May 1877 discussing the 'immense tract of land on the Palmer, which would for 
years have supported a large European mining population': CHPRA, 9 May 1877, 
p. 2. 
^^ See the editorial in The Cooktown Herald of July 1875 noting that the Chinese were 
proving 'particularly successful at such of our goldfields as are partly worked out 
and reckoned too poor to pay the labour of the European': CHPRA, 17 July 1875, 
p. 2. 
* On the issue of the perceived threat to living and labour standards of white 
Australians, see Johnston, The call of the land, pp. 70-4. 
CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 5. S5 
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had tarnished, with a local newspaper vociferous in its criticism of'the evil-
smelhng fi-agment of a Chinese back slum ... [a] haunt of foetid vice'.^^ 
It would seem, however, that the view of Cooktown's business 
community was more ambivalent. The reality that the Chinese t3T)ically 
worked long and difficult hours for far less remuneration than Europeans 
was clearly seen as a threat to the standsird of living of white AustraUans.^^ 
The perception, though, that the 'depression [in Cooktov^n] has increased 
three-fold since the final check was given to Chinese immigration' led The 
Cooktown Courier to ponder 'whether in so strongly advocating its total 
cessation we did not virtually cut a rod for our own backs'.^^ In that respect, 
there would appear to be some unanswered questions over the importance of 
the Chinese to the commercial viability of Cooktown. 
The Development of a Queensland or National Ethos 
A twelfth interpretation has been that the early settlers to 
Cooktown epitomised the pioneering spirit of Australia, with their readiness 
to sally forth into the dangers and hardships of the 'unknown' in pursuit of a 
better lifestyle and, hopefully, their fortune.^^ Less dear is how many of the 
early settlers had any intention of stajdng for any length of time, unlike on 
the pastoral fi-ontier where settlers frequently pltmned to establish a family 
home and remain indefinitely. A number of the would-be settlers 
embarking from Brisbane on board the SS Lord Ashley on 16 January 1874, 
for example, were small storekeepers 'who have migrated with their effects, 
in the hope of making a "pile" ',^ ^^ suggesting perhaps that their aim was a 
quick profit rather than any thought of actually 'settling'. 
The associated issue was the contemporary perception that 
Europeans were not well suited to either residence or physical labour in the 
tropics and that 'imported' labour was usually necessary for menial and 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 20 December 1876, p. 2. 
®" See, for example, the address of B.P. Palmer, candidate for the Cook electorate, to a 
business group in Cooktown on 23 October 1878, as reported in the single-page 
supplement to The Cooktown Courier, 26 October 1878. 
The Cooktown Courier, 19 April 1879, p. 2. 
See, for example. The Brisbane Courier, 17 January 1874, p. 4 describing a group 
about to embark for the Endeavour River as 'adventurers'. 
The Brisbane Courier, 17 January 1874, p. 4. 
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physically-demanding tasks.^^^ It was grudgingly perceived by the early 
white settlers, therefore, that the Chinese were better suited to the climate 
than they, adding another dimension to the anti-Chinese sentiment 
discussed previously.^^^ Moreover, the widely-held view that Europeans 
could only live in the tropics for short periods before returning to cooler 
climates to recuperate would seem to add further ambiguity to the popular 
view of'hardy pioneers'. ^ ^^  
A thirteenth traditional interpretation has been that most of the 
early European business-people in Cooktov^m, as well as white miners, 
operated as individuals or perhaps in psirtnership with one other. ^ ^^  The 
reasons for it are less clear. The popular notion is that the practice derived 
from the evolving ethos of being one's own boss, as opposed to being 
employed. '^^ ^ The consequence was that individuals were usually unable to 
attract the capital, or the economies of scale, necessary to operate 
successfully either as a more permanent miner on the Palmer or a medium-
size business-person in Cooktown. It does seem, therefore, that more 
research could usefully be done on the issue. 
The Structural Viability of Coastal Towns 
A fourteenth interpretation has been that those who profited 
most from the discovery of gold at the Palmer River were not the 
prospectors or miners but those engaged in the service industries — the 
storekeepers, the publicans and the carriers operating both at Cooktown 
and on the goldfields themselves.^^ Indeed, the carrying trade was so 
^^^ See, for example, R.W. Cilento, The white settlement of tropical Australia' in P.D. 
Phillips and G.L. Wood (eds.). The peopling of Australia, Macmillan, Melbourne, 
1928, pp. 229-30, who added that 'any white children [produced] would be sickly, 
frail and sterile'. 
^^ See CHPRA, 12 September 1877, p. 2, advocating the employment of'coloured' 
labour to construct railways and sugar, cotton, coffee and tea plantations in the 
north. 
1^ 3 See Cilento, 'The white settlement', pp. 229-30. 
^^^ See, for example, the description of miners at the Palmer operating alone or in 
small groups in N. Kirkman, 'The Palmer River goldfield' in K.H. Kennedy (ed.). 
Readings in North Queensland mining history, Vol. 1, James Cook University, 
Townsville, 1980, p. 115. 
"® See, for example, A. Trollope, Australia and New Zealand, George Robertson, 
Melbourne, 1873, p. 53 discussing the same issue in relation to Gympie. 
^^^ See, for example, Allen, A visit to Queensland, pp. 132-3. 
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lucrative, peaking at £200 per ton on February 1874, that Corfield noted 
that it was not unusual to see ex-station managers, police inspectors and 
even retired naval officers engaged in the trade.i^'' 
No serious attempt seems to have been made, however, to quantify 
the annual turnover of the carrying trade and retail outlets in Cooktown, for 
example, or to identify the number of individuals or firms involved in the 
various service industries. How much profit, for example, was a bullock-
team plying the route between Cooktovsni and the Palmer River likely to 
have made in the years 1874-78? Similarly, how many European and 
Chinese wholesale and retail traders were operating in Cooktown across the 
same years? Furthermore, and importantly, how critical were the service 
industries to the structural viabihty of CooktovvTi? 
A fifteenth and final traditional interpretation — as discussed 
earlier in this chapter — has been that CooktowTi's viability was 
inextricably linked to the viabihty of the Palmer River goldfields and that 
once the Palmer slid into decline, Cooktown followed suit. The undeveloped 
issues are why civic and business leaders in the tov^ni continued to talk up 
the prospects of the Palmer and why Cooktown fsdled to diversify as a 
market outlet or processing or service centre for other industries or 
settlements. 
The Available Sources 
Before considering the approach to the study, it also seems useful 
to identify and discuss the available sources, in addition to those already 
mentioned in the context of previous research material. For the purposes of 
discussion, they can be grouped under archival records; parliamentary 
papers; government publications and other official records; newspapers; 
maps, photographs and plans; other primary source material; and the 
physical environment and surviving artefacts. 
^"' Corfield, Reminiscences of Queensland, p. 70. 
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Archival Records 
In an informal address to the Brisbane History Group several 
years ago, attended by the writer, the Queensland State Archivist suggested 
that historians should establish the availability of source material in the 
very early stages of any intended study. She then went on to counsel 
against any serious research of Far North Queensland, on the basis that 
many of the early records have either been lost or damaged by the vagaries 
of the tropical climate. 
A detailed search of records at the Queensland State Archives 
repository, however, has revealed that most of the Brisbane-originated 
primary source materials in relation to Cooktown have survived, as have a 
reasonable number of records from Cooktown itself The complete range of 
correspondence between early administrators in Cooktown and both the 
Colonial Secretary's office and the Department of Works, for example, is 
readily available, as is the correspondence to and from the Treasury, Lands, 
Police, Customs and Education Departments. 
A considerable array of other material is also available, including 
electoral rolls, early local authority records of the Cook Shire Council, the 
records of the Clerk of the Court of Petty Sessions (offences, licences and 
registrations), school registers, petitions to the Colonial Secretary, customs 
records of all incoming and outgoing cargo, and registers of the sale of crown 
lands by public auction. Shipping passenger lists, providing details of those 
who arrived in Cooktown from England and Europe, are also available from 
1881 onwards. The difficulty in the shipping records is with immigrants 
from China, who were not listed by name and, of course, in differentiating 
between new arrivals destined for the goldfields and those intent on settling 
in Cooktown. 
In a more general sense, the problem with the available archival 
records is that the material is too detailed for a broad-ranging study of an 
urban centre such as Cooktown. Indeed, the challenge in researching 
archival material for this study has been to avoid becoming too embroiled in 
detail or spending an inordinate amount of time in pursuit of a relatively 
trivial issue. 
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Parliamentary Papers 
Probably one of the most useful sources for this study has proved 
to be the annual Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of 
Queensland [QVP] '. Copies of QVP for the period 1873-85 are available at 
most university libraries, the larger state public libraries and the National 
Library in Canberra. They contain such legislative matters as the daily 
business of parliament, notices of motions and orders of the day, reports of 
divisions in committee, petitions received and reports of committees. They 
also contain the annual reports of all major Queensland government 
departments, the yearly 'blue books' of official statistics, details of annual 
government expenditure and forecasts, and official census data. 
They also contain the findings of royal commissions and other 
official inquiries and investigations, as well as the reports of government-
sponsored geological and exploratory expeditions. The one difficulty 
encountered is that much of the annual statistical data is recorded by 
electoral or police district, rather than by urban centre. While it is easy, 
therefore, to find the population of the Cook district in 1875 or the amount 
spent each year on roads and bridges, it is often nigh on impossible to 
ascertain from QVP the same information for Cooktown itself. 
Another readily-available source is the Queensland Parliamentary 
Debates [QPD]. They are a verbatim record of parliamentary proceedings, 
on a year-by-year basis, and consist primarily of the numerous speeches 
associated with the passage of proposed legislation. They have been of only 
limited value to this study, principally because any parliamentary remark 
of consequence was typically reported on by Cooktown or Brisbane 
newspapers with a more useful commentary than that contained in the 
debate. 
Government Publications and Other Official Records 
Another important and readily-available source is the Queensland 
Government Gazettes for the period. They contain, for example, the names 
of individuals, by town, issued with licences to trade as a business, to deal 
in the sale of spirits, to operate a billiard room or to conduct government 
auctions. They also contain details of individuals. 
£im 
again by town, registered as medical practitioners, or holding official or civic 
appointments, ranging from the police magistrate or superintendent of the 
tov^ni's fire brigade to trustees of the local cemetery. 
Usefully, the Government Gazettes also contain details of all 
official tenders advertised and let (notably for public works and buildings), 
as well as the half-yearly financial statements for all municipalities and 
councils. They also provide information on the gazettal of reserves, stock 
routes, quarantine stations etc, as well as details of procl£imations and 
district or municipal regulations. When synthesised, the information v^dthin 
Government Gazettes can contribute significantly towards an understanding 
of the civic framework within a particular urban centre. 
Another potentially valuable official source, unfortunately not 
easily accessed, are the registers of births, deaths and marriages fi-om the 
period. Somewhat surprisingly, these have survived in good condition in 
hard-copy form and are located in the office of the Clerk of the Court in 
Cooktown. Under existing privacy guidelines, however, their custodian 
refuses to allow general access to them, notwdthstEinding that none of the 
individuals involved (nor probably any of their children) could be alive today 
to be concerned by their release.^^^ 
Newspapers 
The two local newspapers, from the period. The Cooktown Courier 
and The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser, both produced their 
first editions in March 1874. The Cooktown Courier continued to publish on 
a weekly or bi-weekly basis across the period although, inexplicably, there is 
a gap in the surviving coverage between December 1879 and January 1888. 
The Cooktown Herald ceased publication in December 1877. Those gaps 
aside, microfilm copies of most issues of both newspapers are available, at 
^^^ It is, of course, possible to obtain copies of a particular registration item upon 
payment of a fee. If the registers were Commonwealth records, however, any 
researcher could probably obtain unrestricted access to them, given that most 
personal records are released after 30 years, while even the most sensitive personal 
information (under section 33(l)(g) of the Archives Act) would normally be released 
after 100 years: see guidelines on the 'unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs' 
in the Australian Archives Access Manual: Part 1 Access Policy, Australian 
Archives, Canberra, 1984, p. 1BI5.11. 
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least, at the John Oxley Library in Brisbane, the James Cook University in 
Townsville amd the National Library in Canberra. 
Both newspapers are an invaluable source of information on the 
early years of Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields. Their editorials, 
often presenting opposing views, provide a reasonably balanced view on a 
range of topical issues, while most editions contained at least one page of 
current news, being a combination of factual snippets, social gossip and 
excerpts fi-om newspapers elsewhere. Shipping arrivals and departures 
were typically included, with a number of editions also recording the details 
of inward cargo manifests. The several pages devoted to advertisements 
also provide useful information on the number and diversity of businesses 
operating in the town, as well as an indication of the range and price of 
goods and services typically available. 
Both newspapers also provided a reasonably comprehensive 
coverage of civic affairs, ranging from an often verbatim account of public 
meetings and civic receptions to a 'social pages' type account of spring balls, 
race regattas, church fetes and school award nights. The common criticism 
of newspapers as a historical source — that they are not necessarily 
representative of the subject population — certainly applied to Cooktown in 
that the Chinese community, in particular, typically rated barely a mention. 
In addition to the local publications, there were of course a range 
of other regional and Queensland-wide newspapers in circulation at the 
time. The Brisbane Courier, in particular, is a very useful source for 
coverage of the early days of Far North Queensland and, especially, for the 
six months or so prior to the first local editions. The Cleveland Bay Express, 
published in Townsville, also has some useful reports fi-om one of its 
correspondents who visited Cooktown and the Palmer River in October and 
November 1873. 
Maps, Photographs and Plans 
Given the readiness of officials in early Queensland to document 
their particular circumstances, it is perhaps surprising that more maps of 
early Cooktown are not in existence. The only surviving maps from the 
period (as opposed to drawings and diagrams in support of letters and 
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petitions) seem to be the two compiled by the Survey Branch of the Lands 
Department in 1878 and by the Surveyor-General's office in 1885.^^ 
The usefulness of such maps is that they show the physical layout 
and dimensions of the town at a particular point in time. The 1878 map 
also shows, for example, the location of the main government offices and the 
outline of residential and business allotments, as well as the names of 
individual title holders. The 1885 map, which is larger-scale, shows the 
environs of Cooktov^m south to the Annan River. It illustrates that the town 
had almost doubled in size since 1878 and that by 1885 Cooktown also had a 
cemetery, race-course, railway reserve, quarantine station and rifle range. 
Fortunately, there are hterally hundreds of photographs of early 
Cooktown still in existence. The History Department of the James Cook 
University at Townsville holds an extensive collection, as does the John 
Oxley Library in Brisbane. In their composite form, they illustrate such 
matters as street-scapes, architectural styles, building materials, the 
condition of roads and side-walks, types of transport, wharf and stevedoring 
facilities, clothing styles and forms of entertainment. Their main limitation 
is the frequent lack of accompanying explanation and date. 
There is also a reasonable collection of plans still in existence of 
early pubhc buildings and works in Cooktown. They include, for example, 
plans prepared by the Department of Works for the construction of primary 
school buildings^^'^ and by the Hydraulic Engineer's Department for a town 
water supply.^^^ Some of the plans are useful in the context of drawing 
more general conclusions about construction materials or the 
appropriateness of building designs to the climate of Far North Queensland. 
Most of them, however, are too detailed to be of much use in a broad urban 
study. 
^^^ Copies are held at the Queensland State Archives: see map, Town of Cooktown, 
County of Banks, District of Cook, Survey Branch, Lands Department, 1878, 
A/9236, QSA and map, Environs of Cooktown, Survey Office, Brisbane, 1885, N3, 
QSA 
110 See Works Department, Plans, Cooktown State School, PD 95.21-23, QSA. 
m See 'Cooktown Water Supply Report' of 4 December 1884 in QVP, 3, 1884, p. 861. 
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Other Primary Source Material 
Most of the primary source material has already been mentioned 
in the context of previous research. There is, in addition, a number of 
Queensland-wide almanacs and directories which provide some useful 
detail. Pugh's Almanac, for example, contains an annu£d diary of key events 
for the previous year, as well as a listing by name of government officials in 
each town.112 pggt Office Directories, only available fi-om 1883/84 onweirds, 
provide an annual listing by town of key government officials and prominent 
business-men and-women,ii3 while Bailliere's Queensland Gazetteer 
provides a brief description of early Cooktown, including its geography and 
main businesses.^i^ 
A considerable range of primary source material is also available 
in Cooktown itself. As mentioned aheady, most of the early records 
associated with the shire and miuiicipal council have been transferred to the 
State Archives. The local historical society, however, has preserved a good 
collection of'memorabilia' from early Cooktown including documents, 
photographs and ephemeral artefacts. The James Cook Historical Museum 
also houses a similar but more comprehensive collection, spanning from pre-
1873 to the present. 
Because the period in question, 1873-85, is well beyond living 
memory, oral interviews have not been pursued as an available source 
option, notwithstanding that some historians would assert that the 
experiences of the past can still be reached through succeeding 
generations.1^^ It is accepted that oral data, when collected systematically 
and focused on specific rese£irch questions, can contribute vital information 
that otherwise would not have been obtainable. Taking into account, 
however, the reasonable availabihty of other source materigJ — and the 
112 The most detailed for Cooktown across the period 1874-85 is the 1878 edition: see 
Pugh's Queensland almanac, law calendar, directory, coast guide and gazetteer, 
Thorne, Brisbane, 1878. 
11^ See Queensland Post Office Directory, Wise, Watson and Ferguson, Brisbane, 
1883/84. 
11"* See, for example, Bailliere's Queensland gazetteer, 1876, p. 52. 
See, for example, J. Bodnar, Workers' world: township, community and protest in 
an industrial society, 1900-1940, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1982, 
p. 8 and his assertion that experiences back to the 1880s can still be reached 
through the reminiscences of succeeding generations. 
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reality that people often sentimentEdise the idea of community in the past — 
oral history sources have not been pursued. 
The Physical Environment and Surviving Artefacts 
Finally, it is axiomatic that Cooktown today is itself a source in 
terms of the physical environment which existed in the 1870s. The weather, 
the harbour, the terrain, the physical layout of the town, the location of the 
court-house, police station, hospital, school, and cemetery, for example, are 
as they were 120 years ago. Because of a combination of climate, cyclones, 
fires and the process of time, however, very few artefacts have survived. 
Perhaps ironically, the only relics identifiable as such are the headstones in 
the Cooktown cemetery.^^^ 
An Approach to the Study 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the central theme of this 
study is the demise of Cooktown in the late 1870s and the associated issues 
of why the town failed to diversify, why successive governments in Brisbane 
failed to detect the decline until it was almost a fait accompli and why 
business and civic leaders in Cooktown continued to 'talk up' the town's 
prospects. In deciding how best to approach those questions, several issues 
of methodology are deserving of discussion. 
Urban, Social or Local History? 
Whether the study should be considered urban history, social 
history or local history is probably a moot point. Since antiquity, writers 
have been recording the happenings vrithin towns and cities, and the 
historical development of individual urban centres. Many of these 'urban 
biographies' present masses of carefully assembled facts which, for the 
modern historian, provide significant insights into general themes of urban 
11° Monumental inscriptions and the burial register form the basis of a very useful 
recent study by the Cairns District History Society: see Cook Shire burial register 
to 1920 and monumental inscriptions to 1986, Cairns and District Family History 
Society, Cairns, 1989. 
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development.il'' As urban histories, however, they fi-equently lack the 
interpretative framework needed for understanding social change.n^ 
The paradox is that the importance of social change vrithin urban 
communities has often meant that the history of towns and cities has 
become a more important field of study for sociologists than for 
historians.11^ Yet many of the studies by sociologists — vrith their focus on 
the problems rather than the processes of urbanisation — are 'case' or 
'impact' studies, with the city merely the location for the study^s central 
concern and with the urban environment playing no dynamic part.i^o 
Indeed, although some historians would argue that such studies 
are a legitimate form of urban history, the majority view would be that case 
or impact studies are more usually relevant to mainstream historical 
studies, given that the topics addressed should not be 'conveniently isolated 
as the pathology of modern city life'.^^i Certainly, it would seem that urban 
history should be about the study of urbanisation as a process, relating 'the 
configurations of individual communities to ongoing changes that have been 
reshaping societ}^.^^^ A modern viewpoint is that 
urban history is not... merely the sum of its 
constituent parts — cultural, physical, organisa-
tional and behavioural — but more accurately an 
analysis of their interaction in a unique spatial 
setting. 1^ 
11^ See, for example, C.N. Glaab and AT. Brown, A history of urban America, 
Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 60. They also form the basis for much of our 
specific knowledge of cities': L.H. Lees, The challenge of political change: urban 
history in the 1990s', Urban History, 21, 1, April 1994, p. 9. 
11° See R. Lubove, 'The urbanisation process: an approach to historical research' in 
AB. Callow (ed.), American urban history, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1969, p. 643. 
11® J.R. Laverty, The urban revolution. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1978, 
p. 3. 
1^^ See D. Fraser and A Sutcliffe (eds.). The pursuit of urban history, Edward Arnold, 
London, 1983, Preface p. xxi. 
121 g g Lampard, The dimensions of urban history: a footnote to the "urban 
crisis" ', Pacific Historical Review, 34, 3, August 1970, pp. 262-4 and Lubove, The 
urbanisation process', p. 642. 
1^^ See E.E. Lampard, 'Urbanisation and social change: on broadening the scope and 
relevance of urban history' in 0. Handlin and J. Burchard (eds). The historian and 
the city, MIT Press and Harvard University Press, Cambridge (US), 1963, p. 233. 
R. Rodger, 'Urban history: prospect and retrospect' in Urban History, 19, 1, April 
1992, p. 9. 
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On that basis, this study of Cooktown — which includes an 
analysis of the formation of a community, as well as the impact of new 
arrivals on community structure and organisation — should probably be 
seen as a detailed case study of the process of urban formation at the micro-
level. At the same time, it is also a local history, in terms of Weston Bate's 
definition, in that it presents 
a general history of the locahty ... [while demonstrating 
the extent to which] individuals fit a distinct pattern, 
which in turn forms part of a state or national pattern 
of events. ^ 2"* 
A Window in Time 
Obviously, in line with Bate's definition of a study encompassing 'a 
general history of the locality', there may be some who would argue that the 
timefi-ame of this study — 1873 to 1885 — both overlooks significant 
developments in later years and presents a very narrow perspective of the 
'total' history of Cooktown. The counter-argument is that a comprehensive 
history of Cooktown from pre-1770 to the present day would normally be 
beyond any single scholar, or else the analysis would be extremely 
shallow. ^ 25 
There may also be some who would argue that a generation of 
about twenty years is the optimum period over which to analyse the process 
of change vrithin a community and that significant change is unlikely to 
have occurred in Cooktown vrithin the twelve years between late 1873 and 
1885.126 The counter to that argument is that the 'rise and faU' of Cooktown 
was largely fixed at both ends of the time-fi-ame in question by two events 
— the discovery of gold at the Palmer River in 1873 and the completion of 
the ill-fated railway line to Laura in 1885. Moreover, because Cooktown 
only began its existence in 1873, the process of change thereafter was 
almost exclusively influenced by events from that date onwards. 
124 W.A. Bate, 'Review article'. Historical Studies, 14, 54, 1970, pp. 312-3. 
1^^ See the discussion in H.J. Dyos, 'Agenda for urb£in histories' in H.J. Dyos (ed.). The 
study of urban history, Edward Arnold, London, 1968, pp. 6-9. 
12^ See, for example, P. Dawson, 'The community as an object of history', Journal of 
Social History, 6, 1972-73, pp. 344-58 arguing that the ideal community history 
shows changing relations over a long period of time. 
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Analysing the Community 
One of the most significant changes in the scope of historical 
studies in the last two or three decades has been the shift of interest from 
the individual to the commimity.^^^ In part, the shift, has been due to the 
introduction of quantitative techniques, which have enabled historians to 
discover the 'conunon folk' — the vast majority of the population who have 
left no written records of their lives.128 The difficulty in using this 'bottom-
up' approach for a study of Cooktown, or indeed nineteenth century 
Australia in general, is the paucity of information on the poor and working 
classes, as well as the absence of census enumerator sources in Australia.^^9 
There is, for example, very little detailed information available on 
the thousands of would-be miners who passed through Cooktown on their 
way to the goldfields. Even those who stayed in Cooktown, working as 
labourers or in semi-skilled positions, are rarely recorded by name. 
Similarly, the thousands of Chinese who flooded into Far North Queensland 
via Cooktown rate barely a mention as individuals. The small number of 
Chinese who became successful business-men and -women are occasionally 
mentioned in directories, newspapers and the registers of the Court of Petty 
Sessions. But females, children and Aborigines might well have not existed. 
The other consideration is that even when material on the poor and working 
classes is available, a 'bottom up' approach may be using information drawn 
from middle-class sources and reflecting middle-class bias, rather than the 
views of those actually being portrayed. 
An alternative is a 'top down' approach concentrating on the 
wealthy and privileged of Cooktov^Ti society. One of the advantages of this 
12'^  See, for example, the discussion in J. Tosh, The pursuit of history, Longman, 
London, 1984, p. 78. 
118 YoT a critique of this approach see P.N. Stearns, Towards a wider vision: trends in 
social history* in M. Kammen (ed.). The past before us, Cornell University Press, 
London, 1980, pp. 205-30. See also B. Bailyn, The challenge of modem 
historiography, American Historical Review, 87, 1982, pp. 2-4 and, T. Bender, 
'Wholes and parts: the need for synthesis in American history'. Journal of 
American History, 73, 1986, pp. 120-35. 
1*^ It was the availability of census source materials in the United States which was 
largely responsible for the emergence of'quantitative' history, notably by Stephan 
Themstrom. 
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approach is that it would deal with the influential elements of the 
community — the decision makers and those who influenced decisions. 
Moreover, material on the elite is generally readily available in a variety of 
forms, across a broad spectrum of data. The obvious disadvantage of a 'top 
down' approach would be that it reflects an extremely narrow perspective 
and portrays only a limited 'slice' of the community. Moreover, the view of 
the elite would rarely have been the view of the broad masses of society. 
Another approach would be the study of Cooktown through its 
institutions. This could involve analysing the role that institutions, such as 
the church, played in the development of the community. Other possibilities 
would be the primary school, the hospital, community or youth 
organisations, charitable institutions or the local government authority. 
The advantage of this approach is that it would encompass both the elite 
and the mass of society. The disadvantage would be that an institutionsJ 
approach is limited in its perspective and could give undue influence to the 
role of the particular institution in the development of the community. 
Yet another approach would be to concentrate on a particular 
minority group. This could be the study of a racial minority, such as the 
Aborigines, Chinese or Irish. Or it could concentrate on a thematic 
grouping, such as women, the poor, the homeless, the unemployed or a 
particular employment category. The advantage of this approach would be 
that it presents a perspective of the community usually quite different to 
that reflected in more traditional historical studies.i'^^ The obvious 
disadvantage would be that it results, by definition, in a view of the 
community which was treated, at least, as peripheral to that of mainstream 
society. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion would seem to be 
that no single approach is likely to provide a baleinced perspective of the 
Cooktown community. The preferable option, it would seem, would be to 
utilise a combination of approaches, best able to ensure a comprehensive 
overview of early society in Cooktown, and to avoid the obvious extremes. 
130 Australian history has tended to be pre-occupied with decidedly male themes -
mateship, nationalism, labour history etc: see M. Tucker, "Women in Australian 
history'. Historical Studies, 17, 1977, pp. 399-407. 
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The Presentation of Findings 
Amateur historians have written some excellent accounts of local 
history in Queensland. The majority of community-based studies, though, 
have been written by academic historians, with most substantive works 
deriving fi-om dissertations. The dilemma facing academic historians is how 
to present their analysis in a form that will appeal to a wider audience than 
simply other historians working in the same field.^^^ 
Problems of 'readability' are particularly evident in studies 
concentrating on theoretical approaches and those relying heavily on 
quantitative analysis. At the other end of the scale are light-weight 
narratives, often full of interesting anecdotes but lacking an analytical 
framework.^32 Moreover, while the narrative-type local histories may be 
read vrith interest by people vrith close links to the particular community in 
question, they usually have little appeal to a wider readership. The 
challenge, therefore, is how best 
to convey the complexity of a particular town ... 
[to] several layers of readership ... ranging from 
the academically elitist to the coffee table casual.^^3 
One method is the use of narrative — providing a pen picture of 
a slice in time — and describing events and places as a contemporary and 
thoughtfiil observer would have described them.^34 Understandably, this 
form of presentation holds great appeal for lay readers (because its mode of 
cognition approximates the reality of everyday life), particularly when they 
are local residents. ^ ^^  Moreover, urban biographies not only provide 'the 
empirical bedrock for ... [more detailed] analyses' but 
enrich the historical awareness of urban communities 
... [and stimulate] contemporary interest in the 
l^ l^ See Bailjm, The challenge of modem historiography", pp. 1-24 arguing that the 
challenge is how to put the story into a readable account of major developments. 
1§2 Weston Bate in 'The good old cause in local history', Historical Studies, 11, 41, 1963, 
p. 120 refers to such studies as 'undigested reminiscences and lists of names'. 
133 Rodger, 'Urban history', pp. 6-7. 
im -pj^ jg approach can also be termed 'retrospective ethnography*: see C. Tilly, The old 
new social history and the new old social history'. Review, 7, 1984, p. 380. 
13^ See J. Henretta, 'Social history as lived and written', American Historical Review, 
84, 1979, p. 1319. 
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heritage industry .. [by] deepening conmiunity aware-
ness of local history and urban culture.^•^^ 
Notvrithstanding their evident value, the lack of analysis in 
narrative-t3TDe studies and their typical emphasis on the unique rather than 
the common elements in repetitive events often limits their usefulness. An 
alternative is the use of quantitative methodology. In this context, 
'quantitative' relates to an approach based almost exclusively on the 
analytical interpretation of statistical data, supplemented by quantitative 
source materials, such as tables and figures. 
Quantification is certainly a useful means of organising data in 
order to highlight the vital questions needing analysis but it does not, m 
itself, provide the answers. ^ ^^  Quantitative analysis does, however, make it 
possible to connect individual experience with large social processes more 
clearly than ever before.^^ There is, of course, a real danger of quantitative 
historians 'failing to see the woods for the trees' and of becoming so 
engrossed in a maze of details that their findings become meaningless (and 
immensely boring) to the non-specialist reader. 
Another concern is that quantification encourages the notion that 
the basic components of social life are objective and statistically verifiable, 
and that analyses of social structure can be restricted to their objective 
determinants, reduced or derived from material facts and processes.^^^ But 
statistics alone, of course, cannot recreate the ambience and atmosphere of 
people and places from the past. Nor can quantitative analysis interpret 
the mass of data available — that task remains the raison d'etre of the 
modern historian. 
The preferred option, therefore, seems to be a balanced 
combination of narrative and quantitative methodology. A narrative or 
descriptive prose could be used to illustrate the interpretative 
136 Rodger, 'Urban history', pp. 7-8. Lees similarly contends 'a healthy scepticism 
about generalisations not anchored in detailed studies': Lees, 'The challenge of 
political change', p. 10. 
•^3' Stearns, The past before us, p. 227. 
1S8 Tilly, 'The old new social history', p. 394. 
See L. Stone, 'History and the social sciences in the twentieth century' in C.F. 
Delzell (ed.), The future of History, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1977, 
pp. 1-42. 
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generalisations derived from quantitative analysis and to evoke a spirit of 
place and a feeling for the identity of the conmiunity. 
The Structure of the Study 
One of the fundamental issues in deciding how best to structure 
any study is whether to adopt a chronological or thematic approach. 
Intuitively, it would seem that histories spanning a half century or more are 
best handled chronologically, while studies over one of two decades suit a 
thematic approach. A brief perusal of a number of recent Australian local 
history publications suggests that there is no hard and fast rule and that 
the choice very much depends on the subject (and the author). 
The two basic options, therefore, appear to be a chronological 
structure, with themes dealt with on a chapter-by-chapter basis, or a 
thematic structure, with the themes developed separately and 
chronologically. The problem vrith the first option is theme continuity; the 
problem with the second is the relationship between the themes. 
For this study, either option would seem workable. Given, 
however, the need to address in more detail the traditional interpretations 
discussed earlier in the chapter, it seems sensible to structure the study 
along similarly thematic lines, culminating in a discussion of the central 
theme and associated issues. In outline, therefore, the study consists of an 
introductory and concluding chapter (each of around 10,000 words) and six 
main chapters, based thematically around the traditional interpretations 
(each of around 12,500 words). 
Chapter 1 The Study of a Frontier Town obviously introduces the 
study and its central theme, discusses previous research on the subject, 
outlines the traditional interpretations, identifies the available sources, 
discusses certain methodological issues of approach and structure, and 
places the study in its historigraphical context. 
Chapter 2 An Uncertain Beginning deals primarily with the 
tenuous raison d'etre of Cooktown as a frontier mining town. It also 
provides a brief description of the physical and geographic features of the 
region, as well as 'setting the scene' historically for the remaining chapters. 
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Chapter 3 The Coming of the White Man addresses the issue of 
early race relations, primarily between Europeans and Aborigines. It 
refutes some of the more fanciful accounts of early race relations, including 
those relating to the cannibalism of Chinese and the alleged violation of 
white women by Aborigines. More importantly, it addresses the underljdng 
reasons for Aboriginal resistance to 'the coming of the white man'. 
Chapter 4 Tent City to Town deals with the process of small town 
urbanisation, including the development of Cooktown's business community 
and the commercial nexus between the town and the Palmer River 
goldfields. It also discusses the largely unrecorded part played by 
Cooktown's Chinese community in its transformation from tent city to town. 
Chapter 5 A Frontier Community is about the social formation of 
the Cooktown community. It addresses the composition, origins and 
aspirations of Cooktown's early settlers and their subsequent social and 
occupational mobility, as well as the extent of civic involvement. 
Chapter 6 Small Town in a Large Colony examines the role of 
Cooktown, as a frontier mining town, in the wider development of 
Queensland. It addresses the economic importance of Cooktown, the 
development of local government, the town's economic links to its hinterland 
and the rest of Queensland, and the town's success or otherwise in 
attracting an equitable share of government expenditure. 
Chapter 7 Boom to Bust traces the shifting focus of Cooktown's 
business and civic leaders through the mid 1870s to the early 1880s. It 
addresses the important issue of Chinese inmiigration, and the attempts 
made to diversify the Cooktown economy. 
Chapter 8 Conclusions draws together the strands of the study and 
details the extent to which Cooktown fits the current and traditional 
interpretations of national, Queensland and regional history. It also 
identifies a number of additional interpretations which might have wider 
significance elsewhere. Finally, it summarises the issues relating to the 
demise of Cooktown in the late 1870s and draws a number of conclusions on 
the central theme of this study. 
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The Study in its Historiographical Context 
Whether this study is an urban, social or local history it was 
addressed earlier under 'An Approach to the Study'. The concluding point 
made in that discussion was that any analysis of the general history of a 
locality needs also to take account of the wider regional, state or national 
pattern of events. That reflects the prevailing view in Australian 
historiography that lu-ban and regional history should not be regarded as 
two separate sub-disciplines but that 
[t]he history of a city may best be understood if 
it is studied within the context of its hinterland 
and region.140 
A common criticism of many single-town studies in the 1960s and 
1970s has been that while they well demonstrated the variety and 
complexity of urban development, they seemingly failed to appreciate that 
the growth of a country town is largely determined by the size and nature of 
its rural hinterland and by its competitive relationship with other urban 
centres. ^ "^^ S. Priestley's studies ofEchuca (1965) and Warracknabeal 
(1967), for example, were good single-town studies, but were basically 
'urban biographies',^'^^ Similarly, studies such as Buxton's The Riverina 
1861-1891 (1967) and Walker's Old England Town (1966) provided 
comprehensive coverage of the townns, but tended to overlook the critical 
relationship between the town and its hinterland. 
A second view, not exclusive of the first, is that historians should 
consider a comparative social morphology of Australian cities and towns, 
developing a model of towns grouped on the basis of their main industries 
and vrith further sub-divisions defined by characteristics within the group; 
1'^ ^ See J.R. Laverty, The study of city and regional history in Australia', Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 41, Special Issue, 1995, p. 111. 
1^ 1 See J.W. McCarty, 'Australian regional history'. Historical Studies, 18, 70, 1978-79, 
p. 102. 
142 They do, of course, provide most useful secondary source material for regional 
historians. 
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mining towns, for example, could be one 'group', sub-divided into gold towns, 
base metal or coal towns £ind so on.^ '*^ 
According to McCarty, such a morphology would then enable 
comparative studies to be conducted, for example, of Ballarat, Broken Hill, 
Mt Lyell and Newcastle, each of which has already been the subject of a 
local history study.i'*^ His concern is that unless local and regional 
historians progressively adapt their historiography to this sort of approach, 
a continuing replication of urban biographies vrill lead to a situation of 
diminishing returns and eventual stagnation.!'*^ 
The past several years have also seen some move back towards 
what could be termed 'popular' histories. In part, the move has reflected a 
rejection by the reading public of histories which have become too academic. 
The incoming president of the American Historical Association in 1990, for 
example, noted in his introductory address that 
history ... [has] lost much of its audience and much of its 
touch with common hiunan experience by going academic 
... and divorcing itself from the everyday realities that 
history is supposed to explain. ^  46 
In part also, the demand for 'popular' histories is a reflection of the 
resurgence of interest by the wider community in heritage issues and a 
growing public awareness and interest generally in the past.i47 Alan 
Atkinson's study of Camden (1988), for example, while certainly no light-
weight popular history, capitalised on the longstanding public interest in 
the history of early New South Wales and the exploits of John Macarthur 
and his family.^^s The Australian bi-centenary celebrations of 1988 
similarly stimulated considerable public interest in the formative years of 
1"*^  J.W. McCarty, 'Melbourne, Ballarat, Sydney, Perth: the new city histories'. 
Historical Studies, 19, 74, April 1980, pp. 13-4. The relationship between mining 
towns is addressed, for example, by J.R. Laverty 'Urban development' in W.H. 
Richmond and P.C. Sharma (eds.), Mining and Australia, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia, 1983, pp. 119-49. 
14"* McCarty, 'Melbourne, Ballarat etc', pp. 13-4. 
A similar point on the need to undertake synthesis on some of the work already 
done is made by Bender, 'Wholes and parts', pp. 120-36. 
1*" L.R. Harlan, "The future of the American Historical Association' in American 
Historical Review, 95, 1, February 1990, p. 2. 
See, for example, Rodger, 'Urban history", pp. 7-8. 
A. Atkinson, Camden, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988. 
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the coxuitry. Moreover, that interest seems likely to intensify in the years 
ahead, especially in the lead-up to the centenary anniversary of federation 
and with the increasing political and public debate over the issue of 
Australian republicanism. 
The Place of this Study 
Obviously, it is not being suggested that this study will make any 
major impact on Australian historiography, given that its approach and 
methodology represent only evolutionary advances. Indeed, its focus on a 
small Queensland town, in a temporal setting 120 years ago, should 
superficially consign it to relative obsciuity. 
The attempt has been made, however, to present the study in a 
style which will make it of interest, in due course, to more people than just 
the present residents of Cooktown or those with a direct interest in its past. 
Moreover, by analysing the history of the demise of early Cooktown in the 
context of its relationship with the Palmer, and agfdnst a number of current 
and traditional interpretations of regional and Queensland history, the 
study will hopefully attract the attention of a vrider readership than just 
those interested in Far North Queensland. 
It is also hoped that the study's use of quantitative analysis will 
provide some benchmarks which may prove useful not only in better 
understanding certain of the traditional interpretations, but also in 
facihtating comparative analyses with mining towns elsewhere in 
Queensland and Australia. In summary, the study has been researched and 
written bearing in mind that 
the challenge for historians is to make expficit the 
links that they see between macro- and micro-levels 
of analysis.1'*^ 
•  Lees, The challenge of political change', p. 13. 
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CHAPTER 2 - AN UNCERTAIN BEGINNING 
Cooktown has the probably unique distinction for an Australian 
town of being established at a site which visitor after early visitor rejected as 
unsuitable for white settlement. Its first recorded white visitor. Captain 
James Cook, noted in his journal on 19 Jime 1770 that 
the adjacent country ... afforded but a very indifferent 
prospect [vrith] the Low lands near the River all over 
nui with Mangroves ... and the high land ... barren 
and Stoney.i 
Almost a century later, John Jardine (then police magistrate at 
Somerset) reported to the Colonial Secretary, in response to instructions to 
investigate the suitability of the Endeavoiu* River for a township, that lack of 
fresh water would pose serious hardship to any settlement.^ In 1872, 
William Hann, leader of a government-sponsored exploration party reported 
to Parliament that 
the Endeavour does not hold out prospects for settlement 
... there is nothing on it but its beauty ... that would induce 
anyone to come.^ 
Given such adverse reports, it is hardly surprising that Cooktown's 
raison d'etre had little to do with the suitability of its site for settlement, or of 
the inunediate region to sustain a township. Indeed, Cooktown (or Cook's 
Town as it was first known) was established at a landing on the Endeavour 
River on 25 October 1873, by a party of government officials, primarily for the 
purpose of providing resupply access from the coast to the newly-discovered 
Palmer River goldfields, largely via the route marked out by William Hann 
and his party in September/October 1872.^ 
1 A.W. Reed ed.. Captain Cook in Australia, Reed, Sydney, 1969, pp. 85-6. 
® John Jardine to Colonial Secretary, 10 October 1865, in-letter 3221 of 1865, COL/A73, 
Queensland State Archives (QSA). 
® Report from Mr W. Hann, Leader of the Northern Exploration Party, 20 December 
1872 in Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 
1873, p. 1057; Hann was mistakenly describing the Annan River estuary, eight 
kilometres south of the Endeavour. 
* Had the settlement been established in reverse order, that is, by a party from the 
Palmer retracing Hann's route to the coast, it is possible that Cooktown could have 
been established on the Annan River, rather than on the Endeavour River. 
m 
That raison d'etre resulted in a precarious early existence for the 
fledgling settlement, as monsoonal rains cut the road link between 
Cooktown and the Palmer from mid-February to mid-March 1874 and as 
vested interests pressured the Government to consider alternative points of 
access to the Palmer, including Weary Bay (some forty kilometres south of 
Cooktown), Cardwell, Cairns and Townsville. Those issues, as well as a 
brief discussion of Cooktown in its geophysical and historical contexts, are 
the subject of this chapter. 
Significantly, though, Cooktown's economic and communications 
linkages to the Palmer River goldfields also meant that the town's long-term 
viability, in the absence of alternative linkages or local developments, was 
heavily dependent upon the continuing economic viability of the Palmer. 
Later chapters examine the extent to which civic and business leaders in 
Cooktown accordingly 'talked up' the prospects of both the Palmer and 
Cooktown, and the point at which both effectively slid into decline. 
The Geography of the Region 
Cooktown lies on the eastern coast of Far North Queensland, some 
600 kilometres from the northernmost tip of Cape York Peninsula (see Map 
2.1 on page 46). It is 170 kilometres north of Cairns (as the crow flies) and 
some 1600 kilometres north of Brisbane — which is slightly further than the 
distance by air from Brisbane to Melbourne. By sea or air, it is 700 
kilometres from Cooktown to Port Moresby, the capital of Papua New 
Guinea. 
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Map 2.1 - Far North Queensland 
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The major geographic featiu'e of the region is the Great Dividing 
Range, which roughly parallels the eastern coast fi*om Cairns in the south 
to Somerset in the north. The Range rises to over 1500 metres in the 
Bellenden Ker Range, south of Cairns, dropping to aroimd 1000 metres west 
of Cooktown and then gradually falling away to the north. Offshore, the 
Great Barrier Reef similarly parallels the eastern coast. It is rarely more 
than fifty kilometres offshore between Cairns and Cape Melville, cind 
presents a considerable obstacle and threat to coastal shipping.^ 
To the west of the Great Dividing Range, a series of river systems 
drain into the Gulf of Carpentaria. Notable are the Gilbert and Einasleigh, 
the Staaten (or Staten) and the Mitchell and Palmer. Their combined nui-
ofifinto the Gulf in the wet season is reputedly equal to that of all the other 
rivers in Australia combined. In the wet season, creeks in the upper 
reaches are frequently transformed into raging, impassable torrents while 
on the coastal plains, rivers spread for tens of kilometres, inundating vast 
expanses of the peninsula. 
To the east of the Great Dividing Range are generally a series of 
narrow, often fertile, coastal plains. The exception is the area between 
Mossman and Princess Charlotte Bay to the north. That area, which 
includes Cooktown, consists of a series of rugged coastal ranges, 
interspersed about the extensive reaches of the Kennedy and Normanby 
Rivers (which drain into Princess Charlotte Bay) and the lesser coastal 
rivers, which include the Endeavour, Annan and Daintree. Early explorers 
through the area were often limited by the rugged terrain to under ten 
kilometres of progress per day. William Hann, for example, covered some 
sixty-five kilometres in five days while follovmig the watercourse of Oakey 
Creek towards the coast; but fi-om there to the south, towEirds Weary Bay, he 
managed only twenty kilometres in six days.^ 
6 
Captain Cook's ship HM Bark Endeavour ran aground on the later-named 
Endeavour Reef, some sixty kilometres southeast of Cooktown: see Reed, Captain 
Cook, p. 80. 
Details taken from Map Sheet No. 1 of Hann, 'Report...', pp. 1031-74. 
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The Climate of the Region 
The climate along the eastern coastal fringe of Far North 
Queensland is hot and wet in summer (November to April) and mild and 
dry in winter (May to October)."^ Mean daily summer temperatures in 
Cooktown range between a minimiun of 240C and a maximiun of Sl^C in 
January, with winter mean temperatures in July generally between a 
minimum of 15^C and a maximum of 25^C.^ Temperatures fiu'ther inland 
are generally several degrees hotter by day and correspondingly cooler by 
night. On the Palmer River, for example, mean winter temperatures range 
from lO^C to SO^C, with mean summer temperatxu-es from 20^0 to 40^0. 
The actual mean monthly temperature readings for Cooktown for 1880 are 
shown at Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 - Mean Temperature and Rainfall Readings: Cooktown 1880 
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Sources: Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2, 1881, p. 1154. 
7 
8 
The abihty or otherwise of the early white residents in Cooktown to cope with the 
northern climate is discussed in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community'. 
Data taken from Bureau of Meterology, Climatic averages: Queensland, 
Australian Government Pubhshin^ Service (AGPS), Canberra, 1975. 
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As can be seen from Figure 2.1 (at page 48), the summer wet season 
often produces extremely high rainfall in Cooktowni around January. The 
dry season, by contrast, is often marked by almost drought conditions from 
May to November. Aroimd the coastal ranges slightly further inland, the 
average annual rainfall is even higher. West of the Great Dividing Range, 
however, the mean annual rainfall recedes in rough inverse proportion to 
the distance from the Pacific coast. The entire Far North Queensland 
coastline is also vulnerable to tropical cyclones, with the Cooktov^i area 
statistically liable to cyclonic winds and torrential rain approximately once 
every two years.^ 
The Vegetation and Physical Ebivironment of the Region 
Early reports of the vegetation and physicsd environment of Far 
North Queensland often presented quite contradictory views. To an extent, 
those views reflected the diversities which exist between the wet and dry 
seasons, and between the dense, rugged mountains of the Great Dividing 
Range and the inundated featureless swamps of the coastal plains. 
Contradictions also existed between the favourable reports of marine 
geographers, who saw the land from the seciuity of their ship, and the 
reports of those who physically confronted the elements of the 
environment. 1^  
The reports also reflected the striking contrasts which often existed 
in vegetation and terrain over a relatively short distance, regardless of 
season. The Jardine brothers, for example, en route to Somerset along the 
western coast of the peninsula, advanced from 'an excellent camp with 
plenty of green grass, open country and water' on 15 December 1864 to 'a 
wretched country ... [withl no water' a week later.n Even more pronounced 
was the description of country near the Hodgkinson and Mitchell Rivers as 
observed by the prospector James Mulligan — one day 'the country here is of 
the poorest description', while on the next 'a most beautiful creek with the 
richest banks possible, magnificently grassed'.^2 
® Bureau of Meterology, Climatic survey. Northern Region 16 - Queensland, AGPS, 
Canberra, 1971, p. 62. 
^^ See, for example, Dalrymple's exotic description of the tropical jungle, viewed from 
the sea on 6 December 1873 in G.E. Dalrymple, 'Narrative and Reports of the 
Queensland North-East Coast Expedition 1873', QVP, 2, 1874, p. 643. 
^^ F.J. Byerley ed.. Narrative of the overland expedition of the Messrs Jardine, 
Buxton, Brisbane, 1867, pp. 34 and 38. 
^^ J.V. Mulligan, 'Expedition in Search of Gold and Other Minerals in the Palmer 
Districts by Mulligan and Party', QVP, 1, 1876, pp. 3-4. 
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Nearer to Cooktown, early reports on the countryside were 
similarly contradictory. James Cook, in a joiu-nal entry amplifying his first 
impressions, described the coimtry as 
diversified with Hills and plains, and these with woods 
and Lawns; the Soil of the Hills is hard, dry and very 
Stoney .... in general the Land is pretty well Cloathed 
with long grass, wood. Shrubs etc ... but few sorts of 
Trees.13 
G.E. Dalr5miple, leader of the government-sponsored northeast 
coast expedition of late 1873, described the coimtry fifteen kilometres inland 
of Cooktown as 'a great primeval sandy desert plain dotted with coarse 
grasses and stunted dirty green open forest'.i^ A.C. Macmillan, however, 
co-leader of the government party sent to establish a road to the Palmer, 
described the same land between the coast and the ranges as consisting 'of 
ironstone and quartz ridges, timbered wdth stunted ironbark, bloodwood and 
teatree saplings, while the flats are poorly grassed'.i^ Clearly, descriptions 
of the physical environment, like beauty, are often in the eye of the beholder! 
It is clear also, however, that a more useful assessment by early 
visitors would have been to couch their descriptions in terms of the land's 
potential for agricultural or pastoral development. That then would have 
tempered some of the more optimistic predictions for Cooktown which 
appeared not infrequently in southern newspapers. The Brisbane Courier, 
for example, in an article on 'The Future City on the Endeavour', dated 
24 January 1874, spoke glowingly of'farmers on the valuable land ... 
especially sugar planters ... [who] will doubtless sell or ship their produce 
and obtain their stores' via Cooktown.^^ In the event, neither agricultiu-e 
nor sugar-cane farming ever became viable industries in the Cooktown area 
(although sugar-cane was grov^ nn south from the Annan River). 
The Site of Cooktown 
The present site of Cooktown, selected by A.C. Macmillan on 
13 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 104. 
1'* Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 635. 
15 A.C. Macmillan to Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598 of 1873, 
WOR/A74,QSA. 
The Brisbane Courier, 24 January 1874, p. 6. 16 
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28 October 1873, hes on the southern bank of the Endeavour River some 500 
metres from the oceanic (see Map 2.2). Between it and the ocean is Grassy 
Hill, a 150 metre-high grass covered knoll which also forms the southern 
promontory of the estuary.is On the seaward side. Grassy HiU slopes 
abruptly to the water with a steep bank of large boulders washed by the tide. 
Map 2:2 - The Site of Cooktown and its Environs 
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Selection of the site by Macmillan is discussed later in this chapter. 
D.J. Farnfield contends that Cook named Grassy Hill: see 'George Elphinstone 
Dalrymple - His Life and Times in Queensland 1859-74', PhD thesis. University of 
Queensland, 1968, p. 302. But Cook makes no mention of naming it in his journal, 
other than referring to it as 'the hill... near the South point': Reed, Captain Cook, 
p. 91. Neither do AC. Macmillan and Howard St George refer to it as Grassy Hill 
in their respective reports to Brisbane on 30 October 1873. It seems possible, 
therefore, that its name came about through common usage during the few days 
before Dalrymple departed the Endeavour River on 31 October. 
m 
Towards the river, the hill slopes down steeply but then levels out for about 
100 metres before the water 's edge. The bank, composed mainly of large 
boulders, is about one metre above sea level at high tide, forming a na tu ra l 
wharf for about 500 metres. 
To the south of Grassy Hill, the land is generally flat to the foothills 
of Mount Cook, some two kilometres to the south.i^ To the southwest of 
Grassy Hill, the bouldered river bank gradually gives way to mud flats and 
mangroves, through which meanders a nsu-row creek, now named 
Chinaman 's Creek. Depending upon the time of year and local rainfall, 
spring water can be found on the southern slopes of Grassy Hill and in the 
foothills of Mount Cook. 
The Original Inhabitants 
Prior to the destruction of the traditional Aboriginal society around 
the Endeavour River, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, it is possible tha t the 
area sustained an Aboriginal population of around 250-300 people, 
comprising elements of two coastal and at least one hinterland tribal 
groups.20 South of the river, covering an area of about 800 square 
kilometres, was the tribal land of the Koko-Bujundi, extending south along 
the coast for some forty kilometres and inland some twenty kilometres.2i 
North of the river was the tribal land of the Koko-Imudji, extending from the 
Endeavour River some fifty kilometres northwards almost to Cape Flattery. 
Between the coast and the Palmer River were the tribal lands of a t least 
19 Mount Cook was named by Lieutenant Phillip King in 1819 after Captain James 
Cook. Although unnamed in Cook's journal, the sketch on 14 June 1770 suggests that 
Cook had previously named this feature Gores Mount, after one of his officers: see 
Reed, Captain Cook, p. 84. 
20 See N.B. Tindale, Aboriginal tribes of Australia, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, 
p. 176. The estimation of numbers is derived from the work of B.F. Craig, Cape 
York: occasional papers in Aboriginal studies Number 9, Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal Studies, Canberra, 1967, Map Y which shows a total of 135 tribal groups in 
Far North Queensland, and Professor AP. Elkin's assessment that there were 
40,000 Aborigines between Cape York Peninsula and the Gilbert River: see in N.A. 
Loos, 'Aboriginal-European relations in North Queensland 1861-97', PhD thesis, 
James Cook University, 1976, p. 15. In broad terms, those figures suggest a 
population per tribal group of aroimd 250-300 persons, although given the size of the 
tribal areas involved, probably only about one-third of each group would likely have 
been in the Endeavour River at any one time. 
21 But see that K. Pope, 'An examination of the material culture of SE Cape York 
Peninsula based on the Roth Ethnographical Collection at the Australian Museum, 
Sydney', Diploma of Anthropology thesis, Sydney University, 1967, p. 17 shows the 
tribe as Djulngai, with the Bujundi being further inland. Tindale, Aboriginal 
tribes, p. 176 also lists several different names. 
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another five Aboriginal groups, probably comprising some 1250-1500 people 
in total.22 
Contrary to the views of early white explorers and settlers, the 
Aborigines not only had clearly-defined tribal areas but their movement 
within such areas was purposeful and dictated by the seasonal availability of 
food, as well as social and ceremonial demands.23 Captain Cook, for 
example, saw only twenty-one Aborigines south of the Endeavour River 
during his forty-eight day stay, most likely part of two or three family 
groups. Because his visit occurred during the height of the dry season, the 
remainder of the group had probably moved earlier to the more fertile 
foothills. In the eyes of most early whites, however, the Aborigines were 
stone-age hunters who 'wandered as their forefathers had wandered' and 
possessed no claim or legitimate interest in the land.24 
The Fh«t White \^sitors 
According to Cook's journal, the first sighting of Aborigines by the 
ship's crew occurred on 10 July 1770, some twenty-three days after their 
arrival at Endeavour River.25 Cook, though, was understandably pre-
occupied with the repairs to his ship and seems to have overlooked the report 
from Banks (who spent much of his time ashore) that a small party from the 
ship had unexpectedly come across several Aborigines on 5 July.26 Indeed, 
Banks reported that the first 'outsider' seen by the Aborigines at close 
quarters was the Tahitian passenger Tupia, who happened to be at the front 
of the group at the time.27 
The cautious but somewhat indifferent reaction by the Aborigines 
seems to suggest that Cook and his party were not the first visitors to that 
22 See Pope, 'An examination ...', p. Miii. 
23 See, for example, D.J. Mulvaney, The pre-history of Australia, Thames and 
Hudson, London, 1969, pp. 12 and 57. 
24 See, for example, CD. Cotton, Ludwig Leichhardt and the Great South Land, Angus 
and Robertson, Sydney, 1938, p. 140. 
25 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 94. 
26 See F.P. Woolston, 'The Gogo-Yimidir People and The Endeavour' in Queensland 
Heritage, 2, 2, May 1970, p. 13. 
27 Woolston, 'The Gogo-Yimidir People ...', p. 13. 
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part of the coast. Doubtless, the Aborigines would have been observing the 
ship since its arrival three weeks previously.28 Nevertheless, their 
willingness to approach the ship, albeit with some caution, and 
subsequently accept gifts from the crew, suggests an appreciation — based 
on experience — that Cook's men were transients, and not necessarily a 
threat to their well-being. 
Later explorers, particularly those inland, reported quite different 
and often quite dramatic reactions by Aborigines to their first sight of 
Europeans. Many of the natives were absolutely terrified, often shaking 
uncontrollably with visible fear. Many seemed to believe that white men 
were the reincarnations of departed relatives or tribal enemies.29 In other 
cases, reactions were more subdued and seemed influenced by reports of 
contact communicated between Aboriginal groups. 
On 31 December 1844, for example, Ludwig Leichhardt's party 
happened upon a group of Aborigines, one of whom uttered a cry resembling 
the words 'white-fella, white-fella' and ran off", followed by the whole party.30 
One can perhaps assume that this individual's recollection of contact with 
Europeans was not pleasant. In contrast, Leichhardt's party met a group 
on 22 October 1845 who were very friendly and who, having been presented 
with horse-nails, asked Leichhardt to bend them into fish-hooks.3i 
Leichhardt noted that they had doubtless seen or heard of white people 
before, and it was evident that such contacts or reports of contact were 
favourable.32 
Other early explorers were equally impressed with the speed and 
spread of Aboriginal communications. During Sturt's journey towards the 
Murray in 1830, for example, the Aborigines regularly sent 'ambassadors' 
forward and the party was literally handed from local group to local 
group.33 Leichhardt reported a similar system in North Queensland, with 
28 Cook noted that on 29 June, and again on 3 July, shore parties came across hastily-
deserted native encampments, with campfires still burning, suggesting that the 
activities of his men were being closely watched: Reed, Captain Cook, pp. 39 and 92. 
29 See G. Blainey, A land half won, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1980, pp. 66-7. 
30 L. Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition in Australia, Boone, London, 1847, 
p. 90. 
31 Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition, pp. 446-7. 
32 Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition, p. 447. 
33 See H. Reynolds, 'The land, the explorers and the Aborigines' in Historical Studies, 
19, 75,1980, pp. 214-6. 
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messengers being sent forward to inform other groups of the progress of his 
party. 34 
This is not to suggest that a series of Aboriginal messengers 
relayed the news of Cook's progress northwards along the east coast of 
Australia. Rather, it seems probable that the local Aborigines knew of such 
seaborne outsiders from reports of Malay fishermen and traders visiting the 
Gulf of Carpentaria, from as early as the sixteenth century and of the four 
Dutch expeditions which probed the western shores of Cape York Peninsula 
between 1606 and 1756.35 
The Dutch, in particular, with their instructions to kidnap 
Aborigines so that the authorities (and the Dutch East India Company) 
could learn more about the country from them, would certainly have been a 
subject worthy of conununication.36 
The Arrival of Captain Cook 
Captain Cook's first view of the Endeavour River and the landing 
which ultimately took his name occurred on 14 June 1770.3"^  For most of his 
stay. Cook was engrossed in repairing the damage to his ship, and his 
journal entries were dominated either by the progress of repairs, 
reprovisioning the ship or reports of seaward reconnaissance (seeking a 
channel back out through the surrounding reefs). Indeed, his entry on 
19 June of the adjacent lauid affording 'a very indifferent prospect' is the only 
descriptive entry of the countryside for the whole of his time in harbour, 
apart from the sketch (see Plate 2.1 at page 56) appearing in his journal on 
18 June. 
34 Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition, p. 349. 
35 For a fuller account of the Dutch activities see N. Loos, 'A Chapter of Contact: 
Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland, 1606-1992' in H. Reynolds 
(ed.), Race relations in North Queensland, James Cook University, Townsville, 
1993, p. 5. 
36 Loos, 'A Chapter of Contact...', p. 5. 
3"^  Although the Endeavour was not taken into the river until 17 June, Cook 
reconnoitered the harbour by small boat on 14 June: Reed, Captain Cook, pp. 84-5. 
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Plate 2.1 Sketch of the Endeavour River 
from the Journal of Captain James Cook 
Source: A.W. Reed ed.. Captain Cook in Australia, Reed, Sydney. 1969, p. 85. 
Once safely to sea on 4 August, Cook devoted several pages to 'a 
Short description of the Harbour, or River, we have been in, which I named 
after the Ship, Endeavoiu* River'.38 Included with it is a plan of the river 
and foreshore (see Plate 2.2 at page 57). Most of his descriptive conunents, 
however, related either to the river or the fauna observed ashore (including 
the Kangaru), with passing reference to the fact that 'we were very weU 
supply'd with water by springs which were not far off'.39- The underl5dng 
impression from Cook's journal entries for the period is that he was 
generally unimpressed with the area of his enforced landing and was glad 
to be away fi-om it.40 
38 
39 
40 
Reed, Captain Cook, p. 102. 
Reed, Captain Cook, pp. 104-5. 
Even the Endeavour River, which a later commentator asserted was the finest port 
north of Sydney, Cook described as 'convenient for heaving a Ship down [but] ... this 
is all the River hath to recommend it': Reed, Captain Cook, p. 102. 
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Plate 2.2 Sketch of the Endeavour River and Environs 
from the Journal of Captain James Cook 
Souree: A.W. Reed ed.. Captain Cook in Australia, Reed. Sydney, 1969, p. 90. 
Further MaritLme \^sitors 
The second recorded visit of whites to the Endeavoiu* River occurred 
in late June 1819, with the arrival of HM Cutter Mermaid, under the 
command of Lieutenant PhiUip King. King, the son of New South Wales' 
Grovemor Phihp Gidley King, had been conunissioned to survey the 
northeastern coastline and called at the Endeavour River from 28 June to 
12 Ju ly 1819 and again on his return joiuney on 27 July 1819. The most 
notable aspect of his visits was a clash with a group of Aborigines on 2 July, 
when spears were thrown and shots fired after several Aborigines took 'a 
violent fancy' to clothes being washed on shore by the sailors,4i 
41 For an account of the incident, albeit fi-om a 'white' perspective, see R.L. Jack, 
Northmost Australia, Vol. 1, Robertson, Melboume, 1922, p. 149. 
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The next recorded visit was some forty-five years later by John 
Jardine in late September 1865. As discussed earlier, Jardine had been 
instructed by the Colonial Secretary to investigate the Endeavour River, in 
his capacity as police magistrate and official government resident at 
Somerset (on the tip of Cape York Peninsula), to determine its suitability for 
settlement. Being at the height of the dry season, Jardine's inability to find 
an ample supply of fresh water is hardly surprising, although it seems he 
may not have located the more plentiful source in the foothills of Mount Cook 
(which had been reported by Captain Cook's party).42 That source was 
found to provide 'an abundant supply of spring water', even in late October, 
as reported by A.C. Macmillan some eight years later.43 
Although not recorded, it also seems almost certain that the 
Endeavour River landing would have been visited on a number of occasions 
throughout the 1850s and 1860s by whites involved in the beche-de-mer 
industry and possibly, in the late 1860s, by timber cutters. Beche-de-mer 
stations, run by Europeans, were operating along the far north coast in the 
1860s, using 'kanaka' (and probably 'pressed' Aboriginal) labour.44 
Dalrymple, for example, after visiting the fledgling settlement at Cooktown, 
put in at Three Isles (thirty-five kilometres north-east of Cooktown) on 31 
October 1873 to collect twenty tons of beche-de-mer from the fishing station 
there.45 It would not be surprising if the operators oi beche-de-mer stations 
in the 1860s (and possibly as early as the late 1850s) had already been 
attempting to 'recruit' Aboriginal workers from along the coast near 
Cooktown, via the Endeavour River landing.46 
It is also possible that timber cutters, operating from Cardwell, 
could have visited the Endeavour River landing in the late 1860s or early 
1870s. Prolific stands of cedar were 'harvested' along the coast between 
Cardwell and Cooktown in the early 1870s — a party led by one O'Grady for 
42 John Jardine to Colonial Secretary, 10 October 1865, in-letter 3221 
of 1865, COL/A73, QSA. 
43 A.C. Macmillan to Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4578 of 1873, 
WOR/A74,QSA. 
44 See N.A Loos, Invasion and resistance, ANU Press, Canberra, 1982, pp. 118-59 
(Chapter 5 'The Sea Frontier'). 
45 Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 636. 
46 The exploitation of Aborigines in the beche-de-mer industry is discussed more fully 
in Chapter 3. 
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example, felled over 700,000 feet of timber between July and September 
1874.47 Still, no mention of tha t activity appears in the journal of 
Dalrymple's expedition, which explored the coast from Cardwell to 
Cooktown in late 1873. So cedar-cutters may perhaps have been 
reconnoitering, but not necessarily harvesting timber, as far north as 
Cooktown prior to the establishment of the settlement.48 
There are also two reports from 1872 and 1873 of the earlier 
presence of European fishermen at the Annan River (eight kilometres south 
of the Endeavour River) and at the Endeavour River landing itself. William 
Hann, leader of the Northern Exploration Party of 1872, discovered what he 
described as 'an old deserted fishing establishment belonging to Towns and 
Company of Sydney' at the Annan River mouth on 22 December 1872.49 ^ n d 
members of Dalrymple's party, on their arrival at the Endeavour River 
landing on 24 October 1873, found carved in a tree the initial 'G', which 
reputedly had been done some years earlier by one Phillip Garland from the 
fishing station at Hope Island.^^ 
Certainly, Towns and Company was involved in the beche-de-mer 
industry or, at least, the transportation of small cargoes to the Chinese 
community in Sydney, which would explain the Annan River presence.^^ It 
is also possible tha t the hut could have belonged to ASN (the Australasian 
Steam Navigation Company of Sydney). But it is somewhat perplexing why 
ASN, which only extended its northern Queensland trade service to 
47 See in G.C. Bolton, A thousand miles away: a history of Queensland to 1920 
Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1963, pp. 76-7. 
48 That said, Dalrymple broke off his detailed exploration of the coast just north of 
Double Island (between Cairns and Port Douglas), to head for his planned 
rendezvous with Phillip Sellheim at the Endeavour River on 1 November (as 
discussed later in this chapter): See Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 634. So 
Dalrymple could well have missed any evidence of timber cutters operating along 
the coast. 
49 Hann, 'Report from the Leader ...', p. 13. 
^^ As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 30 October 1875, p. 2. See also the earlier report 
- later discredited - from Sub-Inspector Tompson, a member of Dalrymple's party, 
who claimed that it was the letter ' C (provoking rumours it had been made by 
Captain Cook): letter Tompson to Colonial Secretary, 25 October 1873, in-letter 1570 
ofl873,COL/A185, QSA. 
51 See P. Carver, Captain Robert Towns 1794-1873, Maritime Museum of Townsville, 
Townsville, 1993, p. 31. 
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Townsville in 1865, would have ventured as fsu* north as the Endeavour 
River.52 Perhaps the ASN's steamer SS Leichhardt, which was to bring the 
government party to the landing in October 1873, had indeed forayed 
northwards beforehand, possibly en route to the beche-de-mer station at 
Three Isles.^3 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that the Endeavour 
River was no 'pristine' landing, untouched by white man since its discovery 
by Captain Cook, as some early commentators would have us believe. 
Rather, the Endeavour River and its environs were being visited from the 
sea with increasing regularity prior to the establishment of permanent 
white settlement in late 1873, as part of the gradual development and 
'opening up' of Far North Queensland and the Queensland coastline in 
general.54 
The Maritiine Dimensions of Development 
Within that context, the likes of Dalrymple saw the development of 
a settlement at the Endeavour River not so much as opening up new 
pastor£d or agricultural districts, but as a stimulant to 'the valuable pearl-
shell, beche-de-mer and turtle fisheries along this coast'.^s Others would no 
doubt have seen trade opportunities coinciding with the Queensland 
Government's contract with the Eastern and Australian Steamship 
Company of April 1873 for a steamship service to operate between Brisbane 
and Singapore, commencing in December 1873.^6 
Beyond the development of local fisheries industries £md trade, 
Dalrymple's vision (no doubt shared by influential politicians and 
bureaucrats in Brisbane and London) was that the development of the 
Queensland coastline formed part of a grander strategic plan wherein 
52 A brief discussion on ASN's expansion into the northern Queensland trade can be 
found in R. Parsons, A pioneer Australian steamship company. Parsons, Lobethal, 
1970, pp. 39-40. 
53 If that was the case, it would also explain Captain Saunders' masterly handling of 
the SS Leichhardt on 25 October 1873, wherein 'the way (he) brought his vessel right 
alongside the south bank of the river was the theme of general commendation': 
unidentified correspondent to The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
54 Coastal development, for example, occurred in the progression of Rockhampton 
1853, Mackay 1862, Townsville 1864 and Cardwell 1864. 
55 Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 650. 
56 See the discussion of this aspect in N. Kirkman, 'From Minority to Majority: 
Chinese on the Palmer River Grold-field, 1873-76' in Reynolds, Race relations in 
North Queensland, p. 243. 
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the annexation and settlement of New Guinea will 
then alone remain to complete the consolidation 
of British power and commerce in the Pacific and 
Indian oceans .5'^  
Indeed, the strategic dimension to the development of the Queensland 
coastline is evident in a missive of 1872 from the Imperial Government (in 
London) authorising Queensland to annex gdl islands within 100 kilometres 
of the coast at the earliest opportunity.58 On that basis, the Government in 
Brisbane had underlying commercial £md strategic reasons to continue the 
pattern of northerly coastal development. 
That said, the importance of maritime-related trade or strategic 
considerations, in terms of the eventual decision to establish a settlement at 
the Endeavour River, should not be overstated. Moreover, they are clearly 
subordinate to reasons which arose from a particular set of circumstances 
relating to the exploitation of the mineral resources of Far North 
Queensland. To put that situation into its broader context, it is usefiil to look 
briefly at the process by which Far North Queensland was 'opened up' 
during the 1860s and 1870s.59 
The Early Land Explorers of Far North Queensland 
Contrary to contemporary media accounts, the advance of 
'civilisation' into Far North Queensland was not the motivating factor in 
early exploratory expeditions; greater interest lay in investigating trade 
routes through North Queensland with a view to improving access between 
the settled districts of New South Wales and the trading centres of India and 
China. 
Ludwig Leichhardt's expedition of 1844-5, for example, was 
commissioned by the Government to establish the feasibility of an overland 
57 Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 650. 
58 J. Farnfield, Frontiersman: a biography of G.E. Dalrymple, Oxford University 
Press, Melboume, 1968, p. 140. 
59 The economic dimensions of the early development of Far North Queensland are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 'Small Town in a Large Colony'. 
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route from Brisbane to Port Essington (on the Cobourg Peninsula in what is 
now the Northem Territory).60 Leichhardt's expedition followed the 
Mitchell River from its headwaters west of Cardwell to the Gulf of 
Carpentaria, before turning south towards what is now Normanton (see 
Map 2.3 below). 
Map 2 ^ - The Routes of Eariy Land Explorers Into Far North Queensland 
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Source: Compiled from the map data of N. Loos, 'A Chapter of Contact: 
Aboriginal-European Relations in North Queensland 1606-1992' 
in H. Reynolds ed.. Race relations in North Queensland, James 
Cook University, Townsville, 1993, p. 9. 
Although not generally reahsed, Edmund Kennedy's fateful 
expedition of 1848 was also more than simply a trek from Rockingham Bay 
60 See Bolton, A thousand miles away, pp. 10-11. Port Essington, which had been 
established as a trading settlement with Asia in 1838, was eventually abandoned in 
1849. But Captain John Stokes, who explored much of the Gulf covmtry in 1841, had 
reported favourably on the possibility of an overland route from the settled districts 
of the south: See, for example, J. Stokes, Discoveries in Australia: with an account 
of the coasts and rivers explored and surveyed during the voyage of HMS Beagle, in 
the years 1837-43, Vol. 2, Boone, London, 1846, pp. 82 and 272. 
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(or wha t is now Cardwell) to Cape York. It was intended as a projection of 
earlier expeditions to find a route to the Gulf, only this time star t ing from 
the south.61 Similarly, the expedition of the Jardine brothers in 1864-5 was 
primarily to prove the feasibility of overlanding cattle from the Gulf country 
to Somerset, which had been founded in 1862 in the hope of it becoming 'the 
Singapore of Australia'.^2 
As can be seen from Map 2.3 (page 62), though, none of the early 
land explorers went anywhere near the landing on the Endeavour River. 
Kennedy, who came closest, passed some 120 kilometres to the west. 
Moreover, none of the early land explorers saw anything about the 
countryside of Fa r North Queensland which gave them cause to report 
favourably on its prospects for settlement. Indeed, from 1848 until the mid 
1860s, Far North Queensland languished in continued isolation, with no 
European intrusion except for the struggling settlement a t Somerset, on the 
tip of the peninsula, and the single cattle drive of the Jardine brothers along 
the western coastline.^^ 
The Expansion of the Pastoral Frontier 
Elsewhere in Queensland, however, the pastoral frontier was 
rapidly spreading inland and northwards from the 'settled districts' of 
Brisbane and the Darling Downs. Pastoralists were favoured by the 
Queensland Government's land legislation of 1860, which allocated large 
t racts of land for pastoral purposes, but only as an 'imperative forerunner to 
... extensive settlement'.^'^ By 1863, most of the Kennedy district had been 
taken up by squatters and, by 1864, the wave of pastoral expansion had 
spread into all par ts of North Queensland, except Cape York Peninsula.^5 
By 1865, the Fir ths and Atkinson had pushed up to Mount Surprise (inland 
61 See E. Beale, Kennedy of Cape York, Rigby, Adelaide, 1970, pp. 142-3. 
62 Bolton, A thousand miles away, p. 27. 
63 There was also a short-lived Anglican mission presence at Somerset from February 
1867 to August 1868: see J. Bayton, Cross over Carpentaria: being a history of the 
Church of England in Northern Australia from 1865-1965, Smith & Paterson, 
Brisbane, 1965, pp. 33-7. 
64 See D. May, 'The North Queensland Beef Cattle Industry: An Historical Overview' 
in Lectures on North Queensland history, 4th series, James Cook University, 
Townsville, 1984, pp. 121-1. 
65 See Loos, 'A Chapter of Contact...', pp. 11-2. 
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from Cardwell and some eight-five kilometres east of Georgetown), by then 
the most northerly outstation in North Queensland.66 
The importance of the rapid spread of the pastoral frontier into 
North Queensland was tha t the advance of 'civilisation' provided a 
convenient 'stepping off point for later prospecting part ies heading further 
north. Moreover, by the early 1870s, the pastoral stations were well placed to 
provide a ready supply of meat to the newly-discovered goldfields of the 
north, notwithstanding the difficulties of access often imposed by the ter ra in 
and the wet season. That market, of course, in tu rn gave a new lease of life 
to many of the nor them stations, and, indeed, triggered a second wave of 
pastoral expansion, with southern stations then being able to restock those 
in the north.67 
The Opening of the Northem Goldfields 
In late 1868, the Government — probably conscious tha t the alluvial 
workings and shallow reef mines at G3mipie were petering out — appointed 
Daintree an official geologist, with instructions to conduct surveys into the 
Gilbert River area. His cautiously-worded report of April 1869, advising of 
alluvial gold being found on the upper reaches of the Gilbert River, 
prompted a repeat of the rush to Gympie.68 Within weeks, the ports of 
Townsville and Cardwell were filled vrith thousands of would-be diggers 
arr iving on steamships from Brisbane, New South Wales, Victoria, New 
Zealand and Canton, while hundreds more slowly made their way 
nor thwards on foot from Gympie, Brisbane and even New South Wales.69 
Throughout 1870, miners from the Gilbert River followed new 
'mini' rushes ' to Mount Hogan, Percy River, Robertson River, Mosquito 
Creek, Western Creek, Talbot Creek and Delaney River.'^^ Indeed, by the end 
of 1871, most of the Gilbert River's 'population' of 2000-3000 had moved to the 
66 J. Wegner, 'Aborigines of the Etheridge Shire, 1860-1940' in Reynolds, Race 
relations, p. 137. 
67 May, 'The North Queensland Beef Cattle Industry ...', p. 126. 
68 By the time Daintree telegraphed his initial report on 7 April 1869, there were 
already over 200 men on the ground: see 'Report of Mr Daintree, Government 
Geologist, Northern Queensland, on Gold Discoveries in the Gilbert Ranges', QVP, 
2, 1869, p. 163. For an accoimt of the early days of the Gilberton rush, see R.B. 
Brown, 'A History of the Gilbert River Goldfield 1869-1874', BA Hons thesis, James 
Cook University, Townsville, 1974, pp. 4-7. 
^^ Brown, 'A History of the Gilbert River Goldfield', p. 5. 
•70 See Brown, 'A History of the Gilbert River Goldfield ...', p. 115. 
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newly-discovered fields of the Etheridge River (or its township of 
Georgetown), some ninety kilometres to the north.'^i By early 1872, 
therefore, the spread of 'civihsation' was just beginning to encroach into Far 
North Queensland (see Map 2.4 below). 
Map 2.4 - The Extent of the Pastoral and Mining Frontiers in North 
Queensland by 1872 
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The years 1871-72, however, also saw a pause in any further 
expansion northwards. Georgetown was some 425 kilometres via the 
Gilbert River by road from the nearest port at Cardwell, while Gilberton 
itself (on the Gilbert River) was 480 kilometres from Townsville and 335 
kilometres from Cardwell.'^2 The cost burdens imposed by distance and the 
lack of settlement were becoming prohibitive, while the exodus of miners 
(and police) from the Gilbert River to the northerly fields left; those 
remaining in Gilberton vulnerable to attack by Aborigines.'^^ Moreover, the 
discovery of gold at Charters Towers in early 1872 led to some redirection of 
the northerly rush, although the fact that it was a quartz reef rather than 
alluvial field meant that it provided little attraction to the t3T)ical northern 
digger.'^4 
The Push towards the Pahner 
Presumably because of the slowdown in the northern goldfields (or 
possibly to keep the momentum going), the Government in February 1872 
commissioned William Hann to lead an expedition to what is now Coen 'to 
ascertain ... the character of the country and its mineral resources with a 
view to future settlement and occupation'.'^^ The importance of this 
expedition, apart from the discoveries it made, is that it was the first 
initiative by the Queensland Government specifically linking exploration in 
Far North Queensland to future settlement. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Colonial Secretary would 
have been impressed that it then took Hann four months to assemble and 
provision his party, before departing from Fossilbrook (near Mount Surprise 
station) on 26 June 1872 (see Map 2.5 at page 61).'^^ Neither probably did the 
Colonial Secretary expect that Hann and his party would be away for five 
'^ 2 See Brown, 'A History of the Gilbert River Goldfield ...', p. 10. 
^^ Gilberton's eventual demise was often popularly attributed to aboriginal resistance, 
a proposition refuted by Brown in 'A History of the Gilbert River Goldfield ...'. 
'^^  Exaggerated telegrams announcing a great alluvial rush to a second Bendigo did 
however draw several thousand diggers from southern ports: see D. Menghetti, 
'The Gold Mines of Charters Towers' in Readings in North Queensland mining 
history, p. 53. 
^^ See Hann, 'Report...', p. 1031. Daintree was by then unavailable, having been 
appointed Agent-General for Queensland in London in 1871: see Farnfield, 
'George Elphinstone Dalrymple ...', p. 274. 
^^ Indeed, Hann spent the first page of his eventual report explaining why it took so 
long to get started, laying the blame largely on conflicting instructions from 
Brisbane over the composition of his party: see Hann, 'Report...', p. 1031. 
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months (returning to Mount Surprise in mid-November 1872), nor that it 
would take until early 1873 before Hann's report finally reached Brisbane."^"^ 
Map 2.5 - The Expedition Route of William Hann; 
June-November 1872 
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Vols. 1 and 2, Robertson, Melbourne, 1922, Sheets A-M. 
77 Hann's final report, dated 20 December 1872, reached the Colonial Secretary's office 
on 20 February 1873: see in-letter 792 of 1873, WOR 670/73, QSA. There is no 
evidence to suggest that any excerpts or summary of the report were telegraphed to 
Brisbane in advance of the final report, except for the telegraphed advice of 12 
November notifying the Minister for Works that the party had returned safely: see 
Hann, 'Report ..., p. 1069. 
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It took another five months before Hann's report was tabled in 
Par l iament on 28 May 1873."^^ Given tha t Hann's par ty had foimd numerous 
traces of gold on what he named the Palmer River on 9 August 1872, it 
seems extraordinary tha t the Government (or indeed H a n n and his men) 
made no a t tempt to publicise the discovery before the tabling of the report.*^^ 
One possibility is tha t the Colonial Secretary or Minister for Works had by 
then become concerned tha t the headlong rush as far as the Etheridge, with 
its concomitant implications for the safety of miners and the provision of 
infrastructure and services, was already straining the resources of the 
Government. To avoid a further rush to the Palmer, the Government could 
deliberately have 'sat on the news'. 
More difficult to explain is why Hann and his men kept their 
mouths shut over the discovery, from November 1872 until J u n e 1873, 
especially given tha t the Etheridge community would have been eagerly 
awaiting the news from their expedition. Hann, it is acknowledged, was 
careful in the conclusions to his report not to raise expectations unduly and, 
indeed, cautioned tha t 'I t rus t tha t nobody will be led away by anjdhing t ha t 
I have stated to jump to the conclusion that it is here in payable 
quantities' .^^ It seems unrealistic to expect, however, t ha t his men would 
have been so equally concerned. The possibility exists, therefore, t ha t news 
of the discovery did not leak because Hann and his men re t iuned almost 
immediately to the Palmer as a private prospecting party, and were there 
months ahead of i ts 'discovery' by James Venture Mulligan. At the least, 
history should record tha t it was a Frederick Warner who first discovered 
gold at the Palmer River on 9 August 1872, not James Venture Mulligan a 
year later.^^ 
The other interesting twist to Hann's expedition is tha t his leg from 
Princess Charlotte Bay to the south (see Map 2.5 at page 67) struck the coast 
at the Annan River, which he incorrectly described as the Endeavoiu* 
landing with 'its site ... well suited for a small set t lement which should be 
80 
^^ Tabled by the Minister for Works on the first day of sitting in 1873: QVP, 1, 1873, 
p. 2. 
^^  Hann's journal entry for 9 August recorded that 'we have now found the existence of 
gold on both sides of the [Palmer] river': Hann, 'Report...', p. 1050. 
Hann, "Report...', p. 1036. See also Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, p. 387 noting 
that 'to report payable gold was a serious responsibility, and diggers returning from 
an unsuccessful rush were ugly customers for the reporter to meet'. 
^1 See Hann, 'Report...', p. 1050. Certainly, it seems that Hann was a well-known 
identity at the Palmer River by June 1874: see CHPRA, 3 June 1874, p. 2 reporting his 
arrival in the township, presumably after a prospecting expedition in the area. 
69 
on the north side'.82 A . C . Macmillan, co-leader of the government party to 
the Endeavoiu River in October 1873, concluded that 'Mr Hann may have 
mistaken this large salt water river [the Annan] ... for the Endeavour' and, 
to substantiate his suspicions, found Heinn's relevant camp markers to the 
south of Mount Cook.^^ Given that Macmillan's party was supposed to 
follow Hann's route from the coast westwards to the Palmer, there was a 
slight possibility therefore — as mentioned earlier — that the settlement of 
Cooktown could have had its beginnings at the Annan River. 
Back at the Etheridge, James Venture Mulligan (see Plate 2.3 at 
page 70), a longstanding prospector of the northern goldfields, was 
commissioned by a group of miners in early June 1873 to lead a prospecting 
party to the Palmer, once Hann's report became public.^^ After three 
months away, Mulligan and his five fellow prospectors returned to 
Georgetown (the headquarters of the Etheridge field) on 4 September 1873 
with 102 ounces of gold, triggering what was to become the biggest gold rush 
in the history of Queensland.^^ 
82 Hann, 'Report ...', p. 1058. 
S3 A.C. Macmillan to Secretary of Works, 30 October 1875, in-letter 4598 of 1873, 
WOR/A74,QSA. 
8'* Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, p. 413 contends that Mulligan's party was but one 
of several which set out as soon as Hann's report was made public. 
8^ For Mulligan's report of this, his first of six expeditions over the next four years, see 
Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, pp. 413-7. 
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Plate 2.3 — James Venture Mulligan 
JAMES VENTURE M L L L I C A N . I ( > 0 ; . 
Source: R i . Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, Robertson, Melbourne, 1922, p. 424. 
The Pahner River Rush 
Mulligan and his party stayed in Greorgetown only long enough to 
report the discovery and to reprovision, before setting out again on 
12 September 1873 for the Palmer followed by a swarm of local miners.^^ If 
the Etheridge fields were on the fiu-thest edge of 'dvihsation', then the 
Palmer River, a further 350 kilometres to the north, was definitely Tjeyond 
the frontier'. Moreover, getting to the Palmer involved crossing the 
Einasleigh, Lynd, Tate, Walsh and Mitchell Rivers — a formidable if not 
impossible task with the onset of the wet season looming. Indeed, the 
Georgetown correspondent to The Brisbane Courier, noting that MuUigan's 
^^  The main purpose in reporting any significant discovery was to lay claim to the 
reward firom government usually offered to 'practical discovers of payable gold', 
which varied between $500 and $2,000. 
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party was retiu*ning with provisions to last luitil the following April, 
warned that 'it would be useless for diggers to go to the place without 
providing themselves with at least eight months' rations'.^'^ 
Such warnings were echoed in southern newspapers, with the 
strong advice that any rush from the south be postponed until after the wet 
season.88 A letter from Mulligan was similarly published, with the plea 'for 
God's sake do not attempt to come, as people caught out... without rations 
must perish in the rainy season, there are so many large rivers'.^9 In 
Georgetown, anyway, those warnings were largely luiheeded and by mid 
September 1873, an estimated 400 miners had left or were about to leave for 
the Palmer.90 
An Unrelated Government Initiative 
A reconstruction of events from earlier in 1873 suggests that the 
Minister for Works, William Walsh, having digested Hann's report of the 
land exploration of the countryside between the Etheridge and Princess 
Charlotte Bay, decided that the next step should be a maritime expedition of 
the northern coast between Cardwell and the Endeavour River. The 
expedition would explore all rivers, inlets and creeks to ascertain to what 
extent the soil was suitable for agriculture and how far the rivers were 
navigable by small raft.^i 
The Minister's dilemma was in finding a suitable expedition 
leader; Daintree was in England, Howard St George was gold 
commissioner at the Etheridge, Dalrjnnple was gold commissioner at 
Gilberton, Sellheim was managing a pastoral station at the Valley of 
Lagoons and Hann was only recently returned from the land expedition of 
1872. 
A letter from Dalrjmiple to the Minister for Works dated 22 July 
1873 (but probably not received in Brisbane until early August) solved the 
leadership problem. Dalrymple advised that the population of the Gilbert 
8*7 The Brisbane Courier, 6 September 1873, p. 4. 
88 See The Brisbane Courier, 13 September 1873, p. 4. 
The Brisbane Courier, 13 September 1873, p. 4. 
From the Etheridge correspondent of the Cleveland Bay Express, reproduced in The 
Brisbane Courier, 18 October 1873, p. 6. 
^1 As stated in the eventual instructions to G.E. Dalrymple in 'Narrative ...', p. 619. 
89 
90 
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River fields had so fallen away (as miners moved to the Etheridge), that 'my 
services have become unnecessary here' as gold commissioner.^^ 
Accordingly, the Minister telegraphed Dgdrymple with the news of his 
appointment as leader of the northeast coast expedition and instructed him 
to proceed forthwith to Cardwell to take command of arrangements for the 
expedition. After handing over his duties to the mining registrar, 
Dahymple departed Gilberton on 3 September and proceeded initially to 
Georgetown, arriving there on 5 or 6 September, probably intending to brief 
his former superior, Howard St George, on his appointment and 
forthcoming expedition.^3 
Once in Georgetown, of course, Dalrymple quickly heard the news 
of Mulligan and his party, who had themselves only arrived back two days 
before from their thirteen-week prospecting trip to the Palmer. From that 
point on, much of Dalrymple's thinking was on 'the calamity of a rush to the 
Palmer' and on what he could do to assist.^"* It is clear, however, that the 
Government's initial intention in conunissioning the northeast coast 
expedition was not as a result of the Palmer rush, but was simply related to 
exploration, and that 'the connection between the two was the result of 
coincidence'.95 
Dahymple's Rescue Plan 
Dalrymple, like many of the prominent figures involved in the early 
days of North Queensland, had a strong sense of patriotism and civic 
responsibility, and his concerns that 'the government in Brisbane could not 
possibly be aware of the urgency of the situation' were undoubtedly 
genuinely founded.^^ There was, however, in Dalrjrmple (like in Mulligan 
especially) an element of 'popular heroics', with the motivation of public 
acclaim and possible financial remuneration a not insignificant factor in 
his dealings over the coming weeks.^"^ 
92 G.E. Dalrymple to Minister for Works and Mines, 22 July 1873, in-letter 5171 of 
1873, WOR/A76, QSA. 
93 See Farnfield, Frontiersman, p. 121. 
9'* See Farnfield, Frontiersman, p. 124. 
95 Farnfield 'George Elphinstone Dalrymple ...', p. 282. 
96 Farnfield, Frontiersman, p. 124. 
9'^  Dalrymple had, for example, explored the Bowen and Burdekin River areas in 1859 
and, later, pioneered the original dray-road between Cardwell and the Gilbert and 
Etheridge goldfields: Farnfield, Frontiersman, p. 117. 
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Indeed, once at Cardwell, Dalrymple telegraphed his old friend, 
Phillip Sellheim, manager of the pastoral station at Valley of Lagoons (who 
had been with Dalrymple on an earlier expedition in 1859), asking him to try 
to ascertain a more exact location of Mulligan's find on the Palmer. In a 
letter back to Dalrymple, dated 14 September 1873, Sellheim (who was also a 
justice of the peace at Georgetown) suggested 'the advisability of keeping 
your eye on the country when you are at the Endeavour with a view to getting 
a road from the Palmer to the seaboard', adding tha t 'unless 
communication with the coast is opened at once, ut ter starvation must be 
the consequence'.98 
Whether or not the concept of a road from the Palmer to the 
Endeavour was an original thought from Sellheim is not clear. Certainly, 
the same idea had been propounded four days earlier by James Venture 
Mulligan in a letter to an undisclosed friend, in which he stated: 
I would advise tha t the Government open a port at Weary 
or Endeavour Bays, or thereabouts. According to Mr Hann, 
a tolerably good road can be got from there to the Palmer in 
60 or 70 miles. Fancy nearly 600 miles inland carriage ... 
which could be done in less than 100!99 
Mulligan presumably would also have been pushing the same suggestion 
publicly during his few days' stay in Georgetown from 4-12 September. 
In the event, Dalrymple by mid September was seized of the notion 
that he and Sellheim might be able to open an access route from the Palmer 
to the coast. By an exchange of telegrams between the two, in Cardwell and 
Georgetown respectively, it was agreed tha t Dalrymple would proceed by sea 
to the Endeavour River landing, exploring as commissioned en route, while 
Sellheim would take a small par ty overland to the Palmer, following 
Mulligan's track, and from there would blaze a route to the Endeavour 
River, using Hann 's chart from the 1872 expedition. Sellheim was confident 
tha t he could be at the Endeavour within a month of s tar t ing out.i^o 
Although no record of the communications exist, Dalrymple 
contended tha t he obtained government sanction for the scheme by 
98 P. Sellheim to G.E. Dalrymple, 14 September 1873, in-letter 1729 of 1874, WORyA82, 
QSA. 
99 Published in The Brisbane Courier, 11 October 1873, p. 5. 
100 Further details are discussed in Farnfield, 'George Elphinstone Dalrymple ...', 
pp. 286-7. 
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telegram. 101 Before he left Cardwell on 28 September, Dalrymple sent a 
final telegram to Sellheim with the promise 
I will anchor inside Endeavour Mouth on 1st November 
and remain until you come. Will bring you month's 
rations. Am just off Bon voyage. 1^ 2 
The New Government Initiatives of October 1873 
Unbeknown to Dalrjnnple, his agitation — together with further 
worrying reports and dire predictions from the Etheridge throughout late 
September and early October — prompted the Government to take more 
substantive measures to ensure the safety of the hundreds of miners likely to 
be trapped at the Palmer with the onset of the wet season. The Dalrymple 
plan, after all, placed much store in Sellheim, with a party of two whites 
and three Aborigines, being able to cut a track through an area which it had 
taken Hann's well-armed and weU-equipped party some forty days to 
traverse (albeit via Weary Bay). Moreover, the Dalrymple plan offered no 
immediate prospect for the resupply of the Palmer, given that Dalrymple 
had no spare provisions (or carriers) to send to the field, nor would those on 
the Palmer have any way of knowing whether Sellheim's route was viable 
xuitil someone returned along it. 
Accordingly, the Government put in place two fxuther initiatives, 
while sending instructions to Sellheim to halt his proposed move.i^^ The 
first and major effort involved the steamship SS Leichhardt and HM 
SLuvejdng schooner Pearl, under the conunands of Captain Saunders and 
Lieutenant Connor RN respectively, being despatched from Brisbane on 
15 October 1873, boiuid for Bowen, Townsville, Cardwell and the Endeavour 
River. 10^  At Bowen, the ships were to take on board A.C. Macmillan and 
staff from the Roads Department, and at Cardwell collect Howard St George, 
gold commissioner from Georgetown, a number of his staff and a police 
detachment under the command of Sub-Inspector Douglas. The 'expedition' 
101 But see telegram Secretary of Works to P. Sellheim, dated 13 October 1873, letter-
book 3946 of 1873, WOR/A82, QSA, advising that no such approval existed. 
102 Telegram G.E. Dalrymple to P. Sellheim, 27 September 1873, in-letter 1729 of 1874, 
WOR/A82, QSA. 
10^ As it turned out, Sellheim's party had already expended £580 and had commenced 
their trek when ordered to stop. Sellheim's disgruntled men threatened to sue him: 
see The Brisbane Courier, 6 November 1873, p. 2. 
10'* A good account of the voyage north and his impressions of the landing at the 
Endeavour River were provided by the correspondent to the Cleveland Bay Express, 
as reproduced in The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
75 
also included some 180 would-be diggers, forty-five horses, 'tons upon tons' 
of merchandise and a few gentlemen on 'pleasure bent'. 1^ 5 
Details of the official instructions to St George do not seem to have 
survived. 106 It is clear fi-om the correspondence to Macmillan, however, 
that his instructions were primarily to open a road from the Endeavour 
River to the Palmer diggings. lO'^  Once a suitable route was found, St 
George's task would then be to establish an official presence on the Palmer 
River goldfields and, if needed, 'to afford relief and succour to the diggers on 
the field'. 108 Whether or not Macmillan had specific instructions to 
establish a settlement at the Endeavour River will be discussed shortly. 
The second, smaller and more speculative initiative involved the 
despatch of a five-man expedition, under the charge of Bartley Fahey, sub-
collector of customs at Normanton, to explore the Mitchell River from the 
Gulf of Carpentaria, with the view 'to ascertaining ... the possibility of its 
use as a means of communication from the Gulf to the Palmer 
goldfields'. 109 The expedition was to depart Normanton on 23 October on 
board the SS Royal Duke for a rendezvous at the Mitchell River mouth with 
the customs cutter. The Duke of Edinburgh, which was being despatched 
fi-om Brisbane with supplies for the party. It was expected that the 
expedition would be away for about one month, no 
Media and other Pressures on the Government 
The reasoning behind this flurry of government activity is difficult 
to ascertain. Certainly, the Government was becoming increasingly 
responsive to the need to appoint gold commissioners to new fields as soon 
105 The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
106 A note on the Department of Works general correspondence file for 1873 advises 'all 
papers related to Palmer River Gold Rush and goldfields regulations lent to Mines 
Department 13 December 1911': see WOR/A72, QSA. No further trace of the papers 
has been found. 
10'^  See Under-Secretary of Works to A.C. Macmillan, undated letter of October 1873, 
letter-book 1653 of 1873, W0R/G8, QSA, advising 'the duties to be performed ... will 
be the discovery of the best road from the Endeavour River to the diggings. 
10^ As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. See also the cabinet 
submission dated 14 October 1873 by Secretary of Works noting that 'the objects of 
this expedition are generally to guard against the hardships which must be endured 
by the diggers ... unless some communication is speedily opened with the eastern 
seaboard': letter-book 4574 of 1873, WOR/A75, QSA 
10^ As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 30 October 1873, p. 3. 
110 The Brisbane Courier, 30 October 1873, p. 3. 
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after their discovery as possible, not least to enable the timely collection of 
revenue from miners' licences and the l ike.m Moreover, the situation on 
the Palmer was probably the first where there was a foreseeable prospect 
that many lives would be lost primarily because of the lack of infi-astructiu-e 
(roads, bridges and telegraph), as opposed to previous losses on other fields 
due to lawlessness or clashes with Aborigines, which could be remedied in 
part by the provision at relatively short notice of a police contingent. 
In addition to the humanitarian concerns being expressed in 
newspapers, the Government was also under some pressure from the 
media on issues of 'development', and over reports that 'the rising of the 
rivers about Christmas will completely cut off all commiuiication between 
the new diggings and the outside world for several months'.112 The 
Etheridge-based correspondent of the Cleveland Bay Express, for example, 
not only urged 'the Government to lose no time in causing an examination 
of the country between the Eastern Coast and the new goldfields', but noted 
that 
The manner in which the South Australian Government 
is pushing ahead its Northern goldfields should be an 
example to the Government of Queensland, n^ 
With an election looming in early December, the Government of 
Premier Palmer also did not want a repeat of the Canoona incident of 1858 
darkening its election prospects. Much more palatable, from the point of 
view of impressing the electorate, were newspaper editorials which asserted 
that 'great credit is unquestionably due to the Government for their prompt 
action in the emergency consequent on the rush to the Psdmer goldfields'.n^ 
Similarly, Premier Palmer would no doubt have been hoping to bask 
electorally in some of the glory of a successful expedition by Macmillan and 
St George, such as 
... to Mr Palmer as the head of the government we are 
indebted for the foresight and energy with which the 
111 A gold commissioner was not appointed to the Gilbert River goldfields until some 
three months after its discovery in April 1869. But Howard St George, as gold 
commissioner at Gilberton, moved his field headquarters to Georgetown within 
weeks of the discovery of gold at the Etheridge in October 1871: See Brown, 'A 
History of the Gilbert River Goldfield ...', pp. 6 and 39. 
112 See The Brisbane Courier, 18 October 1873, p. 6. 
113 As reproduced in The Brisbane Courier, 18 October 1873, p. 6. 
11'* Editorial comment in response to the government's decision to investigate the 
Mitchell River: The Brisbane Courier, 30 October 1873, p. 3. 
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combined expeditions ... have been carried out. 
Mr Palmer's weaknesses are certainly not those of 
want of energy. 115 
The Arrival of the Expeditions at the Endeavour River 
The first of the expeditions to arrive at the Endeavoiu* River was 
Dalrymple's on 24 October 1873. Even though Dalrjmiple had arranged with 
Sellheim that he would not be there xuitil 1 November, the prospect of such 
an historic rendezvous prompted him to cut short his expedition of the coast 
and head for the Endeavour River.n^ It seems unlikely that Dalrymple did 
so just to beat Macmillan and St George, whose expedition he presumably 
knew nothing of, although it is possible that he could have learnt of their 
inuninent arrival fi*om the captain of a passing vessel. Certainly, 
Dalrjrmple seemed duly flabbergasted when the SS Leichhardt steamed into 
the Endeavour River on 25 October, one day after his own arrival.n^ 
Dalrymple was, however, clearly peeved that his initiative had been 
upstaged by St George (who, in turn, failed even to mention Dalrymple's 
presence at the Endeavour River in his first report to the Secretary for Lands 
and Mines).ii^ In a letter to the Colonial Secretary of 30 October 1873, 
Dalrymple acknowledged receipt of the new instructions from Brisbane 
advising that Sellheim had been ordered not to proceed to the Endeavour 
River and, with a tinge of sarcasm, reported that he had been about to carry 
out his previously-given instructions 'to report ... on the feasibility of 
forming a settlement here' when interrupted by St George's arrival.n^ 
DalrjTnple also reported that his offer of 'every assistance in my 
power' had been declined by both St George and Macmillan. In what should 
probably be seen as a fit of pique, Dahjnnple then decided to split his own 
expedition with him returning alone to Cardwell to seek official approval for 
115 See The Brisbane Courier, 26 November 1873, p. 2. In the event, Palmer's 
government was defeated at the election. 
11^ In his journal, Dalrymple justified his early arrival by explaining that if he had 
waited longer, unfavourable winds could have prevented him from making the 
rendezvous: Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 633. 
11*^  Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 634. 
11^ H. St George to the Secretary for Lands and Mines, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598 of 
1873, WOR/A74, QSA. 
11^ See letter G.E. Dalrymple to Colonial Secretary, 30 October 1873, in-letter 1570 of 
1873, COL/A185, QSA It seems most unlikely, though, that Dalrymple ever had 
instructions to report on the feasibility of a settlement. 
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a revised plan of exploration. 120 In the event, he and his party departed the 
Endeavour River in the SS Leichhardt on 31 October. In the meantime, the 
landing at the Endeavour River had been transformed as early as the 
afternoon of the 25th into a bustling settlement, with 
... men hurrying to and fro, tents rising in all directions, 
horses grazing, and neighing to their mates , all around 
us - the shouts of sailors and labourers landing more 
horses and cargo, combined with the rat t l ing of the 
donkey engine, cranes and chains. 121 
Surprisingly, though, it was not until 31 October — six days after their 
arrival — tha t Macmillan and St George were ready to leave for the Palmer, 
a somewhat inexplicable delay given the Government's urgency in 
mounting the expedition and tha t it was going to take at least another seven 
to ten days for them to reach the Palmer. 
One explanation, and probably the most likely, is tha t it took the 
best par t of the first week ashore to unload the stores, set up a temporary 
encampment, conduct a limited reconnaissance of the immediate area and 
determine the preliminary direction of the route to the Palmer. That 
accords with the journal notes of an unidentified member of the expedition 
who recorded: 
Saturday 25th -• preparation for landing the horses 
and choosing a place for the police 
c a m p 
• Sunday 26th - reconnaissance of the Endeavour 
River 
Monday 27th - crew landed the horses etc. 
Macmillan and St George rode 
out to Mount Cook 
• Tuesday 28th - Macmillan conducted prel iminary 
reconnaissance 'for the purpose 
of deciding on the best road to the 
Palmer ' (and remained away 
Tuesday night) 
120 Farnfield explains Dalrymple's return to Cardwell as simply 'an opportunity to 
reorganize the expedition': 'George Elphinstone Dalrymple ...', p. 305. But the 
correspondent to the Cleveland Bay Express claims that 'a fracas had occurred 
between the leader and some members of the expedition which necessitated 
Dalrymple's return to Cardwell': see The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
121 Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 635. 
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Wednesday 29th - crew employed surveying and 
landing stores 
Thiusday 30th - diggers started (along the 'clear 
road for twenty-two miles' 
marked by Macmillan) 
Friday 31st - SS Leichhardt departed. 
Macmillan and St George 
readying to start out for 
the Palmer. 122 
That schedule represents, however, a reasonably leisurely pace of 
activities, given that the same expedition had been able to load all its stores 
in foiu separate ports and steam some 1700 kilometres in the previous ten 
days. A second explanation, therefore, £ind one not mutually exclusive of 
the first, is that Macmillan and St George were determined not to leave the 
establishment of the fledgling settlement in the hands of Dalr3Tnple, who 
could have claimed — had they left for the Palmer on say, Monday 27 
October — that it was he who arrived at the landing first and that it was he 
who supervised the establishment of the settlement. 123 
A Temporary Encampment or Permanent Settlement? 
That rather conspiratorial possibility leads to the question of 
whether it was the Government's intention to establish a permanent 
settlement at the Endeavour River, or whether the Macmillan/St George 
expedition was primarily a 'rescue mission', with the Endeavour River 
landing a convenient but temporary setting off point. The issue is made 
uncertain by the fact that the file copy of the instructions fi-om the Under-
Secretary of Works to Macmillan has the sentence crossed out reading '[y]ou 
will also select a suitable site for a Township on the Endeavoiu'. 124 What is 
not clear is whether Macmillan's copy was similarly amended or, indeed, 
whether the sentence was later re-inserted. 
In their respective reports to Brisb£me dated 30 October 1873, both 
Macmillan and St George make several mentions of 'the township'. 
122 See The Brisbane Courier, 13 November 1873, p. 3. 
123 There was, for example, no-one of any authority in the Macmillan/St George 
expedition who had been charged with remaining at the settlement when the two co-
leaders departed for the Palmer. 
124 See letter Under-Secretary of Works to A.C. Macmillan, undated October 1873, 
letter-book 1653 of 1873, W0R/G8, QSA. 
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Macmillan, for example, specifically reported that 'I have chosen the 
immediate neighbourhood of Captain Cook's landing for the Township'.125 
St George similarly reported that he and Macmillan had 'proceeded about 
twelve miles up the river in search of an eligible site for a Township, but 
could [find] none possessing anything like the advantages of the landing 
place where the ship lies'.126 Moreover, Macmillan — a surveyor by trade — 
actually marked out the main street and the location of several areas 
reserved for official purposes. 12"^  It certainly seems, therefore, that 
Macmillan either had, or thought he had, instructions to establish the 
beginnings of a permanent settlement at Cook's Town. 128 
Subsequent events, however, cast some doubt on whether 
Macmillan was so instructed and, indeed, give a touch of substsmce to the 
possibility that he and St George had 'established the settlement' to counter 
the prospect that Dalr5miple might otherwise have done so in their absence. 
The first shadow of doubt comes from newspaper editorials and official 
correspondence which, in referring to the success of their expedition, only 
ever mentioned that their task had been to open a road from the Endeavour 
River to the Palmer goldfields. 129 More significantly, the Government in 
January 1874 sent James Read, from the Lands Department in Brisbane, 'to 
select a town site, survey a number of suitable town allotments and mark off 
wharf frontages', a tasking which hardly would have been necessary if 
Macmillan had indeed been duly authorised to do the same in October 
1873.130 
Even after that survey by Read, however, it is evident that the 
Government still had serious doubts over the viability of the settlement, 
notwithstanding the rapid influx of would-be miners between November 
1873 and February 1874. Having just witnessed the 'boom to bust' demise of 
Gilberton, the newly-elected premier, Arthur Macalister, said that he was 
125 A.C. Macmillan to the Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598 of 1873, 
WOR/A74, QSA. 
126 H. St George to the Secretary for Lands and Mines, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598 of 
1873, WOR/A74, QSA. 
Reported in official mining news, as published in Brisbane Courier, 21 January 
1874, p. 3. 
The name Cook's Town was first used, in official correspondence, by Howard St 
George on 24 November 1873, in a telegraphed report to the Colonial Secretary: as 
published in The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
See, for example, a report by courtesy of the Colonial Secretary, published in The 
Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
Read's instructions reported in official mining news, as published in The Brisbane 
Courier, 21 January 1874, p. 3. 
129 
130 
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prepared to spend money on Cooktown 'as soon as the place gave indications 
of its permanency'.131 Another member of Parliament, in the same debate, 
said that 'he would not vote a farthing for Cooktown, as he was in daily 
expectation that [the bureaucracy] ... would demand a large sum to bring 
the diggers back, as in the case of the Canoona rush sixteen years before'. 132 
That comment, at least, needs to be seen in the context of the 'emergency' 
which arose over the Palmer in February 1874 and the 'return' rush of April 
1874, as will be discussed shortly. 
The Road to the Pahner Goldfields 
When Macmillan and St George departed the Endeavour River on 
31 October, their expectation was that it would take them about a week to 
reach the Palmer River. Macmillan intended that his first trip would be a 
'flying survey' and, accordingly, left the bulk of his staff at the Endeavour 
River, with instructions to erect the government store and clear mangroves 
from the landing point. 133 As it turned out, finding a route to the Palmer 
proved easier but more time consuming than expected and their party, 
along with eighty-six diggers, reached the goldfields on 12 November after a 
190-kilometre trek.i34 Macmillan reported that the route would require 
some clearing of timber to make it accessible to drays, but could be used 
henceforth by pack animals. 
Once at the Palmer, Macmillan and St George found that their 
arrival had come none too soon, as the 500 men at the diggings were 
completely out of supplies. The reason, however, was not flooded rivers 
between the Etheridge and the Palmer, but drought conditions between 
Townsville and Georgetown, which had turned the country into 'almost a 
desert' (with no forage available for dray teams). 135 St George decided. 
131 From parliamentary reporting, as reproduced in The Cooktown Herald and Palmer 
River Advertiser (CHPRA), 13 May 1874, p. 3. Macalister would also have been 
conscious of the six other failed settlements on coastal northern Australia, namely 
Fort Dundas (1824-29), Fort Wellington (1827-29), Port Essington (again from 1838-
49), Gladstone (1847) and Palmerston (1864-67): see P. Bell, 'Houses and Mining 
Settlement in North Queensland 1861-1920', PhD thesis, James Cook University, 
Townsville, 1982, p. 37. 
132 CHPRA, 13 May 1874, p. 3. 
133 See Macmillan to the Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598 of 1873, 
WOR/A74, QSA. 
134 See letter St George to Secretary for Works and Mines dated 16 November 1873, in-
letter 158 of 1874, WOR/A77, QSA. 
135 See telegram St George to Colonial Secretary, 24 November 1873, in-letter 2483 of 
1873, COL/A189, QSA. 
therefore, to send all the available packhorses on the Palmer, some 200 in 
niunber, back to the Endeavour River with fifty diggers to collect more 
rations. Macmillan, incidentally, would also retiu-n to the Endeavoiu* and 
prepare to withdraw his party by 1 December, his duty done. 
In the event, Macmillan left the Endeavour River confident that the 
'main object of the expedition [had been] fully realised' and that because the 
Palmer was completely out of supplies, 'the action of the government in 
sending out this expedition ... [has been] fiilly justified'. 136 Nevertheless, the 
miners 'rescued' by Macmillan and St George were never really 'trapped' 
and were unlikely to die fi-om starvation, given that the route back to the 
Etheridge was still open to them, albeit that the lack of forage would have 
made it a difficult trek for stock. The paradox, therefore, is that in opening a 
temporarily more accessible route via the Endeavour River, Macmillan and 
St George unwittingly exacerbated the eventual emergency of February 1874, 
by facilitating the ingress of several himdred more miners to the Palmer, as 
well as providing those gdready there with the expectation that the 
Government would come to their eventual assistance. 
The 'Emergency' of February 1874 
Despite continuing warnings in the media for would-be miners 
fi-om southern ports to stay away until after the wet season, the opening of 
the route from the Endeavour River resulted in a flood of new arrivals at 
Cooktown. The Brisbane Courier, for example, reported in mid January 
that 
In addition to the miners which every steamer from the 
south is bringing ... vessels are being laid on specially at 
Sydney and Melbourne, and it is said ... at Adelaide and 
at more than one of the New Zealand ports. A month 
hence the little harbour at Cookstown will probably be 
choke-ftill.137 
As well as would-be miners, most ships also brought an increasing 
number of small businessmen and women, intent on capitalizing on the 
thriving market for supplies and services. The Townsville correspondent to 
The Brisbane Courier, for example, reported in mid December that many 
1^ 6 See his interim report, reproduced in The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
1^^ The Brisbane Courier, 20 January 1874, p. 2. Indeed, in one week alone in February, 
nine ships berthed at Cooktown: TTie Brisbane Courier, 21 February 1874, p. 4. 
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businessmen have gone there, £ind have taken substantial buildings with 
them'.138 Similarly, a reporter in Brisbane observing the departure of the SS 
Lord Ashley on 16 January, with 150 'adventurers' bound for the Palmer, 
noted that the contingent includes 'several storekeepers, on a small scale, 
who have migrated with their effects in the hope of making a "pile" '.139 
By the middle of February, with the wet season well underway, the 
population of Cooktown had swollen to around 2000, of whom 1000 were 
miners waiting to move to the Palmer. At the Palmer itself were an 
estimated 1600-2000 people, reportedly with no meat and only eight to ten 
tons of flour. 140 On the road between were an estimated 500-1000 would-be 
miners, trapped between flooded rivers and reportedly reduced to eating 
horseflesh.i'*i The Commissioner of Police, D.T. Sejmiour, who was visiting 
Cooktown at the time, ordered the local police sub-inspector to despatch a 
party to the Daintree River (some ninety kilometres south of Cooktown) to 
investigate the possibility of an alternative route to the Palmer. 1^ 2 
In Brisbane, the situation was seized upon by The Brisbane 
Courier, which ran an alarmist editorial on 28 February 1874, speculating 
that 'should relief not reach those three of four thousand perishing men ... 
famine and flood wiU have left few, very few, to tell the story of their 
rashness and their misfortunes'.i'*3 xhe editorial, while enjoining the 
Government to take prompt and resolute action, also sought the views of its 
readers on suggestions for getting relief provisions to the Palmer, hinting 
that 'liberal rewards' would await solutions which resulted in stores and 
cattle getting through to the stranded diggers. At the same time, a report 
reached Brisbane advising that the party despatched to the Daintree River by 
the Commissioner of Police had been unsuccessful in opening a track to the 
Palmer.144 
138 The Brisbane Courier, 15 December 1873, p. 3. 
139 The Brisbane Courier, 17 January 1874, p. 4. 
140 From the report to the Colonial Secretary by Commissioner of Police Seymour: The 
Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1874, p. 2. 
141 From the same report, The Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1874, p. 2. 
142 That was the route suggested earlier by Dalrymple, as an alternative to the route 
being attempted by A.C. Macmillan: See Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', p. 649-50. 
143 The Brisbane Courier, 28 February 1874, p. 4. The figure of 3000-4000 seems 
considerably exaggerated. 
144 Reported in The Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 2. An earlier report, dated 
20 November 1873, had advised that Fahey's expedition to the Mitchell River found 
no access to the Palmer River diggings from the west: as reproduced in The 
Brisbane Courier, 25 November 1873, p. 3. 
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The editorial in The Brisbane Courier prompted a range of 
suggestions fi-om its readers, some seemingly sensible, some rather 
outlandish. Dalrymple, who by that time had retired in ill-health to 
Brisbane, suggested using rubber dinghies to ferry stores across the flooded 
rivers. 145 Another reader suggested using 'a rocket apparatus ... to convey 
stock or any other conunodity across rivers of not too great magnitude'. 146 
Another suggested a ste£miship-bome transit of the Kennedy River via 
Princess Charlotte Bay, while another urged that station owners be offered a 
bonus of £5 per head of cattle delivered to the Palmer within three weeks.147 
The Government, in the meantime, was certainly not sitting on its 
hands. The police expedition which had been luisuccessful in finding a 
route via the Daintree River was redirected to the mouth of the Bloomfield 
River at Weary Bay, with instructions to try again fi-om there. 148 And the 
police inspector at Cooktown reported in late February that he was about 'to 
try for a new road to the Palmer ... [and expected] to reach Georgetown in 
three weeks'. 149 As it turned out, the wet season abated suddenly and, by 12 
March 1874, the road fi-om Cooktown to the Palmer was again open.i^o 
In the minds of many Brisbane-based bureaucrats and politicians 
alike, the 'emergency' of February 1874 was further proof of the uncertain 
viability of Cooktown as the access port for the Palmer River. Their 
concerns were exacerbated by William Hann, for example, leader of the 1872 
expedition into the area, who continued to promote the possibility of a route 
via the Kennedy River to Princess Charlotte Bay, and George Dalrjnnple's 
continuing to insist that a route via the Daintree River 'provided the nearest 
and best way to reach the Palmer'.i^i By mid April 1874, however, the 
initial qualms of the 'doubters' were largely overshadowed by growing 
scepticism as to the viability of the Palmer itself. 
145 Dalrymple to Colonial Secretary, 6 March 1874, in-letter 471 of 1874, COL/A192, 
QSA. 
146 The Brisbane Courier, 28 February 1874, p. 5. 
147 See The Brisbane Courier, 2 March 1874, p. 3 and 3 March 1874, p. 3. 
148 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 2. Dalrymple, however 
remained convinced that a route from the Daintree was viable and attributed the 
failure of the police party to the fact that they had not taken the route which he had 
recommended: See Fairnfield, 'George Elphinstone Dalrymple ...', p. 311. 
149 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 2. 
150 See The Brisbane Courier, 13 March 1874, p. 2. 
151 See reports in The Brisbane Courier, 22 April 1874, p. 3. 
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The 'Return' Rush of April 1874 
As early as mid-March 1874, The Brisbane Courier had questioned 
the justification for 'the mad impulse which has spread from Cape St 
Vincent to Queensland', noting that 
no appreciable increase in the exports of gold from the 
Northern ports is perceptible, and not a skittle of trust-
worthy evidence can be produced to authorise the 
impetuosity which leads so many to seek what, we 
fear, will prove the grave of themselves and their 
delusive expectations. 1^ 2 
Those comments were somewhat unfounded given that correspondents in 
January 1874 were consistently reporting that most of the 600 miners then at 
the diggings were making at least one ounce of gold per day and that 
storekeepers, in particular, were hoarding large quantities awaiting the 
first police escort of gold out of the Palmer after the wet season. 1^ 3 
By early April 1874, though, with hundreds of would-be miners 
stranded either at Cooktown or on the road between there and the Palmer, 
many individuals were becoming increasingly disconsolate at their 
prospects of ever reaching the diggings. Moreover, the exorbitant price of 
provisions at the Palmer, coupled with the extremely harsh conditions, 
resulted in a number of diggers quitting the field, even though some were 
reportedly gleaning as much as three ounces of gold per day.i^4 There was 
also the suggestion that 'New Zealanders, Victorians and all except very few 
of the New South Wales men are not able to stand this climate ... [whereas] 
the Northern Queensland diggers ... can do moderately well'.i^^ 
On 7 April 1874, in what was the start of a 'return rush', 200 
disgruntled miners quit Cooktown on the SS Lord Ashley, bound for 
Townsville, claiming that the Palmer diggings would only support 1000 
152 Editorial in The Brisbane Courier, 12 March 1874, p. 2. 
153 See, for example, The Brisbane Courier, 6 January 1874, p. 3 and 10 January 1874, 
p. 5. 
154 Gold commissioner St George reported on 25 March that miners were leaving the 
Palmer at the rate of 50-80 per day: The Brisbane Courier, 15 April 1874,, p. 3. 
155 See the letter from an unidentified correspondent in The Brisbane Courier, 27 April 
1874, p. 3. 
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men.156 On 10 April, an unruly group of about 600-700 ex-miners attempted 
to gain free passage out of Cooktown on the SS Florence Irving by rushing 
the gangplank; in the ensuing 'riot', the mate of the vessel was seriously 
injured and police were assaulted before arresting three of the 
ringleaders. 157 Once order was restored, 400 of the miners departed on the 
vessel. The Townsville correspondent of The Brisbane Courier, in reporting 
the incident, claimed that 'there are 4000 people at Cooktown waiting to 
return southwards'. 158 
Clearly, the Townsville correspondent's reporting of the numbers 
in Cooktown waiting to return southwards was grossly exaggerated, 
perhaps tenfold, and £tn example of the developing rivalry between the two 
townships. It is apparent also, however, that business and civic leaders in 
Cooktown recognised the effect that such adverse publicity would have on 
their settlement, as evidenced by the fact that from mid-April onwards, both 
The Cooktown Courier and The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River 
Advertiser inexplicably stopped reporting the number of persons departing 
Cooktown by ship. Moreover, from that time onwards, both newspapers 
started to run 'pro-Cooktown' editorials, actively promoting the viability of 
the settlement and scotching any rumours (often emanating from 
Townsville) that Cooktown was under threat.i59 
The reality was, however, that at least 1052 disgruntled miners 
shipped out of Cooktown in April 1874, followed by 437 in early May.i^^ 
Moreover, another 500 or so men, 'penniless and destitute', remained in 
Cooktown unable to pay their fare south.i^i Although the numbers arriving 
in Cooktown were more than double the number of departures in April and 
May 1874, the adverse publicity generated by the 'return rush' of April 1874 
15^ See The Brisbane Courier, 13 April 1874, p. 2. Twenty four men had left a week 
earlier on the Victoria and 40 on 2 April on the Wonga Wonga: as detailed in 
CHPRA, 1 April 1874 and 8 April 1874. 
15"^  See the report of Inspector McKiernan on the incident in The Brisbane Courier, 
15 April 1874, p. 3. 
158 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 14 April 1874, p. 2. 
159 The Cooktown Courier's editorial of 22 April 1874, for example, rebutted the rumour 
that the settlement was likely to be removed to Princess Charlotte Bay: The 
Cooktown Courier, 22 April 1874, p. 2. The extent to which business and civic leaders 
subsequently 'talked up' the prospects of Cooktown is addressed in more detail in 
Chapter 7 'Boom to Bust'. 
160 Figures compiled from passenger sailings reported in The Brisbane Courier from 
1 April to 8 June 1874. It is possible that at least that number again may have quit 
Cooktown for other southern ports. 
1^ 1 In the event, authorities in Cooktown subsequently paid the return fares of more than 
600 men: see CHPRA, 10 June 1874, p. 2. 
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was certainly yet another factor in the Government's unwillingness to 
commit funds to the town. 
Cooktown's Transition to a Township 
At what point the Government finally decided to accept the reality 
of Cooktown's transition to a township, or at least a permanent settlement 
deserving of government support, is difficult to discern. The process by 
which it occurred is discussed in Chapter 4 'Tent City to Town' and, in a 
formal sense, Cooktown attained township status with its incorporation as a 
municipality in July 1876. In terms of the turning point in the transition, 
though, it could be argued that the Government's decision to send James 
Read to survey a site for the township in January 1874 was the critical event. 
On the other, it could be argued that it was arrival in late April 1874 of 
prefabricated buildings for a customs house and post office which marked 
the first real commitment by Government to the settlement. i^ 2 
In terms of an event or incident at Cooktown itself, however, it 
probably was the successful auction of Crown land of 19 May 1874 which 
convinced the authorities in Brisbane that, in the minds of the residents of 
the town anyway, Cooktown had a viable future. At that auction, 135 of the 
139 allotments offered for sale by the Government were purchased for a total 
price of £2938, almost three times the upset value.1^3 Even though an 
editorial in The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser asserted that 
much more would have been raised had the sale been held two months 
previously, 'when fi-ontages to the main street [being sold privately] were 
fetching absurd prices', it seems that the Government was sufficiently 
heartened by the response to loosen its own purse strings, i^ ^ Certainly, the 
expenditure by the Government of some £8200 on public works in Cooktown 
in the financial year 1874/75, against only £889 in 1873/74, would suggest 
that the turning point occurred after the inaugural land sale of May 1874.1^5 
1^^ That represented a committed expenditure, once constructed, of £889 in the 
financial year to 30 June 1874, the first public expenditure to appear against 
Cooktown: see Queensland Government Gazette [QGG], XV, 1874, p. 105 for 
the tender details. 
1^^ See List of Crown Lands Offered for Sale by Public Auction at Cooktown, 18 May 
1874, LAN/AB 27, QSA. 
164 CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. 
165 Figures compiled from various expenditure summaries in QGG, XVI, 1875 and 
XVII, 1876. 
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Putting 'An Uncertain Beginning' into Perspective 
In many respects, Cooktown was probably no different to a host of 
other Australian coastal towns, established in the nineteenth century, 
which struggled in their formative years to attract recognition and funding 
from their respective colonial or state capital. An historical accoimt of the 
early years of Cairns, Cardwell, Bowen, Coffs Harbour, Port Macquarie, 
Portland, Robe, Millicent, Albsiny, Esperance or Broome, for example, 
would likely bear striking similarities to m£iny of the trials and tribulations 
of Cooktown. 166 
The major differences would be that most successful coastal towns, 
established in the late nineteenth century, had a good harbour, a suitable 
and contiguous site for a settlement, at least one viable primary industry 
either operating from the port or within their hinterland and good 
communication linkages both to their hinterland and their markets. 
Cooktown, as has been argued in this chapter, compared 
favourably only in terms of its excellent harbour. Its site — selected 
primarily as a point of access for resupplying the Palmer River goldfields — 
had little to do with its suitability for settlement. Moreover, Cooktown had 
only one primary industry within its hinterland and that with an uncertain 
long-term viability. Finally, the communications linkages between 
Cooktown and its hinterland were tenuous, to say the least. 
Cooktown was only ever going to flourish, therefore, if its main 
supporting industry flourished, namely the Palmer River and associated 
goldfields, or if it was able to diversify as a market outlet or processing or 
service centre for other industries or settlements. Obviously, it is easy to be 
wise with the benefit of hindsight. Later chapters, however, will argue that 
especially given Cooktown's 'uncertain beginning' and tenuous raison 
d'etre, successive governments in Brisbane should have been far more 
critical in their assessment of Cooktown's viability and prospects, and — 
notwithstanding the h3rperbole coming from certain business and civic 
leaders in Cooktown — should have detected the demise of the town years 
before they did. 
166 A comparative analysis between Cooktown and similar-sized coastal towns 
elsewhere in Queensland and Australia, albeit limited, is included in Chapter 8 
'Conclusions'. 
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Before proceeding to that analysis, it would seem useful to examine 
the impact that the European settlement of Cooktown had on traditional 
Aboriginal society in the area between the Endeavour River and the Pahner 
River gold-fields. 
» 
CHAPTER 3 - THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN 
Aborigines rate barely a mention in typical earlier accounts of the 
history of Cooktown. Usually, they are mentioned only in terms of the 
hardships they inflicted on would-be miners travelHng from Cooktown to the 
Palmer River goldfields. Indeed, most contemporary accounts of Aborigines 
in the early days of Cooktown centred either on their supposedly barbaric 
behaviour (the most favoured are their 'dastardly* attack on the defenceless 
Mary Watson — for whom a memorial still stands in Cooktown's main 
street — and their allegedly cannibalistic preference for Chinese), or Boys 
Own -type stories of their demise at the hands of'heroic' white explorers 
and prospectors. 
The reality was that 'the coming of the white man' to Cooktown, 
starting with Cook's visit in 1770 and culminating in the Pedmer River rush 
of the early 1870s, probably resulted directly in the killing of around 190 
able-bodied Aboriginal men, effectively 'gutting* two key generations from 
the seven tribal groups living astride the route between Cooktown and the 
Palmer River.i The loss of those 190 lives, however, together with probably 
another fifty or sixty men, women and children indiscriminately killed in 
the lust of battle, was only the beginning of the destruction of traditional 
Aboriginal society in the Cooktown-Palmer area. 
Forced from their tribal areas and traditional lifestyles, probably 
two-thirds of the remaining 1700 or so Aborigines progressively succumbed 
over the following twenty years from exposure to European or Chinese 
diseases and ills (smallpox, TB, venereal diseases, pneumonia, alcoholism, 
opium addiction etc) or from starvation or malnutrition. By 1897, only 
twenty-five years after the first settlement by Europeans at Cooktown, the 
official statistic for the local Aboriginal population was under 100,2 
although this figure excludes young children in government reserves, and 
A more detailed account and discussion of Aboriginal deaths follows later in this 
chapter under the heading of'The Balance Sheet of Losses'. 
Based on the annual issue of blankets to Aborigines by the Grovernment: see report 
of'Measures recently adopted for the amelioration of the Aborigines', Votes and 
proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2, 1897, p. 46. The 
total number of Aborigines was probably around 200-300. 
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the small number of Aborigines probably still chnging to a traditional 
lifestyle in the Cooktown hinterland. 
The intensity of racial conflict in the Cooktown-Palmer area does, 
however, reinforce the modem view of a white 'invasion' of Australia, 
against the earlier notion (and legal doctrine) of terra nullius. It also makes 
a mockery of the seeming neglect of early historians to address (or even 
acknowledge) the issue of racial conflict, as well as the equally myopic view 
that 
settlement by the British has usually proceeded without 
much resistance. The blacks have kindly assisted in 
their dispossession ... submitting contentedly to indignation 
and oppression ... with gentleness and service.^ 
Notwithstanding such misrepresentations, it is equally clear that 
many of the contemporary accounts of racial conflict in the Cooktown-
Palmer area were considerably exaggerated or distorted. On the jittery 
edge of a violent frontier, it is perhaps understandable that the report of an 
isolated clash between Aborigines and miners would often be transformed 
in the passage of its retelling to a more serious confi-ontation or a string of 
bloody encounters. Less understandable is why later writers would 
perpetuate such exaggerated accounts, with Holthouse in River of gold, for 
example, contending (with no apparent basis) that 'hundreds of Chinese and 
whole tribes of blacks were to die in the relentless fighting before the rush 
was over'."* 
This chapter aims, therefore, to refute the more fanciful accoimts 
of early race relations in the Cooktown area, including those relating to the 
violation of white women by Aborigines and of Chinese being strung up by 
their pigtails in Aboriginal 'kitchens', awaiting the cooking pot of their 
captors. More importantly, it addresses the underlying reasons for 
Aboriginal resistance to 'the coming of the white man' and differentiates 
between the impact on Aboriginal society of the early explorers against the 
^ J. Mathew, Eaglehawk and crow: a study of the Australian Aboriginal, Nutt, 
London, 1899, Preface. 
4 H. Holthouse, River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1967, p. 36. 
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more permanent (and pervasive) presence of later prospectors, miners and 
settlers. 
What seems evident is that it was the explorers of Far North 
Queensland, rather than early white settlers or miners, who 'set the stage' 
for the fi-ontier conflict which ultimately resulted in the demise of the 
Aboriginal people aroimd Cooktown. It also seems hkely that it was the 
imusually long period of intermittent contact in the area, spanning close to 
100 years, which resulted in racial conflict as violent, and an Aboriginal 
response as purposeful, as perhaps an3rwhere else in AustraUa. 
But did the settlement of Cooktown itself, or the passage of men 
and stock along a single, narrow track to the Palmer River (some 200 
kilometres distant), really pose a serious threat to Aboriginal control of the 
region's natursd resources? Was it not possible (with the admitted benefit of 
hindsight) that the two cultures could have existed side-by-side during the 
formative years of Cooktown? And given the rugged, almost impenetrable 
nature of the terrgdn inland from Cooktown, why did the Aboriginal groups 
astride the route to the Pahner continue to harass whites and Chinese who 
largely were only transiting their tribal leinds? 
Surely, it seems far-fetched to suggest that there could have been 
any collusion, in a tactical or strategic sense, between Aborigines from the 
Palmer River (who were certainly directly threatened by mining activities) 
and those who hved astride the supply line from Cooktown, 
notwithstanding that word of white activities would have been passed from 
group to group. Moreover, most of the notorious clashes occurred around 
Hell's Gate, midway between Cooktown and the Palmer, and presumably 
involved Aborigines whose best option would have been to allow the 
trespassers to pass unimpeded. 
The explanation advanced in this chapter is that racial conflict in 
the Cooktown area needs to be seen in the context of a self-perpetuating but 
ultimately one-sided cycle of violence, exacerbated by the prevailing 
European notions of racial superiority and, fi-om 'the other side of the 
frontier', by the relative vulnerability of white and Chinese trespassers to 
Aboriginal 'guerilla' tactics. The question which remains unanswered, 
perhaps to be taken up by an anthropologist, is why there never emerged an 
m 
Aboriginal guerilla-type leader, not least from the disaffected ranks of the 
Queensland Native Police Force. 
The Aborigines of the Cooktown-Palmer River Region 
The destruction of traditional Aboriginsd society wrought by the 
coming of the white man to the Cooktown-Palmer River region has 
obviously made difficult an accurate assessment of the tribal groups, clans 
and moieties which existed in the area before 1770. Captain Cook saw only 
twenty-one Aborigines during his stay at the Endeavour River, comprising 
twelve men, seven women, one boy and a girl.^ But as discussed earlier in 
Chapter 2, in the section headed 'The Original Inhabitants', it seems 
probable that the area within a twenty-kilometre radius of the Endeavour 
River sustained an Aboriginal population of around 250-300 people, made 
up of elements of three tribal groups.^ 
Interestingly, it is evident from Cook's description of visits to his 
ship by Aborigines on 10 July and 19 July 1770 that the local group moved 
freely between the north and south banks of the Endeavour River, 
suggesting that the river was not a tribal boundary."^ At first glance, that 
tallies with the tribal designation and distribution classification used by 
Tindale, who portrayed (see Map 3.1 over) the local Aboriginal group as the 
Koko-Bujundi, with a territorial area from Rossville in the south, extending 
northwards some forty kilometres along the coast to a point about five 
kilometres north of the Endeavour River, and westwards some twenty 
kilometres inland to the Annan-Normanby Divide.^ Further north, 
according to Tindale, was the tribal area of the Koko-Imudji, extending 
some fifty kilometres along the coast almost to Cape Flattery and inland 
some forty kilometres almost to the infamous Battle Camp.^ 
^ See J. Hawkesworth, An account of the voyages undertaken by order of his present 
Majesty for making discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, Vol. 4, Strahan and 
Cadell, London, 1783, p. 205. 
® That assessment, which was attributed in Chapter 2 to B.F. Craig and A.P. Elkin, 
is corroborated by R.M.W. Dixon, 'Tribes, languages and other boundaries in 
Northeast Queensland' in N. Peterson (ed.), Tribes and boundaries in Australia, 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra, 1976, p. 207. 
'^  See A.W. Reed (ed.). Captain Cook in Australia, Reed, Sydney, 1969, pp. 94 and 98. 
«• N.B. Tindale, Aboriginal tribes of Australia, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, Map 
'Australia NE Sheet'. 
® Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, Map 'Australia NE Sheet'. 
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Map 3.1 - The Designation and Distribution of Aboriginal 
Groups in the Cooktown-Pahner River Region 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4 
S. 
6* 
7. 
Koko-jawa 
Koko-wara 
Koko-imudji 
Koko-walandja 
Koko-bididji 
Koko-bujundi 
Koko-jelandi 
Source: N.B. Tindale, Aboriginal tribes of Australia, ANU Press, 
Canberra, 1974, Map 'Australia NE Sheet". * 
Several other anthropologists, though, seem to differ with Tindale, 
both over names and tribal areas. Davidson, for example, contended in an 
earher study that the tribal area around the Endeavour River belonged to 
the Koko-Yimoji (with the clans ICai-ar-a at Mount Cook and Koko-Yalyu at 
Grassy Hill).io Equally perplexing was the description by Craig in 1967 of 
the group to the north of the Endeavour River as the Gugu-Jimidir and the 
southern group as the Gugu-Njunngal.^^ Local historisins have similarly 
confused the issue, with Woolston talking of the Gogo-Yimidir tribe and 
10 
11 
See D.S. Davidson, A preliminary register of Australian tribes and hordes, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1938, p. 52. 
See B.F. Craig, Cape York: occasional papers in Aboriginal studies Number 9, 
AustraHan Institute of Aboriginal Studies, Canberra, 1967, Map Y. 
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Trezise asserting that the group aroimd Cooktown (and some 100 
kilometres to the west) was the Gugu-Imudji!^^ 
In part, the explanation would seem to lie in pronunciation, either 
as a result of anthropologists interpreting the Aboriginal language or 
because of local variations within and between neighbouring groups or 
clans. The prefix Koko, for example, which designates a total of twelve 
tribal groups in the area between Cape Flattery and Port Douglas, and 
inland to the Pahner River, can alternatively be written in English as Gogo 
or Gugu. Similarly, Aboriginal clans of the Koko-Imudji around Cape 
Flattery pronoiuice their tribal name as Koko-Yimidir, while clans near the 
Endeavour River pronounce it as Koko-Jimoji.^^ 
Taking the two local groups to the north and south of the 
Endeavour River as an example, it can be seen from Table 3.1 below that 
many of the apparent inconsistencies over tribal names are largely 
differences over pronunciation, i^ 
Table 3.1 - Alternative Proniuiciations for Aboriginal Groups 
in the Cooktown Area 
(less the prefix Koko or an alternative spelling) 
Reseatcheit 
Tindale 
Davidson 
Craig 
Woolston 
Trezise 
Other 
Other 
South of the 
Endeavour River 
Bujundi 
not known 
Njunngal 
not known 
not known 
Nyungal 
Bulanji 
North of the 
Endeavour River 
Imudji 
Yimoji 
Jimidir 
Yimidir 
Imudji 
Jimoji 
Yimidjir 
Differences over the delineation of tribal areas are less easy to 
explain, particularly in relation to groups in the vicinity of Cooktown itself. 
12 
13 
14 
See F.P. Woolston, 'The Gogo-Yimidir people and the Endeavour', Queensland 
Heritage, 2, May 1970, pp. 12-22 and P.J. Trezise, Last days of a wilderness, 
Colhns, Sydney, 1973, p. 33. 
See Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, p. 176. 
The same exercise for the other five groups named in Map 3.1 at page 94 would 
reveal similar differences over pronunciation. 
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The most obvious explanation is that Tindale was wrong, at least in his map 
as reproduced at Map 3.1 at page 94, in portraying the tribal area of the 
Koko-Bujiuidi as including the eventual site of Cooktown and the northern 
banks of the Endeavour River. Indeed, in the accompanying text he 
designated the main location of the Koko-Bujundi as the Annan River (eight 
kilometres south of Cooktown) and the main location of the Koko-Imudji as 
Trom Endeavour River (Cooktown) north to ...'A^ 
That would tend to suggest that the tribaJ boundary between the 
Koko-Bujundi and the Koko-Imudji was not the Endeavour River itself, but 
probably Mount Cook some five kilometres to the south. That delineation 
would also help explain why the Aborigines seen by Cook — probably Koko-
Imudji — were able to frequent both sides of the Endeavour River, a 
situation not easily explicable had the river indeed been a tribal boundary. 
The Traditional Aboriginal Lifestyle 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 2, Aborigines in pre-colonial 
Australia not only had clearly-defined tribal areas but their movement 
within such areas was purposeful and dictated by the seasonal availability 
of food, as well as social and ceremonial demands. In the relatively-fertile 
land around Cooktown, the need for mobility was less than in the more 
open, unproductive areas further inland.!^ As a generalisation, the 
movement patterns of the Aborigines of coastal Far North Queensland were 
more often dictated by the climate, with groups tending to travel 'to the 
tablelands diuing the wet season [when the coastal flats were hot, humid 
and insect-ridden] and descend to the coast in winter', providing they could 
access an adequate supply of fresh water. ^ "^  
Against such seasonal movements were the advantages of 
remaining close to the sea-shore. During his stay at the Endeavour River, 
Captain Cook observed local Aborigines in 'a small wooden canoe with 
^^ See Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, p. 176. See also the map in J. and L. Haviland, 'How 
much food will there be in heaven? Lutherans and Aborigines around Cooktown to 
1900', Aboriginal History, 4, 2, 1980, p. 118 showing the tribal area of the Guugu 
Yimidhirr extending from the Annan River almost to Cape Flattery, and westwards 
almost to Battle Camp. 
^^ See Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, pp. 111-2. 
^^ Dixon, 'Tribes, languages and other boundaries', p. 210. 
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outriggers, in which they seem'd to be employed striking fish', although he 
thought that they would not 'dare ventiue ... far out at sea in such a 
vessel'. 1^  Joseph Banks, however, on a brief excursion to Lizard Island 
(some thirty kilometres off Cape Flattery) found clear evidence of periodic 
visits by mainland Aborigines in the form of 'seven or eight frames of [since 
deserted] huts', a finding he appears not to have passed on to Cook.i^ 
Cook also observed several Aborigines wearing 'Necklaces made of 
Shells, which they seem'd to Value, as they would not part with them'.20 
But he saw no evidence that the coastal Aborigines regularly harvested 
oysters, clams or other shellfish 'for if they did we must have seen of these 
... shells on shore about their fire places'.^i Again, Joseph Banks provides a 
contradictory observation, noting that 'we saw near their fire places 
plentifiiU [sic] remains of lobsters, shell fish of all kinds and ... sea 
squirts'. 22 Banks noted in his journal that 'for food they seem to depend 
very much tho' not intirely [sic] upon the sea'.23 
Both Cook and Banks nevertheless agreed that the locals 
appreciated turtle meat. The altercation between Cook's crew and a group 
of Aborigines on 19 July 1770, in which 'a Musquet loaded with small Shott 
[sic] [was fired] at one of the Ring leaders', was over the issue of the 
Aborigines attempting to carry off two (of the twelve) turtles the crew had 
caught the previous day.24 Unrelated to that incident. Cook noted that a 
turtle caught several days later had the remnants of a wooden hsirpoon still 
embedded in its shell, evidence to his mind 'that they strike Turtle, I 
suppose at the Time they come ashore to lay their Eggs, for they certainly 
have no boat fit to do this at Sea, or that will carry a turtle'.^s 
IS Reed, Captain Cook, pp. 92 and 94. 
1® See J.C. Beaglehole (ed.), The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1768-1771, 
Vol. 2, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1962, p. 103. It is acknowledged that Cape 
Flattery is some seventy kilometres to the north of the Endeavour River and that 
the clans aroimd Cooktown may not have been as sea-going as their northern 
neighbours. 
20 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 97. 
21 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 92. 
22 Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, p. 127. 
23 Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, p. 126. 
24 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 98. The incident is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter under the heading of'Early Contact with White Explorers'. 
25 Reed, Captain Cook, p. 99. 
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It seems reasonably apparent, therefore, that at least some of the 
coastal clans depended in part on access to the sea for their hvelihood, 
although it is unclear what proportion of the Aborigines from the two 
coastal groups about the Endeavour River regularly made use of marine 
resources. For those who did, such dependence would have further reduced 
their need for mobility and, indeed, had probably resulted — over a period 
of many generations — in the gradual contraction of the overall size of their 
traditional tribal area.26 Importantly, clans with smaller tribal areas 
are more defensive in attitude, fearing others who 
may usurp their territory and tend to hold closely 
to their own limited territories.2"^ 
Coping with Intruders 
Despite the obvious difficulties faced by twentieth-century 
anthropologists in delineating tribal boundaries in the Cooktown-Palmer 
River region, no such uncertainties would have existed within traditional 
Aboriginal societies. The limits of a tribal area — usually delineated in a 
relatively-fertile region, such as Far North Queensland, by a geographic 
feattue like a river or divide — were effectively barriers which as a rule 
could only be crossed on pain of death.^s 
Tindale contends that 'trespass was a crime ... defined [in 
traditional Aboriginal society] as greater than woman-stealing and even 
greater than the evil doings and magical practices of clever men'.29 In 
practical terms, anyone trespassing on tribal areas 
was looked upon as an intruder and would be called 
upon to give an account of himself and unless he was 
26 Tindale asserts that a position on the sea-shore 'seems to afford a territorial 
advantage of a factor between three and four': Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, pp. 111-2. 
It is interesting to note that of the twelve Koko-groups in his catalogue, the Koko-
Bujundi (and another coastal group around Port Douglas) have the smallest tribal 
areas by far: Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, pp. 176-7. 
2*^  Tindale, A6ori;^ma/^n6es, p. 11. 
28 In more open, less fertile areas the boundaries were often not so clearly delineated 
and may, for example, be a small plain: Dixon, 'Tribes, languages and other 
boundaries', p. 210. 
2® N.B. Tindale, 'Some ecological bases for Australian tribal boundaries' in Peterson, 
Tribes and boundaries, p. 18. 
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accredited as a messanger or herald would pay the 
penalty most likely with his life.^ o 
Such drastic action was reportedly in prospect even where a period of 
friendly encounter between contiguous tribal imits had resulted in a 
niunber of intertribal marriages.^^ 
Against that background, the coming of the white man — in the 
form of sea-borne and land explorers — added a totaJly new dimension to 
the traditional concept of trespass. In some cases. Aboriginal groups seem 
to have persisted in regarding Eiuopeans as possible fiiends, at least until 
they knew otherwise from experience.32 In other cases, white men were 
initially believed to be the reincarnations of departed relatives or tribal 
enemies, thereby inspiring a probable mix of awe, fear and iuicertainty.33 
On balance, it seems that many Aborigines, including those aroimd the 
Endeavour River, initially treated early European trespassers with greater 
consideration than would have been accorded strange blacks who attempted 
to intrude upon their tribal lands.^ 
Indeed, the initial and tj^ Dical response of many Aboriginal groups 
was often a genuine attempt to involve whites in the Aboriginal system of 
reciprocity, which was central to the social organisation and ethical 
standards of traditional society.^ Unfortunately for both sides, the system 
of reciprocity — which involved the concept of sharing and the reciprocal 
exchange of gifts or services — was often not known of, misused or exploited 
by the white trespassers. 
3^ Edward Palmer quoted by Tindale, Aboriginal tribes, p. 77. See also Dixon, Tribes, 
languages and other boundaries', p. 214. 
^^ Tindale in Tribes and boundaries, p. 17. 
^2 See CD. Rowley, The destruction of Aboriginal society, Penguin, Ringwood, 1972, 
p. 159. 
W As discussed in Chapter 2 under "The First White Visitors'. 
^ See H. Reynolds, The other side of the frontier: Aboriginal resistance to the 
European invasion of Australia, Penguin, Ringwood, 1982, p. 39. 
^ See H. Reynolds, 'The other side of the frontier' in H. Reynolds (ed.), Race relations 
in North Queensland, James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 
1978, p. 9. 
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Early Contact with White Explorers 
Mention has already been made of the probability that Malay 
fishermen and traders visited the Gulf of Carpentaria fi"om as early as the 
sixteenth century, giving rise to the prospect that some ventured 
occasionally down the eastern shores of Cape York Peninsula.^^ 
Notwithstanding the possibility that Malays or even the Dutch may have 
put into the Endeavour River before him, Cook's enforced stop-over from 
14 June to 4 August 1770, as he effected major repairs to his ship, remains 
the first documented visit by outsiders to the area.^'' 
In terms of later race relations, the significant occurrence during 
Cook's visit was the clash with local Aborigines on 19 July 1770 over the 
issue of reciprocity, stemming from Cook's disinclination to share captured 
turtles. The background to that clash was that a week earlier, the crew had 
presented gifts of cloth, nails, paper and fish to four Aborigines who came 
out to the ship.-^^ The next day, the Aborigines reciprocated with the gift of 
a small fish, the symbolism of which was obviously missed by Cook and his 
crew, with Banks noting that 'they readily received the things we gave them 
but never would understand our signs when we askd [sic] for retums'.^^ 
The crew's acceptance of the single fish, however, most likely led the 
Aborigines to believe that Cook and his men appreciated the system of 
reciprocity. 
When Cook then refused to share twelve newly-captured large 
turtles (their cross-loading fi-om small boats to the ship would have been 
clearly visible from the shore), the Aborigines were understandably 
mystified.40 At first, the Aborigines attempted to obtain a share through 
negotiation. When that failed they tried simply to take two of the turtles. 
^^ See also the discussion in L. Whitehouse, The northern approaches: Australia in 
old maps, Boolarong, Brisbane, 1994, p. 80 of the map by Father Ricci in 1602, 
suggesting Spanish exploration of the north-east Queensland coast circa 1590-1600. 
®^  Although Cook was understandably preoccupied with overseeing the repairs to his 
ship and making preparations to resume his expedition, Joseph Banks made 
extensive journal entries of his observations ashore, including a comprehensive 
description of the local Aborigines (which takes up fifteen pages of Beaglehole's 
edited version of his journal): see Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, pp. 122-37. 
^ Reed, Captain Cook, p. 94. 
3S Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, p. 125. 
40 For an account of the incident, see Reed, Captain Cook, pp. 98-9. 
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In the ensuing altercation, the Aborigines set fire to dry grass near a shore 
encampment, killing one of the ship's pigs. Cook responded with musket 
fire, wounding one Aborigine. 
From 'the other side of the frontier', therefore. Cook's visit most 
likely found its way into Aboriginal folklore — both locally and passed by 
word of mouth to other groups — in terms of a group of strange trespassers 
who, although they presented no particular threat to the traditional 
Aboriginal hfestyle, were unwilling to share their belongings or food 
supplies and, indeed, resorted to violence to protect their material 
possessions. It was perhaps not unexpected then that forty years later, 
during the second recorded visit of Europeans to the Endeavour River, the 
crew of the Mermaid (under Lieutenant Phillip King) also clashed with 
Aborigines over the issue of reciprocity.'*^ In that incident, on 2 July 1819, 
spears were thrown and shots fired after a group of Aborigines took a 
'violent fane/ to clothes being washed onshore by the sailors. 
The journals of later explorers and prospectors abound with 
further examples of the exploitation or misuse of reciprocity (or perhaps 
simply the failure of whites even to think of their behaviour in terms of 
reciprocity). The Jardine brothers, for example, on their trek along the 
western side of Cape York Peninsula in November 1864 'breakfasted off 
some opossums from a hurriedly-deserted blacks' camp'.42 Similarly, the 
prospector James Venture Mulligan noted in his diary on 13 June 1875 that 
his party 'came upon a blacks' camp ... [and] got a number of large spears, 
boomerangs ... and several other nic-nacs'.'*^ 
Other explorers, notably Ludwig Leichhardt, claimed in their 
defence that they never took anj^thing from the Aborigines 'without giving 
something in retum'.44 Nevertheless, it is evident from Leichhardt's journal 
that his party frequently mis-appropriated Aboriginal property without 
•*^  For an account of the incident, albeit from a white perspective, see R.L. Jack, 
Northmost Australia, Vol. 1, Robertson, Melbourne, 1922, p. 149. 
^ F.J. Byerley (ed.), Narrative of the overland expedition of the Messrs Jardine, 
Buxton, Brisbane, 1867, p. 16. 
^ J.V. Mulligan, 'Expedition in search of gold and other minerals in the Palmer 
Districts by Mulligan and party, QVP, 1, 1876, p. 9. 
^ L. Leichhardt, Journal of an overland expedition in Australia, Boone, London, 1847, 
p. 28. 
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recompense, or bartered items which likely had no reciprocsd value within 
Aboriginal society, the classic being a 'bright shining penny' in payment for 
two appropriated calabashes.^5 
A number of explorers — including Leichhardt — also did not 
even include in their provisions any legitimate articles of barter, probably 
reflecting the prevailing conviction that Aborigines would not (or could not) 
comprehend the 'civilised' concept of barter. In the latter stages of his 
expedition, Leichhardt secreted a number of negotiable items (unwanted 
gun barrels and surplus horse-shoes) rather than allow the local Aborigines 
to have them. 46 
So it is unsurprising that over the space of a number of decades 
and with intermittent but increasing contact with white explorers and 
prospectors. Aborigines became disenchanted with what they would have 
seen as a rejection by Europeans of their traditional system of reciprocity. 
Their common response — often as a S5Tnbolic rejection of the European's 
concept of materialism, or in an attempt to enforce the concept of reciprocity 
— was to engage in the pilfering of white possessions, whenever the 
opportunity presented. 47 Contemporary European conunentators were 
quick to cite the prevalence of pilfering by Aborigines as a deficiency of 
character. 48 But Joseph Banks' observation that the Aborigines he had 
deahngs with 'never once attempted to take any thing in a clandestine 
manner' would support Reynolds' contention that pilfering was a deliberate 
and reactive response to the continuing abuse of reciprocity by whites.49 
The unfortunate but predictable outcome was that whites, as they 
had elsewhere in Australia, responded in turn with harsher counter-
measures. The explorer John Oxley, for ex£imple, decided on 27 September 
1824 to make an example of Aborigines pilfering his camp and shot one of 
them, noting in his journal that 'events of this nature are sure to be 
45 Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, p. 162. 
4^ Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, pp. 150 and 320. 
47 RejTiolds contends that 'to the Aborigines, European possessiveness was morally 
obnoxious': see Reynolds, "The other side', p. 56. 
4^ As cited in Reynolds, 'The other side', p. 56. 
*^ Beaglehole, Joseph Banks, p. 125. 
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communicated fi-om tribe to tribe'.^ Similarly, Ludwig Leichhardt noted on 
20 July 1845 that a group of Aborigines were observing his camp and 
ordered one of his men 'to discharge his gun, in order to drive them awa^.^^ 
Other explorers also used their horses to intimidate would-be 
pilferers. F.T. Gregory in Western Austrgdia noted in his journal on 18 May 
1858 that 'four of us suddenly ... charged them at the full gallop. This 
harmless manoeuvre had the desired effect... [with several nearly] being 
trodden under-foot'.^^ Leichhardt also used his horses on several occasions 
to 'disperse' groups of Aborigines.^^ Nearer to Cooktown, Wilham Hann and 
his party on 17 September 1872 drove their horses at a group of Aborigines 
who had approached his camp seeking back a young boy kidnapped by 
Hann's men. 54 As for the use of firearms, one can but speculate as to 
whether the circumstances necessitated such intimidation. 
It is also evident that the explorers abused the system of 
reciprocity over the issue of sexual relations with Aboriginal women. Such 
subjects were offensive to Victorian (and racial) morality and, although 
there are isolated incidents recorded, it is a topic generally avoided in the 
journals of the explorers. A.C. Gregory's party in Western Austraha in 
October 1848 offended a group of Aborigines by declining their offer of 
sexual relations: 
The women commenced pelting the psirty with stones, 
apparently in revenge for the refusal of certain courteous 
invitations, which perhaps are the greatest marks of 
politeness which they think it possible to offer to strangers.^ 
On a number of occasions, however, it is apparent that the explorers were 
not so remiss. When Gilbert was left in charge of Leichhardt's party on 
^^ See J.G. Steele, The explorers of the Moreton Bay District 1770-1830, Queensland 
University Press, Brisbane, 1972, pp. 148-9. 
^^ Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, p. 456. 
52 A.C. Gregory, Journals of Australian explorations, Beal, Brisbane, 1884, p. 44. 
53 For example, see Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, p. 150. 
54 Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, p. 396. 
55 Gregory, Australian explorations, p. 25. Reynolds notes that 'young women ... were 
frequently dispatched ... to appease ... the strange and threatening white men': see 
Reynolds, The other side', p. 18. 
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18 January 1845, the explorers were offered the 'use of women' and one 
member of the party noted in his journal that 'the travellers had some 
gin'.56 
A certain mystery surrounds the subsequent death of Gilbert in 
June 1845. Leichhardt's journal entry describes the attack by Aborigines 
upon the camp and contends that the attack was the culmination of an 
earlier attempt by Aborigines to steal their bullocks.^^ Chisholm, though, 
contends that the attack was in retaliation for the sexual mis-treatment of a 
native woman by the expedition's Aboriginal guides.^^ Reading back 
through Leichhardt's journal, one notes a number of previous occasions 
when the guides were absent from the camp for inexplicable and prolonged 
periods and one can but speculate as to their whereabouts and 
companions.5^ In summary, while it is appreciated that a number of 
Aboriginal tribes may have offered their women to explorers, most likely as 
a form of appeasement, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that sexual 
relations between expeditions and Aborigines resulted in the further 
aggravation of race relations.^o 
What emerges from the preceding discussion is that it was largely 
the explorers of Far North Queensland who 'set the stage' for the racial 
conflict which ultimately was to result in the destruction of traditional 
Aboriginal society in the Cooktown-Palmer area. In contrast to many other 
'frontiers' in Australia, where it was the settlers who were responsible for 
dispossessing Aborigines of their land and livelihood, it seems that an 
escalating cycle of racial conflict was well underway in Far North 
Queensland even before the first white settler set foot ashore at the future 
site of Cooktown. 
The unfortunate irony is that explorers, as opposed to prospectors, 
miners and settlers, should have posed no direct threat to the Aboriginal 
people (other than as the advance party of the spread of'civilisation'). The 
fact that explorers did pose a direct threat to the Aborigines of Far North 
Queensland, over the space of 100 years, explains in part why later racial 
5^ Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, p. 162. 
57 Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, pp. 305-6. 
5fi A.H. Chisholm, Strange new world, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1941, 
pp. 271-2. 
59 Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, pp. 157-8, 295 and 385. 
60 See Reynolds, The other side', p. 57. 
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confhct involving miners and settlers was Eirguably more violent than 
an3rwhere else in Australia. Had the Aborigines been able to foresee the 
eventual consequences of the incursions by these white explorers, their 
response would undoubtedly have been far different. 
The strange men on horses ... sewing the seeds of death 
... would have been speared ... as they rode along.^^ 
Exploitation on the Sea Frontier 
Overlapping the two sequential periods of early contact with 
European explorers and the influx of miners and settlers from the early 
1870s was another, equally violent but often unreported period of racial 
conflict on the sea fi*ontier, centred on the beche-de-mer and pearl-shelling 
industries.^2 While both industries were based primarily on Thursday 
Island, Cooktown was an important port for the beche-de-mer trade, with 
thirteen boats employing over 450 men operating from the Endeavour River 
in the mid 1870s.63 
It seems likely that Aboriginal groups aroimd the Endeavour 
River had contact with beche-de-mer fishermen from as early as the 1850s.^4 
The beche-de-mer fishing station at Three Isles (thirty-five kilometres 
north-east of Cooktown) was already well established by the time the first 
settlers arrived at Cooktown in October 1873, with Dalrjnnple noting in his 
journal that 'the settlement of this new district [around the Endeavour 
River] will stimulate the valuable pearl-shell, beche-de-mer and turtle 
fisheries along this coast'.^^ Given that the industry required a large supply 
of cheap labour to gather the beche-de-mer (by wading or diving from 
6^ CD. Cotton, Ludwig Leichhardt and the Great South Land, Angus and Robertson, 
Sydney, 1938, p. 212. 
6^ For a detailed account of that conflict in Far North Queensland, see Chapter 5 The 
sea frontier' in N.A. Loos, Invasion and resistance, ANU Press, Canberra, 1982, pp. 
118-59. 
^^ See G.C. Bolton, A thousand miles away: a history of Queensland to 1920, 
Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1963, p. 76. By the late 1880s, the number of boats had 
increased to close to thirty: see Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 118. 
^4 Vessels from Sydney were involved in the beche-de-mer trade in the Torres Strait in 
the 1840s and exploiting the Barrier Reef during the 1860s: see Loos, Invasion and 
resistance, p. 118. 
^5 G.E. Dalrymple, 'Narrative and reports of the Queensland North-East Coast 
Expedition 1873', QVP, 1, 1874, pp. 636 and 650. 
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offshore reefs during low tides), it seems probable that mainland Aborigines 
from around the Endeavour River were being 'pressed' into the industry 
from the 1860s. 
The difficulty in quantifying the above assertion is that early 
commentators did not always differentiate between mainland Aborigines, 
Torres Strait Islanders and South Sea Islanders.^^ Dalrjrmple, for example, 
on his visit to Three Isles on 31 October 1873 noted in his journal that 'most 
of the employees are Kanakas, healthy, happy-looking and fat'.^'' But it is 
not clear from his description whether Dalrymple could differentiate 
between ICanakas (the term usually applied to South Sea Islanders) and 
mainland Aborigines; alternatively, his terminology that 'most' were 
Kanakas may mean that some were Aborigines. 
The other explanation is that Dalrjnnple only saw the curing 
station on the main island, which typically would have been manned by the 
higher-skilled Torres Strait and South Sea Islanders, while mainland 
Aborigines (or 'Binghis' as they were called) would have been employed in 
the more menial task of gathering on the outer islands .^ ^ Some twenty 
years later, the first protector of Aborigines in North Queensland, Walter 
Roth, estimated that about 300 Aborigines were employed in the beche-de-
mer industry.^^ His estimate did not include either those Aborigines 
illegally pressed into service or women and children, whose combined 
numbers even then would probably have almost equalled his official 
estimate.''O 
Nevertheless, by the late 1880s and early 1890s many of the worst 
excesses in relation to the employment of Aborigines in the industry had 
already transpired, with Roth noting in one of his early reports that 
®® See Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 122 who notes that 'one is left wondering ... 
whether they have taken ... [mainland Aborigines] into consideration at all'. 
^^ Dalrymple, 'Narrative', p. 637. 
6S See Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 123. 
® See W.E. Roth to Commissioner of Police, 6 May 1898, in-letter 6944 of 1898, 
COL/142, Queensland State Archies (QSA). 
'^ ^ See Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 123 who asserts that 'there must have been a 
significantly larger number working in the fisheries' over and above Roth's 
estimate. 
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the whole story of this beche-de-mer trade which, until 
my arrival... I could scarcely have credited, is one 
long record of brutal cruelty, bestiality and debauchery.'^^ 
Fifteen years earlier, in 1877, the Pohce Magistrate at Cardwell was 
reporting to Brisbane four recent incidents of Aborigines being kidnapped 
and forced to work in the industry, while the Police Magistrate at Cooktown 
was informing the Colonial Secretary that 'this forcible carrying away of 
gins is the cause of much of the ill feeling existing towards whites'.''^ 
There is also considerable evidence to suggest that hundreds of 
Aborigines along the coast between Cardwell and Somerset were kidnapped 
and forced to work in the industry in the 1870s. Often, the men were 
literally stranded on a remote island or reef and forced to gather beche-de-
mer in return for the barest supply of food and water, while the women were 
kept at the main base for the sexual use of the white overseers and their 
underlings.''-' Their day-to-day living conditions were often pitiful and 
those that get sick die ... and they all live the 
hardest possible life, generally on the verge of 
starvation and fi-equently in want of water.74 
By the early 1880s, the incidences of kidnapping had declined, 
being gradually replaced by a more complex labour trade, albeit that the 
emerging multi-racial relationship between Europeans and Aborigines 'was 
still one of coloniser and colonised, superior and inferior racial castes'.^^ jn 
simplistic terms, the labour trade became one based on the whites' need for 
Aboriginal labour (and their sexual dependency on Aboriginal women) 
while, for many young Aborigines, employment in the fisheries industry 
'^ 1 See W.E. Roth letter dated 4 February 1884, 'Typescript copies of reports of 
W.E.Roth at Cooktown 1898', COL/139, QSA. 
^2 See Brinsley Sheridan, 'Reserves for Aboriginals, Cardwell District' in QVP, 2, 
1877, p. 1245 and Howard St George to Colonial Secretary, 3 March 1882, in-letter 
1385 of 1882, COI7A333, QSA. 
^^ See R. Evans, 'Harlots and helots: exploitation of the Aboriginal remnant' in 
R. Evans et al, Exclusion, exploitation and extermination: race relations in colonial 
Queensland, ANZ Book Company, Sydney, 1975, p. 105. 
"^ 4 See W.E. Parry-Okeden (Commissioner of Police), 'Report on the North Queensland 
Aborigines and the Native Police', QVP, 2, 1897, p. 35. 
"^ 5 N. Loos, 'A chapter of contact: Aboriginal - European relations in North 
Queensland 1606-1992' in Rejmolds, Race relations, p. 19. See also the discussion of 
working conditions in N.A Loos, 'Queensland's Kidnapping Act: The Native 
Labourers Protection Act of 1884', Aboriginal History, 4, 2, June 1980, pp. 150-73. 
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offered 'a new, if often unpredictable, social and economic security'.''^ 
Eventually, the rough and crude culture of the sea frontier was largely 
subsumed by the paternalistic bureaucracy of white 'civilisation'.'''' 
The point of this discussion, however, has not been to focus on the 
partial acculturation of certain coastal Aborigines into a fidnge society on 
the sea frontier. Rather, it reinforces the argument of the spiralling cycle of 
violence which confi-onted local Aboriginal groups around the Endeavour 
River. Even before the first European settler arrived on their shores, they 
had been forced to contend not only with a string of explorers but also with 
the very real threat posed by whites in the beche-de-mer industry, 
frequently bent on kidnapping the cream of their young men and women. 
In practical terms, the coastal Aborigines who had traditionally 
based their livelihood on fishing and the utilisation of other marine 
resources would have become loath to venture far off-shore or, indeed, to 
linger too long near the coast itself for fear of capture. Moreover, foraging 
further inland in pursuit of alternative food sources would have involved 
encroaching on the traditional areas of other clans, thereby restricting their 
available food sources. The probable consequence is that by the time the 
first white settlers arrived at the Endeavour River, both the Koko-Bujundi 
and the Koko-Imudji had become increasingly defensive in attitude and 
increasingly determined to protect their shrinking resource areas. 
The Arrival of Miners and Settlers 
The initial lodgement by Howard St George and A.C. Macmillan 
and their men on the southern banks of the Endeavour River in late 
October 1873 probably had no great impact on the one or two clans of the 
Koko-Imudji who frequented that area. The early settlement occupied an 
area of less than one square kilometre and was in an exposed locality which 
the local clans probably avoided, through fear of kidnap by white beche-de-
mer fishermen. Moreover, there was practically no movement by the early 
settlers into the coastal fringe north of the Endeavour River, which was the 
tribal area of the bulk of the Koko-Imudji. 
'^ 6 Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 154. 
^? See Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 159. 
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Of more concern to the local clans would have been the small-scale 
exploration parties which, almost inunediately after the first landing, 
ventured into the countryside surrounding the new settlement. On Monday 
27 October 1873, two days after their arrival at the Endeavour River, St 
George and Macmillan rode some ten kilometres to the south, almost to the 
Annan River.^^ The next day, Macmillan and a small group of men set out 
for a two-day exploratory push into the hinterland, penetrating westwards 
some thirty-five kilometres and 'finding an excellent route through several 
Gaps to the foot of the ... Main Range'7^ Another group, under the 
conunand of Lieutenant Connor RN, took a small boat some twenty-five 
kilometres up the Endeavour River noting that 'fresh tracks of blacks were 
seen, but for reasons best known to themselves they kept awaj^.^ 
To the local Aborigines, these exploration parties were probably 
perceived as a direct threat, either in the context of Connor's group being 
seen as marauding beche-de-mer fishermen, intent on kidnap, or 
Macmillan's group as a follow-up to Hann's party, which a year earlier had 
kidnapped a young Aboriginal boy from the Koko-Wara tribe in the vicinity 
of what was later to be named Battle Camp.^i The activities of these small-
scale exploration parties probably had very little effect on native game or 
other Aboriginal food sources. But the appropriation upriver by Connor's 
party of'a canoe with outriggers, made of red cedar, a very superior craft' 
would have done nothing to ease the fear of local Aborigines that this was 
yet another group of trespassing whites, bent at best on the abuse of 
reciprocity. ^ 2 
In the meantime, 200 kilometres to the west, a flood of white 
prospectors and would-be miners was pushing north from Georgetown and 
the Etheridge River into the headwaters of the Palmer River, separated 
from Cooktown by the Great Dividing Range. James Venture Mulligan, one 
of the first prospectors into the area, reported that 
"^ 8 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 13 November 1873, p. 2. 
79 See A.C. Macmillan to the Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598/73 
of 1873, WOR/A74, QSA 
80 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 6. 
81 For an account of that incident on 17 September 1872, see Jack, Northmost 
Australia, Vol. 2, p. 396. 
82 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 6. 
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on the first evening the party camped on the Palmer 
... [we] saw a number of... [Aborigines] in the 
neighbourhood, who set fire to the grass, threw 
stones down a range and brandished their spears.83 
As hundreds of European miners spread throughout the area, the 
wandering, fossicking nature of their operations scared off native game, 
while their panning and sluicing for alluvial gold proved ruinous to 
Aboriginal fishing holes — a situation which surely would have been 
conveyed to neighbouring groups. A visiting correspondent noted that the 
local Aborigines 'do not like being put off their fishing grounds on the river 
and are determined to keep possession of the back ... giillies'.84 
Moreover, because the prospectors and miners usually operated 
alone, or in small groups, and often scattered over wide areas, they were 
vulnerable to Aboriginal retaliation.85 Howard St George, in one of his 
early reports from the Palmer, noted that 'the back gullies have not as yet 
been prospected, as the blacks drive the miners in from them'.86 A 
correspondent to one of the local Cooktown newspapers later noted that 'the 
most successful [prospectors] were those with good ... arms and horses [who] 
were able to proceed 30 to 40 miles' at a time.87 
Against that background, it is hardly surprising that the 100-man 
party of St George and Macmillan, which left Cooktown on 31 October 1873 
bound for the Palmer, was to clash heavily with Aborigines on at least three 
occasions en route.88 It is evident, though, that the severity of those clashes 
— which were the unfortunate precursors to a series of similar clashes over 
the following three or four years — was played down at the time, as was 
any discussion of which party initiated them. 
88 As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 18 October 1873, p. 6. 
8* See The Brisbane Courier, 13 December 1873, p. 5. 
85 See N. Kirkman, 'The Palmer River goldfield' in K.H. Kennedy (ed.). Readings in 
North Queensland mining history. Vol. 1, James Cook University Townsville, 1980, 
p. 124. 
As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
87 See The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser (CHPRA), 29 April 1874, 
p. 2. 
88 Local Aborigines had no way of knowing that the party of whites was headed for the 
Palmer, but could reasonably have assumed that it had some hostile intent towards 
them. 
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Neither St George nor Macmillan, for example, even mentioned 
the clashes in their respective reports to Brisbane, with St George merely 
noting that 'blacks numerous and hostile on way up'.89 The correspondent 
to the Cleveland Bay Express, who accompanied the expedition, similarly 
noted only that 'twice they attacked us, and once the black troopers had a 
skirmish with them'.^o 
When it became public knowledge that a major clash had occurred 
at Battle Camp, with considerable loss of Aboriginal lives, the Government 
felt compelled to hold a public enquiry in Cooktown.^i One witness, William 
Webb, informed the enquiry that 'some blacks were shot [near the 
Normanby River on 3 November]. I do not know why, as they had not 
interfered with us.'^2 Despite such evidence, and the admission that 
'whenever the black troopers came across ... [Aborigines] they made short 
work of them', the enquiry decided that St George and Macmillan and their 
men had been justified in defending themselves.^^ i\yo years later, in a 
spirited attack on Aborigines, an editorial in The Cooktown Herald went so 
far as to assert that 
it is well known ... that the first hostilities have in 
all cases been on the part of the blacks. When the 
blacks attacked and stormed ... [Macmillan's] camp ... 
he was in no way to blame for the loss of life that 
eventuated.^4 
8^ St Greorge's report of 24 November 1873 to the Colonial Secretary, as published in 
The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
*" As reported in The Brisbane Courier, 13 December 1873, p. 5. 
•^^  See Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, pp. 421-2. From the report of the Cleveland 
Bay Express correspondent, in particular, it seems likely that the number of 
Aborigines killed was probably in the order of twenty to thirty, rather than the 
'hundreds of blacks were killed' as asserted in A Laurie, The Black War in 
Queensland', Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 1, September 
1959, p. 169. 
^2 Jack, Northmost Australia, pp. 421-2. 
^8 The evidence regarding black troopers as published in The Brisbane Courier, 
13 December 1873, p. 5. Other evidence given included the admission that those 
blacks not killed in the initial attack were pursued and killed in a nearby lagoon: 
Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, pp. 421-2. 
^ CHPRA, 8 December 1875, p. 2. 
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The Aboriginal Response 
In the months after the initial transit by St George and 
Macmillan, hundreds more would-be miners followed in their footsteps, 
with further sporadic but small-scale clashes with Aborigines being 
reported to the authorities. A number of those clashes, however, occurred 
when would-be miners, who were trapped by floodwaters between rivers 
along the route to the Palmer, purposely left the track in search of game (or 
gold) and confronted Aborigines in a chance encounter. 
Indeed, throughout most of 1874, with some 3000-4000 mainly 
white would-be miners transiting the track from Cooktown, there are very 
few reports of Aborigines deHberately targeting those en route to the 
Palmer.95 Moreover, European settlers in Cooktown were never under any 
serious or particular threat, despite local newspaper editorials — couched in 
foreboding terms — warning of the possibility that the Aborigines 'might 
either slaughter us when we are quite unprepared or bum us out of their 
territor/.^^ It seems probable, therefore, that over the space of the first 
year of Cooktown's settlement. Aboriginal groups to the east of the Great 
Dividing Range gradually came to accept that their best option was to avoid 
the fledgling township itself and to allow those trespassers using the track 
between Cooktown and the Palmer to pass unimpeded. 
That uneasy truce came to an abrupt end in late October 1874 
with the killing by Aborigines, probably of the Koko-Wara group, of the 
Strau family near the Normanby River (within twenty kilometres of Battle 
Camp). A closer reading of the circumstances, however, indicates that the 
incident was not simply 'another wanton and brutal murder of defenceless 
whites', as contemporary accounts would suggest.^'' 
Rather, it seems evident that local Aborigines were attempting to 
prevent the opening up of a new diversionary section of track which would 
^^ The exception was native troopers escorting gold from the Palmer to Cooktown, who 
seemed to have been considered 'fair game' by Aborigines around Battle Camp, in 
particular: see CHPRA, 3 June 1874, p. 2, for example, reporting an incident when 
spears were thrown at native troopers as they camped at night near Battle Point. 
See CHPRA, 1 July 1874, p. 2. 
9'^  For a somewhat 'sensationalised' account of the incident, see CHPRA, 21 October 
1874, p. 3. 
96 
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have taken traffic 'along the banks of the Normanby ... [close to] a network 
of lagoons, dense scrub, and rich vegetation, infested with game'.^8 Indeed, 
the Aborigines went so far as to place logs across the track to stop drays, as 
well as 'stakes about three feet high in the wheel tracks to stay the progress 
of wheels'.^^ The unarmed Strau family was also advised by other 
teamsters not to attempt the new track but persisted, with the husband 
sajdng 'he was not afraid of blacks, as he had been used to them'.^o^ 
In the event, the killing of the family and the reported sexual 
violation of Strau's wife and young daughter provoked an outrage among 
whites.^^^ A nearby group of white teamsters formed themselves into 'a 
strong, well-armed party and proceeded after the offending Aborigines, 
although the result of their pursuit is not recorded.^^2 Several days later, a 
native police detachment under the conunand of Sub-Inspector Douglas 
joined the pursuit, with one of the local Cooktown newspapers anticipating 
that 'a leaden dose of scriptural facts' was about to be administered.^^^ 
Douglas' subsequent report noted only that his men 'followed the murderers 
across the Normanby River, where they overtook and dispersed them'.i04 
In the weeks and months that followed, as Europeans continued to 
avenge the Straus in a wave of indiscriminate shooting and kilhng. 
Aboriginal resistance similarly hardened. Aboriginal attacks on whites and 
Chinese became commonplace along the length of the track to the Palmer, 
with The Cooktown Herald noting in late 1875 that 'the black nuisance is 
becoming quite a bore to those that have occasion to travel the roads'.^^^ 
Moreover, at the infamous Hell's Gate, a particularly vulnerable defile on 
the approaches to the main range, a group of Aborigines — possibly the 
98 CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 3. 
S^ CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 3. 
W<* See W.H. Corfield, 'Reminiscences of North Queensland, 1862-1878', Journal of the 
Historical Society of Queensland, 2, 2, June 1923, p. 91 for a first-hand account of 
the incident. 
101 Allegations of the sexual abuse of white women by Aborigines are discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter under the heading 'The Alleged Violation of White 
Women'. 
102 CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 2. 
103 CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 2. 
10'* As reported in Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 91. 
105 CHPRA, 20 October 1875, p. 2. 
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fighting-age remnants of the Koko-Wara group — regularly ambushed those 
passing by over a period of several months in late 1875.1^6 
The fi-equency and severity of such clashes needs to be tempered 
by the estimate that the total number of Europeans and Chinese killed by 
Aborigines both on the goldfields and on the Cooktown-Palmer track 
throughout the 1870s probably did not exceed 100.^ ^^ 7 Given that an 
average of 4000 whites and Chinese passed along the Cooktown-Palmer 
track each year from 1874 to 1879, the likelihood of an individual being 
killed by Aborigines on the track was probably less than 0.4 per cent.^^s 
Had the same individual stayed in Cooktown, his or her chance of dying 
from illness, disease or accident, at least in 1874, was 3.3 per cent.io^ 
Aboriginal Attacks on Stock 
More vulnerable to Aboriginal retaliation were the horses, 
bullocks and cattle of white prospectors, miners, carriers and settlers. 
Between 1873 and 1879, at least 133 horses and 67 bullocks were killed by 
Aborigines in the Palmer River alone, with some estimates putting the 
combined total at over 300.^ ^0 Along the Cooktown-Palmer track, scores of 
saddle- and pack-horses were similarly speared or driven off, with the local 
Cooktown newspapers publishing reports practically every week such as 
'carriers advise horses lying dead ... in the vicinity of Oakey Creek, also 
three bullocks'.m 
Some of the animals were killed in sporadic attacks by Aborigines 
on the pack trains and bullock-wagons of carriers supplying the Palmer 
las 
•^ 06 See, for example, reports of attacks in CHPRA, 21 October 1875, p. 2 and in 
Trezise, Last days, p. 145. 
Iwl The basis of this calculation is discussed in more detail later in this chapter under 
the section headed 'The Balance Sheet of Losses'. 
Calculated on the basis that, in very crude terms, the population of the Palmer 
goldfields increased (or decreased) each year between 1874 and 1879 by an average 
of 4045 persons (taken from 'population of the goldfields' statistics in QVP, 1874-80) 
and that the average number of whites and Chinese killed per year on the track 
was 16.6 (100 divided by six years). If carriers, returnees and visitors are also 
taken into account, the percentage would be even smaller. 
Based on a crude death toll in Cooktown of sixty six persons in 1874, from an 
estimated population of 2000: see QVP, 2, 1875, p. 1186. 
110 See I.L. Hughes, 'A state of open warfare: frontier conflict in the Cooktown area' in 
Reynolds, Race relations, p. 107. 
111 See CHPRA, 8 May 1875, p. 2. 
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track.1^2 Others were killed in Aboriginal raids on mining camps, like the 
fifty horses reportedly speared in a single attack on the Palmer in 
September 1874.1^3 Most were killed when they were left unattended and 
free to graze at night, often roaming (albeit hobbled) several kilometres 
from the camp of their owners. There are numerous instances throughout 
the various prospecting expeditions of James Venture MuUigan, for 
example, when his party UteraUy spent days searching for horses which had 
wandered off during the night.^^^ 
That obviously raises the question as to whether local Aborigines 
deliberately targeted the horses and cattle of whites, as a means of 
disrupting the supply line between Cooktown and the Palmer, or whether 
unattended stock were largely seen by Aborigines as a convenient new 
source of food. There are numerous reports of animals being killed and 
eaten by the Aborigines. Three would-be diggers fi'om New Zealand, for 
example, had two of their horses speared overnight as they camped astride 
the Palmer track, finding in the morning that 'half the carcass ... [of one had 
been] cut off and taken awa/.^^^ In another incident on the Palmer, 'the 
remains of [a horse] ... was found consisting of its head and feet, all the rest 
having been eaten'.^^^ 
Contemporary reports also contended that Aborigines at times 
drove off groups of up to twenty horses to 'inaccessible mountain 
strongholds', there to kill them as required. ^ '^^  That story seems somewhat 
far-fetched, as does the suggestion that 'horses and bullocks became [the 
Aborigines'] staple food', because their own traditional sources of food had 
been so devastated by the white invasion.^^^ At least in the area west of 
Cooktown to the main range, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
transit of would-be miners to the Palmer had any significant impact on 
112 See, for example, an incident reported in The Cooktown Courier, 3 October 1874, 
p. 3. 
11^ See H. Reynolds, 'The unrecorded battlefields of Queensland' in Reynolds, Race 
relations, p. 27. 
114 On Mulligan's fifth expedition, the party spent nine days (21 June to 2 July 1875) 
looking for lost horses: see Mulligan, 'Expedition ...', p. 10. The carrier William 
Corfield attempted to protect his stock by camping with his bullocks once they 
settled for the night after feeding: Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 93. 
l i s The Cooktown Courier, 5 December 1874, p. 2. 
116 CHPRA, 6 December 1876, p. 2. 
11*^  See Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 73. 
11® See Holthouse, River of gold, p. 98 and Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 73. 
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native game or other Aboriginal food sources; rather, the impact, 
particularly as a result of the 'dispersal' tactics of the native police, was on 
the Aborigines themselves.^^^ 
The most likely explanation, therefore, would seem to be that 
Aborigines in the Cooktown area had no 'policy* of targeting stock per se 
although, in any premeditated attack on whites or Chinese, horses and 
cattle were probably seen as soft, alternative targets of opportunity. 
Moreover, as race relations worsened from late 1874 onwards, local 
Aborigines probably had fewer inhibitions about killing unattended stock, 
presumably on the basis that it was a reasonable exchange for the losses 
being inflicted by Europeans on their traditional sources of game. 
The Myths of Aboriginal Cannibalism 
In a similar vein to the reports of horses being driven off to 
'mountain strongholds' were rumours of 
the devil's kitchen ... where captured Chinese 
were taken by the dozen and hung on trees by 
their pigtails until they were needed for killing 
and eating. 120 
Such rumours, like Holthouse's assertion that 'hundreds [of Chinese] were 
ambushed, captured and eaten at leisure', are unfounded.^^i The noted 
anthropologist, Walter Roth, in his research in North Queensland could find 
'no instance where any ... male or female had been killed solely for the 
purpose of providing a repast'. ^ 2^ 
That is not to say that Aborigines in the Cooktown-Palmer area 
did not engage in cannibaUsm. Pietistic burial cannibalism (endo-
cannibalism) was widely practised in Far North Queensland and elsewhere 
11^ The latter issue is discussed later in this chapter under the heading 'An Instrument 
of Extermination: The Native Mounted Police'. 
120 Holthouse, River of gold, p. 94. 
121 See Holthouse, River of gold, p. 94. 
122 W.E. Roth, 'Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Aborigines [of 
Queensland]', North Queensland Ethnography Bulletin, No. 3, Brisbane, 1901-2. 
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in Austraha, as were certain ritual acts of revenge cannibahsm.^^ 
Instances of the eating of human flesh 'solely for food were much rarer'M* 
Moreover, 
the degree to which Queensland Aborigines actually 
indulged in this practice is problematical, as is the 
explanation for it.^^s 
Nevertheless, contemporary accounts fi-om the region abound with 
allegations of wanton Aboriginal cannibaHsm. George Dalrymple, as he 
headed north towards the Endeavour River, noted in his journal on 19 
October 1873 that his men had seen 
unmistakable evidence of wholesale habitual 
cannibalism ... [with] heaps of human bones and 
skulls in each camp ... [and] lumps of half-eaten 
flesh in the gins' dilly bags.i26 
Dalrymple's men, however, had been engaged at the time in a clash near 
Cape Tribulation with an 'utterly reckless mob of blacks ... [led by] a big 
hulking ferocious looking savage over six feet tair.i27 go it seems possible 
that their description of the evidence of cannibalism was perhaps post facto 
justification for their massacre of a large number of 'the mob'. 
Reports of cannibalism along the Cooktown-Palmer track were 
much more speculative, notwithstanding the assertion by Holthouse that 
Aborigines in the area 'for centuries ... had been in the habit of tiding 
themselves over the bad season with human flesh'.^28 When a would-be 
miner by the name of Flannery went missing after a clash with Aborigines, 
The Cooktown Herald quickly asserted that 'there can be little doubt... 
123 E.G. Heap, 'Some notes on cannibalism among Queensland Aborigines, 1824-1900', 
Queensland Heritage, 1, 7, November 1967, pp. 25-6. See also, for example, AW. 
Howitt, 'Burial practices of the Native Tribes of South-east Australia' in M. 
Charlesworth et al (eds.), Religion in Aboriginal Australia: an anthology. 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1994, pp. 221, 229 and 233-4. 
1^ "^  Heap, 'Some notes on cannibalism', pp. 25-6. 
12^ R. Evans, 'A king of brutes: stereotyping the vanquished' in Evans et al. Exclusion, 
p. 72. 
12fi Dalrymple, 'Narrative ...', pp. 632-3. 
127 Dalrymple, 'Narrative...', p. 632. 
1 ^ Holthouse, River of gold, p. 52. 
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[that he has become] the staple of a horrid banquet to the savages'. ^ 9^ 
Similarly, when a lone Chinese miner reported that his five colleagues had 
been killed in an Aboriginal ambush, the loc£d newspaper noted that 
the increasing appetite of the aborigines for 
roasted Asiatic is one of their marked 
peculiarities.130 
Certainly, the Chinese were easier targets for Aborigines than 
Europeans, as they were generally poorly armed, nearly always travelled on 
foot and were less capable of reprisals.^^^ But stories that so-called 
Aboriginal cannibals preferred Chinese to Europeans were mostly spread by 
whites attempting to inspire fear and panic amongst the Chinese in order to 
get them to quit the goldfields. Apart from the occasional report of an aged 
Aborigine supposedly recollecting that Chinese flesh tasted sweeter than 
the salty flesh of whites, there is not a shred of substantiated evidence that 
even a single Chinese was captured and subsequently eaten by local 
Aborigines in the Cooktown-Palmer area. 
The Alleged Violation of White Women 
Equally spurious were the rumours that Aborigines 'lusted after 
white women' and that women and female children would suffer the 
grossest sexual indignities in the event of their capture. Within a mind-set 
more usually associated with the Indian frontiers of the American West 
it was generally held that in the event of an Aboriginal 
raid ... a man should keep his last shot [for a female 
companion rather than let her]. . . fall into the hands of these 
fiends. 132 
129 CHPRA, 10 November 1875, p. 2. The Cooktown Courier, 21 February 1877, p. 2 
similarly reported an account from Senior Constable Pickering that his party of 
native police had found a 'large oven [at Hell's Gate]... where the cannibals had 
cooked ... men and horses ... all together for their horrid feast'. 
130 CHPRA, 12 July 1875, p. 2. 
131 The supposed passivity of the Chinese should not be over-stated. After one 
particular clash with Aborigines, 'the Chinamen cut off the ears of both victims and 
brought them in to the township in pickle': J.H. Binnie, My life on a tropic 
goldfield. Penguin, Melbourne, 1944, pp. 22-3. 
132 Evans, 'A king of brutes', p. 71. 
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Yet throughout the entire 1870s, the alleged violation of the Strau 
woman was the only reported incident of the rape of a white woman by 
Aborigines in the Cooktown-Palmer area. Moreover, a closer reading of the 
various accounts of her death raises considerable doubt as to whether she 
was sexually abused by her attackers. 
WiUiam Corfield, for example, who spoke to the two carriers who 
found the bodies of the family in the immediate aftermath of the killings, 
recounted that 'a spear had been driven through her mouth, and pinned her 
to the ground' (with no mention of her state of dress or any suggestion of 
sexual abuse). ^ ^ The Cooktown Herald, though, reported in its version of 
the incident several days later that the woman was found 'stark naked ... 
evidently having been ravished by the murderous wretches, and then 
tomahawked in the head'.^^ 
The Cooktown Herald report also alleged that the body of the 
daughter 'also on her back naked ... lay alongside her mother', inferring that 
she too had been sexually abused. ^ 5^ Corfield's account, however, claimed 
that the body of the girl was found some distance away 'with a large gash 
across the forehead [and] her stomach ripped up by the blacks' wood knives', 
but with no mention of her nakedness nor any suggestion of sexual abuse. ^ ^^  
Indeed, the only mention of sexual abuse in Corfield's account is 
the hearsay comment that 'the police learnt through the troopers ... that the 
woman was subjected to horrible outrage by the blacks' before being 
kiUed.137 As for Dalrymple at Cape Tribulation, that 'confession' smacks of 
post facto justification for the killing by the poUce of the entire group of 
alleged perpetrators. Certainly, it would be stretching the credulity of any 
reasonable observer to befieve that Inspector Douglas' detachment csdmly 
took the opportunity to obtain such a confession as they routed 'the 
133 See Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 91. 
114 CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 3. 
ISi CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 3. 
ISi Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 91. In fact, Corfield's account contended that the girl 
had been captured alive and killed later, after 'two old gins quarrelled over [her] 
possession'. 
137 Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 92. 
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murderers across the Normanby River, where they overtook and dispersed 
them'.i38 
The death in 1881 of Mary Watson, who fled the beche-de-mer 
station on Lizard Island in a makeshift water tank after an attack by 
Aborigines, provoked a similar white outrage. The fact that there was no 
suggestion of any intention by the Aborigines to abuse her sexually meant 
little to outraged Europeans; nor did the fact that the attack was doubtless 
in retaliation for the abuses and exploitation suffered by Aborigines 
'pressed' into service over the years by her husband, the station's white 
overseer. The issue was seen by Europeans simply as a cowardly attack by 
an inferior race on the family unit of white society, providing them with 
continued 'justification' for their subjugation of Aborigines. ^ 9^ 
Stereotjqjing Aborigines as Black Savages 
What emerges from the preceding discussion is that it well suited 
Europeans in Far North Queensland in the 1870s to portray the local 
Aborigines in pejorative, dehumanizing terms. That was in distinct 
contrast with the prevaihng views at the time of Cook's visit in 1770, when 
ideas of'noble savagery^ were fashionable in educated circles in England.^^^ 
Indeed, Cook had on board a native fi"om the Tahitian Islands, whom he 
was taking back to England on a 'cultural exchange'.^'*^ Cook was duly able 
to record that the features of the Aborigines at the Endeavour River 'were 
far from being disagreeable [and that] their Voices were soft and 
Tunable'. 142 
Over the following 100 years, changing intellectual fashions and 
the influence of colonial life in Australia eroded the 'notable savage' 
138 Inspector Douglas' account as recounted by Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 91. 
Iff See R. Evans, 'A policy tending to extermination' in Evans et al. Exclusion, p. 51. It 
is noteworthy that the Chinese servant who fled the island with Mary Watson, and 
who also died, rates not a mention in the memorial to her erected in the main street 
of Cooktown. 
140 See H. Reynolds, 'Racial thought in early colonial Australia', in Australian Journal 
of Politics and History, 20,1,1974, p. 51. See also H. Reynolds, Dispossesion; black 
Australians and white invaders, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1989, pp. 104-19 
discussing 'The enlightenment at the Antipodes'. 
Ml See Reed, Captain Cook, p. 94. 
1 ^ See Reed, Captain Cook, p. 95. 
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viewpoint. Europeans quickly found justification for the subjugation of 
Aborigines in an ideology of racism, coming to relegate them in terms of 
Social Darwinism to the lowest link of the 'Great Chain of Being'.i43 
Contemporary accounts from about the mid nineteenth century, therefore, 
typically described 'the nature of the barbarians',144 while others asserted 
that 'of all the wild men of the earth, the Australian savage is one of the 
most degraded'.i45 
Within that stereotyping, the Tilack savage' came increasingly to 
be described in terms which emphasised the 'repulsiveness' of the image.^46 
Allen, for example, claimed that 'no race of savages can be imagined more 
hideously ugl3^.i47 The Jardines described the Aborigines they encountered 
as 'puny, wretched-looking creatures ... cowardly and treacherous in the 
extreme'.^48 Leichhardt noted that 'one can easily see the bad intention in 
their unsteady, greedy, glistening eyes',149 while James Morrill, who lived 
with an Aboriginal group in North Queensland for seventeen years, would 
surely have reinforced contemporary prejudices with his astounding 'eye-
witness' account that 
when bom they are nearly white, but when they 
are three days old, the gins squeeze their own milk 
on them and rub charcoal into their skins to make 
them black and shiny.^^^ 
An extension of the 'black savage' stereotype was the prevailing 
belief among Europeans that 'blacks own no law themselves but the law of 
might'. ^ 5^  Many Europeans on the pastoral and mining frontiers in Far 
North Queensland accordingly subscribed to the view that 'the only thing to 
143 See N.S. Kirkman, 'A Snider is a splendid civiliser' in Reynolds, Race relations, 
p. 133 and N.A Loos, The pragmatic racism of the frontier', also in Race relations, 
p. 299. 
144 See, for example, the warning from the Colonial Secretary of Western Australia to 
the explorer AC. Gregory in 1848: Gregory, Australian explorations, p. 14. 
I l l C.H. Allen, A visit to Queensland and her goldfields, Chapman and Hall, London, 
1870, p. 179. 
141 See R. Evans, 'Half-savage and half-starved: the condition of the Aboriginal 
remnant' in Evans et al. Exclusion, p. 89. 
^47 Allen, A visit to Queensland, p. 181. 
148 Byerley, Narrative of the expedition, pp. 11 and 82-3. 
149 Leichhardt, Journal of an expedition, p. 507. 
150 Quoted in E.B. Kennedy, Four years in Queensland, Stanford, London, 1870, p. 81. 
151 See E. Palmer, Early days in North Queensland, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1983, p. 213. 
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do on seeing an [A]borigine was to shoot and shoot strsdght'.i^^ The moral 
justification for such behaviour was further reinforced by the common beUef 
that Aborigines were a doomed race and 'what good could accrue from the 
remnants of a race that is ... impossible to civilize?'.^^^ LeichhEirdt, in 
particular, believed that 'neither Christianity nor civilisation would make 
any advance among the natives' and frequently deprecated any suggestion 
of human equality between whites and Aborigines.^^4 
By stereot5T)ing the Aborigines of Far North Queensland (and 
elsewhere) as 'black savages', Europeans were able to dismiss Aboriginal 
resistance to the coming of the white man as a response emanating purely 
from their savagery and 'primeval barbarism'.^^s The corollary was that 
violence against Aborigines by whites, 'when recognised at all, was simply a 
justifiable reaction to such savagery^. ^ ^^  Moreover, many Europeans on the 
North Queensland frontier, in the early 1870s at least, obviously held to the 
view that 'if the [local] blacks will not recognise the paramount influence of 
the [white man's] law, the consequence would of necessity become [their] 
extermination'.i^^ 
An Instrument of Extermination: The Native Mounted Police 
As on most other frontiers in Central and North Queensland 
during the 1860s and 1870s, the 
manner in which aggression was most officially 
and relentlessly applied, and violence institutionalised 
on the [Cooktown-Palmer] frontier ... was through the 
agency of the Native Mounted Police.^^^ 
1^ 2 See W.R.O. Hill, Forty-five years' experience in North Queensland, Pole, Brisbane, 
1907, p. 31. 
153 See Palmer, Early days, p. 209. 
154 See, for example. Cotton, Ludwig Leichhardt, p. 140. 
155 See Allen, A visit to Queensland, p. 179 and R. Evans, The "darkling plain": 
impressions of early racial confrontation' in Evans et al. Exclusion, p. 28. 
156 Evans, The "darkling plain"', p. 28. 
157 As discussed in an editorial, CHPRA, 8 December 1875, p. 2. 
158 See R. Evans, 'A policy tending to extermination' in Evans et al, Exclusion, p. 55. 
See also Reynolds, Dispossession, pp. 46-52 on the Queensland Native Mounted 
Police. 
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Elements of that force arrived in Cooktown with the initial wave of settlers 
and miners on 25 October 1873, having accompanied Gold Commissioner St 
George on board the SS Leichhardt from Cardwell. 1^9 
Over the succeeding twelve years, the number of native troopers in 
the Cooktown-Palmer area increased fi-om twenty five in 1874 to a peak of 
seventy one in 1876, thereafter dechning to around thirty.^^ Most of the 
native police were stationed either at the Pahner River (or the Hodgkinson 
goldfield from 1876) or at the police post on the Cooktown-Palmer track, 
established in mid 1874 at Puckley Creek {neai the Normanby River, some 
seventy kilometres from Cooktown).^^^ It also appears that a small 
detachment was stationed in Cooktown itself from 1875, as evidenced by the 
editorial complaint in The Cooktown Herald of'black police lounging around 
the town'. 162 
As elsewhere, the native police in Far North Queensland quickly 
established a reputation for their brutal suppression of Aborigines.1^3 in 
responding to reports of attacks by Aborigines on white miners or carriers, 
the native police — under command of a white officer — would typically 
track down the offending party (or any other Aborigines unfortunate enough 
to be in the area). They would then 'disperse them by force of arms', a 
euphemism for the indiscriminate shooting of able-bodied Aboriginal males 
(£ind any women or children who happened to be in range), and the driving 
away of the remainder.i64 
The carrier William Corfield, who accompanied a native police 
patrol in December 1875, described in Boys Own-type detail the summary 
159 See the account provided by the correspondent to the Cleveland Bay Express, as 
published in The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. It is not clear, 
however, whether the police detachment was drawn from the force at Cardwell or 
Greorgetown, or from both. 
160 Figures drawn from annual reports of the Commissioner of Police in QVP, 1874-
1886. Most if not all of the troopers would have been drawn from Aboriginal groups 
elsewhere in Queensland. 
161 The move to Puckley Creek as reported in CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 5. 
162 CHPRA, 5 June 1875, p. 2. 
163 For a general account of the Native Mounted Police in Queensland see S. Bamett, 
'A study of the Queensland Native Mounted Police Force in the 1870s', BA (Hons) 
thesis. University of Queensland, 1975. 
114 Evans notes that in their reporting of raids upon Aboriginal groups, 'the words 
"dispersal" or "dispersed blacks by force of arms" were the only description required 
(or allowed)': Evans, 'A policy tending to extermination', p. 61. 
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justice meted out to a group of Aborigines cornered after a three-day 
pursuit.165 It is evident from his account that no attempt was made to 
arrest the alleged perpetrators (suspected of stock-spearing and the killing 
of two white teamsters), i^ ^ Corfield's own involvement and his arbitrary 
killing of several Aborigines was explained away by the sweeping 
justification that 'I thought of the murders of Strau, his wife and daughter 
... and the murder ... of the two packers'.i^'' Yet the Strau killings had 
occurred some fifteen months beforehand. There was also nothing to 
substantiate that the Aboriginal group being pursued was in any way 
involved in either the killing of the Straus or that of the two packers. 
Although the Aboriginal group in Corfield's accoimt only included 
'a mob of old gins', the native troopers in a dispersal action would tj^jically 
be allowed to ravish their choice of Aboriginal women. If the circumstances 
of the patrol permitted, it was also not unusual for 'the pick of the 
Aboriginal women to be seized and taken back to the police base camp for 
the sexual use of native troopers (and often their white officers), or to be 
traded off to European carriers and teamsters for their sexual use.i^^ 
Aboriginal children whose parents were killed in a 'dispersal' (or those 
children simply separated from their parents) were also frequently 
kidnapped by the native police and distributed as 'orphans' to European 
settlers or carriers, usually for employment as child labour.i^^ 
Even more damaging to traditional Aboriginal society than specific 
pursuit actions were the periodic 'scourings of the country^ by the native 
police. These patrols were aimed simply at disrupting and dislocating the 
lifestyle of any Aboriginal groups encountered, through the tactics of 
indiscriminate dispersal. After one such 'thorough scour' by Sub-Inspector 
Douglas and his men in July 1874, The Cooktown Herald reported that 'we 
have that gentleman's word that no more horses or cattle will be speared in 
our neighbourhood for some time'.i^o Similarly, Senior Sergeant Devine 
1*5 See Corfield, 'Reminiscences', pp. 94-5. 
18i j ^ McGregor, 'Law-enforcement or just force? police action in two frontier districts' 
in Reynolds, Race relations, p. 71 similarly notes that in the Kennedy district 
'shooting was their sole mode of operation'. 
167 Corfield, 'Reminiscences', p. 95. 
168 See Evans, 'A king of brutes', p. 80 and 'Harlots and helots', p. 104. 
169 See W.H. Corfield, Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-1899, Frater, Brisbane, 1921, 
p. 53 talking of the 'splendid little fellow* given to him by the native police. 
1'70 CHPRA, 29 July 1874, p. 2. 
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reported in October 1875 that his patrol to the Eight Mile had succeeded in 
dispersing one group of Aborigines, while 
on the following day a camp of 200 or more ... [were] 
again persuaded to retire ... leaving behind a splendid 
collection of spears.^^^ 
Notwithstanding the many reports of such 'successful' encounters, 
there is some evidence to suggest that the native police in the Cooktown-
Palmer area were not always so effective. In July 1874, for example, every 
one of Sub-Inspector Dumaresque's native troopers deserted him on the 
Palmer, a somewhat desperate move given that they could have expected no 
mercy fi-om local Aborigines and would have faced summary execution if 
captured by the authorities.^''^ 'phe most likely explanation for their 
desertion is that they resented the enforced absence from their local area, 
together with the harsh discipline of service within the Native Mounted 
Police. Another possibility, not mutually exclusive of the first, is that local 
Aborigines were proving to be formidable opponents who could guarantee 
native troopers 'a fate worse than death' in the event of their capture. 
That latter possibihty may explain why native police detachments 
steadfastly avoided going anywhere near Hell's Gate throughout the middle 
months of 1875, despite (or because of) a spate of Aboriginal attacks on 
miners and carriers.^''^ An editorial in The Cooktown Herald of early June 
1875, in a stinging attack on the native police, complained that 
the black demons ... [are] continuing their mischievous 
depredations ... spearing horses and cattle by wholesale 
... [yet] black police never go up the Hell's Gate road 
where these native pests ... congregate.^^4 
An alternative explanation is that certain of the white officers 
commanding the native police detachments in the Cooktown-Palmer area 
were either lazy or incompetent, or both. That view was certainly held by 
1*^1 The Cooktown Courier, 30 October 1875, p. 3. 
1^ 2 The desertion reported in CHPRA, 29 July 1874, p. 2. McGregor claims that 'there 
was frequently a problem of desertion' in the Kennedy district, while noting that 
their social alienation from local Aboriginal groups enforced their allegiance to the 
detachment: McGregor, 'Law enforcement', p. 67. 
1'^ ^ See the editorial in CHPRA, 17 July 1875, p. 2 complaining that 'no police have 
been seen [there] the past six weeks'. 
174 CHPRA, 5 June 1875, p. 2. 
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the editor of The Cooktown Courier in late 1875 who charged that 'if the 
force were properly officered ... many of the murders in the district could 
have been avoided'. ^ ''^  Bamett, however, contends that white officers were 
well aware that if they 'did not successfully reduce the [Aboriginal] 
aggravation, dismissal was imminent'.^^^ It seems possible, therefore, that 
the failure — or at least the unwillingness — of the native police to 'bring to 
heel' the more belHgerent Aboriginal groups in the Cooktown-Palmer area 
may have related to their fear of them, compounded by the relatively 
inaccessible terrain of the Great Dividing Range. 
From Extermination to Suppression 
The Queensland Government never had a declared policy which 
could be construed as supporting or even condoning the indiscriminate 
killing of Aborigines by the Native Mounted Police. Rather, the official line 
was that 
demonstrations of strength of a character that. . . 
[Aborigines] will respect are necessary to submission, 
which is the essential prologue to gaining an influence 
over them for good.^ ^^ 
The Commissioner of Police assured Parliament in 1882 that 'the efforts of 
the native police had been untiring' in their attempts at conciliation with 
the Aborigines of North Queensland. ^ ''^  
Local officials and commentators, however, saw the issue in much 
blunter terms. The Cooktown Herald argued in a lengthy editorial in 
December 1875 that 'we can see no middle course .... [The choice is either] 
the abandonment of the country or the complete repression of these 
pests'.^^^ Engaging in the same debate, the Rockhampton Bulletin 
suggested that 
1*^ ^ The Cooktown Courier, 17 November 1875, p. 3. 
I'^ S Barnett, 'A stud/ , p. 89. 
l"^ "? Parry-Okeden, 'Report', p. 37. But see Chapter 7 'Government policy: assimilation 
or segregation' in Reynolds, Dispossession, pp. 182-214 and especially the section on 
Queensland at pp. 195-205. 
IfS QVP, 1, 1882, p. 419. 
l i t CHPRA, 8 December 1875, p. 2. 
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in order to initiate the horrors of the extermination 
policy ... the most merciful and effective [response] ... 
would be to despatch a large, well-equipped force [to 
Far North Queensland] to subdue them at once.^^ 
The reahty was that 'a large, well-equipped force', which already 
existed in the guise of the Native Mounted Police, was having some 
difficulty — in Far North Queensland at least — in carrying through the 
Government's de facto extermination policy. In early 1877 an editorial in 
The Cooktown Courier denounced the existing poUcy as a failure noting that 
armed police have been waging continual war with 
the blacks [for three years] and private individuals 
have been doing a great deal of shooting among them. 
[But] ... the result is what?^^! 
That editorial sparked a heated debate in Cooktown over whether 
the local Aborigines should be exterminated or suppressed. The argument 
advanced by The Cooktown Courier was that 'if [the Aborigines] ... don't 
touch the whites, the police ... [should] leave them alone'.^^^ The paper 
warned, however, that any attempt at inducing the Aborigines to live in 
harmony with the white population — as was largely the case in the period 
between December 1873 and October 1874 — would be futile until the 
native police desisted fi-om 
[their] present fitful system of haphazard little 
massacres, having no apparent connection to the 
outrages they are supposed to punish.^^^ 
The outcome of the debate is unclear. It does seem, though, that clashes 
between the native police and Aborigines declined progressively thereafter, 
although that could be attributable also to the progressive decease in the 
population of the Palmer and Hodgkinson goldfields after 1877 (and the 
consequence of less traffic on the Cooktown-Palmer track). 
180 Quoted in CHPRA, 8 December 1875, p. 2. 
181 The Cooktown Courier, 28 February 1877, p. 2. 
182 The Cooktown Courier, 21 February 1877, p. 2. 
183 The Cooktown Courier, 21 February 1877, p. 2. The editorial gave only cursory 
mention to the prospect of Aborigines and Europeans living in harmony", and there 
is little to suggest that the idea was ever taken particularly seriously within the 
Cooktown community or elsewhere. 
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What is clear is that the debate in Cooktown in the late 1870s over 
the issue of race relations was driven largely by a recognition that the policy 
of extermination had failed to deal with the stubborn remnants of 
Aboriginal resistance in the area. That was in contrast to the success of the 
unwritten policy of extermination elsewhere in Queensland or, 
alternatively, to the moral and economic considerations typically behind 
decisions to 'let in' the Aborigines, either to pastoral stations or island 
reserves. ^ 84 Certainly, the Cooktown experience would seem to add a 
further dimension to Loos' conclusion that the rainforest and sea fi"ontiers 
were the two obvious situations where Europeans were forced to 
accommodate the local Aborigines.i85 
The Balance Sheet of Losses 
Accepting that the direct killing of Aborigines by the native police 
and white 'vigilantes' had largely tailed off in the Cooktown-Psdmer area by 
the late 1870s, it is useful to compare losses on both sides to that point. 
According to a detailed study by Loos, the number of EuropeEuis and 
Chinese killed by Aborigines throughout the 1870s in the Cooktown-Palmer 
area probably did not exceed about eighty five, although unrecorded 
Chinese deaths could realistically have pushed that figure towards 120.^ 86 
Probably around fifteen of the European deaths included in the 
eighty-five occurred on the 'sea frontier', between the Annan River to the 
south and Cape Flattery to the north.^87 They included Aboriginal revenge 
attacks on white overseers in the beche-de-mer industry, such as the later 
attack against Mary Watson's husband on Lizard Islemd in 1881. They also 
184 See, for example, the discussion on 'letting in' in C. Moore, 'Restraining their 
savage propensities: the South Kennedy and North Leichhardt districts in the 
1860s and 1870s' in Reynolds, i?ace relations, pp. 98-105 and A Allingham, 
'Burdekin frontier' in Reynolds, Race relations, pp. 126-130. 
185 Loos contends that settlers on the rainforest frontier, finding the battle too slow 
and costly, entered into a treaty with resisting Aborigines, while on the sea frontier 
Aborigines were coopted for their labour: Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 160. 
181 ggg Loos, Invasion and resistance. Appendix B 'Settlers and their employees 
reportedly killed as a result of Aboriginal resistance in North Queensland between 
1861 and 1897', pp. 194-247. 
18^ Loos has calculated that probably thirty whites were killed on the sea frontier in 
Far North Queensland during the 1870s: Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 138. It 
seems reasonable to assume that about 15-20 of those deaths occurred in the 
Cooktown area, between the Annan River and Cape Slattery. 
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included the occasional but random attack by Aborigines on passing boats 
which ventured too near to the coast. The cutter Prospect, for example, en 
route to Cooktown from Cardwell in February 1879, 'had a very narrow 
escape from being captured by the blacks ...' after the vessel put in to shore 
to take on a supply of firewood.i88 
There is also some evidence to suggest that a number of European 
and Chinese deaths attributed to Aborigines on the Cooktown-Psdmer track 
were in fact the work of criminal gangs who earned their living by robbing 
miners and carriers.^89 The Cooktown Herald, for example, reporting the 
deaths of two Chinese packers in July 1875, noted that although their heads 
had been terribly mutilated with tomahawks, there was an 'entire absence 
of any [other] aboriginal signs ... confirming the suspicion of foul play on the 
part of Europeans or Chinamen', ^ o^ A. not uncommon ploy was reportedly 
for European gold robbers to thrust spears into the bullet wounds of their 
Chinese victims, in order to shift the blame to Aborigines.^^^ 
It seems probable, therefore, that the number of miners, 
prospectors, carriers and settlers killed by Aborigines on the mainland in 
the Cooktown-Palmer area during the 1870s was somewhere between fifty 
and seventy five.^^^ To put that into perspective, 742 whites and Chinese 
died in Cooktown alone from illness or accident between 1874 and 1879.1^3 
The reasonable conclusion is that more whites and Chinese died in 
Cooktown fi-om sickness and accidents in each year fi-om 1874 to 1879 (an 
average of 123) than died in total at the hsinds of Aborigines in the 
hinterland during the whole of the 1870s. 
The number of Aborigines killed was similarly not as high as many 
contemporary (and later exaggerated) accounts would suggest. Many 
188 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 8 February 1879, p. 2. 
1®^  See K Cronin, 'On a fast boat to Queensland: the Chinese influx onto Queensland's 
goldfields' in Evans et al, Exclusion, p. 258. 
1«0 CHPRA, 21 July 1875, p. 2. 
1^1 See Tresize, Last days, p. 32. 
192 Calculated by deducting 15-20 deaths on the sea frontier (see footnote 187) and 20-
25 deaths by criminal gangs (assuming that about 20 per cent of reported deaths 
were the work of criminals rather than Aborigines) from the range of 85-120 total 
deaths as assessed by Loos. 
ISS Statistics derived from annual reports of births, deaths and marriages in QVP, 
1875-80. 
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Aborigines — possibly as many as 1200-1500 in the Cooktown-Palmer area 
— were later to die indirectly from exposure to Europesui and Chinese 
diseases and illnesses, and fi-om starvation or malnutrition, following the 
destruction of their traditional hfestyle. But the total number killed 
directly by Europeans and native police throughout Far North Queensland 
was almost certainly less than 400 over the period 1861-97.1^4 
Moreover, as many as 100 of those most likely died during their 
enforced service in the beche-de-mer and pearling industries, particularly in 
the mid 1880s. ^ ^^  A further fifty or so probably perished at the hands of the 
Jardine brothers, during their expedition along the west coast of Cape York 
in 1864-5.1^ So probably around 250 or less were fi-om the seven Aboriginal 
groups hving astride the route between Cooktown and the Palmer (taking 
into account that some Aborigines were also killed in clashes with white 
prospectors and miners with the opening of the Etheridge goldfields). 
More difficult to estimate are the losses wrought within the seven 
Cooktown-Palmer groups. On balance, it seems probable that those hardest 
hit would have been the Koko-Wara, whose tribal area encompassed the 
Normanby River and the infamous Battle Camp and Hell's Gate. Assuming 
that the Koko-Wara's original population was around 500 (see Table 3.2 at 
page 131), the number of able-bodied males of fighting age in the group 
(that is, those aged 15-29 years) would probably have numbered around 
seventy five.^^'' 
19* See Reynolds, The unrecorded battlefields', p. 24 conservatively estimating the 
total for the whole of North Queensland as between 420 and 440. 
If i jn 1885, for example, thirty-one Aborigines died in those industries: see Reynolds, 
The unrecorded battlefields', p. 24. 
198 IJ^ one clash alone on 18 December 1874, the Jardine party 'poured volley after 
volley into [a group of Aborigines]... about 30 being killed': Byerley, Narrative, 
p. 36. 
1®"^  Calculated on the basis of an age/sex distribution of 15 per cent males between the 
ages of 15-29 years: see L.R. Smith, The Aboriginal population of Australia, ANU 
Press, Canberra, 1980, Figure 8.4.1 on p. 219 (albeit for Victoria in 1871 - no details 
were available for Queensland until 1890, by which time the age/sex distribution 
would have been profoundly affected by racial conflict). 
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Table 3.2 - A Possible Population Distribution of the 
Cooktown-Pahner River Aboriginal Groups 
circa 1870 
iiiiiiiiiiiiilWii»P^ii 
Koko-Imudji 
Koko-Bujundi 
Koko-Bididji* 
Koko-Walandj a* 
Koko-Wara* 
Koko-Jawa* 
Koko-Jelandi* 
Totals 
B^^H 
1600 
800 
1300 
1600 
7300 
7800 
5700 
26100 
iiiiiiiiiiii 
220 
110 
90 
110 
500 
550 
400 
1980 
Abte-bo^<i Males 
33 
17 
14 
17 
75 
82 
60 
298 
Source: Tribal names and areas from N.B. TmAeUe, Aboriginal tribes of Australia, ANU Press, Canberra, 1974, 
pp. 176-7. 
Notes: 1. Overall population numbers derived from calculations shown at footnote 20 
in Chapter 2. Individual numbers for the inland groups (indicated by 
asterisk) calculated on the basis of one person per 14.4 square kilometres of 
area: see L.R. Smith, The Aboriginal population of Australia, ANU Press, 
Canberra, 1980, p. 69. Coastal groups calculated on the same basis but 
with a factor of 2 applied to take accovmt of the added availability of marine 
resources. 
2. Calculated on the basis of the age/sex distribution shown at footnote 197, to 
this chapter that is, 15 per cent of the group would be able-bodied males 
between the ages of 15-29 years. 
Given the fi^equency and intensity of clashes involving the Koko-
Wara, it would not have been surprising if close to 75 per cent of their able-
bodied men were killed between 1873 and 1878. Similarly, the two groups 
to the north and south of the Palmer River, the Koko-Jawa and Koko-
Jelandi, could have had around two-thirds of their fighting-age men killed. 
Of the remzdning groups, the three others astride the route to the Palmer 
could have lost around 50 per cent of their men. The Koko-Bujundi, in 
relative isolation south of Mount Cook and the Annan River, probably 
escaped reasonably lightly with a casualty rate of around 30 per cent. 
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The consequence of such estimates is that the seven Aboriginal 
groups of the Cooktown-Palmer area could have lost around two-thirds of 
their able-bodied men between 1873 and 1878 (see Table 3.3 below). 
Another sixty or so Aborigines — younger or older men, the infirm, and 
women and children — were probably inadvertently (but indiscriminately) 
killed in native police 'dispersals' and the like, taking the total killed to 
around 250, as mentioned earlier.^^s 
Table 3.3 - An Estimate of Able-bodied Aboriginal Males killed between 
1873 and 1878 
Name 
Koko-Imudji 
Koko-Bujundi 
Koko-Bididji 
Koko-Walandj a 
Koko-Wara 
Koko-Jav^^a 
Koko-Jelandi 
Totals 
Able-bodied 
Male Populat ion 
(from Table 3.2) 
33 
17 
14 
17 
75 
82 
60 
298 
Fossibie 
KiUed 
50 
30 
50 
50 
75 
66 
66 
. 
Fossibie 
Number 
Killed 
17 
5 
7 
9 
57 
55 
40 
190 
Number 
Left 
16 
12 
7 
8 
18 
27 
20 
108 
The Impact on Aboriginal Society 
Superficially, it could be said that the two sides suffered not 
markedly different losses across the period 1873 to 1878 — 100 or so adult 
male whites and Chinese killed versus 250 Aboriginal men, women and 
children. The difference is that 100 European and Chinese deaths 
represented a 'societal' casualty rate of something less than one per cent of 
the 20,000 or more miners and settlers who flooded through the area, 
whereas 250 Aboriginal deaths not only represented a casualty rate of over 
10 per cent but effectively 'gutted' two male generations of Aboriginal 
society. 
198 A number of the 'survivors' would also have sustained debilitating injuries, which 
would have degraded their ability to fimction within traditional Aboriginal society. 
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The impact on traditional Aboriginal society of the loss of almost 
two-thirds of their able-bodied males over such a short period would have 
been profoiuid. Commenting upon a similar (but temporary) situation in 
the Batavia River region, caused by the absence of many of the young and 
middle-aged Aboriginal men in the fisheries industries, the anthropologist 
Walter Roth noted that 
these were the males who would have been most 
important in the hunting and fishing expeditions 
and the support, through kinship obligations, of a 
large number of dependants, especially older women.^^ 
The practice of the native police to confiscate or destroy Aboriginal 
weapons foiuid during 'dispersals' would have made life even more difficult 
for the survivors. After a raid at the Eight Mile near Cooktown in October 
1875 the local newspaper reported that the routed Aborigines had left 
behind 'a splendid collection of spears ... which have been brought in as 
spoil'.^^^ The need to replace quickly such confiscated weapons may explain, 
in part, why Aborigines on the Palmer track fi-equently 'carried away as a 
prize ... hoop iron for knives [and] waggon lynchpins for axes'.^^^ 
Particularly in the area around Cooktown and on the Palmer, the 
physical spread of white 'civilisation' would also have had a marked impact 
on the traditional hfestyle of the local Aboriginal groups. As settlers and 
miners 'tiuned a usurped land to new uses', they also monopolised or 
befouled water sources, luisettled native game in the vicinity of roads and 
tracks, and progressively pushed the remaining Aborigines — no doubt 
seriously demorahsed and in psychological shock — into increasingly 
smaller tribal areas.^^^ By the late 1870s, many of the Aboriginal clans 
199 See W.E. Roth to Under-Secretary Home Department of 4 October 1899, as 
published in 'Report of the Northern Protector of Aborigines for 1899', QVP, 5, 1900, 
p. 584. 
200 The Cooktown Courier, 30 October 1875, p. 3. 
201 Though Loos, Invasion and resistance, p. 81 cited the practice as an example of 
Aborigines readily adapting European articles to their traditional needs. 
202 H. Reynolds, The land, the explorers and the Aborigines' in Historical Studies, 
19, 75, 1980, p. 214. 
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in the region probably had no choice, because of imminent starvation, but to 
move to the fidnges of Eiuopean and Chinese communities.203 
In Cooktown, as elsewhere in Queensland, officials were keen to 
ensiu-e that 'the blacks' camp ... [would be] out of earshot, out of sight and, 
out of mind', with the proclamation in 1881 of an Aboriginal reserve on the 
northern banks of the Endeavour River. 204 There, in £m area of 20,000 
hectares, Aborigines 'would be unmolested as long as they did not commit 
any depredations'. 205 i t seems unlikely, though, that any Aborigines would 
have attempted to revert to a traditional lifestyle within the reserve, not 
least because the area, 'consisting mainly of sandhills and swamps', was 
generally too poor to sustain a permanent existence.206 Most camped on the 
immediate northern bank of the river, notwithstanding that they shared the 
location with a lepers colony for Chinese.207 
As in other areas of Queensland, the move to the fi-inges of white 
and Chinese communities may have saved the remnants of Aboriginal 
groups in the Cooktown-Palmer area from imminent st£irvation.208 Once 
there, however, their numbers were decimated by exposure to such 
European and Chinese diseases as smallpox, TB and pneumonia.209 Others 
fell prey to the ills of alcoholism or opium addiction, while the sexual 
exploitation of Aboriginal women by men in the townships led to the 
widespread incidence of venereal diseases. 
203 Reynolds notes that the move to the fringes of towns because of hunger was not 
unusual throughout Queensland: see H. Reynolds, Townspeople £tnd fringe-
dwellers' in Reynolds, Race relations, p. 149. Some Aboriginal sub-groups no doubt 
shunned the move, and attempted to maintain their traditional lifestyle and their 
resistance to white expansion. Those who mounted the attack on Lizard Island in 
1881, for example, were presumably Aborigines who had remained 'in the bush'. 
204 Reynolds, 'Townspeople', p. 148. 
205 See R. Evans, 'Missionary effort towards the Cape York Aborigines 1886-1910: a 
study of culture contact', BA (Hons) thesis. University of Queensland, 1969, p. 81. 
206 Evans, "Missionary effort', p. 81. 
207 Evans, 'Half-savage and half-starved', p. 98. 
20S Reynolds notes, however, that 'camp-dwellers were rarely able to gain a reliable 
and adequate supply of food': Reynolds, 'Townspeople', p. 151. 
209 By 1886, Aboriginal numbers in the vicinity of Cooktown were estimated to be 
between 400 and 500: see Haviland, 'How much food will there be in heaven? ...'. 
pp. 126-7. Some Aborigines reportedly contracted leprosy from the Chinese living 
near their camp: Evans, 'Half-savage and half-starved', p. 98. 
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hi Cooktown itself, Aborigines were progressively le t in' to the 
town diuing the early years of the 1880s, usually as a cheap soiu-ce of 
menial labour and to satisfy the sexual needs of a still male-dominated 
settlement. By 1885, though, 'the flotsam and jetsam of Aboriginal societj^ 
had created such a nuisance that a ciufew was imposed after dark. 210 
hi September 1886, with the opening of the Cape Bedford (or Hope 
Vale) mission, some fifty kilometres north of Cooktown, the Aboriginal 
'nuisamce' was moved even fiulher out of sight and out of mind.2ii By 1897, 
the niunber of'registered' Aborigines in the Cooktown area was xuider 100. 
It seems probable, therefore, based on the estimates at Table 3.2 (see page 
131), that the population of the five Aboriginal groups to the east of the 
Great Dividing Range had been reduced over the space of about twenty-five 
years fi-om around 1030 to the low hiuidreds. The fate of the two Palmer 
River groups was probably similar. 
In Memoriam 
One of the key themes in this chapter has been that an escalating 
cycle of racial conflict was underway in Far North Queensland long before 
the first white settlers arrived at Cooktown in October 1873. Another is 
that racial conflict in the Cooktown-Palmer area was as violent, and with 
an Aboriginal response as purposefiil, as perhaps anywhere else in 
Australia. 
In relation to the second theme, a possible explanation is that in 
most other parts of Australia, especially coastal areas, the gap between the 
first European explorers and the arrival of white settlers was usually in the 
order of years rather than decades.2i2 The 'discover}^ of Australia by Cook 
and the arrival of the First Fleet, for example, were separated by eighteen 
years. Settlers crossed the Blue Mountains hard on the heels of Blaxland 
and his party. Further north, settlers moved into the Darling Downs in the 
210 See Rowley, The destruction of Aboriginal society, p. 178. 
211 For a brief account of the Lutheran missionary work at Cape Bedford see Evans, 
'Missionary effort', p. 81. See also the good account in Haviland, 'How much food 
will there be in heaven? ...', pp. 119-149. 
112 The obvious exception is much of inland Australia, but there, the Aboriginal 
population was relatively sparse and much less siffected either by white exploration 
or settlement. 
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early 1840s, less than fifteen years afl;er its 'discovery* by Ciumingham in 
1827. So for most Aborigines, the gap between first contact and 'invasion' 
was across only one or two generations. 
Yet in Far North Queensland, and particularly around Cooktown, the 
gap spanned seven or eight generations, over about 100 years. Moreover, 
until 1873, the Aborigines had only intermittent contact with whites, 
resulting on almost every occasion (from an Aboriginal perspective anyway) 
in Europeans 'withdrawing* aft;er some altercation or confrontation. The 
Aborigines, therefore, may well have come to believe — possibly to the 
extent of it becoming engrained in tribal lore — that they, ludike Aboriginal 
groups elsewhere, were able to keep whites fi*om their traditional lands. 
The irony, as pointed out by Re5molds, is that 'Aboriginal 
resistance did not heighten the respect of the white man, it deepened his 
hatred and contempt'.2i3 And in a sad indictment of'the coming of the white 
man', the Queensland Commissioner of Police reported to ParhEonent in 
1897, following his inspection of the remnants of the Aboriginal groups of 
Far North Queensland, that 
I have avoided the use of the term tribes, as there 
are no such things as tribal chiefs, tribal laws or 
organisation left among them.2i4 
Certainly, the conclusion of this chapter is that while 'the coming 
of the white man' resulted directly in the killing of around 250 Aboriginal 
men, women and children, the far greater losses occurred over the following 
three decades. Indeed, the rise of Cooktown — as will be discussed in the 
next chapter — effectively sealed the fate of traditional Aboriginal society in 
the Cooktown-Palmer area, as the remaining local Aborigines succiunbed to 
exposure fi-om European and Chinese diseases, or the ills of'civihsation'. 
213 Reynolds, 'The unrecorded battlefields, p. 62. 
214 Parry-Okeden, 'Report', p. 16. 
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CHAPTER 4 • TENT CITY TO TOWN 
Cooktown in its heyday, in the mid-to-late 1870s, was a bustling 
commercial centre, boasting a population of some 3,000 people and £iround 650 
buildings. Not surprisingly, many accounts of the physical growth of the town 
over its first five or so years have dwelt heavily on the more notorious aspects 
of Cooktown's history with frequent descriptions of its 
... ninety-foiu licensed hotels, with as many brothels, with 
gambling dens, opiiun halls, dance halls, and good-time 
girls ready to ... strip off £in apparently endless array of 
clothing at the rate of one nugget per garment.'i 
At the other extreme are accounts from the time, dutifully recorded 
in The Cooktown Courier and The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River 
Advertiser, of the often lavish lifestyle of Cooktown's exclusive set of 
government officials, bank officers and prosperous businessmen and their 
families, looking down on the rest of Cooktown fi-om their comfortable homes 
on the slopes of Grassy Hill. Theirs was an existence seemingly centred on 
piano recitals, race meetings and regattas, formal dinners, picnics and spring 
balls. Early issues of The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser, for 
example, announced in May and June 1874 (only six months after the 
settlement began) that a fancy dress ball would be held at the Australian 
Hotel to celebrate the Queen's Birthday and that inaugural meetings of the 
Cooktown jockey and cricket clubs were planned. 2 Yet only a month 
beforehand, the newly-appointed government medical officer was still seeing 
patients at his tent in Charlotte Street.^ 
Obviously, the mainstream story of Cooktown's early commercial and 
residential development lies somewhere between the two extremes. It is also 
evident that the physical growth of Cooktown is more than just the story of a 
'rip-roaring' frontier town making the transition to a respectable commercial 
centre for its hinterland. What emerges in this chapter is the complex 
interplay between the views of the govemment-of-the-day and Cooktown's 
early settlers. Initially, for example, the Government saw the town primarily 
See H. Holthouse, River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, Angus 
and Robertson, Sydney, 1967, p. 141. 
The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser (CHPRA), 13 May 1874, p. 3, 
20 May 1874, p. 2 and 3 June 1874, p. 2. 
As advertised in CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 1. 
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as the entry point at which to extract duty and taxes on goods en route to the 
Palmer. Government expenditure, therefore, tended to relate primarily to 
revenue collection, such as customs, and harboiu* and wharfage facilities. 
Similarly, the majority of early settlers were service providers — pubhcans, 
storekeepers, carriers, farriers and the like — who were out 'to make a quick 
buck' and cared little for the town itself. 
With the passage of time, however, the more civic-minded settlers 
(many of whom had achieved a degree of social status through their official 
position or their commercial prosperity) began to agitate for the 
accoutrements of'civihsed society^, such as kerbs and paved roads, a town 
hall, botanical gardens etc, largely on the perceived basis that such trappings 
would demonstrate both to the Government and would-be residents the 
progress and longer-term viability of the town. But many of Cooktown's 
service providers remained apathetic towards such 'progress'. Moreover, once 
the bubble of the Pahner had burst by about late 1877, the Government 
(though not the local government authorities) rapidly downscaled its 
commitments to public works in the town. Indeed, from about 1878 onwards, 
the development (or demise) of Cooktown is largely a story of business and 
civic leaders attempting to convince the Government in Brisbane of the town's 
longer-term prospects, culminating in the ill-advised and ill-fated railway line 
to Laiu-a.4 
Overlaying the gradually divergent views of the Government and 
civic leaders was the often under-rated issue of the Chinese presence in 
Cooktown. Much has been written about the presence of Chinese on the 
Pahner River goldfields and their arrival and subsequent exodus through 
Cooktown. What is less well known is that, in 1875 and 1876, more Chinese 
were reportedly living in Cooktown itself than whites.^ Yet apart from 
occasional mentions of'Chinatown, a town within a town ... a series of narrow, 
covered alleys like a great bazaar', very little has been written of the role and 
influence of the Chinese business commimity in Cooktown.^ This chapter 
These issues are addressed in detail in Chapter 7 'Boom to Bust'. 
See editorials in The Cooktown Courier, 20 October 1875, p. 2 noting 'about 2000 of 
them within the precincts of the town' and similarly on 21 October 1876, p. 2, the 
claim that 'they make up more than half our town population'. 
Holthouse's description of Cooktown's Chinatown in River of gold, pp. 144-5 is one of 
the few mentions of the subject in either primary or secondary sources. 
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includes, therefore, the largely unrecorded part played by Cooktown's Chinese 
community in its transformation fi-om tent city to town.^ 
The Initial Lodgement 
Cooktown's first permanent building (differentiating here between 
tents and those constructed fi-om timber and iron) was probably the 
government store erected by A.C. Macmillan's work party in the first few days 
of November 1873. ^  Neither its size, description nor location are recorded. 
But it was probably constructed from sawn timber £md corrugated-t5rpe iron 
from materials loaded on the SS Leichhardt at either Bowen or TownsviUe. It 
was probably erected on the government reserve at the foot of Grassy Hill (see 
Map 4.1 over), at the head of the main street as marked out by Macmillan 
prior to his departure for the Palmer River on 31 October 1873. 
The role and influence of the Chinese commimity in Cooktown, in a social and 
economic context, are also addressed further in Chapters 5 and 7. 
See AC. Macmillan to Secretary for Works, 30 October 1873, in-letter 4598/73 of 1873, 
WOR/A74, Queensland State Archives (QSA). 
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Map 4.1 - The Settlement at Cooktown as Laid Out 
by A-C. Macmillan in October 1873 
Landing 
Endeavoiir 
River 
main street 
(subsequently 
Charlotte Street) 
Road to Palmer River Uoo 
J 
Source: As reported in ofJBdal mining news published in The Brisbane Courier, 21 January 1874, p. 3. 
The function of this building, apart from it being a 'government 
store', is also not recorded. Presiunably its purpose was to house the 
equipment and supphes of Macmillan's road party which, in the event, he left 
at the settlement while he proceeded on his *fl3rLng visit' to the Palmer. It is 
possible that it was also used temporarily as a store by the small pohce 
detachment which was left *to form a station on the river', while the main 
pohce party accompanied Howard St George to the Pahner. ^  
Apart from the government store, all the other ^buildings' in the 
fledgling settlement were tents or timber and canvas fabrications. The 
number erected in late October and the early days of November 1873 is 
As reported by the correspondent to the Cleveland Bay Express, as pubUshed in The 
Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
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difficult to quantify. Dalrymple described the scene on 25 October, the day of 
the SS Leichhardt's arrival, as Uke 'a young diggings township ... [with] tents 
rising in all directions'. ^ ^ But probably as many as two-thirds of those tents 
belonged to the pohce detachment and road party accompan3dng St George 
and Macmillan, and to the eighty-six would-be diggers who left the settlement 
on 31 October bound for the Palmer. ^ ^ 
Indeed, given that reports suggest that the SS Leichhardt had taken 
on some ninety diggers at Bowen and Townsville, and 'more passengers' at 
Cardwell, the number left at Cook's Town was probably less than fifty, of 
whom more than half would either have been members of Macmillan's road 
party (who were subsequently withdrawn in early December) or the police 
detachment. 2^ Certainly, the only report of commercial activity at the 
settlement prior to the departure of the main party for the Palmer was that 
'two stores and a public-house [or tent] were doing a brisk business'. ^ ^ 
Moreover, most of the 'tons upon tons of merchandise' taken on by 
the SS Leichhardt at either Bowen or Townsville was obviously intended for 
the immediate resupply of the 500 or so men already at the Palmer diggings, 
presumably through two or three retail distributors who had accompanied the 
expedition to Cook's Town. Indeed, immediately upon his arrival at the 
goldfields, Howard St George arranged for all the available packhorses, some 
200 in number, to be sent to the Endeavour River to collect rations for the 
diggers who by then were completely out of supplies. ^ ^ 
The point of this discussion is that, contrary to contemporary 
accounts, it seems unlikely that a 'bustling tent c i t / sprang up almost 
^^ G.E. Dalrymple, 'Narrative and Reports of the Queensland North-East Coast 
Expedition 1873' in Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland 
[QVP], 2, 1874, p. 635. 
^^ See letter Howard St George to Secretary for Works and Mines of 16 November 1873: 
in-letter 158 of 1874, WOR/A77, QSA See also the report by the correspondent to the 
Cleveland Bay Express advising that St George and Macmillan left with 106 men (and 
that five foolhardy souls had ventured alone earlier): see The Brisbane Courier, 13 
December 1874, p. 5. 
12 There is considerable variance in the reports of the number of would-be miners on 
board SS Leichhardt: Dalrymple reported seventy (see 'Narrative ...', p. 634), a 
member of his expedition said 150 (see The Brisbane Courier, 13 November 1873, p. 3) 
and the Cleveland Bay Express correspondent said 180 (see The Brisbane Courier, 
29 November 1873, p. 5). A figure of around ninety diggers, with a total expedition 
complement of around 150 seems most likely. 
13 See The Brisbane Courier, 29 November 1873, p. 5. 
14 See letter St George to Colonial Secretary dated 24 November 1873, as published in 
The Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1873, p. 2. 
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overnight in Cook's Town with the arrival of the SS Leichhardt on 25 October 
1873. Rather, it seems that the initial lodgement — once the main party 
departed — comprised a handful of police, probably about ten storekeepers 
and their assistants (several of whom were presumably planning to return 
from whence they came as soon as the Palmer was resupplied) smd the 
temporarily unemployed Works Department road party. 
The Early Rush 
It is similarly useful to attempt to differentiate, from the numerous 
accounts of the rush to the Endeavour River which then took place between 
December 1873 and mid April 1874, between those who stayed in Cooktown 
and those who were heading for the Palmer. Figure 4.1 (below) shows that the 
semi-permanent population of Cooktown steadily increased over that period 
from about 300 in early Jgmuary 1874 to aroimd 1800 by late April. 
Numerous heady accounts from a variety of ill-informed visitors, however, 
often put the population as high as 4000, which represented more probably 
the combined niunber of residents and transients. 
Figure 4.1 - The Estimated Number of Residents and Transients in 
Cooktown: January-May 1874 
(as at the first of each month) 
4000 T 
3500 
3000 
2500 
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Source: Resident numbers primarily from telegrams Police Magistrate Thomas Hamilton to Colonial Secretary 
dated 23 March (in-letter 399/74 of 1874, C0IVA192, Queensland State Archives (QSA) and 2 May 
1874, in-letter 1034/74 of 1874 COL/A195, QSA). For examples of exaggerated accounts, see The 
Brisbane Courier, 13 February 1874, p. 2 and The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser 
(CHPRA), 29 April 1874, p. 2. 
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Differentiating between residents and transients is obviously 
important in further distinguishing between dwellings in Cooktown of a semi-
perm£ment nature and the temporary encampments of those readying to 
depart for the Palmer. The inability to make that distinction is evident in 
many of the early accounts of the physical growth of Cooktown, not least in 
the reports of dwellings being constructed along Charlotte Street. In what 
was probably a reasonable assessment, the visiting Commissioner of Police 
noted in late February that the main street had been built upon on its eastern 
side for half a mile.^^ But at least two accounts from the same time claimed 
that the main street had buildings on each side stretching for two miles, while 
other more conservative commentators put the figiue at one and a quarter. ^ ^ 
In a similar vein, it is also evident that many early commentators, 
caught up in the euphoria of the rush mentality, exaggerated the nature, size 
and construction materials used in even the semi-permanent buildings which 
had sprung up in the opening months of Cooktown's existence. In mid 
January 1874, for example, one sober report of Cooktown's progress noted that 
the eastern side of Charlotte Street 'is tolerably lined with shanties and tents', 
while another in mid February noted that 'two or three of them are 
substantially built weatherboard places'.^^ Inexplicably (and unbelievably), a 
correspondent from Cooktown was reporting only three weeks later that 'a 
large town exists ... with banks, public-houses, billiard saloons, theatres and 
rifle galleries ... and [that] buildings in the main street consist now ahnost 
entirely of wood and iron'.^^ 
The more likely reality was that most, if not all, of the ^buildings' on 
the west side of Charlotte Street, the side reserved for government purposes, 
were only tents or canvas and timber fabrications. And in the period of 
uncertainty before the first public land action on 19 May 1874, the majority of 
the buildings on the east side of Charlotte Street and elsewhere were probably 
easily dis-assembled timber and canvas fabrications, albeit that many of the 
commercial buildings most likely had a timber and iron facade. 
^^ See letter Commissioner Seymour to Colonial Secretary dated 24 February 1874, in-
letter 399/74 of 1874, COL/A192, QSA 
1^ See, for example, The Brisbane Courier, 19 January 1874, p. 2 and 16 February 1874, 
p. 3 and James Mulligan quoted in Holthouse, River of gold, p. 53. 
1'^  See The Brisbane Courier, 10 January 1874, p. 5 and 20 February 1874, p. 3. 
18 See The Brisbane Courier, 18 March 1874, p. 3 publishing a letter dated 12 March 
1874. 
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Certainly, shipping records indicate tha t practically every ship 
arriving a t Cooktown from late March 1874 onwards was carrying building 
materieds (see Table 4.1 below), although what proportions were destined for 
the Palmer, ra ther than Cooktown, is unclear. ^ ^ 
Table 4.1 - Building Materials Arriving by Ship in Cooktown 
in late March 1874 
(extracts from the manifests of every ship arriving in the week to 1 April 1874) 
Vftss^l 
Morning Light 
Marquis of Lome 
African Maid 
Princess Louise 
Emma Jane 
Tengril 
<3r*lv«SJSe<l 
Ceases} 
5 
-
3 
4 
-
-
NaUB 
<kfigs> 
_ 
-
1 
9 
-
-
\ Palings 
4080 
2000 
-
5800 
-
1000 
ISnsifee*' 
Cihtearf«et) 
. 
-
-
-
54215 
-
Cpleqes) 
_ 
905 
-
1613 
-
-
Source: CHPRA, 1 April 1874, p. 2. 
It also appears tha t the same commentators frequently exaggerated 
the niunber and size of the various businesses operating in Cooktown, 
particularly in relation to public houses and brothels. One correspondent 
claimed tha t there were sixty-five pubhc-houses in Cooktown in late April 
1874, while Holthouse quotes another as saying tha t ' the brothels 
outnumbered the public houses', ^ o Both accoimts seem grossly exaggerated. 
The number of retail spirit hcences issued in the period to 30 J u n e 1874 was 
only thirty-seven. 21 Moreover, a number of those operated from general 
stores, ra ther t han hotels or pubhc-houses. 22 There is also not a single 
mention of brothels, prostitution or even dance-halls in either The Cooktown 
Courier or The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser from April 1874 
19 
m 
m. 
m 
Given the uncertainty regarding the Palmer goldfields at about that time, as discussed 
in Chapter 2 under The Return Rush of April 1874', it seems possible that most of 
such material was in fact destined for Cooktown. 
See The Brisbane Courier, 27 April 1874, p. 3 and Holthouse, River of gold, p. 54. 
Licence details from Queensland Government Gazette [QGGJ^ol. 15, 1874, p. 580 and 
pp. 918-9. 
By mid 1874, it seems probable that there were about 40 hotels per se operating in 
Cooktown. The hotel industry is, however, discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
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to the close of 1880.23 That is not to say they did not exist. But their presence 
could not have been as overt as Holthouse would suggest, given the 
newspapers' sense of propriety on every other issue of public morality. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the one aspect which rates barely a mention 
in most contemporary accounts of early Cooktown was the abysmal lack of 
government buildings and services (although perhaps understandable given 
the local communit/s primary focus on commerce). In February 1874, the 
town still had no pohce magistrate, no registrar of births, deaths and 
marriages, no postmaster and no hospital. Indeed, the government buildings 
consisted of two small iron and wooden buildings for the nine-man police 
detachment and one small hut (8 feet x 8 feet) for the acting sub-collector of 
customs.24 One of the police buildings (8 feet x 6 feet) doubled as the court 
house and store for the Works Department, although in mid Januairy 1874 the 
police court was 'completely destitute of office books and printed forms'.25 
The foregoing somewhat negative assessment of Cooktown's early 
progress is not meant to disparage the obviously rapid development which 
occurred between November 1873 and April 1874. Rather, it is meant to rebut 
some of the more fancifiil and exaggerated accounts which emerged both at 
the time and in later recountings of Cooktown's early days. It is also meant to 
portray Cooktown after six months of settlement not only as a boisterous 
frontier town, with a highly transient and male-dominated population, but 
also as a town somewhat uncertain of its own longer-term prospects. 
The Land Sale of May 1874 
In that regard, the single issue causing most uncertainty in terms of 
the physical growth of the town in the period to May 1874 was the lack of a 
government survey and associated plans for the sale of crown land. 
Bemoaning the lack of activity, an editorial in The Cooktown Herald and 
Palmer River Advertiser of 1 April 1874 lambasted the Government in 
Brisbeme for its 'great wrong to the community and pointed out that the delay 
23 There is frequent denunciation of the sin and immorality within Chinatown, but that 
usually related to gambling, opium smoking and the allusion to the homosexual 
activities of certain 'depraved heathens'. 
24 See report by Police Commissioner Seymour to Colonial Secretary, as published in The 
Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 3. 
25 Seymour in The Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 3 and report in The Brisbane 
Courier, 10 January 1874, p. 5. 
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'luisettles business mens [sic] calculations £md keeps the pubhc mind 
uneas5^.26 
As illustrated at Map 4.1 (at page 140), A.C. Macmillan had laid out 
the main street and several government reserves as early as late October 
1873. But his survey did not include the demarcation of building allotments, 
nor any additional parallel or cross streets. In consequence, Cooktown by 
early 1874 had degenerated into a hotch-potch collection of temporary 
buildings, shanties and tents strimg out very roughly along Charlotte Street, 
but also occup3dng most of the supposed government reserves and many of the 
areas which clearly would be needed as thoroughfares. 
The complete western side of Charlotte Street, which was reserved 
for government purposes, was a jumble of tents 'pitched as thick as it is 
possible to place them'.27 Elsewhere, buildings had been erected on the post 
office reserve at the foot of Grassy Hill. 28 Charles Bouel, later a weU known 
publican in the town, complained to the Surveyor General in January 1874 
that 'two storekeeper justices of the peace, who are jealous of my [store's] 
position, being adjacent to the wharf were threatening to evict him from a 
public reserve.29 And dwelHngs along Charlotte Street had been erected 
'without any regard to symmetry, except that they faced the road'.^^ 
The arrival in Cooktown in February 1874 of James Read, the 
government surveyor commissioned to 'survey a number of suitable town 
allotments and mark off wharf frontages' was, therefore, initially welcomed by 
the townspeople.31 The enthusiasm of a number turned to dismay, however, 
when it became obvious that Read was recommending street frontages of 
9 metres (30 feet), as against the 18 metre (60 feet) frontages many had 
claimed, and that his plan for cross streets and thoroughfares meant that a 
number of dwellings would have to be removed.32 One angry correspondent 
26 CHPRA, 1 April 1874, p. 2. 
2^ See report of Police Commisioner Seymour to Colonial Secretary published in The 
Brisbane Courier, 27 February 1874, p. 3. 
28 See CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 3. 
29 See C. Bouel to Secretary for Lands and Mines, 10 January 1874, in-letter 805/75 of 
1874, LAN/A45, QSA. 
30 See report in The Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1874, p. 3. 
31 See the report in official mining news published in The Brisbane Courier, 21 January 
1874, p. 3. 
32 See, for example, letter to the editor in CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. 
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asserted that 'Mr Macmillan's authority to lay off the township seems to have 
been entirely ignored by the gentleman who came after him'. ^ 
The other aspect causing even more consternation to many of those 
who had claimed a piece of land by simple possession, and had then erected a 
building upon it, was the advice from Brisbane that neither possession nor 
improvements would confer any pre-emptive right to purchase at the eventual 
land sale. The concern, rgdsed in the editorial of The Cooktown Herald and 
Palmer River Advertiser of 1 April 1874, was that Cooktown would suffer the 
s£ime fate as Maryborough, Gladstone and Rockhampton, where 'land sharks 
... systematically picked up the best lots of every new township to hold them 
for an advance price and stuck the real inhabitants into comers'. ^ 4 In the 
event, the Government decided — after a private deputation of Cooktown 
residents to the Lands Department — that claims would be allowed for 
improvements in excess of £50, provided such claims were lodged before the 
first land sale, scheduled for 19 May 1874.3^ 
On the due day, 139 town allotments were offered by public auction 
at the upset price of £50 per acre for frontages on Charlotte Street and £12 10s 
per acre for allotments elsewhere (see Map 4.2 over). One hundred and thirty 
five of them sold for a total price of £2938, almost three times the upset 
value. 3^  The highest price bid was £100 by Henry O'Reilly (through an agent) 
for an allotment on Charlotte Street; the lowest was £3 15s by one of the 
trustees of the Masonic Lodge for a small allotment on the comer of Helen and 
Fumeaux Streets. ^ ^ Contrary to the concerns expressed earher, no 'land 
sharks' seem to have been present and most blocks seem to have been sold to 
those already in possession of them. 
33 As above in CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. Yet James Read had been sent by the 
authorities in Brisbane on the advice of AC. Macmillan, who had telegraphed the 
Under-Secretary of Works in late December 1873 advising that the 'settlement now 
sufficiently advanced to warrant immediate survey of the town': see Macmillan to 
Under-Secretary of Works of 24 December 1873, in-letter 2458 of 1873, COL/A189, 
QSA 
34 CHPRA, 1 April 1874, p. 2. For an account of earlier land speculation in the 1840s 
and 1850s, see H. Gregory, 'Squatters, selectors and — dare I say it — speculators'. 
Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 11, 4,1983, pp. 74-87. 
35 See CHPRA, 8 April 1874, p. 3. 
36 As reported in CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. 
3'^  See lots 2 and 102 respectively in Register of the Sale of Crown Land by Public Auction 
at Cooktown on 19 May 1874, LAN/A327, QSA 
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JVIap 4.2 - Building Allotments Sold at the First Land Sale 
m Cooktown: 19 May 1874 
Grovenunent 
reserve 
Endeavour 
River 
Charlotte 
Street 
O l o o **30 
I I t Mi 
J 
blocks sold 
n allotments alienated by 
1885 
Source: Register of the Sale ofCroum Land by Public ./Miction at Cooktown on 19 May 1874, LAN/A327, 
QSA. 
Coping with the Influx of Population 
One of the unmediate benefits of the land sale was that it gave 
successful purchasers the confidence to construct more substantial and more 
permanent businesses and dwellings. The Cooktown Herald and Palmar River 
Advertiser, in an editorial dated 17 Jime 1874, asserted that 
Those persons who were wont to regard the vEirious places 
of business as "all fi-ont and cahco" would be considerably 
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astonished at the change which has already taken place ... 
since the L£ind Sale ... [and] by the numerous substantial 
buildings erected and even now in the course of erection.38 
It is evident, however, that the s£Je of 135 building allotments would 
have gone only part of the way towards providing permanent accommodation 
for the estimated 1800 people then resident in Cooktown, especially given that 
half of the blocks were commercial sites in Charlotte Street. Indeed, assuming 
that all seventy blocks facing Charlotte Street ultimately had business 
premises erected upon them and that the remaining sixty-five blocks were 
sold for residential purposes (see Map 4.2 on previous page), it seems unlikely 
that the first land sale provided permanent accommodation for more than 
about 670 persons.^^ That calculation suggests that in May 1874 some 1130 
other 'residents', most of whom were probably single white adult males, were 
living in tents or shanties either in areas reserved for government purposes or 
on the fi-inges of the land already surveyed and sold."^ 
Complicating the accommodation problem, of course, was the large 
transient population passing through Cooktown at any one time, either en 
route to the Palmer, returning to southern ports from the Palmer or simply 
visiting Cooktown from the Palmer to savour the ^bright lights'. As indicated 
earlier at Figure 4.1 (at page 142), the transient population was at times as 
high as around 2000, although that figure from ApriL/May 1874 was unusually 
high and a result of heavy rains cutting access to the Palmer for several 
weeks, combined with the 'return rush' of April 1874. Moreover, most of that 
particular 2000 were camped either on the roadside on the southwestern 
outskirts of Cooktown, or on the road towards the Palmer rather than within 
the town itself.'*^ 
Apart from such brief concentrations, it seems likely that the daily 
transient population in Cooktown — including Chinese — rose from an 
38 CHPRA, 17 June 1874, p. 3. 
39 Assuming that each business premise provided accommodation for four persons and 
that each residential dwelling accommodated six persons, an assumption based on a 
variety of anecdotal accounts of early life in Cooktown. 
'^ ^ The editorial in The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser of 20 May 1874, for 
example, spoke of'those who were left out in the cold' after the recent land sale: 
CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. Similarly, in a criminal prosecution before the 
magistrates' court on 27 May 1874, against two Cooktown residents who had 
unlawfully erected a dwelling on Crown land, the defendants' lawyer pointed out 'most 
of the population of Cooktown ... had no alternative but to occupy unalienated land 
until another sale should take place': CHPRA, 3 June 1874, p. 2. 
41 See The Cooktown Courier, 25 March 1874, p. 2. 
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average of about seventy five in 1874 to close to double that number in 1875, 
before declining steadily thereafter as shown at Figure 4.2. 
Figure 4J2 - Average Daily Transient Population in Cooktown: 
1874-79 
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Source: Data derived from Table 4.2 (over). 
The calculations to support those estimates are shown at Table 4.2 
(over). They assume that a small proportion of new arrivals in Cooktown each 
year remained in the town, replacing those who departed either for southern 
ports or perhaps for the Palmer itself. They assume also that incoming 
transients stayed an average of three days in Cooktown, engaged in such 
activities as equipping themselves for the jomney to the goldfields, buying 
supphes and equipment, and seeking travelling companions and the latest 
word on new discoveries. 
The calculations similarly assume that departing transients stayed 
an average of four days in Cooktown, primarily to arrange their passage 
southwards or, in the case of the Chinese, back to Hong Kong or Canton. They 
also assiune that around 30 per cent of the population of the goldfields made 
one visit to Cooktown in 1874, for an average of five days stay, either to 
transact business (as in the case of carriers and storekeepers) or simply to 
enjoy the relative comforts and lifestyle of the town. In the years thereafter, 
as the population on the goldfields became increasingly dominated by the 
Chinese, the percentage used has been decreased to 20 per cent in 1875 and 
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10 per cent per year thereafter (with all such assumptions based on anecdotal 
evidence fi'om contemporary newspaper accounts and the like). 
Table 4.2 - The Calculation of the Average Daily Transient 
Popvdation in Cooktown: 1874-79 
Set^ 
Ca> 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
FaetOM 
(b) 
Population of 
Cooktown 
Numbers arriving in 
Cooktown by ship 
Number of arrivals 
remaining in 
Cooktown 
Number of arriving 
transients 
Number of days in 
Cooktown by 
arriving transients 
Numbers departing 
Cooktown by ship 
Number of Cooktown 
residents departing 
by ship 
Number of departing 
transients 
Number of days in 
Cooktown by 
departing transients 
Population of Palmer 
River and 
Hodgkinson 
goldfields 
Number of Palmer 
River and 
Hodgkinson visitors 
to Cooktown per 
year 
Number of days in 
Cooktown by 
goldfields visitors 
Total days in 
Cooktown by 
transients 
Average transient 
population in 
Cooktown per day 
'Ntitb& 
(o) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
mu 
m 
2000 
6200 
600 
5600 
16800 
1500 
400 
1100 
4400 
4000 
1200 
6000 
27200 
75 
mm 
(e> 
2200 
11342 
660 
10682 
32046 
3045 
460 
2585 
10340 
8000 
1600 
8000 
50386 
138 
18?e 
0 
2400 
9616 
720 
8896 
26688 
2591 
520 
2071 
8284 
14410 
1440 
7200 
42172 
118 
mn 
(g) 
2600 
7320 
780 
6540 
19620 
2905 
580 
2325 
9300 
19000 
1900 
9500 
38420 
105 
M7& iS7& 
m 
3000 
397 
120 
277 
831 
2437 
820 
1617 
6468 
12982 
1300 
6500 
13799 
38 
(i> 
2300 
149 
45 
104 
312 
1035 
690 
345 
1380 
7634 
760 
3800 
5492 
15 
Notes: 1. Data derived from statistical records and extrapolation, as at 31 December. 
2. Data derived from immigration records, except for 1874 which is an estimation. 
3. Assuming 30% of population of Cooktown (from serial 1) or 30% of numbers arriving 
(from serial 2), whichever the lesser. 
4. Subtract serial 3 from serial 2. 
5. Based on numbers from serial 4 multiplied by an average of three days. 
6. Data derived from immigration records, except for 1874 which is an estimation. 
7. Difference between number of arrivals and population of following year. 
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8. Subtract serial 7 from serial 6. 
9. Based on numbers from serial 8 multiplied by an average of four days. 
10. Data derived from statistical records, as at 31 December, except for 1874 which is an 
estimate. 
11. Assuming 30% of the goldfields population paid one visit to Cooktown in 1874, 20% in 
1875 and 10% thereafter (as the population increasingly became dominated by the 
Chinese). 
12. Assuming average visit of five days. 
13. Sum of serials 5, 9 and 12. 
14. Serial 13 divided by 365. 
Sources: Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2,1876, pp. 451-2, 521 
and 756; 2, 1877, pp. 970-1; 1, 1878, pp. 922-3; 1, 1879, pp. 1201-2 and 2, 1880, pp. 161-2. 
Obviously, it is not being suggested that the figures are exact, given 
the assumptions being made. But they are probably reasonably indicative of 
the numbers and the trend across the period. Importantly also, the figures 
can be used (as shown at Figm*e 4.3 below) to illustrate the approximate 
composition of the average daily transient population, differentiating between 
'arrivals', 'departures' and 'visitors'. 
Figure 4.3 - The Composition of the Average Daily Transient 
Population in Cooktown: 1874-79 
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Source: Data derived from Table 4.2 (at page 151). 
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The significance of the differentiation is that 'arrivals' would 
presmnably have been primarily interested in equipping themselves for the 
journey to the Palmer and for employment on the fields, and would probably 
have had httle interest in spending their money on hotel accommodation or 
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'entertainment'. 2^ Conversely, 'departiu-es' — if they had been successful at 
the Palmer — would probably have been prepared to part with some of their 
hard-won earnings on entertainment, regardless of whether they were white 
or Chinese. ^Visitors', of course, would probably have been midway between 
the two. The interesting trend in Figure 4.3 at page 152 is that the number of 
'arrivals' peaked in 1875 and declined drastically after 1877. The other 
significant trend is that the number of'visitors' remained steady over the 
period 1874 to 1878, with concomitant impHcations for the 'entertainment' 
industry in Cooktown, albeit that the bulk of visitors from 1875 onwards were 
probably Chinese. 
The point of this discussion is that in the formative years of 1874 
and early 1875, Cooktown probably had a resident population of around 1000 
white adults (predominantly male) living in temporary accommodation, as 
well as a daily transient population of around 100 adult white males. Indeed, 
what emerges in this chapter is that Cooktown's early business community 
was centred in large part on the 'service' needs of those two almost exclusively 
European groups, by way of restaurants, dining rooms, hotels, stores and 
boarding accommodation. 
With the passage of time and further land sales, however, many of 
Cooktown's residents made the transition fi-om temporary to permanent 
accommodation, thereby lessening their dependence on the business 
community, while the transient population increasingly came to be dominated 
by the Chinese. 43 The outcome was that many of the service businesses 
established in 1874 and 1875 struggled to survive, particularly in the face of 
keen competition fi-om the close-knit Chinese business commimity. Against 
that background, this chapter now examines the history of the key non-
government service industries in Cooktown, both in relation to commercial 
development and physical growth of the town. 
Cooktown's Early Hotels 
Probably no other aspect of Cooktown's early history has achieved 
the notoriety accorded to its hotels and 'grog shops', and associated dance-
halls and brothels. As indicated earlier, however, much of the notoriety seems 
42 The reception and outfitting of Chinese arrivals is discussed in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
43 The changing social, domestic and racial composition of Cooktown's population is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community'. 
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imwarr£inted and based Igu-gely on the ill-informed and exaggerated accounts 
of certain early visitors, whose primary interest was often in selling their 
story to a newspaper rather than a factual recording for posterity. 
Holthouse's description in River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold 
rush of Cooktown's ninety-four licensed hotels, for example, seems to have 
been based on the April 1874 visit report of the Townsville correspondent to 
The Brisbane Courier, who claimed (incorrectly) that '65 pubhc licences are 
issued and 30 more applied for'. 44 In reality, as can be seen fi-om Figiu-e 4.4 
(below), the highest number of licences issued was fifty eight in the year to 30 
June 1877 (and licences had to be renewed each financial year). 
Figure 4.4 - Retail Spirit Licences Issued for Cooktown 1874-84 
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Source: Data derived from Queensland Government Gazettes 1873-85. 
Even the number of licences issued, though, can be a misleading 
indication of the actual number of licensed premises. It is evident fi-om 
contemporary accounts of The Cooktown Courier and Cooktown Herald and 
Palmer River Advertiser that a number of establishments operated for only a 
few months before either going out of business or relocating to the Palmer. 
Conversely, public-houses often changed hands several times in the course of 
44 See The Brisbane Courier, 18 April 1874, p. 3. 
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a single year (as is particularly evident in the extremely low munber of 
renewed hcences in the 1875 figures at Figm-e 4.4). Accordingly, it seems 
probable that in the calendar year 1874 the total number of establishments 
which traded at some time during the year as a licensed hotel was around fift;y 
(see Table 4.3 below), with the possibihty of an additional twenty-three retail 
outlets operating for at least part of the year fi-om stores etc. ^ 
Table 4.3 - The Licensed Hotels Trading in Cooktown in 1874 
(but not necessarily across the 12 months) 
Albion 
All Nations 
Austrahan 
Brighton 
British 
Cafe' de Paris 
Captain Cook 
Ceuiboo 
Camiers Arms 
Commercial 
Cosmopolitan 
Criterion 
Diggers Arms 
Empire 
Etheridge 
European 
Exchange 
Gold Exchange 
Gulgong 
Gympie 
Hillside 
Keyes 
Leichhardt 
Melbourne 
Northern Australian 
Northern Star 
O'Grad/s Sydney 
Post Office 
Prince of Wales 
Queens 
Queensland 
Retreat 
Rock Inn 
Royal 
St Patricks 
Scandinavian 
Shamrock 
Sovereign 
Tattersals 
Thames and Auckland 
Travellers Home 
Travellers Rest 
Turf 
Universal 
Victoria 
Welcome 
West Coast 
Wheatsheaf 
Whitehorse 
Source: Derived primarily from The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, April-December 1874. 
Of those hotels listed at Table 4.3 above, only six had a female 
publican and only one — the Queensland — was run by a Chinese. Of the 
twenty-three other retail outlets, none was in the name of a female but four 
had a Chinese licensee. Only twenty-one of the forty-nine hotels listed 
'siu-vived' for more than five years (see Table 4.4 over) and only two — the 
Sovereign imder Henry Poole and the Welcome imder Mary O'Neill — were 
still operating with the same publican after ten years. By 1885, as can be 
45 A visitor to Cooktown in February 1874, for example, noted that 'even the chemist 
keeps a grog shop': The Brisbane Courier, 20 February 1874, p. 3. The figure of 
twenty-three derived from a check of licences issued in 1874 and 1875 against the 
names of publicans from the hotels at Table 4.3. 
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seen fi-om Figure 4.4 (publicans licences at page 154), the number of hotels 
trading in the town had probably dropped to less than thirty.46 
Table 4.4 - The Major Licensed Hotels in Cooktown: 1874-85 
(which traded for more than five consecutive years) 
Ksxne 
Black Eagle 
Cafe' de Paris 
Captain Cook 
Carriers Arms 
Cosmopolitan 
Criterion 
Diggers Arms 
Gold Exchange 
Great Northern 
Gympie 
Post Office 
Queensland 
Reynolds Family 
Royal 
Shamrock 
Sovereign 
Tattersals 
Turf/Club 
Welcome 
West Coast 
White Horse 
PaMican 
N. Armbrust 
C. Bouel 
J. Neill 
numerous 
numerous 
D. Lane 
D. Galvin et al 
C. Bouel 
S. Balser 
M. Wholohan 
M. & F. Totten 
See Wah 
T. & 0. Reynolds 
M. Lynch 
A. Smith/M. Ruge 
H. Poole 
M. Wholohan et al 
J. & E. Easdon 
M. O'Neill 
numerous 
A Thredgold/ 
A Langeschwerdt 
Dates 
1878-85 
1874-78 
1874-85 
1875-85 
1874-85 
1874-85 
1874-85 
1874-80 
1877-85 
1874-79 
1875-79 
1874-83 
1876-85 
1874-85 
1874-85 
1874-85 
1874-85 
1874-79 
1875-85 
1874-85 
1874-80 
Source: Derived primarily from The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, 1874-85. 
Initially, at least, most of licensed premises were prefabricated 
shanties sited along both sides of Charlotte Street, with several on the 
government reserve at the foot of Grassy Hill. In the lead up to the first land 
sale of 19 May 1874, those publicans with premises either on the west side of 
Charlotte Street or on reserves elsewhere felt themselves particularly 
disadvantaged by the decree from the local magistrates court that licences 
would only be renewed on 1 July for those premises erected on land duly 
purchased fi-om the Crown.47 After considerable complaint and lobbying, the 
46 
47 
In 1878, there were only twenty-five hotels listed in directories of Cooktown: see 
Pugh's Queensland Almanac 1878, Thorne, Brisbane, 1878, pp. 417-8. 
See letter to Magistrate Hamilton published in CHPRA, 25 March 1874, p. 2. 
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comt eventually decided to renew such licences, conditional on the premises 
being moved from reserved land 'when required' by the authorities.4S 
The pending land sale also brought the expectation from the 
authorities that publicans would henceforth construct more substantial 
dwelhngs and that such premises would need to satisfy the requirements of 
the Licensing Act. To that end, the local magistrates comt in late April 1874 
rejected all twenty-eight applications for the renewal of existing publicans 
hcences on the grounds that not one of the premises provided the necessary 
accommodation required by the Act. 49 The court adjourned all applications 
until two weeks after the land sale, warning prospective pubhcans that by 
then they needed at a minimum to have arranged for the installation of at 
least one 'properly-constructed earth closet', a facihty none of them currently 
had.50 
In the event, the land sale triggered a building boom throughout 
Cooktown, not confined to the retail spirit industry. Renovated and new 
hotels, however, were at the forefi-ont of the boom, with the new Sovereign 
Hotel for example, 'of an imposing nature and commodiously designed', as well 
as being the first two-storied building constructed in Cooktown.^^ Certainly, 
within the space of a few months, most of Cooktown's licensed hotels had 
made the transition to more permginent structures with practically all of them 
then ofiering, at a minimum, 'two sitting rooms and four bedrooms' as 
required by the Act.^^ jt seems likely, therefore, based on an average 
occupancy of two persons per bedroom, that by late 1874 Cooktown's thirty-
five or so hotels would have provided a reasonable standard of accommodation 
for about 300 persons, or some 10 per cent of Cooktown's resident 
population. 53 Of that total, only about ten places were in a 'Chinese' hotel. 
The amount and t5T)e of liquor consumed on the various hotels is 
difficult to quantify. Moreover, 'drinking' as a form of entertainment, together 
48 See The Cooktown Courier, 18 July 1874, p. 3. 
49 See CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2. 
5^ That ruling made something of a mockery of the earlier advertisement, for example, of 
the Australian Hotel offering 'a fine range of bedrooms, also spacious and airy dining 
rooms ... and assembly rooms for private or professional use': see CHPRA, 15 April 
1874, p. 1. 
51 See CHPRA, 17 October 1874, p. 2. 
52 At least five hotels had six bedrooms and one had eight: as advertised in The 
Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, July-December 1874. 
53 The prospects of comparing that percentage against other northern towns, such as 
Townsville and Cardwell, are discussed later in this chapter. 
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with the associated 'ills' of gambling, biUiard playing, dance-hall 
entertainments and prostitution, are examined in more detail in Chapter 5 'A 
Frontier Community'.^4 i t is perhaps suffice at this stage to note at Table 4.5 
(below) an example of one week's supply of alcoholic beverages passing 
through the customs house at Cooktown in early 1875, although what 
proportion was destined for the Palmer is obviously tmclear.^^ It is, however, 
probably indicative of the levels of consumption by some in Cooktown to note 
that in May 1874 alone, '12 lunatics were conmiitted to [the reception house 
at] Rockhampton due to intemperance'!^^ 
Table 4.5 - An Example of AlcohoUc Beverages Imported 
through Cooktown in January 1875 
(from the shipping records for one week) 
Item 
Brandy 
Beer 
Wine 
Ale 
Ale 
Rum 
Port 
Stout 
Schnapps 
Champagne 
tkiHtioA^t 
cases 
kegs 
casks 
hogshead 
cases 
cases 
casks 
cases 
cases 
cases 
QuftOtxtp 
179 
52 
7 
18 
10 
10 
2 
30 
10 
2 
Source: CHPRA, 27 January 1875, p. 2. 
Finally, it is useful to recall that hotels in country towns during that 
era often played an important civic role in providing a venue for public 
meetings, official dinners and receptions, and community-wide social 
fiinctions. Several of the larger hotels in Cooktown, for example, boasted 
'assembly rooms' and regularly hosted public meetings, social functions and 
receptions for visiting dignitaries, which in more developed centres would 
probably have been held in a town hall or council building.57 
54 
55 
56 
57 
The 'commerce' aspects of the retail spirit industry are discussed later in this chapter 
under 'Traders and Storekeepers'. 
Cooktown also had its own brewery producing 'Bolger's hop beer': see advertisement 
in CHPRA, 15 April 1874, p. 1. 
CHPRA, 6 May 1874, p. 3. 
The Australian Hotel, for example, was the fi-equent venue for public meetings 
throughout late 1874 and 1875: see, for example, CHPRA, 16 September 1874, p. 2 for 
a public meeting called to discuss improving access to the Palmer. 
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Early Commerce in the Town 
Most early accounts of the commercial development of Cooktown 
t5T3ically described the large number and variety of stores operating in the 
town, the ahnost frenzied rate of daily business activity and the importance of 
Cooktown as the key entry point and resupply centre for the Palmer River 
goldfields. A closer analysis of the role played by traders, storekeepers and 
carriers in the town — as will be addressed shortly — indicates a somewhat 
different reality. It seems, for example, that once past the initiaJ rush to the 
Palmer of late 1873/early 1874, very few of the traders and storekeepers in 
Cooktown were actually involved — in a commercial sense — in the ongoing 
resupply of diggers at the Palmer. Indeed, by about late 1874, the important 
business links to the Palmer were in the h£uids of probably five or six 
wholesale agents in Cooktown, with the remaining traders and storekeepers 
in the town confined primarily to the daily needs of the residents of Cooktown 
itself. 
Most popular accounts of early Cooktown similarly underplayed the 
importance of the Chinese business community in the town, fi-equently 
relegating the Chinese to a peripheral role as minor storekeepers and 
occasional market gardeners, with the more critical accounts dwelhng on the 
evils of their gambling and opium dens, and the supposed illicit export of 
Palmer gold to China. In reality, the Chinese business commimity in 
Cooktown — across the years 1875 to 1880 at least — was almost certainly 
wealthier and commercially more influential than the 'white' business 
community and, indeed, largely displaced the role of the handful of wholesale 
agents who had come to dominate Cooktown's commercial activities by late 
1874. By the early 1880s, however, with the continued decline of the Palmer 
£ind associated goldfields, Cooktown's Chinese business community likewise 
contracted and eventually withered, leaving the commercial activity of the 
town once again in the hands of small-scale traders and storekeepers. 
The exodus of the Chinese business community, with the demise of 
the Palmer, exacerbated the perception in the minds of many white residents 
and other Queenslanders alike that the Chinese had 'plundered' the mineral 
wealth of North Queensland, with little or no return to the state.^^ Again, in 
reality, a closer analysis of the cost components involved in the typical 
58 The implications of this perception, in terms of its impact on the emergent 'White 
Australia' policy, are discussed in more detail at Chapter 7 'Boom to Bust'. 
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production of a nominal one oimce of gold by a Chinese miner on the Palmer 
— as will be discussed shortly — suggests that around one third of its value 
was p£dd to Queensland or Cooktown-based 'white' suppliers and that, even if 
eventually exported or smuggled to China, over half its value remained in 
Queensland (albeit not necessarily in European hands). 
The Quantification of Commercial Activity 
The difficulty in attempting to quantify the assertions of the 
preceding paragraphs is obviously the paucity of data. It does seem possible, 
however, using a combination of statistical sources, contemporary accounts 
and reasonable assumptions to build up an indicative portrayal of several of 
the key elements of commercial life in Cooktown in the 1870s. ^ 9 To that end, a 
useful starting point (albeit one somewhat removed from daily life in 
Cooktown) is to identify the yearly average yield of gold produced by both 
Chinese and European miners on the Palmer River goldfields across the 
period 1874-82 (see Figure 4.5). 
Figure 4.5 - Estimated Annual Productivity of Miners on the 
Pahner River Goldfields 1874-82 
120 
100 . . 
80 . . 
Ounces 60 - • 
40 • • 
- • European miners 
D Chinese miners 
20 . . 
1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 
Years 
Source: Calculated by dividing average number of miners by amount of gold produced. Yearly gold production 
figures and population numbers from QVP, 1874-82. Also assumes that European miners generally 
produced around double the quantity of gold than Chinese miners, based on anecdotal evidence that 
Europeans would move to other fields when yields fell below about one ounce per week. 
59 The acknowledged risk in using 'reasonable assumptions' in quantification is that 
minor errors can become seriously compounded. 
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The significance of Figure 4.5 (on the previous page) is twofold. 
First, it graphically illustrates that the peak years were 1874 and 1875 in 
terms of 5delds per man (overall production also peaked in 1875 at 250,400 
ounces, declining thereafter at the rate of about 30,000 ounces per year). 
Second, it shows that the average yield per white miner had fallen by 1876 to 
40 ounces per year and for the Chinese miner to aroimd 20 oiuices per year.^o 
Given that the white and Chinese miner needed to produce around 37 and 15 
ounces respectively, just to cover their annual expenses (see Table 4.6 below), 
it seems therefore that for most miners, white or Chinese, the Palmer River 
goldfields were on the point of being imviable by aroiuid late 1876.^1 
Table 4.6 - Annual Operating Expenses for European and 
Chinese Miners on the Pahner River Goldfields circa 1876 
IteiSEi 
(a) 
Passage to Cooktown 
Initial issue of mining 
equipment 
Maintenance items 
(clothing, bedding etc) 
Food 
Indenture charges 
Total(£) 
Gold equivalent (ozs) 
Notes 
(b) 
1 
2 
-
3 
4 
5 
C0«tfe3* 
m 
{0 
2.5 
6 
7.5 
125 
-
141 
37.6 
CkistfoiT 
m 
(d) 
6.7 
1.7 
5.Q 
30.0 
13.0 
56.4 
15.04 
Notes: 1. £2/10/- is cost for European miner of one-way sea passage Brisbane-Cooktown or 
Cooktown-Brisbane, on the assumption that most who arrived by sea departed the 
Palmer overland for the south or reached the Palmer initially overland from the 
Etheridge. Chinese figure amortises cost of £10 for return passage Hong Kong-
Cooktown-Hong Kong for 18-month visit. 
2. Assumes issue of only basic items to Chinese ie pick or shovel and pan, whereas 
European miners would also need tentage, blankets etc. 
3. Foodstuffs based on requirement for £2/10/- per week for European and 12s per 
week for Chinese (some accounts put the European requirements at between 
£3/10/- and £4). 
60 
61 
The difference is based on the fact that white miners were prepared to 'prospect', 
whereas Chinese miners largely worked abandoned white claims, sometimes for the 
second or third 're-working": See, for example, The Cooktown Courier, 10 August 1878, 
p,2. 
This assertion has important implications for continuing Chinese immigration to 
Cooktown, as will be discussed in Chapter 7 'Boom to Bust'. 
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4. Assumes that two-thirds of Chinese miners would have been indentured to a 
financier to the value of about £65 (£10 for passage, £45 for food, £10 for 
equipment and bedding etc) over 18 months; interest based on annual repayment 
of around 30%. 
5. Gold equivalent calculated on sale value of £3/15/- per ounce, which was the 
'standard'. 
Source: Estimated costs derived from a wide variety of sources but primEirily The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, 
1874-79. 
The second exercise, bringing the subject calculations closer to 
Cooktown, is to estimate what proportions of the annual operating expenses of 
individuals were spent at the Palmer, in Cooktown, in Queensland and in 
China, and to differentiate between proportions paid by way of government 
charges and to private enterprise. Table 4.7 (below) shows those calculations 
for a Eiu-opean miner, while Table 4.8 (over) shows the calculations for a 
Chinese. 
Table 4.7 - Estimated Cost Components in One Year's Production of 
Gold by a European Miner on the Pahner River circa 1876 
(assuming an annual production of 40 ounces and a value of £4 per ounce) 
Cost 
Componeata 
(a) 
One-way p£issage 
of individual 
Initial purchase 
of mining equip-
ment, tentage etc 
Maintenance 
items (clothes, 
bedding etc) 
Food (@ £2/10/-
per week) 
Profit/w£iges of 
individual 
Sale of gold 
Tota l (£) 
Note? 
(b) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
U 
12 
. 
Goods or Services 
paid to a resident 
ofQueenalsnd 
(0 
-
4.49 
2.24 
37.49 
9 
-
53.22 
companiBB 
{£)*^ 
(d) 
2.5 
0.16 
0.19 
3.13 
-
-
5.98 
Customs 
-duties 
(Cooktown) 
(e) 
-
0.45 
0.56 
9.38 
-
-
10.39 
Paymenta to 
<3ooktowii' 
hasUsi 
Buj^lier 
(0 
" 
0.9 
1.13 
18.75 
" 
5 
25.78 
Coats of 
<airTiage 
(Cooktown 
to Palmer) 
(f>*5 
(K) 
' 
2.25 
37.5 
* 
-
39.75 
Payments! 
t o Palmer-
baaed 
jBU|ipliar 
(h> 
1.13 
18.75 
" 
5 
24.88 
Total ; 
(i) 
2.5 
6 
75 
125 
9 
10 
160 
Notes: 1. Column (c) figures derived by subtracting sum of columns (d) to (h) inclusive from 
column (i). Note that a proportion of the total could well have gone to New South 
Wales or Victoria - see notes 8 and 10 to follow. 
2. Column (d) figures, with the exceptions of first item, represent 2.5% of total at 
column (i). First item represents 100% of total. 
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3. Column (e) figures represent 7.5% of total at column (i). 
4. Column (f) figures represent 15% of total at column (i). 
5. Column (g) figures represent 30% of total at column (i). 
6. Column (h) figures represent 15% of total at column (i). 
7. Assumes, based on anecdotal accounts, that half of all European miners either 
reached the Palmer via the Etheridge or, if they arrived by sea via Cooktown, 
departed the Palmer overland for the south. 
8. Assumes items procured by Cooktown-based supplier fi-om Brisbane. There is, of 
course, evidence to suggest that the coastal shipping service diverted a good deal 
of trade from Brisbane to Sydney or Melbourne. 
9. Assumes half the items supplied by Cooktown-based supplier and half by Palmer-
based supplier. 
10. As above, and that all foodstuffs imported from Brisbane or southern ports. 
11. Assumes that individual is progressively able to sell 40 ounces of gold at £3/15/-
per ounce, while paying for equipment, maintenance items and foodstuffs on 
ongoing basis. 
12. Assumes that bankers or dealers at the Palmer and Cooktown are each then able 
to sell the gold at £3/17/6 and £4 respectively. 
Sources: Percentages used and the estimated cost of the VEirious components derived from a wide variety of 
sources but primarily The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, 1874-79. 
Table 4.8 - Est imated Cost Components in One Year's P r o d u c t i o n of 
Gold by a Chinese Miner o n the Pahner River c irca 1876 
(assuming an annual production of 20 ounces and a value of £4 per oiuice) 
Components 
<a) 
Return passage 
of individual 
Initial issue of 
mining equipt. 
Maintenance 
items (clothing, 
bedding etc) 
Food (@ 12s 
per week) 
Interest/admin, 
charges to 
financier 
PVofit/wages of 
individual 
Sale/export of 
gold to China 
by financier 
Total (£) 
Notes 
(b) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
u 
12 
13 
-
Gooda or Services 
paid to a resident 
of China 
<£) *1 
(0 
-
-
LO 
12.0 
6.5 
18.6 
38.1 
<3oods«r 
Bervioespaid ; 
to a resident 
ojTQn^^nsIattd 
i£)*2 
(d) 
-
1.19 
LO 
-
-
2.19 
Paynienta 
to shipping 
<»tap$itAe$ 
<£)*3 
(e) 
6.7 
0.04 
0.13 
0.75 
-
7.62 
Customs 
dutiea 
(Cooktown) 
(£)*4 
(G 
-
0.13 
0.37 
2.25 
-
0.75 
3.50 
Payments 
to Cboktown-
basied Chinese 
financier 
(£)*5 
(8) 
0.34 
LO 
6.0 
6.5 
-
4.25 
18.09 
C5ost«<jf 
caRisige 
(Cooktown 
toP$>lm«r) 
<£)*6 
(h) 
-
-
L5 
9.0 
-
• 
10.5 
Total 
ii) 
6.7 
L7 
5.0 
30.0 
13.0 
18.6 
5.0 
80.0 1 
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Notes: 1. Column (c) figures derived by subtracting sum of columns (d) to (h) inclusive from 
column (i). 
2. Column (d) figures derived by subtracting sum of columns (c) plus (e) to (h) 
inclusive from column (i). Note that a proportion of the total could well have gone 
to New South Wales or Victoria — see notes 8 and 9 to follow. 
3. Column (e) figures, with the exception of first item, represent 2.5% of total at 
column (i). First item represents 100% of total. 
4. Column (f) figures represent 7.5% of total at column (i). 
5. Column (g) figures represent 20% of total at column (i). 
6. Column (h) figures represent 30% of total at column (i). 
7. Amortises assumed cost of £10 for return passage Hong Kong-Cooktown-Hong 
Kong for 18-month visit. 
8. Assumes issue of basic items ie pick, shovel, and pan, purchased by financier from 
Brisbane, although some could have been supplied direct from Sydney or 
Melbourne. 
9. Assumes 50% of items procured from China, 50% from Brisbane (although some 
could have come direct from Sydney or Melbourne). 
10. Assumes all foodstuffs imported from China or grown locally by Chinese market 
gardeners and small-scale farmers. 
11. Assumes that two-thirds of all Chinese miners were indentured to a financier to 
the value of £65 over 18 months; interest based on annual repayment of around 
30%. Cooktown-based financier would need to pay China-based agent at least 
half for administrative tasks involved in arranging the indenture and passage to 
Cooktown. 
12. Assumes that individual could sell 20 ounces of gold at £3/15/0 per ounce to his 
financier and, after repaying any indenture debt, return to China with the 
difference. 
13. Assumes that financier sends half the produced gold back to China and retains the 
other half in Cooktown for business purposes or hoarding. 
Sources: As for Table 4.7 at page 162. 
By translating the totals from Table 4.7 (at page 162) into graphical 
format, it can then be seen at Figure 4.6 (over) that the Government probably 
received some 6.5 per cent of the eventual retail value of every ounce of gold 
mined at the Palmer River by a European miner, and that suppliers and 
carriers operating out of Cooktown received the equivalent of around 41 per 
cent of its worth for goods and services. Obviously also, the total value of 
European-mined gold remained in Queensland (with the possible exception of 
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goods purchased in southern states or monies paid to Sydney-based shipping 
companies). 
Figure 4.6 - Estimated Cost Components of Eiu*opean-produced Gold 
on the Pahner River circa 1876 
(for each one ounce of gold) 
Carriers 
(Cooktown to Palmer) 
24.8% 
Cooktown-based 
supplier 
16.1% 
Goods or services paid to a 
resident of Queensland 
(or other Australian state) 
33.3% 
Shippers (to/from Cooktown) 
3.7% 
Palmer-based supplier 
15.6% 
Customs duty (Cooktown) 
6.5% 
Source: Data derived from Table 4.7 (at page 162). 
Similarly, it can be seen from the estimates at Figure 4.7 (over) that 
the Government probably received only about 4.4 per cent of the value of each 
oimce of gold mined by a Chinese digger, that just over 50 per cent of its value 
remained in Queensland (albeit some 22 per cent in the hands of a Chinese 
financier in Cooktown) and that just under 50 per cent most likely ended up in 
China. 
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Figure 4.7 - Estimated Cost Components of Chinese-produced Gold 
on the Pahner River circa 1876 
(for each one ounce of gold) 
Cooktown-based 
Chinese financier 
22 6% 
Customs Duty 
(Cooktown' 
4.4% 
Shippers 
(to/from Cooktown) 
9.5% 
Csirrlers 
(Cooktown to Palmer) 
13.1% 
Goods or services paid 
a resident of China 
47.7% 
Goods or services paid 
to a resident of Queensland 
(or other Australian state) 
27% 
Source: Data derived from Table 4.8 (at page 163). 
Before proceeding further with what some may see as increasingly 
theoretical or hypothetical calculations, it is probably useful to test the 
validity of the figures to date against some known statistics. Taking the 
estimate of customs duty paid at Cooktown, for example, from Tables 4.7 and 
4.8 (at pages 162 and 163 respectively) and multiplying it by the average 
number of miners on the Palmer between 1875 and 1880, together with the 
population of Cooktown, indicates that the calculated and actual revenue 
figures are reasonably similar (see Figure 4.8 over), giving a fair level of 
confidence in the methodology employed. 
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Figure 4.8 - Comparison of Actual Customs Revenue against 
Estimate Calculated from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
Y//////A Calculated 
^ ^ ' Actual revenue 
1875 
Source: Estimates from Tables 4.6 and 4.7 on pages 162 and 163 respectively. Actual revenue from QVP, 
1875-81. 
Traders and Merchants 
On that basis, it seems reasonable to extrapolate two further sets of 
figures, namely the amounts paid to Cooktown-based suppliers and separately 
to carriers plying between Cooktown and the Palmer. In regards to the first. 
Figure 4.9 (over) shows estimates of the amounts paid to Cooktown-based 
suppliers across the period 1874-84, derived from the earlier calculations at 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8, multiplied by the average number of miners on the Palmer 
River goldfields. The striking trends are the dominance of the market by 
Chinese suppliers in the period 1875-79, the rapid decline of the Chinese 
thereafter and the downturn in Palmer trade with European suppliers after 
1875. 
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Figure 4.9 - Estimates of the Amoimts Paid to Cooktown-based Supphers 
by Miners on the Palmer River Goldfields 1874-84 
- • Paid to European suppliers 
-*• Paid to Chinese suppliers 
£000 
1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 
Years 
1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 
Source: Tables 4.7 and 4.8 at pages 162 and 163 respectively, and f)opulation of the goldfields figures from QVP, 
1875-85. For the purposes of this calculation, it has been assumed that two-thirds of Chinese miners 
on the Palmer were indentured (and therefore paid interest to a Cooktown-based financier). In reality, 
the figure was probably nearer to 75 per cent, which would marginally inflate the upper graph line. 
Figure 4.9 does not, of course, present a complete picture of trade 
between Cooktown wholesalers and the Palmer. It does not include supplies 
sold by European traders in Cooktown to carriers operating between the two 
centres. Nor does it indicate the market share of Palmer River-based traders 
or merchants on the Hodgkinson goldfields, many of whom operated as the 
agents of Cooktown-based traders. Nor does it include supplies sold within 
Cooktown itself by either European or Chinese traders to smaller, retail 
outlets. Those exclusions aside, the underlying trend remains the dominance 
of the market by Chinese suppliers.^^ 
The Chinese Business Community 
Certainly, even a cursory examination of The Cooktown Courier and 
The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser across the period 1875-76 
62 Indeed, that trend would be even more marked had not the assumption been made, for 
the purposes of calculations in Figure 4.9, that only half all Chinese immigrants to 
Cooktown across the period were indentured labourers. If a higher proportion of 
indentured immigrants were to be used, the top of the curve in Figure 4.9 would nudge 
the £200,000 mark. 
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quickly reveals the enormous volume of goods imported into Cooktown, 
primarily from Hong Kong, by Chinese traders in support of Chinese miners 
on the Palmer. Table 4.9 below, for example, is an extract fi-om the shipping 
manifests of a mere two vessels, the SS Japan and SS Scotland, which 
arrived in Cooktown fi-om Hong Kong in early May 1875, canying inter alia in 
excess of 16,000 bags of rice.^^ 
Table 4.9 - Typical Cargoes Arriving in Cooktown from Chinese 
Ports in 1875 
(extracted from the manifests of two vessels) 
V<es»et 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan & 
Scotland 
Japan & 
Scotland 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
Scotland 
Scotland 
Scotland 
Scotland 
Scotland 
Total 
Bice 
(bags) 
400 
1000 
7753 
800 
1000 
500 
300 
2000 
1000 
400 
620 
300 
638 
16711 
Flour 
(bags) 
-
-
3464 
-
-
-
-
-
100 
-
5 
-
-
3569 
M'^ 3ise 
(boxes) 
86 
-
1118 
180 
351 
248 
90 
426 
-
-
-
-
-
2499 
Tea 
(boxes) 
-
-
80 
8 
-
-
-
-
10 
-
-
45 
-
143 
Oil 
(cases) 
-
-
70 
15 
-
-
-
-
30 
20 
-
40 
10 
185 
Tobacco 
(boxes) 
-
-
12 
3 
-
-
-
-
2 
-
-
5 
-
22 
Opmi» 
(cases) 
-
1 
6 
1 
2 
-
8 
2 
-
2 
-
8 
-
30 
Sugar 
(boxes) 
-
-
470 
107 
-
-
-
-
25 
-
-
-
-
602 
Cooktown* 
based TVader 
Cheong Loong 
Man Tong On 
Kum Chung 
On & Co. 
Sun Tung Lee 
&Co. 
Kwong Fong 
Too Chong 
Kwong Loo 
Chong 
Kwong Hon 
Long 
Kwong Foong 
June & Co. 
Cheong Leong 
Wing On & Co. 
Kwong Wu 
Cheong & Co. 
Lee Tuck Yet 
_ 
Source: CHPRA, 5 May 1875, p. 2 and 12 May 1875, p. 2. 
A more detailed analysis of the same newspapers suggests that the 
Chinese business community in Cooktown across the period 1876-79 
comprised about twelve major traders, with a further half dozen or so 
63 These were not one-ofF shipments, but typical of the cargoes arriving every two to 
three weeks. The SS Estepona, for example, arrived with 10,060 bags of rice in early 
August 1875: see CHPRA, 7 August 1875, p. 2. The issue of calls for a duty on rice 
imports, in the context of restricting Chinese immigration, are discussed in Chapter 7 
'Boom to Bust'. 
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mediiun-size merchants and countless smaller storekeepers and speciality 
stores. On that basis, it seems possible that the major traders listed at Table 
4.10 below each had an annual turnover in the peak years 1876-78 of at least 
£12,000.^4 Across those same years, probably foin- or five major European 
traders had to compete for their share of a Palmer River market (see Figure 
4.9 at page 168) which fell fi-om an estimated £46,400 in 1875 to £8,120 in 
1878 (albeit that the downturn in trade with the Palmer was offset in part by 
the opening of the Hodgkinson fields in 1876). ^ ^ 
Table 4.10 - The M^or Chinese Traders in Cooktown 1876-79 
Kum Chung On & Co Kwong Hong & Co 
Kwong Foong Jime & Co Chew Lee & Co 
Kwong Wo Chung & Co Sun Tung Lee *1 
Kwong Han Long Wing On & Co *2 
Sun Ye Lee & Co Gee Woh Chong & Co 
Sun Yee Lee & Co Yuet Hing Wo 
Notes: 1. His premises burnt down in somewhat suspicious circumstances, possibly the work of a 
competitor, in October 1875: see CHPRA, 16 October 1875, p. 2. 
2. His premises, and stock valued at £12,000 similarly destroyed in August 1875: see 
CHPRA, 11 August 1875, p. 2. 
The Carriers 
On the amount of money potentially paid to carriers operating 
between Cooktown and the Palmer, Figure 4.10 (over) shows that the annual 
sum could have been as high as £140,000 in 1877. Moreover, that figure 
would have been the sum just to keep the workforce in rations and other 
essential supplies, albeit that the total would have been apportioned between 
the foiu- means of transport used to convey goods to the Palmer, namely 
bullock-drawn drays, horse-drawn wagons, pack-horses and human porterage. 
64 Calculated on the basis that the estimated Chinese share of the trade at Figure 4.9 (at 
page 168) across the years 1876-78 was respectively £130,248, £198,990 and £194,467. 
65 The key figures in the European business community are discussed in some detail in 
Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community'. 
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Figure 4.10 - Estimates of the Amounts Paid to Carriers Operating 
between Cooktown and the Palmer River Goldfields 1874-84 
140 T 
£000 
120 -• 
100 -• 
80 . . 
60 . . 
40 
20 - • 
- • Paid by Chinese miners 
° Paid by European miners 
1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 
Years 
Source: Tables 4.7 and 4.8 at pages 162 and 163 respectively, and population of the goldfields figures ftx)m 
QVP, 1875-85. 
Certainly, there are numerous reports of Chinese 'coolies' being used 
to carry loads of around 120 poiuids fi-om Cooktown to the Palmer diggings. 
One of the early white carriers noted in his reminiscences that 
The Chinese storekeepers generally packed their goods 
by their own countrymen, who carried them in baskets 
hung on bamboo sticks across their shoulders.^^ 
It seems unlikely, however, that would-be Chinese miners were used as 
porters other than on their first trip to the Palmer, given that they were 
probably more profitably employed as miners.^^ Moreover, the sheer volmne 
of goods required to resupply the Chinese workforce would have required a 
more substantial carrying capacity than individual porters. ^ ^ 
66 
67 
68 
See W.H. Corfield, Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-99, Frater, Brisbane, 1921, 
p. 54. But see also the comment made at a public meeting in April 1878 that '[many] 
Europeans earn a living by packing for them: The Cooktown Courier, 27 April 1878, 
p. 3. 
Some reports suggest, however, that as many as 500 Chinese were employed as 
packers or carriers by 1879: see The Cooktown Courier, 24 September 1879, p. 2. 
In mid 1876, for example, the resupply requirements of the 15,000 Chinese miners on 
the Palmer would have amounted to 4888 tons per year (based on a daily requirement 
of 2 lb per man). That would have required a full-time workforce of 5703 porters, each 
carrying 120 lbs per trip and making sixteen trips per year between Cooktown and the 
Palmer. 
172 
It seems probable, therefore, that the c£irrying trade between 
Cooktown and the Palmer in the peak years 1875 to 1878 was divided 
something along the lines shown at Table 4.11 below, with Chinese carriers 
increasingly involved from 1876 onwards. The calculations of note are that 
each dray team (of 12-16 bullocks) probably retiu-ned a gross annual profit of 
aroiuid £530, each wagon team (of 6-8 horses) around £265 and each 
individual pack-horse aroiuid £25.^^ The obvious conclusion, supported by 
anecdotal evidence fi-om the time, is that there was generally more to be made 
fi-om the carrying trade than there was from prospecting, particularly in the 
years 1875-76, although the capital investment required and stock losses 
through disease and attacks by Aborigines would probably have reduced gross 
turnovers by at least 50 per cent.^^ 
Table 4.11 - The Calculation of Earnings by Carriers Operating 
between Cooktown and the Palmer River Goldfields 1875-78 
Serial/Notes 
(a) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Item 
(b) 
Resupply requirements (tons) 
Total paid (£) 
Amount per ton (£) 
Porters available (no.) 
Estimated porterage (tons) 
Estimated total value (£) 
Value per man (£) 
Dray teams 
Potential capacity (tons) p.a. 
Estimated carriage (tons) p.a. 
Estimated total value (£) p.a. 
Value per team p.a. (£) 
Wagon teams available (no.) 
Potential capacity (tons) p.a. 
Estimated carriage (tons) p.a. 
Estimated total value (£) p.a. 
Value per team p.a. (£) 
Pack horses available (no.) 
Potential capacity (tons) p.a. 
Estimated carriage (tons) p.a. 
Estimated total value (£) p.a. 
Value per horse p.a. (£) 
187S 
(0 
1724 
108,000 
62.6 
6524 
349 
21847 
3.3 
100 
4000 
890 
55714 
557 
60 
1200 
266 
16659 
278 
500 
1000 
222 
13883 
28 
1876 
(d) 
2763 
126,000 
45.6 
5679 
304 
13862 
2.4 
130 
5200 
1630 
74372 
572 
80 
1600 
502 
22884 
286 
570 
1040 
326 
14874 
26 
1877 
(e) 
3772 
138,000 
36.6 
6364 
340 
12444 
2.0 
140 
5600 
2044 
74832 
535 
115 
2300 
840 
30735 
267 
750 
1500 
548 
20044 
27 
1878 
(f) 
3606 
125,000 
34.7 
88 
4.7 
163 
1.9 
150 
6000 
1942 
67377 
449 
150 
3000 
970 
33688 
225 
920 
1840 
595 
20662 
22 
69 
70 
Carriers could well have made considerably more than these figures, given the 
requirement also for building materials etc to be transported to the Palmer. An 
estimate in one of the local newspapers, for example, put the potential profit per trip 
at £424 (which seems grossly exaggerated): The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 2. 
In April 1874, bullocks were selling in Cooktown for £25 (ie £300 for a team of twelve) 
and team/pack-horses for £12 (ie £72 for a team of six): Brisbane Courier, 22 April 
1874, p. 3. See also the cost estimate of £100 for a single wagon with harnesses: The 
Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 2. 
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Notes and Sources: 1. Calculated by multiplying the average number of miners at the 
Palmer River goldfields by 2 lb per day. 
2. Figures taken from Figure 4.10. 
3. Calculated by dividing serial 2 by serial 1. Note also that these 
figures accord reasonably with contemporary accounts. 
4. Derived from an assumption that 90% of Chinese immigrants 
to Cooktown were en route to the Palmer. 
5. Calculated by multiplying number of porters available by 120 
pounds. 
6- Calculated by multiplying serial 3 by serial 5. 
7. Calculated by dividing serial 6 by serial 4. 
8. Calculated by extrapolation from the report of 2784 bullocks in 
the district in 1878: The Cooktown Courier, 19 January 1878, 
p. 3. Based on teams of 12-16 bullocks and an availability on 
the Cooktown-Palmer route of 75% of all teams in the district. 
i . Based on the assumption often trips Cooktown-Palmer each 
year at 4 tons per dray: see W.H. Corfield, 'Reminiscences of 
North Queensland 1862-78' in Journal of the Historical Society 
of Queensland, 2, 2, Jime 1923, p. 93. 
10. Calculated by apportioning the resupply reqmrements at serial 
1 between the four modes on the basis of pro rata potential. 
11. Calculated by multiplying serial 10 by serial 3. 
12. Calculated by dividing serial 11 by serial 8. 
13. Calculated by extrapolation from the report of 1100 team 
horses in the district in 1878: The Cooktown Courier, 19 
January 1878, p. 3. Based on teams of 6-8 horses and an 
availability on the Cooktown-Palmer route of 75% of all teams 
in the district. 
14. Based on the assumption often trips Cooktown-Palmer each 
year at 2 tons per wagon: see the estimate of each round trip 
taking six weeks in The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 2. 
15. As for note 10. 
16. Calculated by multiplying serial 15 by serial 3. 
17. Calculated by dividing serial 16 by serial 13. 
18. Calculated by extrapolation from the report of 1230 pack-horses 
in the district in 1878: The Cooktown Courier, 19 January 
1878, p. 3. Based on an availability on the Cooktown-Palmer 
route of 75% of all pack-horses in the district. 
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19. Based on the assumption often trips Cooktown-Palmer each 
year at 2 cwt per animal. 
20. As for note 10. 
21. Calculated by multiplying serial 20 by serial 3. 
22. Calculated by dividing serial 21 by serial 18. 
The Nexus between Cooktown and the Palmer 
What emerges from the preceding discussion is that miners on the 
Palmer River goldfields generated a substemtial amount of business, peaking 
in 1877 at some £462,000 for supplies, cartages, shipping and customs duty.^i 
A large proportion of the annual turnover, however, went either to Chinese 
merchants in Cooktown (35 per cent of it in 1877) or to Eiu-opean and Chinese 
carriers (30 per cent) (see Figure 4.11 below). The major Eiu-ope£m traders in 
Cooktown in 1877 probably received only around 3 per cent of the annued 
tin-nover (valued at aroimd £14,800), while the smaller European merchants 
and storekeepers in Cooktown were by then largely confined to trade within 
the town and meeting the 'entertainment' and resupply needs of visiting 
transients (whose numbers it will be recalled from Figure 4.3 (at page 152) 
were around 100 per day). 
Figure 4.11 - The Estimated Apportionment of Business Generated 
by the Miners on the Pahner River Goldfields in 1877 
Carriers 29.9% / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Cooktown-based 
Chinese traders 35.3% 
Cooktown-based 
European traders 3.2% 
Shipping N . M | # f f f 4 | t i f f l ^ ' ^ „ , . . 
^, >w^ WmMmmmillS^ Palmer-based companies 18 9% ^^»_ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m y ' ^ ^ HB»«ass»^^ ^p- European traders 3.1% 
Customs 
duty 9.6% 
Source: Calculated by multiplying figures from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 at pages 162 and 163 
respectively by average number of miners on the Palmer goldfields. 
•^ l Calculated by multiplying figures from Tables 4.7 and 4.8 at pages 162 and 163 
respectively by average number of miners on the Palmer goldfields. 
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As discussed earlier, though, Cooktown's early 'white' business 
community had been established in the formative years of 1874 and 1875 on 
the basis of meeting the service needs of a large number of temporarily-
accommodated residents, a daily transient population of around 100 adult 
white males and being involved in meeting the resupply requirements of a 
predominantly-white group of miners at the Palmer. As Cooktown's residents 
made the transition to permanent accommodation, as the transient population 
became increasingly dominated by the Chinese and as the white business 
community's share of the Palmer trade fell fi-om 14.5 per cent in 1875 (valued 
at aroimd £46,400) to 8.3 per cent (£33,000) in 1876 and then to 3.2 per cent 
(£14,800) in 1877, many white businesses went to the wall.''^ 
It is tmsurprising, therefore, that the euphoria of the white business 
community in 1874, wherein 'Cooktown has never enjoyed such prosperity as 
at present','^^ progressively waned over the succeeding three or so years until 
even the usually optimistic Cooktown Courier admitted in an editorial of early 
1878 that 'the times are dull, and above all, unprofitable in this district... no-
one will ventiu-e to den/.^^ Similarly, while correspondents in early 1874 
were extolling the variety and number of small businesses in the town, as 
listed at Table 4,12 (over), more astute commentators were noting by late 1874 
that 'the market is rapidly becoming overstocked and ... already there are 
more stores than the business of the town warrants'.''^ Indeed, in the years 
after about late 1877 the history of Cooktown's commercial development is one 
of continuing decline (the social and occupational mobility issues of which are 
addressed in detail in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Commimity^). 
^2 Figures calculated for 1875 and 1876 as for Figure 4.11. Cooktown's role as a service 
centre for the Hodgkinson goldfields, particularly in the peak years 1876-78 and in 
competition with other northern coastal ports, is important here in the context of 
attempting to stimulate business confidence in Cooktown and, in part, to offset the 
downturn in business with the Palmer. 
'^ 3 Report by one of Cooktown's prominent merchants F.J.W. Beardmore in CHPRA, 
7 November 1874, p. 2. 
'^'^ The Cooktown Courier, 13 March 1878, p. 3. 
75 See CHPRA, 7 November 1874, p. 2. 
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Table 4.12 - Cooktown's SmaU Business Community in 1874 
20 restaurants/dining rooms 
12 large stores 
20 smaller stores 
7 bootmakers 
7 blacksmiths 
6 butchers 
6 hairdressers 
5 saddlers 
5 bakers 
5 auctioneers 
4 tent/sail-makers 
4 chemists 
3 banks 
3 doctors 
3 watchmakers 
3 booksellers 
3 tinsmiths 
2 newspapers 
Source: The Brisbane Courier, 27 April 1874, p. 3. 
Residential Development 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the initial land sale of May 1874 
saw 135 town allotments auctioned off" in some spirited bidding. The second 
land sale of September 1874 was similarly well patronised with 115 of 116 
allotments on offer purchased for some two and a half times the upset value.-^^ 
By the end of 1874, therefore, 250 town allotments had been sold by public 
auction in a block extending two streets back fi-om Charlotte Street and five 
streets south from the government reserve at the foot of Grassy Hill (see Map 
4.3 over). 
76 The slightly higher average of May 1874 was because the early allotments were the 
prime commercial sites and most already had improvements upon them. 
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Map 4 ^ - Land Sales in Cooktown as at December 1874 
(Jovemment 
reserve 
Endeavour 
River 
Charlotte 
Street 
OP 
Primary school 
O 2oo 4oo 
D 
blocks sold 
allotments 
alienated by 
1885 
Source: Registers of the Sale ofCroum Land by Public Auction at Cooktown on 19 May and 24 September 1874, 
LAN/AB27, QSA. 
In the years thereafl;er, however, sales sliunped and it took another 
five years to sell the next 250 allotments.77 While it was, of coiu^e, reasonable 
to expect that the prime commercial and residential sites would be purchased 
77 Some of the early commercial sites, however, continued to change hands for almost 
exorbitant prices. One, for example, was sold in late 1874 for £375: See CHPRA 
9 December 1874. D. 2. 
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in the first year, Figure 4.12 below shows the progressively widening gap 
between the number of town allotments offered at public auction £md actued 
sales.''^ 
Figure 4.12 - Cvunulative Gap between the Nmnber of Town Building 
Allotments offered at PubUc Auction and Actual Sales 
Cooktown 1874-84 
1200 T 
1000 . . 
800 . . 
No. 600 - -
400 - -
200 . . 
"•' Allotments offered at auction 
" Actual sales 
+ 
1874 1875 1876 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 
Years 
Source: Compiled from Registers of the Sale ofCown Land by Public Auction for Cooktown, 1874-84, 
LAN/AB series, QSA. 
By the end of 1880, the main residential area had extended further 
south another two streets and eastwards one street, with some movement into 
the larger 'suburban' blocks astride the road leading towards the Palmer. As 
can be seen from Map 4.4 (over), however, most of that expansion had 
occm-red by 1876, with the noticeable trend by 1880 being the increasing 
number of available but unpiu-chased allotments. 
78 Some of the allotments offered at auction were passed in several times, resulting in 
some inflation of the 'allotments offered' trend line. 
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Map 4.4 - Land Sales in Cooktown as at December 1880 
(Government 
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Endeavour 
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a l i e n a t e d b y 
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Source: Map 4.3 on page 177 and Registers of the Sale of Crown Land by Public Auction at Cooktown 1875-80, 
LAN/AB 28, 29, 31, 33, 34 and 35 of 1875-80, QSA. 
The other significant trend was the difference between upset £uid 
reahsed values for the land offered at pubhc auction over the period 1874-84. 
While it was to be expected that the prime commercial and residential sites 
(most with an upset value of £50 per acre) would attract high bids at the sales 
in 1874, Figure 4.13 (over) shows that reahsed values fi-om 1876 onwards 
barely exceeded upset prices which by then had faUen to £12/10 per acre.''^ 
79 The exception was 1882 where the release of prime residential sites along the 
waterfront on the north-west slopes of Grassy Hill briefly revived realised values. 
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Figure 4.13 - The Difference between Upset and ReaHzed Values for Town 
Building Allotments offered at Public Auction 
Cooktown 1874-84 
l^m^<-^^:y^^<^:::^l Upsot Value 
*i Realised Value 
1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 
Years 
1881 1882 1883 1884 
Source: Compiled from Registers of the Sale of Crown Land by Public Auction for Cooktown, 1874-84, 
LAN/AB series, QSA. 
By the end of 1884, therefore, land sales in Cooktown had largely 
reached the point of satisfying foreseeable demand, with the 'town' allotments 
occupying an area five streets wide by seven streets long, and with 'subiu-ban' 
blocks spreading astride the road to the Palmer (see Map 4.5 over).^ 
80 No land sales were conducted in 1885. In later years, further 'suburban' blocks were 
offered extending east from the area of the primary school towards the ocean and 
south from the area of the hospital. 
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Map 4.5 - Land Sales in Cooktown as at December 1884 
blocks sold 
to 1880 
blocks sold 
to 1885 
blocks offered 
but not 
purchased 
Source: Maps 4.3 and 4.4 (at pages 177 and 179 respectively) and Registers of the Sale of Crown Land 
by Public Auction at Cooktown 1881-85, LAN/AB 37, 39, 41, 43 and 45 of 1881-85, QSA. 
More difficult to quantify is how many of the 755 town £uid suburbgrn. 
allotments sold by 1884 actually had buildings or dwellings constructed upon 
them. The census of 1881 and official statistics for 1885 put the niunber of 
buildings at 665 and 630 respectively, although it is not clear how many of 
those were pubhc buildings erected on government reserves as opposed to 
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buildings on alienated allotments.^i Similarly, contemporary accounts across 
the period 1879-85 often mentioned around 660 buildings in the town but with 
no differentiation between pubhc buildings, commercial premises, private 
dwellings or the fabrications of fringe dwellers.^2 On balance, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the number and composition ot permanent 
buildings was something along the lines shown at Figure 4.14 below. 
Figure 4.14 - An Estimate of Permanent Buildings in Cooktown 1874-84 
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500 - -
400 . . 
No. 300 - -
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100 -
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Years 
Source: Assumes construction on 80% of all building allotments sold to 1881 and 70% thereafter. Figures for 
commercied premises and public/government buildings tsJcen from various reports in The Cooktown 
Courier and CHPRA, 1874-85. 
The Fringe Dwellers 
In addition to the permanent buildings within the town proper, 
Cooktown also had a floating population living temporarily or semi-
permamently on its fringes. In the early years, it consisted on those 'residents' 
unable to afford or secure permanent accommodation within the town, as well 
as would-be white miners either waiting to move to the Palmer or waiting to 
ship southwards having failed at the goldfields. As discussed earlier in this 
81 
82 
See QVP, 1, 1881, p. 1112 and 2, 1886, p. 481. 
A visiting Water Supply Department official in a letter to the Colonial Treasurer of 
December 1884 put the number of dwellings (presumably he meant residential) at 400: 
see letter Hydraulic Engineer to Colonial Treasurer of 4 December 1884, in-letter 
4093/84 of 1884, TRE/A29, QSA 
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chapter, the number of would-be residents probably numbered at its peak 
about 1100, while the number of would-be or had-been miners was at one time 
as high as 2200 (see Figure 4.1 at page 142). 
No details seem to have survived of the accommodation conditions of 
the would-be white residents but most probably hved in shanties or tents 
abutting the more permanent parts of the town. As the town grew, many 
probably made the transition to permanent accommodation, either to a 
boarding house or a residential dwelling. Most of the would-be miners, 
though, seem to have camped astride the road leading south of Cooktown 
towards the Palmer, ^ ^ 
Similarly, newly-arrived Chinese bound for the Palmer were taken 
by their 'minders' to camping grounds south of the town, to be equipped and 
loaded up for the trip to the goldfields.^ From mid 1875 onwards, however, 
more and more Chinese settled in Cooktown itself, with their numbers by late 
1876 supposedly totalling half the population.^ By early 1877, it was claimed 
— exaggeratedly — that 'there are 3000 Chinese about the town'.^^ What is 
somewhat unclear, though, is where the Chinese population resided, given 
that only nine town or suburban allotments were sold to Chinese buyers at 
lEind sales between 1875 and 1879. 
A number of the Chinese 'residents' were market gardeners, working 
on small plots south of the town. Their first-recorded presence was in April 
1874, with a correspondent noting that 'the Chinamen have commenced a 
garden and today we have Cooktown-grown lettuce on the table'.^^ Two years 
later, their numbers seem to have increased significantly, with an editorial in 
The Cooktown Courier complaining that the town's water supply 'is so 
befouled by Chinese gardeners that it is often not fit to drink'.^ Indeed, by 
late 1878 Chinese market gardeners, wood cutters and water carriers so 
dominated those industries that editorial comment, again in The Cooktown 
®^  See, for example, the report of'500 men camped within a few miles of town wEiiting for 
the rivers to go down' in The Brisbane Courier, 16 February 1874, p. 3. 
^ See CHPRA, 8 May 1875, p. 2 noting that 'they pass through the town ... in very short 
time'. 
85 The Cooktown Courier, 21 October 1876, p. 2. 
8^ See The Cooktown Courier, 10 February 1877, p. 2. 
87 See The Brisbane Courier, 22 April 1874, p. 3. 
88 The Cooktown Courier, 15 November 1876, p. 2. The issue of town water is discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. 
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Courier, bemoaned the situation whereby 'they are ahnost in a position to 
dictate ... what we shall pay for the bare necessaries of life'.89 
The remainder of the Chinese community, possibly numbering 
between 500 and 1000 people, most hkely hved in 'Chinatown', the term 
loosely applied by white residents to the collection of stores and shanties in 
'the Chinese section' of Charlotte Street. Holthouse in River of gold gives a 
very exotic account of the 'town within a town ... which might have been 
Canton or Hong Kong*.^ The local newspapers, by contrast preferred such 
descriptions as 'the evil-smelling ... back slum, with which the town is ciu*sed 
... [and] which nightly draws boys, raw youths and foolish men into that haunt 
of foetid vice'.^i While both descriptions are certainly colourful, neither is 
particularly useful in terms of understanding the role played by fringe 
dwellers in Cooktown's early development, an issue discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. 
Housing Styles 
Very little was likewise written about the housing styles or 
architecture in general of Cooktown's early years. Fragmentary evidence 
lends support to a number of the conclusions of Ray Sunmer in her article on 
Tioneer homesteads of North Queensland'. ^ ^ In particular, many of the 
dwellings erected in Cooktown in the early 1870s seemed to conform to 
Stunner's 'distinctive Australian house-form: the timber framed, 
weatherboard, verandahed house with an iron roof and with her observation 
that most 'houses were raised some 20 cm above the ground on wooden piles 
[stumps]'.93 
Indeed, on both those counts, the Cooktown experience seems to n m 
contrary to Bell's assertions (perhaps made more in relation to mining 
settlements) that 'the nature of housing in the region was determined by the 
origins of the immigrant population' and that 'adaption to the physical 
environment was a secondary concern, expressed more often in subsequent 
89 The Cooktown Courier, 4 September 1878, p. 2. 
9^ Holthouse, River of gold, pp. 144-5. 
91 The Cooktown Courier, 20 December 1876, p. 2. 
92 See R. Sumner, 'Pioneer homesteads of North Queensland' in Lectures on North 
Queensland history, 1st series, James Cook University, Townsville, 1974, pp. 47-62. 
Sumner, 'Pioneer homesteads ...', pp. 55 and 57. 93 
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modification of buildings than in original construction'.^'* Certainly, any 
number of Cooktown's early buildings — the school-house and the customs 
house of 1874, for exaimple — EJI had wide verandahs all round, with 
particular further emphasis in their construction on being 'well ventilated'. ^ ^ 
That aside, it is evident that four additional observations can be 
made about Cooktown's early housing. The first is that a number of 
government buildings, in particular, were prefabricated in Brisbane. The 
early customs house, bond stores and post office, for example, arrived in 
Cooktown in late April 1874 in prefabricated sections, for assembly by 
contractors sent from Brisbane.^^ Moreover, several such 'prefabs' were quite 
substantial buildings. The bond store, for example, measured 60 feet x 30 feet 
and required considerable excavation 'to receive the immense foundation 
stones for the structure which is being put together'.^^ 
The second observation, perhaps a subset of the first, is that many of 
the early commercial buildings in Cooktown were constructed in such a way 
that they could be easily dis-assembled (and moved, for example, from 
Cooktown to the Palmer diggings) or moved bodily over short distances within 
Cooktown, once land tenure had been established. The Australian Joint Stock 
Bank in Cooktown, for example, was 'moved bodily to a new location' after the 
land sale of late May 1874, as was the Gympie Hotel in July 1874.^8 
The third observation is that many of the early buildings in 
Cooktown were flimsily constructed, with little regard (undoubtedly through 
ignorance) to the prevailing climatic conditions. A strong gale in July 1876 
demolished the verandahs of the Temperance Hall and Diggers Arms hotel, 
'carried away the roof of the hospital ... [and] completely removed 
Mr Henriques' office from its stumps'.^ Two weeks later, a similarly severe 
gale blew the school building 'out of perpendicular by twenty-two inches'. ^ ^ 
The final observation is that buildings were frequently sited with 
scant regard for adjacent buildings in the event of a fire. In the aftermath of 
94 See P. Bell, 'Houses and Mining Settlement in North Queensland 1861-1920', PhD 
thesis, James Cook University, Townsville, 1982, p. iii. 
95 See CHPRA, 17 June 1874, p. 3 and 9 September 1874, p. 2. 
96 See CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 3. 
97 See CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2 and The Cooktown Courier, 23 May 1874, p. 3. 
98 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1874, p. 2 and 18 July 1874, p. 3. 
99 The Cooktown Courier, 21 June 1876, p. 2. 
100 The Cooktown Courier, 5 July 1876, p. 2. 
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the town's first major fire in August 1875, an editorial in The Cooktown 
Herald and Palmer River Advertiser noted that 'had the fire gained hold ... no 
exertion could have saved the whole town'.ioi Although the lesson was not 
heeded, European 'volunteers' pre-emptively demolished a number of shanties 
£md outbuildings in Chinatown to halt the spread of Cooktown's second major 
fire in October 1875.^02 In the event, the second fire at least prompted the 
eventual formation of a volunteer fire brigade. 
Government Buildings 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, an issue which drew surprisingly 
little agitation from Cooktown's early settlers was the paucity of government 
buildings and services. One explanation is that the early residents were 'hell-
bent' on exploiting the commercial opportunities presented by the rush to the 
Palmer and either gave little thought to the longer-term prospects of the 
settlement, or preferred anyway a laissez-faire approach not only to business 
but also to their everyday lifestyle. Another explanation, not exclusive of the 
first, is that Cooktown's early residents well recognised the tenuous raison 
d'etre of the town and wanted to give the authorities in Brisbane no additional 
excuse, by complaining of the lack of government infrastructure, to question 
further the longer-term prospects of the infant settlement. 
For its part, the Queensland Government was certainly in no hurry 
to provide government infrastructure or services, beyond the minimum 
presence needed to collect customs revenues and duties, and to provide a 
modicum of law and order. lO^  in the period to 30 June 1875, for example, 
some twenty months after the town's establishment, almost 80 per cent of 
government-funded public works expenditure on buildings related to the 
provision of customs services and harbour facilities.^04 Indeed, in the period to 
30 June 1884 (over a decade after the town's establishment), the customs' and 
harbours' share of public works building expenditure still exceeded 50 per cent 
of the cumulative total.io^ 
101 CHPRA, 11 August 1875, p. 2. 
102 CHPRA, 16 October 1875, p. 2. 
103 The relationship between the authorities in Brisbane and the early settlement of 
Cooktown is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 'Small Town in a Large Colony*. 
104 Expenditure on 'customs' and "harbours' was some £4816 in a total of around £6107: 
see QVP, 1, 1875, pp. 849, 855, 875 and 900-2. 
105 Expenditure on 'customs' and "harbours' was some £20,697 in a total of around 
£39,953: see Table 6.1 'Expenditure on Public Works in Cooktown by Queensland 
Government, 1873-86' in Chapter 6. 
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That apportionment met with little opposition from the town's early 
traders and merchants, especially as it related to wharf improvements and the 
provision of bonded stores (for incoming cargo hable for customs duty). 
Indeed, practically the only criticism of the Government in the first year or so 
of settlement related to one or the other of those two issues. The visiting 
Commissioner of Pohce, for example, noted in February 1874 that 'the 
wharfage is in very bad state ... [and] nothing has been done to improve it 
beyond the partial clearing of mangroves by private persons here and 
there'.i06 in early March 1874, one of the town's prominent merchants, 
frustrated at the lack of action by the government, built his own wharf 
described by the local newspaper as 'thoroughly substamtial in character and 
calculated to last for years'.i07 
Unrelated to that initiative but in response to ongoing pressure, the 
authorities in Brisbane despatched a prefabricated customs house and bonded 
store, together with a team of contractors to assemble the buildings on site.ios 
They were erected on the government reserve at the northern end of Charlotte 
Street (see Map 4.6 over), with both buildings described by visitors as 
substantial and commodious, albeit that the bonded store was also 'plain, solid 
and unpretentious'.i09 
106 See letter Commissioner Seymour to Colonial Secretary of 24 February 1874, in-letter 
399/74 of 1874, COL/A192, QSA 
107 See CHPRA, 25 March 1874, p. 2. 
108 The urgency of their despatch is perhaps evident by the fact that the buildings arrived 
in Cooktown on 22 April 1874 (see CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 3) although the closing 
date of the tender for their supply was 20 April 1874: see QGG, Vol. 15, 1874, p. 377. 
109 See The Cooktown Courier, 23 May 1874, p. 3. The customs house was 76 feet x 32 
feet, with a wide verandah all round, while the bonded store was 60 feet x 30 feet. 
Their combined value was £3030: see QVP, 1, 1875, p. 875. 
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Map 4.6 - The Location of Early Government Buildings 
in Cooktown 1874-75 
» CD 
Source: Locations primarily derived from descriptions in The Cooktown Courier and 
The Cooktown Hertdd and CHPRA, 1874-75. 
Shortly thereafter, the authorities m Brisbane also agreed to the 
construction of three wharves, to be sited adjacent to the government reserve 
at the northern end of Charlotte Street. Work on them began m late June 
1874, with the arrival of a pile-driving machine fi-om Cardwell.no 
Interestingly, tunber for the wharves — mcluding swamp mahogany piles — 
was transported fi-om Brisbane 'm consequence of the scarcity of suitable 
110 See CHPRA, 1 July 1874, p. 2. No expenditure for wharfage, however appears in the 
relevant public works allocations or estimates for either 1873/74 or 1874/75. 
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timber on the spot'.m Once completed, the wharves were leased by tender, on 
an annual basis with No. 1 wharf going initially to ASN & Co. (The 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company of Sydney) for an luidisclosed but 
'exorbitant rate'.n^ Nmnbers 2 and 3 were leased to local agents for £450 and 
£280 respectively. 113 
Other major expenditure on customs and harbours in the period to 
1885 is shown at Table 4.13 (below). Of particular note, given the downturn 
in Cooktown's economy fi-om about 1877, is the substantial expenditiu-e in the 
years between 1881 and 1884 (see serials 6, 8 and 11). 
Table 4.13 - Pubhc Works Expenditure on Customs and 
Harboiu-s in Cooktown 1874-85 
Serial 
(a) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
T^par 
(b) 
1873/74 
1874/75 
1875/76 
1876/77 
1877/78 
1881/82 
1881782 
1883/84 
1883/84 
1883/84 
1884/85 
1884/85 
€ostm \ 
(c) 
586 
650 
414 
874 
561 
2664 
335 
3421 
258 
700 
2673 
1334 
tt^TEL 
(d) 
Pilot and boatmen's houses 
Residence for sub-collector of customs 
Wharf improvements 
Pilot vessel 
Additions to bond store 
Extension of wharves and sheds 
Cottage for coxswain 
Lighthouses (Walkers Point and Stony Island) 
Harbour office 
Cottages for boatmen 
Wharf extension 
Dredging of harbour 
Source: Public works estimates and expenditure tables in QVP, 1874-85. 
The second significant grouping of government buildings included 
the police, court-house and post office. Although the three were eventually 
funded into separate buildings by their respective departments, they started 
life in Cooktown sharing the same two small iron and wooden buildings 
described earlier in this chapter. At that time (February 1874), the police 
detachment comprised nine men, with the bulk of the force in the district 
111 
112 
113 
See report in CHPRA, 17 June 1874, p. 3. At the same time, 34 iron-screw pile 
beacons were positioned on outlying reefs to mark the route seawards. 
CHPRA, 10 November 1875, p. 2 in relation to 1874 tender process. 
The Cooktown Courier, 20 October 1875, p. 2. Note, however, that CHPRA, 
21 October 1874, p. 2 stated that No. 2 wharf was leased for £185. 
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(another 66 men) deployed to the Palmer, n^ Although no details seem to have 
been recorded of the expenditin-e involved, it seems likely that the Cooktown 
detachment imder Sub-Inspector Douglas moved to a temporary station in the 
government reserve at the northern end of Charlotte Street sometime in mid 
1874. In 1878/79, a new police station, barracks and cells were built on the 
same site, costed at £1327.i^^ 
Similarly, the post office moved from its shared accommodation to a 
new site next to the police station in Charlotte Street in July 1874. n^ That 
move somewhat alleviated the problems of the long-suffering postmaster, who 
had previously attempted to manage the postal needs of around 1500 
residents from a 'pigeon-hole', leading one of the local newspapers to describe 
the postal service as 'one of the worst managed of all the local government 
offices'.ii'^ With the connection of Cooktown to the overland telegraph service 
in 1876, a new combined post and telegraph oftice was funded in the public 
works estimates of 1876/77 to the value of £2495."8 The building was 
described as 'nice looking and commodious ... with both the public offices and 
private apartments being spacious and lofty [while] the roof is admirably 
arranged to allow the free circulation of air'.i^^ 
The court house seems to have stayed in its original accommodation, 
once vacated by the police and post office, until mid 1875. It then moved to a 
newly-constructed building, described as of 'an imposing nature on one of the 
most eligible sites in town', on the government reserve at the foot of Grassy 
Hill.120 A local newspaper report noted that its construction included 150,000 
feet of timber, i^ i 
The two other important government-funded buildings were the 
hospital and primary school. Both had an extremely checkered early history, 
brought about in large part by the fact that the Government made the funding 
of their construction (and maintenance in the case of the hospital) contingent 
114 From about August 1874, it seems that a detachment of native troopers was also 
stationed at Eight Mile (from Cooktown) to keep the Palmer road 'clear of blacks': 
see The Cooktown Courier, 15 August 1874, p. 3. 
11^ See QVP, 1, 1880, pp. 939 and 1387. 
116 See CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 2. The new building cost £303: QVP, 2, 1874, p. 42. 
11'^  See CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2. 
118 QVP, 1, 1878, p. 615 and 1, 1879, p. 89. 
11^ See The Cooktown Courier, 20 December 1876, p. 2 although the same report noted 
that 'the rooms are closely ceiled, with no gratings to allow the escape of hot air'. 
120 See CHPRA, 28 April 1875, p. 2. The building cost £859: QVP, 2, 1877, p. 272. 
121 CHPRA, 12 May 1875, p. 2. 
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upon matching subscriptions fi*om the local community. The hospital, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community', also suffered seriously in 
its early years from a procession of resident doctors, allegations of 
mismanagement and rifts with the Chinese business commimity over the 
funding of Chinese patients. 
That said, the hospital at least had the advantage over the school of 
wide community support for its construction. Indeed, the first fifteen-bed 
hospital was constructed on the comer of Green and Helen Streets within the 
space of about two weeks in late April 1874, solely on the basis of private 
subscriptions to the value of £265.1^2 Subsequent advice fi-om the Government 
was that it would match private subscriptions towards building costs to the 
value of £300, as well as providing £600 per year towards maintenance costs, 
on the proviso that the local community matched half the latter amount. 123 
Over the following three or so years, the hospital expanded to forty-
seven beds, as its yearly admissions — with an increasing number of Chinese 
— rose fi-om 141 in 1874 to 348 in 1878.124 The large increase in Chinese 
patients from 1876 onwards prompted periodic calls fi-om disgruntled white 
subscribers for a separate Chinese ward (funded by the Chinese business 
community) or, indeed, a separate Chinese hospital.125 In the event, the 
Chinese issue was largely overtaken by the decision to build a new hospital on 
the southern edge of the town precincts, funded to the value of £1945 in the 
pubhc works estimates of 1879/80.126 In the years thereafter, the 
preoccupation of hospit£j administrators — like most other civic leaders in 
Cooktown — was in attempting to secure a 'fair share' of government funding, 
as the town slipped into decline. 
The primary school, by contrast, had a more difficult birth but an 
easier infancy. Its initial canvass for subscriptions clashed with that of the 
hospital and less than £95 of a promised £125 was raised.i27 Sensing a 
general lack of interest by the community, the honorary secretary decided to 
122 See CHPRA, 20 April 1874, p. 3 and 6 May 1874, p. 3. 
123 CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 3. 
124 See The Cooktown Courier, 23 January 1879, p. 3. 
125 At its monthly meeting in February 1876, the hospital committee resolved to provide a 
separate ward for Chinese: see The Cooktown Courier, 9 February 1876, p. 2. In the 
event, that did not eventuate because of difficulties in funding. A Chinese wardsman 
was, however, appointed in March 1877: The Cooktown Courier, 3 March 1877, p. 2. 
126 QVP, 1, 1880, p. 1387. 
127 CHPRA, 5 August 1874, p. 3. 
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let matters rest. The Board of Education in Brisbane, however, having been 
advised of the original proposal for a school, proceeded with its plans for the 
design of a 60 foot x 20 foot prefabricated building 'ready to be shipped to 
Cooktown as soon as possible'. 128 By August 1874, therefore, acrimonious 
recriminations were being bandied around the town and south to Brisbane, 
together with the occasional suggestion of embezzlement by the secretary. 
After a heated public meeting in Cooktown in early August, the 
project was resurrected (albeit that the original subscription list had been 
mislaid) and plans put in place to get the then-completed school building 
shipped at the first opportunity, on the understanding that the government 
would match private subscriptions on the basis of £2 for every £1 raised. 129 By 
early September, a tender had been let to a local tradesman to erect the 
building for £180, with the work expected to be completed within two 
months. 130 After inspecting the plans and specifications, the editor of one of 
the local newspapers pronounced that the building should be 'exceedingly well 
adapted to the climate .... we now need only a talented master and mistress to 
occupy it'. 131 
As it turned out, a school-master was duly provided by the Board of 
Education and the school opened on 26 January 1875 with 80 pupils, 
consisting of 38 girls and 42 boys.i32 The downside was that the Education 
Department had neglected to provide 'books, registers, black boards or any 
other requisites for the conduct of a school'. 133 How long that equipment took 
to procure was not recorded. Over the following decade, the number of 
teachers at the school varied between four and eight, with the number of 
pupils ranging between 154 and 322.134 Although the government provided 
£239 and £216 in 1878/79 and 1884/85 respectively for repairs to school 
buildings, an editorial in The Cooktown Courier of January 1877 noted that 
'the ruinous condition of the primary school is ... a matter that deserves 
attention'. 135 
128 See report in The Cooktown Courier, 25 July 1874, p. 3. 
129 Proceedings of the meeting duly recorded in CHPRA, 5 August 1874, p. 3. 
130 See CHPRA, 9 September 1874, p. 2. 
131 CHPRA, 9 September 1874, p. 2. 
132 CHPRA, 27 January 1875, p. 2. 
133 CHPRA, 27 January 1875, p. 2. 
134 Education matters are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community*. 
135 The Cooktown Courier, 13 January 1877, p. 2. Funding figures from QVP, 2, 1879, 
pp. 26-7 and 2, 1885, p. 686. 
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The remaining 'public' buildings in the town were either funded 
through the local council or by special-interest groups within the 
commimity. 136 The former included the school of arts, which opened in 
February 1876.137 By the end of 1878, its pubhc hbrary was lending over 2000 
books per year, 'notwithstanding that a number of inhabitants have left 
Cooktown over the past twelve months because of the depression in trade'.i38 
Early calls for a mechanics institute resulted in the appointment of a 
cormnittee to investigate the acquisition of suitable premises but little 
concrete action thereafter. 139 
The 'special-interest' buildings included the masonic lodge and a 
number of churches. 140 The foundation stone for the masonic hall was laid in 
July 1875.141 Early meetings were well attended but, by 1878, the building 
had fallen into disuse and disrepair, wdth an estimate from the town council 
(in the context of buying the building for use as a town hall) that it would need 
£100 'just to prevent it falling down'.i42 The volunteer fire brigade, on the 
lookout for a suitable building in which to house its newly-acquired (horse-
drawn) fire engine, similarly decided that it could not afford to buy the 
building, 'owing to the dullness of the times'.i43 
The first permanent church building in Cooktown was that of the 
Roman Catholics, which officially opened in May 1875. Subscriptions to its 
building fund raised over £200 wdthin the space of a few days, 'with only half 
the town canvassed'. 144 Next was the Episcopalian Church of Christ in June 
1875, a 'very conunodious building valued at £300', closely followed in July by 
the Church of England. 145 The churches, like almost all other buildings in the 
136 Public facilities, such as the botanical gardens, racecourse and cricket ground are 
discussed in more detail in the context of'entertainment' in Chapter 5 'A Frontier 
Community. 
137 See QVP, 2, 1879, p. 163. 
138 As reported in the school's annual report for 1878: The Cooktown Courier, 11 January 
1879, p. 2. By then, the school's maintenance was being subsidised by the 
Government on a £1 for £1 basis. 
13^ See CHPRA, 25 August 1875, p. 2 for a spirited argument for the need. Pending 
construction of a dedicated building, the Police Magistrate granted free use of a room 
in the newly-constructed court house: The Cooktown Courier, 4 August 1875, p. 3. 
The role of such organisations within the Cooktown community is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community". 
141 CHPRA, 21 July 1875, p. 2. 
142 The Cooktown Courier, 5 October 1878, p. 2. 
143 See The Cooktown Courier, 24 July 1878, p. 2 and 5 October 1878, p. 2. 
144 CHPRA, 25 November 1874, p. 2. 
145 See CHPRA, 19 May 1875, p. 2 and 16 July 1875, p. 2. The Church of England 
building was described as 40 feet x 24 feet, with walls 13 feet high, and the cost £300: 
The Cooktown Courier, 22 May 1875, p. 2. 
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town, were initially constructed of timber, with weatherboard-tj^je outer wgdls 
and a corrugated-iron roof 
Public Works 
The final and over-riding physical manifestation of Cooktown's early 
development was, of course, the public works aspect of its roads, kerbs and 
culverts, and some early moves towards the provision of a water supply and 
sewerage. Whereas the road fi-om Cooktown to the Palmer was funded by the 
Queensland government, the provision of public works within Cooktown was 
largely the responsibility of the town council (once formed), albeit that 
assistance with funding for larger projects also came from Brisbane.146 
The 'saga' of the early development of locsd government in Cooktown 
is a story in itself, as will be discussed later, complete with the resignation of 
mayors, the sacking of town clerks, accusations of embezzlement and 
mgdpractice, motions of no-confidence and the formation of an alternative 
'progress cormnittee' by disgruntled townspeople. It is perhaps suffice at this 
stage to say that the early conduct of municipal affairs made the problems of 
the hospital and primary school pale into insignificance, and confine 
discussion here to the physical extent and progress of Cooktown's early public 
works program. 
In that regard, the early focus of public attention (and criticism) was 
on the state of Cooktown's roads, especially Charlotte Street. In the first year 
or so of Cooktown's existence, the main street was a narrow, uneven laneway, 
leading southwards from the government reserve and lined with a leu-gely 
ramshackle collection of buildings, shanties and tents protruding irregularly 
onto the thoroughfare. In the dry season, the street was dusty and rutted; in 
the wet, it became a quagmire of chumed-up mud, pot-holes and rivulets, 
fi-equently impassable to drays and wagons. 147 One of the side-streets, leading 
to the hospital, was particularly described by The Cooktown Courier as 
'positively dangerous to life and limb [vdth] large ruts in the path and tree-
stumps in the roadwa/. 14^  
146 Pubhc works funding and, indeed, the wider issue of the development of local 
government in Cooktown is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 'Small Town in a 
Large Colony*. 
147 See Holthouse, River of Gold, p. 54 describing 'the mud which was inches thick'. 
148 The Cooktown Courier, 4 August 1875, p. 3. 
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In December 1874, with the grant of £1000 from the authorities in 
Brisbane, work began on surfacing the upper end of Charlotte Street and 
constructing a stone-lined culvert at the creek-crossing three blocks south of 
the government reserve. 149 At the same time, government-funded work 
parties grubbed out the remaining tree stumps fi-om the main street 'which 
have hitherto been so unsightly and dangerous'. 150 A further grant of £1000 in 
August 1875 enabled work on the main street to be extended southwards and 
for some preliminary work to be done on several of the side streets.i5i 
By early 1876, however, in the absence of further allocations, 
Cooktown's streets had quickly deteriorated, with the bottom end of Charlotte 
Street once again impassable to dray traffic because of 'large gullies caused by 
the surface flow of heavy rain'. 152 Several side streets were still in 'an 
extremely dangerous state ... with the small rivers and large creeks across 
Green Street [near the hospital] ... a matter of positive danger'. 153 Local 
newspaper editorials warned that 'unless maintained, even the metalled part 
[of Charlotte Street] will become unavailable for traffic'. 154 
In early 1877, the newly-formed municipal council secured a 
government loan of £5000 for Cooktown's roads and quickly set about 
surfacing the complete length of Charlotte Street and the key side streets, as 
well as constructing kerbs and channels with locally-quarried stone. 155 
Interestingly, most of the stone-working work-force consisted of Chinese, as 
whites supposedly 'considered it derogatory work to do'.i56 Following 
complaints from white ratepayers, a council meeting in July 1877 resolved to 
stop employing Chinese labourers and to advertise in southern papers for 
European workers. 157 The outcome of the council's initiative is not recorded. 
That issue aside, it seems likely that Cooktown by aroimd 1878 had 
a metalled main street, with stone kerbs and channelling, and that a similar 
program for its secondary and cross streets was underway by the late 1870s. 
In the minds of some residents, that progress had no doubt come too slowly. 
149 The Cooktown Courier, 26 December 1874, p. 2. 
150 CHPRA, 16 December 1874, p. 3. 
1^ 1 See The Cooktown Courier, 4 August 1875, p. 3. 
152 The Cooktown Courier, 5 February 1876, p. 2. 
153 The Cooktown Courier, 25 March 1876, p. 3. 
154 The Cooktown Courier, 5 February 1876, p. 2. 
155 The Cooktown Courier, 7 February 1877, p. 2. 
156 The Cooktown Courier, 21 July 1877, p. 3. 
157 The Cooktown Courier, 21 July 1877, p. 3. 
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But compared to many other provincial towns, both in Queensland and New 
South Wales, Cooktown had done extremely well in a relatively short time. 
Newcastle, for example, which had been settied since 1804, still had 'not one 
decendy paved street or one healthy drain' by the early 1880s.i58 
On the latter point of'healthy drains', Cooktown similarly did not 
fare too well, at least in its early years. The provision of at least one 'earth 
closet' (see advertisement at Plate 4.1) per hcensed hotel had been made 
mandatory by the local magistrates court as early as April 1874.159 g^^ the 
waste fi-om them, as weU as the night-soil fi-om the open pans of most 
residential dwellings, was simply dumped into the mangrove swamp adjacent 
to the wharf area.i^ 
Plate 4.1 - An Example of a Sanitary Earth Closet circa 1870s 
EARTH CLOSET, 
WHOLESALE AGENTS: 
ha.1. Fw. n. 
Source: As reproduced in M. Cannon, Australia in the Victorian age: life in the cities. Penguin, Ringwood, 
1988, p. 161. 
By mid 1875, this open sewer was the source of persistent editorial 
criticism in the local newspapers. The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River 
Advertiser, for example, described it as 'a hotbed for the germinating of... a 
thousand attendant physical evils', with the smell 'of strength enough in 
effervescence to knock down ... twenty bullocks'.i^i Interestingly, the 
notoriety of Cooktown's cesspool reportedly reached Hong Kong. The captain 
of the SS Killamey, upon his arrival in Cooktown with a new batch of Chinese 
158 
159 
160 
161 
See M. Cannon, Australia in the Victorian age: life in the cities, Penguin, Ringwood, 
1988, p. 156. 
CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2. 
CHPRA, 5 May 1875, p. 2. 
CHPRA 5 May 1875, p. 2. 
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immigrants in May 1875, claimed that placards had recently been liberally 
displayed in the streets of Hong Kong (presumably by a detractor) clEuming 
that 
Cooktown is the most unhealthy spot on earth ...[with] a 
cesspool of filth in the very centre of the town and a death 
rate of 100 per day. i^ ^ 
By around 1877, Cooktown's open sewer problem had largely been 
alleviated, with the promulgation of council by-laws requiring that night-soil 
be buried in trenches some distance from the town, and with the eventual 
flushing of the contents of the mangrove swamp seawards.i^ On that basis, 
Cooktown again had progressed reasonably well in comparison to many 
southern towns and cities. Open cesspools, for example, were a feature of 
everyday life in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne throughout the 1860s. 
Moreover, earth closets only came into regular use in Melbourne's hotels and 
ofiices in the 1880s, while pan collection in Perth did not begin until 1888. i ^ 
Probably the main focus of editorial criticism in Cooktown's 
newspapers, though, was on the issue of water. During 1874 and early 1875, 
it seems that most businesses and residents were able to satisfy their 
requirements by small-scale carting from the numerous springs and creeks on 
the southern slopes of Grassy Hill or on the foothills of Mount Cook. By late 
1875, however, the water carting business had largely fallen into the hands of 
Chinese carters, who obtained their supplies fi-om Two Mile Creek, a source 
which had become increasingly befouled by the activities of Chinese market 
gardeners, i ^ 
Throughout the late 1870s, therefore, newspaper editorials in 
Cooktown regularly lambasted the local council for its failure to provide a 
rehable supply of fi-esh water to the town. At the same time, editorials 
proposed a range of options including, for example, the sinking of wells, 
damming nearby creeks and constructing underground storage tanks, fed 
1^ 2 As reported in CHPRA, 29 May 1875, p. 2. The captain claimed that the adverse 
publicity had resulted in the loss of 300 prospective passengers. 
163 CHPRA, 9 September 1876, p. 2. 
1^ 4 Cannon, Life in the cities, pp. 154-62. 
1^ 5 See The Cooktown Courier, 15 November 1876, p. 2 describing the water from there as 
'unfit to drink'. A secondary concern was that water became increasingly scarce (and 
more polluted) during the dry season. The steamer Exeter, for example, was detained 
in Cooktown for over two days in November 1875 because of the shortage of water for 
its boilers, eventually having to send small boats 20 miles upriver: see CHPRA, 
27 November 1875, p. 2. 
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fi-om the run-off of the nine large iron-roofed government buildings in the 
town. 166 The constant theme of the editorials was also that Cooktown's 
ongoing scourge of fevers and other epidemics was directly attributable to the 
impurity of its water supply.i67 
Eventually, in the late 1880s, Cooktown's local council decided to 
fund the provision of a town water supply, based on the plans and estimates of 
the 1884 inspection report of a team from the Queensland Government's 
Water Supply Department. 168 That report indicated that a supply of 30 
gallons per person per day, for a population of some 4000, could be provided 
for around £28,000.169 In that regard, Cooktown certainly was lagging behind 
the capital cities, at least, which had reticulated water in Sydney in the 1850s, 
Melbourne in 1857, Adelaide in the late 1850s and Brisbane in the late 
1860s. 170 
Fittingly, perhaps, the final subject in this discussion of Cooktown's 
early development and physical growth is the local cemetery. It was 
established, probably in mid 1874, on a large block of land on the northern 
side of the road leading towards the Palmer (at the bottom end of Charlotte 
Street). Before that, bodies were buried in a vacant lot alongside the first 
hospital in Green Street, while some were possibly simply buried 'in the 
bush'. 171 The first recorded mention of the cemetery was in July 1875 in the 
context of a government grant of £100 for fencing, leading a local newspaper to 
express the hope that 'the careless apathy that has hitherto been exhibited ... 
[towards] the repository of the dead will no longer exist'. 172 
The cemetery register, which lists the details of the 277 Europeans 
and 145 Chinese buried in the period to 1885, has its earliest interments 
recorded as 1877.173 It seems, therefore, that the details of the eighty or so 
people who died in the Cooktown hospital between 1874 and 1876, and those 
166 See CHPRA, 3 November 1875, p. 2 and 27 January 1877, p. 2 and The Cooktown 
Courier, 25 October 1876, p. 2. 
167 See CHPRA, 18 August 1877, p. 2. 
168 See their report in QVP, 3, 1884, pp. 861-4. 
169 See QVP, 3, 1884, p. 864. 
1^ 0 See Cannon, Life in the cities, pp. 165-8. 
171 Six or seven bodies were reportedly buried in what was to become Green Street itself. 
They were removed to the cemetery, with the appropriate government approvals, in 
late 1877: see CHPRA, 13 October 1877, p. 2. 
172 See CHPRA, 17 July 1875, p. 2. 
173 See Cook Shire Burial Register to 1920 and monumental inscriptions to 1986, Cairns 
and District Family History Society, Cairns, 1989. 
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residents of Cooktown who died fi-om natural causes over the same period 
(probably another 130 or so), have largely been lost to history.i74 
That aside, the only other significant mention of the cemetery in 
contemporary accounts was in relation to the Chinese. A newspaper editorial 
in September 1875 complained that the Chinese practice of burying coffins in 
very shallow graves was unacceptable 'in a tropical climate where putrefaction 
rapidly sets in', noting that some had been interred so shallowly that the 
coffins lay exposed on the surface.175 One possibihty is that such graves 
belonged to Chinese 'paupers', who had been buried either by their 
countrymen or contracted white undertakers, with little regard for the 
proprieties. Another, alluded to by Holthouse in River of gold, is that 
shallowly-dug Chinese graves were temporary repositories and that 
in due course, the relatives of every Chinese who died on 
the Palmer — if they could afford it — had his bones dug up 
and shipped home to China in a large earthemware jar. 176 
While that latter explanation undoubtedly has some cultural 
credibility, it does not explain why several hundred Chinese remain buried in 
the Cooktown cemetery, especially given that a number of them — with 
occupations hsted as storekeeper, carpenter, gardener, drajmian emd farmer 
— would presumably have had the means for their remains to be repatriated 
to China. Indeed, although the issue is not in itself particularly significant, it 
typifies much of the preceding discussion on Cooktown's transition from 'tent 
city to town' — that is, the need to differentiate between probable reahty and 
the often more entertaining blend of fact and fiction, based fi-equently on 
popular stereotypes of brave and hardy white pioneers labouring on the 
fi-ontiers of 'civihsation'. 
An Atypical Transition? 
The foregoing observation leads reasonably to the question of 
whether Cooktown's early physical growth and commercial progress were 
typical of the development of other coastal or provincial towns and centres in 
174 Hospital deaths 1874-76 taken from QVP, 1,1876, p. 177; 2, 1876, p. 689 and 1, 1878, 
p. 913. 
175 CHPRA, 25 September 1875, p. 2. 
176 Holthouse, River of gold, p. 146. Holthouse also asserts that the Chinese frequently 
smuggled out gold in such jars, figuring that no-one in customs would be inclined to 
pull out the bones to look for contraband: River of gold, p. 147. 
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Queensland and elsewhere in Austraha and whether, therefore, the lessons' of 
Cooktown have wider apphcation. Obviously, the process of urbanisation 
includes far more than simply physical growth and commercial development. 
But it would seem a useful exercise if it were possible to compare some of the 
key issues discussed already in this chapter against the experiences of, say, 
Townsville, Cardwell, Cairns and Charters Towers. 
Such a comparison is attempted in Chapter 8 of this study, which is 
based largely on an assessment of the conclusions of the preceding chapters 
against the conclusions of aheady-pubhshed work. What can be said at this 
stage of the study is that Cooktown in its early years was not fundamentally 
or even markedly different, in terms of its physical development, from most 
other 'fi-ontier' townships in Queensland or Austraha. It is also evident that 
the presence and influence of a large Chinese community had a major impact 
on the town, both in an economic and social sense, though within the typical 
pattern of physical development. The analysis in this chapter has highhghted 
the key role played by the Chinese business community in Cooktown across 
the pcEik years 1876 to 1879, typically at the expense of the Europesm 
business community. It has also confirmed that those who frequentiy 
benefited most fi-om gold mining were those involved in the service industries, 
especially the carrying trade. 
Perhaps the major point of difference would be that Cooktown was 
estabhshed primarily as an entry point for the Palmer River goldfields, rather 
than a typical population settiement or service centre. In consequence, much 
of the Government's early focus and expenditure were on revenue collection. 
In addition, the township developed largely as a trading centre, rather than a 
residential community. 
Finally, it is also clear that many of the early and popular accounts 
of the formative years of Cooktown were shallow, exaggerated and largely 
seen from the perspective of a white male of nineteenth-century British 
background. That is not to be unduly critical of such contemporary accoimts, 
given that most were simply a product of their time. Rather, the smalysis and 
discussion of this chapter has been intended to refute the more fanciful claims 
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and 'set the scene' for Chapter 5 'A Frontier Community', which addresses the 
day-to-day fives of the residents of Cooktown as it made its transition from 
'tent d ty to town'. 
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CHAPTER 5 - A FRONTIER COMMUNITY 
Previous chapters have addressed the early years of Cooktown in 
terms of its historical and physical development, with little emphasis on the 
people of the town. This chapter focuses on the social formation of the 
Cooktown community, addressing particularly the composition, origins and 
aspirations of the early settlers. 
Perhaps more importantly, it also addresses the extent of 
community participation in civic affairs, as well as the djmamics involved in 
the development of the community as an organisation capable of advancing 
the interests of the town. While it is largely a truism, the following editorial 
assertion of early January 1877 seems a particularly apt introduction to this 
chapter, namely that 
... the fate of Cooktown is in the hands of its own 
inhabitants, i 
To that end, the two local newspapers pubhshed numerous 
editorials throughout the mid 1870s bemoaning the apathy of the 
townspeople towards civic affairs and agitating for a more robust sense of 
community. 2 The typical outcome was a spate of public meetings in the 
town, at which speaker after speaker castigated the govemment-of-the-day 
in Brisbane for its neglect of northern interests, while extoUing the virtues 
of Cooktown and the prospects of the goldfields of its hinterland. A not 
infrequent theme was that unless Brisbane apportioned a fairer share of 
financial resources, the Far North would secede with Cooktown as its 
capital.3 
Behind the h3T)erbole of a succession of civic and business leaders, 
however, it is evident that Cooktown was anything but a cohesive 
community. The influx of miners to the Palmer created a constant stream 
1 The Cooktown Courier, 3 January 1877, p. 3. 
2 See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 20 June 1874, p. 3 noting 
that 'we feel bound to remonstrate against the apathy and want of public spirit 
displayed by the people of Cooktown'. 
3 See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1877, p. 3 asserting 
that 'if the government persists in refusing us our just demands ... [our only 
remaining] course is simply to cut the painter*. 
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of transients and short-term visitors, none of whom cared one wit for 
Cooktown or its commimity. Similarly, many of the merchants of Cooktown 
itself were far more interested in short-term profits than the longer-term 
viability of the town. With every new rush, a proportion would quit the 
town to try their luck elsewhere. Severe divisions also existed within the 
semi-permanent business community of the town, involving several key 
figures in at least twelve criminal court proceedings for assault or abusive 
language in 1876 and 1877 alone.4 
Overlaying these realities were two added issues. The first was 
that the climate of Cooktown was widely considered to be unsuited for 
European habitation. Many of the 'residents', therefore, sent their wives 
and children south to recuperate for several months each year, while they 
stayed on to persist as long as they could. The underlying sentiment was 
that residency in Cooktown was a temporary expedient, with the 
opportunity to make 'a quick buck' needing to be balanced against the 
detriment to one's health. 
The second issue militating against a sense of community was that 
Chinese reputedly at times made up half the town's population. That was 
an exaggeration. Nevertheless, the considerable Chinese presence not only 
split the town along racial lines, but created fiu-ther divisions within the 
European business community between those who benefited from the 
throughput of Chinese immigrants and those who claimed that the Chinese 
were taking jobs and resources away from Queenslanders. Against such a 
background of divisiveness, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Cooktown 
community of the 1870s and early 1880s was unable to put in place the 
measures necessary to ensure the town's longer-term viability. 
Analysing the Community 
How best to analyse such a community, in terms of structure and 
lifestyle, as well as its dynamics, is a moot point. An anecdotal account, 
such as that used in Holthouse's River of gold, could be both informative 
and entertaining.5 The downside is that narrative-based studies provide 
4 This issue is discussed in more detail later in the chapter under the heading 
'Community Interest in Civic Affairs'. 
^ See H. Holthouse, River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1967. 
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little opportunity for the meaningful smalysis of such structural elements as 
age, sex, place of origin, marital status, occupation etc. A better option, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, would seem to be a balanced combination of 
narrative and quantitative methodology, with descriptive prose being used 
to illustrate the interpretative generahsations derived fi-om quantitative 
analysis. 
The difficulty in applying a quantitative methodology to the study 
of the Cooktown community in the 1870s is in deciding (or simply locating) a 
suitable statistical base. One fleeting consideration was to use data from 
census returns, such as used in America by Stephan Themstrom in The 
other Bostonians and by Ehzabeth Pleck in Black migration and poverty. 6 
The problem in relation to Cooktown is that the individual census schedules 
for Queensland from 1876 and 1881 are no longer available, nor were 
detailed city directories ever compiled such as those used by Themstrom 
and Pleck to trace individuals from one census period to the next. 7 
Similarly, none of the extant directories, rolls or almanacs for 
Cooktown from that era provides anything like a comprehensive listing of 
the individuals who were resident in the town between 1873 and 1885. 
Moreover, any single listing would only capture a small proportion of those 
who were resident across the period, given the estimate by Themstrom 
(admittedly for an American city) that the population flow over a ten-year 
period was often between six and twelve times the population present at 
anyone time.^ 
Compiling a Cooktown Register 
It was decided for this study, therefore, to attempt to create a data 
base of every individual who resided in Cooktown between 1873 and 1885, 
derived fi-om the range of available source materials. Those sources 
included electoral rolls, directories, almanacs, court records. 
See S. Themstrom, The other Bostonians: poverty and progress in the American 
metropolis 1880-1970, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973 and E. Pleck, 
Black migration and poverty: Boston 1865-1900, Academic Press, New York, 1979. 
The nearest equivalent for Queensland are electoral rolls, post office directories and 
business almanacs. Pleck also had access to Civil War pension records: see Pleck, 
Black migration, preface p. xv. 
See T. Hershberg, The new urban history: towards an interdisciplinary history of 
the city, Journal of Urban History, 5, 1, November 1978, p. 20. 
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burial registers, newspapers, petitions, registers of the sale of crown lands, 
shipping lists, school records, Queensland Government gazettes, Votes and 
proceedings of the Legislative Assembly [QVP], official correspondence and 
the numerous primary source reminiscences and accounts of the early days 
of Cooktown. 
The end result was a register of 2615 names, with an average 
annual population across the period of 532 individuals. Notable by their 
absence were Aborigines (only one name recorded across the period), while 
women, children and Chinese were considerably under-represented. Using 
Themstrom's estimate of a population turnover of six times over a decade, 
the register might optimally have had a total of 11,700 names (taking the 
average population of Cooktown across the period 1874-85 as around 1950 
— see Figure 5.1 at page 210 — multiplied by Themstrom's figure of six). It 
could be argued, therefore, that the register as compiled captured only 
about 20 per cent of the actual residents (and considerably less if one used 
Themstrom's higher estimate of twelve). 
Given, however, that the primary purpose of the register has been 
to quantify key variables of the working population of Cooktown (age 
structure, race, occupations and civic involvement), it can be argued that 
the exclusion of children and women engaged in home duties and unskilled 
Chinese workers is not a critical omission. Indeed, accepting — from census 
data and extrapolations — that the town had an average school student 
population of around 300 across the period, a pre-school children population 
of around 175 and a home duties population of around 350 women, it seems 
reasonable to accept that the yearly average of 470 or so adult male 
Europeans listed in the register represented around 45 per cent of all white 
males present in Cooktown (on average) across the period 1873-1885 (see 
the calculations at Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 - Average Composition of Cooktown's Eiuropean Population 
1873-1885 
Children 
(pre-school age) 
175 
Children 
(school age) 
300 
Women 
(home duties) 
350 
Women 
(workforce) 
50 
Men 
(unemployed 
and workforce) 
1075 
Total 
1950 
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Note: Chinese population probably varied between 100 and 1500 (as discussed later). 
Source: Figures for women and children derived primarily from 1876 and 1881 census details: 
see Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2, 1877, p. 421 
and QVP, 2, 1882, pp. 913 and 975. 
The Register as a Data Base 
In its design, the register made provision for the compilation of 
data, by individual, in relation to age, sex, marital status, place of origin, 
date of arrival, occupation, occupational mobility, years resident and civic 
involvement, for each of the years 1874 to 1885. The data base program 
employed was Microsoft ACCESS, operated on a lap-top 386 computer.^ For 
each of the structural elements, various numeric codes were used as shown 
at Tables 5.2 to 5.6.10 
Table 5.2 - Data Base Codes for Age Groupings 
0: not known 
1: 0-8 years 
2: 9-17 years 
3: 18^26 years 
4: 27-35 years 
5: 36-44 years 
6: 45-53 years 
7: 54-62 years 
8: 63-71 years 
9: 72-80 years 
10: 81-89 years 
11: 90 and over years 
Table 5.3 - Data Base Codes for Sex and Marital Status 
0: not known 
1: male - raarital status not known 
2: female - marital status not known 
3; male under 16 years 
4; female under 16 years 
6: male - single 16 years and over 
6: female - smgle 16 years and over 
7: male - married 
8: female - married 
9: male - widowed or divorced 
10: female - widowed or divorced 
9 
10 
The programming was provided by John O'Neill of Mercadier Strategic 
Developments, North Lyneham ACT, (06) 257 6873. 
Codes for years resident (0-12) matched the number of years. Codes for 
occupational mobility provided for all variations between the occupational 
groupings at Table 5.5. 
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Note: Chinese population probably varied between 100 and 1500 (as discussed later). 
Source: Figures for women and children derived primarily from 1876 and 1881 census details: 
see Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2, 1877, p. 421 
and QVP, 2, 1882, pp. 913 and 975. 
The Register as a Data Base 
In its design, the register made provision for data, by individual, in 
relation to age, sex, marital status, place of origin, date of arrival, 
occupation, occupationEd mobility, years resident and civic involvement, for 
each of the years 1874 to 1885. The program employed was Microsoft: 
ACCESS, operated on a lap-top 386 computer. ^  For each of the structural 
elements, various numeric codes were used as shown at Tables 5.2 to 5.6. ^^  
Table 5.2 - Data Base Codes for Age Groupings 
0: not known 
1: 0-8 years 
2: 9-17 years 
3: 18-26 years 
4: 27-35 years 
5: 36-44 years 
6: 45-53 years 
7: 54-62 years 
8: 63-71 years 
9: 72-80 years 
10: 81-89 years 
11: 90 and overyears 
Note: 8 year-range selected to achieve optimal grouping of infants (code 1), youths (2) 
and young adults (3). 
Table 5.3 - Data Base Codes for Sex and Marital Status 
0: not known 
1: male - marital status not known 
2: female - marital status not known 
3: male under 16 years 
4: female under 16 years 
5: male - single 16 years and over 
6; female * single 16 years and over 
7: male - married 
8: female - married 
9; male - widowed or divorced 
10: female - widowed or divorced 
9 
10 
The programming was provided by John O'Neill of Mercadier Strategic 
Developments, North Lyneham ACT, (06) 257 6873. 
Codes for years resident (0-12) matched the number of years. Codes for 
occupational mobility provided for all variations between the occupational 
groupings at Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.4 - Data Base Codes for Place of Origin 
0: not known 
1; Brisbane 
2: elsewhere in Queensland 
3: other Australian colonies 
4: Great Britain 
5: Ireland 
6: other Europe 
7: Americas 
8: South Pacific including New Zealand 
9: China 
10: elsewhere 
11: bom in Cooktowii 
12: Aborigine 
Table 5.5 - Data Base Codes for Occupations 
(the structure of this table is discussed later in the chapter) 
0: not known 
1: unemployed, home duties, student 
2: unskilled manual (European) 
3: semi-skilled manuaUEuropean) 
4: artisan (European) 
5: basic white collar (European) 
6: managerial white collar (European) 
7: professional white collar (European) 
8: self-employed mercantile (European) 
9: unskilled manual (Chinese) 
10: semi-skilled manual (Chinese) 
11; artisan (Chinese) 
12: basic white collar (Chinese) 
13: managerial white collar CChinese) 
14: professional white collar (Chinese) 
15: self-employed mercantile (Chinese) 
Notes: 1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
Codes 2 and 9 relate primarily to labourers. 
Codes 3 and 10 include such occupations as miner, gardener, fisherman, boatman, cook, 
storeman, groom, fencer, painter, packer, waitress, barman, drayman, domestic servant. 
Codes 4 and 11 include such occupations as blacksmith, baker, saddler, jeweller, tentmaker, 
carpenter, butcher, chemist, tinsmith, hairdresser, dressmaker, bootmaker, chef 
Codes 5 and 12 include such occupations as shop assistant, clerk, policeman, teller, tutor, 
nurse, river pilot, journaUst, rate collector, billiard room proprietor. 
Codes 6 and 13 include such occupations as engineer, accountant, police sergeant or sub-
inspector, harbour master, surveyor, teacher, newspaper editor, matron, town clerk. 
Codes 7 and 14 include such occupations as solicitor, doctor, magistrate, police inspector, 
headmaster, minister of reUgion, bank manager. 
Codes 8 and 15 include such occupations as merchant, shopkeeper, grocer, auctioneer, 
carrier, agent, publican, contractor, cordial maker. 
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Table 5.6 - Data Base Codes for Civic Involvement 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
resident for 0-12 months and no civic involvement 
resident for 1 year « « « « 
resident for 2 years « « « « 
resident for 3 years « « « « 
resident for 4 years « « « « 
mayor, alderman or JP and occupational grouping 0-3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
official committee person and occupational grouping 0-3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
unofficial committee person and occupational grouping 0-3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
previous mayor, alderman or JP and not 5-22 
previous official committee person and not 5-22 
Notes: 1. Official committees include those for organisations funded or subsidised by the government 
eg hospital, education, fire brigade, school of arts. 
2. Unofficial committees include those receiving no direct government funding eg jockey club, 
victuallers association, progress association, railway league, cricket club, carriers association, 
temperance society. 
Results of the Data Base Compilation 
Needless to say, much of the information sought for the various 
data matrices was not available, resulting in a default entry of'0' or not 
known. Of the possible 44,688 entries, however, data was entered for 
23,487, representing a value input entry of 52.6 per cent.^^ As can be seen 
at Table 5.7 (on next page), the information most available related to years 
resident, followed by sex and marital status, followed by civic involvement. 
The information least available related to place of origin, followed by age 
and occupational mobility. 
11 The figure of 44,688 was calculated by multiplying the average number of 
individuals (532) by the years (12) and then by variable columns (7). 
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Table 5.7 - Availability of Information for Entry on Data Base 
EH^metit 
Years resident 
Civic involvement 
Occupation 
Occupational mobility 
Age 
Place of origin 
Average 
Avallai^miy {%) 
100 
59.2 
49.8 
30.0 
20.5 
8.9 
52.6 
Beyond the raw data output shown at Table 5.7, it is not intended 
here, or elsewhere within this chapter, to table the various spreadsheet 
summaries, not least because the data is largely meaningless without close 
cross-referencing to the various data base codes (although the summaries 
are available to anyone interested). Rather, it seems more useful to move to 
an analysis of the various elements of the community structure of 
Cooktown, using the summaries — supplemented by other quantitative and 
qualitative source materials — as the anal)rtical basis for discussion. 
Early Population Numbers 
As discussed in Chapter 4 under the heading 'Coping with the 
Influx of Population', many of the early estimates of Cooktown's population 
were obviously exaggerated or included would-be miners readying to 
proceed to the Palmer River. Figure 4.1 (at page 142), it will be recalled, 
estimated that of the some 4000 people present in Cooktown in May 1874, 
around 2000 of them were either waiting for rivers between Cooktown and 
the Palmer to subside, or were disgruntled miners from the 'return rush' of 
April 1874 waiting for passage south. 
That is not to imder-estimate, of course, the practical difficulties in 
attempting to determine the size of the town's population in such a fluid 
situation. Indeed, even the semi-permanent population often varied by 
several hundred from month to month, as residents left to try their luck at 
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newly-discovered fields.^^ On balance, it seems reasonable to accept, based 
on a variety of soin-ces, that the population of Cooktown across the period 
fluctuated between 1300 and 2800 as shown at Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 - The Estimated Population of Cooktown 1874-1885 
(as at 30 June each year) 
3000 n-
2500 • -
2000 . -
No. 1500 • -
1000 . -
500 . . 
Source: Derived from a variety of sources, including the 1876 census report in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 336 
and the 1881 census report in QVP, 1, 1882, p. 948, and extrapolations by the author. 
What Figure 5.1 does not show is the extremely high turnover of 
population within the annual totals. Figure 5.2 (on next page), for example, 
using data fi-om the 'years resident' spreadsheet of the sample register, 
shows that of the 500 or 600 Europeans listed as resident each year in 
Cooktown, an average of 45 per cent of them had either arrived in the town 
or departed fi-om it during that year. Moreover, between 1875 and 1879, the 
turnover rate was nearer to 50 per cent, going as high as 63 per cent in 
1878. Obviously, a community in which half of the population tin-ned over 
each year could hardly be expected to develop easily any sense of cohesion or 
civic pride. 
12 An editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 25 July 1874, p. 2, for example, noted that 
news from the Palmer River Tias induced quite a number of townspeople ... to visit 
the Palmer and try their luck'. 
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Figure 5.2 - Population Turnover (of Europeans) within the Cooktown 
Register Sample 
(the percentage of the sampled population arriving or departing each year) 
1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 
Years 
1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 
The Persistence of the Population 
It is also evident from the sample register (as shown at Table 5.8 
below) that, on average, two-thirds of those departing the town each year 
had been resident for less than twelve months and that only around 15 per 
cent of each year's intake of residents stayed in the town for five years or 
more. 
Table 5.8 - Annual Departiu'e Rate of Europeans 
within the Cooktown Register Sample 
(showing the percentage of each year's intake 
who had departed after x years) 
Year 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879* 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
Average 
Mk&t t Year 
60 
71 
65 
75 
69 
37 
78 
82 
67 
60 
64 
66 
2 Years 
71 
79 
67 
82 
75 
51 
83 
84 
71 
70 
N/A 
73 
3Year& 
79 
79 
79 
86 
81 
53 
84 
88 
80 
N/A 
N/A 
79 
4 Year^ 
80 
88 
84 
91 
83 
54 
87 
91 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
82 
5 Years 
84 
90 
87 
92 
84 
63 
89 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
84 
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Note: The markedly higher persistence rates for those arriving in 1879 cannot readily be explained. 
The reasons for such high timiovers and low persistence rates are 
probably several. Most obvious is that a sizeable number of residents were 
lured to try their luck at the Palmer River and Hodgkinson goldfields, 
especially in the boom years of 1874, 1875 and 1876. Others went certainly 
to new settlements elsewhere along the Far North Queensland coastline, in 
the hope of establishing a mercantile foothold in what were being touted at 
the time as the future service centres for the goldfields of the region.^^ A 
number may also have found the heat, the humidity and the 'fi-ontier' 
conditions simply too much to bear.^'* 
It is also plausible that some Em-opean merchants and carriers 
were able to make their fortune within the space of a number of months (or 
perhaps within a single dry season in the case of carriers) and then quit 
Cooktown for southern ports. ^ ^ Certainly, a similar accusation was 
frequently levelled at the Chinese who, as can be seen from Table 5.9 (on 
next page), had even lower persistence rates than the European population. 
In the case of the Chinese, however, higher turnovers related in part also to 
the terms of indenture of the majority of labourers (as will be discussed 
shortly). Chinese merchants were probably also even more mobile than 
their European coiuiterparts in terms of their preparedness to relocate to 
new fields. 
®^ Several well-established merchants in Cooktown, for example, including three 
sitting aldermen, left to set up new businesses in nearby coastal settlements in 
July/August 1877: see The Cooktown Courier, 28 July 1877, p. 3 and 8 August 
1877, p. 3. 
l** The issue of environmental hardships is discussed later in this chapter under the 
heading of'Health and Mortality*. 
1^ In Chapter 4 under the heading The Carriers', for example, it was noted that 'there 
was generally more to be made from the carrying trade than there was from 
prospecting*. 
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Table 5.9 - Annual Departure Rate of Chinese 
within the Cooktown Register Sample 
(showing the percentage of each year's intake who had departed after x years) 
ir«ar 
1874* 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
Chinese Average 
European Average 
(from Table 5.8) 
After! y^ar 
0 
60 
89 
86 
98 
93 
88 
92 
94 
82 
100 
80 
66 
2y^ar& 
0 
70 
93 
90 
98 
96 
94 
97 
94 
100 
100 
85 
73 
Syeaans 
50 
80 
100 
94 
98 
96 
94 
100 
94 
100 
100 
91 
79 
A years 
75 
90 
100 
94 
100 
100 
97 
100 
N/A 
100 
100 
96 
82 
5y«!az^ 
75 
90 
100 
96 
100 
100 
97 
100 
N/A 
100 
100 
96 
84 
Note: Five of the twenty-four Chinese merchants who arrived in 1874-75 were 
still resident in 1878; three of them were stiU trading in 1884. 
The consequences of high population turnovers and low 
persistence rates for both the European and Chinese communities of 
Cooktown will be discussed later in this chapter imder the heading 
'Community Interest in Civic Aifiars'. 
Place of Origin of the Early Settlers 
Unfortunately, information as to the place of origin of individuals 
within the sample register was rarely available. There are, for example, no 
detailed passenger lists available (or perhaps ever prepared) for the scores 
of ships which conveyed would-be miners and settlers to Cooktown from 
ports along the eastern Australian seaboard or from Hong Kong.^^ Even 
where passenger lists are available, such as those for ships arriving from 
Great Britain and Ireland from November 1881 onwards, it is almost 
^^ Well-to-do passengers travelling in 'cabin-class' were normally listed by name in the 
Cooktown newspapers upon arrival. Those travelling 'in steerage', however, were 
simply noted as a total number. 
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impossible to determine whether immigrants landing at Cooktown were 
intending residents or were destined for the goldfields of the hinterland.^^ 
The paucity of data is compounded by the need to differentiate 
between place of birth and the individual's residential location immediately 
before his or her arrival in Cooktown. For the purposes of this study, the 
primary focus is on the latter, rather than the fact that a person was, for 
example, of Irish extraction. The reason for that focus is that it would seem 
useful, in terms of better understanding community structure, to be able to 
analyse where individuals were Uving and what their occupations were 
before their arrival in Cooktown, rather than simply their nationality.^^ 
In the event, such an aim has largely been unfulfilled. What 
seems evident, however, is that in the years from October 1873 until 
November 1881, all the Europeans in Cooktown (and all the Chinese before 
late March 1875) arrived either overland from elsewhere in eastern 
Australia or via a port on the Australian eastern seaboard.^^ The first ship 
to berth at Cooktown directly from Europe was the RMS Chyebassa, which 
arrived from Plymouth on 19 November 1881 with nine passengers.^^ There 
also seems to be no evidence, at least across the years 1874 to 1877, of ships 
arriving directly from New Zealand or from Califomia.^i 
From the available newspaper records of ships arriving from ports 
on the Australian eastern seaboard, it is difficult to assess the main 
embarkation points. The (incomplete) records of The Cooktown Courier and 
^'^ In a few instances, it has proved possible to use passenger list information (in 
relation to place of origin, age and marital status of an individual arriving from 
Europe) to supplement an entry where the same individual is confirmed as a 
resident of Cooktown subsequent to his or her arrival. 
^^ It was also hoped that such an approach would facilitate the discussion in Chapter 
6 'Small Town in a Large Colony' of the role played by Cooktown and the Palmer 
River goldfields in encouraging both immigration and the flow of investment capital 
to Queensland during the 1870s and 1880s. 
®^ The immigration to Cooktown returns in successive issues of QVP for example, 
show nil arrivals from Great Britain, Ireland or Europe between 1874 and 1881, 
and nil arrivals of Chinese before 1875. 
2^ See Immigration Department inwards passenger register 1881, pp. 549-50, 
IMM/116, Queensland State Archives (QSA). 
2^ The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser (CHPRA), for example, noted in 
March 1874 that 'none at all... [had yet arrived] from New Zealand': CHPRA, 
25 March 1874, p. 2. Similarly, The Cooktown Courier, 2 May 1877, p. 3 noted 
(without subsequent confirmation) 'a report that several miners from California 
[are] en route to Cooktown from San Francisco'. 
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Cooktown Herald for 1875, for example, indicate that at least 4008 
individuals disembarked in Cooktown from southern ports in 1875, of whom 
2610 were recorded in immigration records as being from Australian 
colonies other than Queensland.22 That broadly suggests that only aroimd 
1400 persons or 35 per cent of the total were from Queensland. 
The probabiHty is, of course, that most of the would-be miners and 
settlers from Queensland had already proceeded by ship or overland in 
1874. Certainly, Table 5.10, which shows the available details of all ships 
arriving in Cooktown for the months of March (two weeks only) and October 
1874, suggests that probably around 70 per cent of the arrivals were from 
elsewhere in Queensland, with the New South Wales share almost certainly 
less than 30 per cent. 
Table 5.10 - Ships Arriving in Cooktown from 
Australian Ports in March and October 1874 
Date 
20/3/74 
22/3/74 
26/3/74 
27/3/74 
28/3/74 
30/3/74 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
u 
5/10/74 
10/10/74 
25/10/74 
26/10/74 
29/10/74 
30/10/74 
Totals 
Percentages 
Vessel 
Tararua 
Isabelle 
Victoria 
Boomerang 
Princess Louise 
Marquis of Lome 
Emma Jane 
Morning Light 
Kishon 
African Maid 
Wonga Wonga 
Western 
Atjeh 
Florence Irving 
Leichhardt 
Wonga Wonga 
Alexandria 
Florence Irving 
SydiliBy 
passengers 
-
74 
-
37 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
47 
-
158 
12.6 
passengers 
30 
37 
-
161 
-
20 
50 
20 
130 
85 
-
-
93 
108 
-
-
-
41 
775 
61.9 
embarkation * 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
60 
24 
-
-
133 
101 
-
-
318 
25.5 
See over I 
22 The figure of 4008 derived from the inwards shipping lists of The Cooktown Courier 
and Cooktown Herald for 1875. The figure of 2610 derived from the 'immigration to 
Cooktown' return as pubhshed in QVP, 2, 1876, p. 451. 
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Note: 
Sources: 
This heading for ships which departed from Sydney but called at 
intermediate ports in Queenslaind. 
The Cooktown Courier and Cooktown Herald, 25 March 1874 to 1 April 1874 
and 10 October to 31 October 1874. 
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, based on the calculations 
shown at Table 5.11 below, that close to 60 per cent of the individuals 
arriving in Cooktown from eastern Australia between November 1873 and 
December 1876 (the peak yccu-s of influx) were from elsewhere in 
Queensland, with the majority of the remainder from Sydney or northern 
New South Wales. As will be discussed shortly, the 1874 and 1875 figures 
included a number of Chinese. 
Table 5.11 - The Embarkation Point of Arrivals in Cooktown 1873-1876 
(from ports on the ejistern Australian seaboard) 
Year 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
Total 
El$ewb«rem 
Qtkeenslaitd 
400(100%) 
4650 (75%) 
1398 (35%) 
1647 (50%) 
8095 (58%) 
NSW 
. 
1550 (25%) 
2610(65%) 
1647 (50%) 
5807 (42%) 
Total 
400 
6200 
4008 
3294 
13902 
Notes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Notes 1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
Figure of 400 is an estimate by the author. 
Figure of 6200 is an estimate by the author, used previously at Table 4.2, 
derived by extrapolation from official returns on the population of the goldfields. 
The break-up of 75%-25% derived from Table 5.10 and the discussion in its following 
paragraph. 
The figure of 4008 taken from newspaper records EIS discussed previously (see 
footnote 22). The break-up of 65%-35% based on official immigration records 
(see footnote 22 also). 
The figure of 3294 derived from official immigration records (see QVP, 2,1877, 
pp. 970-1) plus an estimate by the author of 2000 individuals arriving from elsewhere 
in Queensland. The break-up of 50%-50% estimated by the author, based on the trend 
over the previous yetirs. 
The percentage figures shown against the sub-totals closely proximate the Queensland 
and 'other AustraUans' composition figures at Figure 5.3 (to foUow). 
The proportion of Queenslanders versus New South Welshmen, or 
Europeans versus Chinese, who stayed in Cooktown from the 13,902 
arrivals at Table 5.11 cannot be ascertained. From anecdotal accounts, it 
would seem that most of the early storekeepers, publicans and artisans in 
Cooktown came from Brisbane, Maryborough, Rockhampton, Townsville or 
Cardwell.23 There are also a number of mentions in the Cooktown 
23 The Brisbane Courier, it will be recalled from Chapter 2, noted that a contingent 
departing on the SS Lord Ashley on 16 January 1874 included 'several storekeepers 
... who have migrated with their effects': The Brisbane Courier, 17 January 1874, 
p. 4. 
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newspapers of newly-arrived merchants from Ravenswood, Charters Towers 
and Millchester, There are also several reports which suggest that a 
number of the early Chinese merchants in the town were from Sydney. The 
Cooktown Courier, for example, noted in mid June 1874 that 
... a fresh batch [of Chinese from southern ports] 
arrived here on Monday last. [FJrom Sydney, heavy 
shipments of goods are weekly arriving for them direct.24 
Putting aside the Chinese for a moment, it is also somewhat 
unclear what proportion of the CEirly European population in Cooktown was 
Queensland or Australian-bom against those born overseas. The 1876 
census, as illustrated at Figure 5.3, shows that Australian-bom settlers in 
the combined settlements of Cooktown, Laura and Normanby River 
constituted 31.6 per cent of the non-Chinese population, while those born in 
the British Isles constituted 53.9 per cent. It is presinned that the 
population structure was broadly similar in 1874 and 1875, and that 
Cooktown itself was broadly representative of the wider subdivision.^^ 
Figure 5.3 - The Composition of the Non-Chinese Population 
in the Cooktown Subdivision in 1876 
Others 6.1% 
_ Queensland 17.7% 
other Europeans 8 4% 
Scotland 6.8% 
other Australians 
13,9% 
Ireland 22.3% 
England & Wales 
24.8% 
Source: 1876 census statistics QVP, 2, 1877, p. 505. 
24 The Cooktown Courier, 13 June 1874, p. 3. 
25 The percentage for Queensland-born in 1874 would probably have been higher, 
reflecting the early dominance of arrivals from elsewhere in Queensland as shown 
a tTable5 . l l , (seep. 216). 
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Queensland-wide in 1876, the percentages for AustraUan-bom 
against those bom in the British Isles (33.4 and 43.2 per cent respectively) 
were very similar to those in the Cooktown subdivision.^^ The percentage of 
Queensland-bom in the Cooktown subdivision was much lower, however, 
reflecting the higher proportion of those from the southern states 
(Queensland-bom in Queensland 36.0 per cent; in Cooktown subdivision 
17.7 per cent). Similarly, the Cooktown subdivision had a slightly higher 
proportion of those bom in Ireland than across the state (Ireland-bom in 
Queensland 15.3 per cent, in Cooktown subdivision 22.3 per cent), reflecting 
presmnably the attraction of'striking it rich' to a generally impoverished 
people. 
By 1881, the proportion of Australian-bom in the Cooktown 
subdivision had risen to 40 per cent (up 7 per cent from the 1876 census), 
with Queensland-bom residents exceeding 'other Australians' by a ratio of 
three to one.27 Presumably by 1881, with the lure of the goldfields having 
faded, many of the earlier hopefuls from New South Wales retiu-ned to their 
place of origin. The proportion of those bom in the British Isles had 
similarly declined from 53.9 to 40.2 per cent. What remains unclear, 
against the background of falling gold production and a waning of business 
generally, is why the proportion of Queensland-bom residents increased, 
both in percentage terms as a proportion of the population and in real terms 
from 396 persons in 1876 to 811 at the 1881 census.28 
The Influx of Chinese 
Hector Holthouse, in River of gold, erroneously suggests that the 
mass migration of Chinese to Far North Queensland from Canton and Hong 
Kong began with the arrival of the Victoria on 30 January 1875.29 Actually, 
26 Derived from 1876 census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 505. 
27 Figures derived from 1881 census statistics as published in QVP, 2, 1882, p. 975. 
28 One explanation is that a number of families in Queensland may initially have been 
deterred from venturing to the Far North by the reports of frontier hardships, in the 
form of attacks by Aborigines and the general standard of health and facilities in 
Cooktown, as well as the pervading presence of the Chinese. By the mid to late 
1870s, a number of such families might have decided to try their luck at Cooktown, 
on the perceived basis of improved living conditions and notwithstanding the 
prevailing view that 'the bubble had burst'. 
2^ Holthouse, River of gold, p. 86. In reality, the Victoria arrived from Sydney, via 
Brisbane and Townsville: see CHPRA, 3 February 1875, p. 2. 
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the first ships to bring Chinese from the East were the SS Adria and SS 
Singapore, arriving at Cooktown with a total of 754 Chinese passengers on 
20 March 1875.^0 As mentioned previously, however, Chinese had been 
arriving in Cooktown since the early months of 1874 on ships plying along 
the eastern seaboard of Australia. 
The SS Boomerang, for example, arrived in Cooktown on 7 July 
1874 with 112 Chinese passengers from Brisbane and intermediate ports, 
leading a local newspaper to note that 
... the Boomerang brought a considerable addition 
to the Chinese population.^^ 
Indeed, by the end of 1874, there were an estimated 1500 Chinese at the 
Palmer River goldfields, most of whom would have reached there via 
Cooktown.32 How many had established themselves as traders or marketr 
gardeners in Cooktown by that time is not clear, although the Cooktown 
register sample shows six merchants, one doctor and two artisans present in 
1874, suggesting that their numbers were probably at least aroimd the 
twenty to thirty mark.^^ 
Where exactly in Australia the first 1500 or so Chinese came from 
is not clear, nor is there any indication of how long they had been in 
Australia or what they had been doing in the interim. Given, however, that 
there were at least 28,000 Chinese in Australia in the early 1870s, including 
over 3000 in Queensland, it would be surprising if several thousand had not 
headed for the Palmer at their first opportunity.^'* 
Over the following five years, a total of 20,832 Chinese (all males 
except for thirty) arrived by sea at Cooktown from Canton or Hong Kong.^^ 
Several thousand more, unrecorded in Cooktown immigration records. 
^ The Cooktown Courier, 27 March 1875, p. 2. 
31 CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 3. 
32 See 'population of the goldfields' return as at 31 December 1874, as published in 
QVP, 1, 1876 (statistics of the Colony for 1874), p. 8. 
33 The Chinese physician, Kong Chung, arrived in mid April 1874 from Millchester: 
see CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 3. 
34 In 1871, there were 3305 Chinese in Queensland 7220 in New South Wales and 
17,795 in Victoria: see C.Y. Choi, Chinese migration and settlement in Australia, 
Sydney University Press, 1975, p. 22. 
35 See successive 'immigration to Cooktown' returns as published in QVP, 1875-80. 
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probably arrived by sea from elsewhere in Queensland or New South Wales. 
Most of the arriving Chinese were destined for the Palmer River goldfields 
and usually spent only a day or so at a camping groimd on the outskirts of 
Cooktown, being 'kitted out' with the necessary basics for alluvial mining 
and a load of supplies to be carried to the Palmer.36 
The number of Chinese who became residents of Cooktown over 
the years between 1875 and 1885 is difficult to verify. As discussed 
previously in Chapter 4 under the heading 'The Fringe Dwellers', it was 
claimed at times that the Chinese constituted half the population of 
Cooktown and that by early 1877 there were some 3000 Chinese in the 
town.37 Those numbers seem exaggerated, not least because it is difficult to 
imagine that gainful employment could have been available in Cooktown for 
that number of people, even in support of a goldfields population of around 
15,000. 
Certainly, the highest number of Chinese identified in the 
Cooktown register sample was forty-two in 1878, with the highest number 
of individual merchants being thirty-five in the same year. Even if the 
nmnber of merchants had been seventy, which seems unlikely, the 
associated workforce would probably not have exceeded 300.^^ Added to 
that could have been a domestic staff of say three servants each for the 
wealthier hgdf of the merchants, making another 105. On the outskirts of 
the town, Chinese market gardeners and their employees might have 
totalled 300 individuals, while another fifty might have been working as 
fishermen.39 Another 100 might have been employed as water carriers, with 
the same number as firewood vendors. It is also possible that around 300 
Chinese could have been employed as carriers and packers, although much 
3^ For an excellent account of Chinese immigration to Far North Queensland during 
this period see K Cronin, 'The Chinese community in Queensland, 1874-1900', 
Queensland Heritage, 8, 1978, pp. 3-13. 
37 See The Cooktown Courier, 21 October 1876, p. 2 and 10 February 1877, p. 2. 
3^ Calculated on the basis that each merchant, on average, would have been unlikely 
to have employed more than four other Chinese. Even at the peak of the Chinese 
presence, there were only seventy to eighty Chinese eligible to vote in council 
elections, that is, rate-paying residents: see The Cooktown Courier, 30 January 
1878, p. 3. 
3^ The sub-collector of customs seized all the Chinese fishing nets in 'Chinatown' and 
at Patrick's Point on 3 January 1878 in order to measure their mesh size: see The 
Cooktown Courier, 5 January 1878, p. 3. Although numbers were not mentioned 
specifically, the impression given is that only twenty or thirty individuals were 
involved. 
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of their time would have been divided between Cooktown and the Palmer.^o 
And at any one time, it is possible that an additional 200-300 Chinese could 
have been in the town, either awaiting a ship back to China or preparing to 
move to the Palmer. On that basis, it seems unUkely that the Chinese 
population of Cooktown would have exceeded 1500 even in the peak years of 
1875 to 1878. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning briefly several issues in relation to 
the ethnic background of the Chinese in Cooktown. Kathrjni Cronin, in her 
excellent account of the Chinese in Far North Queensland in the late 
nineteenth century, discusses in some detail the place of origin of most of 
the Chinese in Cooktown as being Kwangtung (now Guangdong) province in 
southern China.^^ She differentiates, for example, between those of the 
League of three yik and the League offouryik (or the Sam Yap and Sze Yap 
associations), while noting that the principal Chinese merchants belonged to 
the former.42 Importantly, though, she also makes the point that the 
wealthy capitalists and financiers of the Sam Yap organisation 
... affected a private contempt in their hatred of 
the rival League of four yik which would have been 
presumptuous if it had not been fiilly reciprocated.^ 
The point is that there were considerable rivalries within the 
Chinese community in Cooktovni, both between the urban and provincial 
factions of those from Kwangtung, and between those from Kwangtimg and 
the neighbouring province of Fukien. The Chinese community, therefore, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter, was rarely able or interested in 
presenting itself as a cohesive bloc in its dealings with the wider 
community. Sea Wah, for example, the longstanding owner of the 
Queensland Hotel, failed dismally in his attempt to gain election as an 
40 The claim in The Cooktown Courier, 24 September 1879, p. 2 of as many as 500 
Chinese employed as packers or carriers seems exaggerated, particularly given the 
several reports of Chinese merchants sub-contracting the carriage of goods to 
European dray-team operators. See, for example, W.H. Corfield, Reminiscences of 
Queensland 1862-1899, Frater, Brisbane, 1921, p. 53 talking of'an agreement with 
a Chinese storekeeper to carry for him for twelve months at the rate of £50 per ton'. 
41 See Cronin, 'The Chinese community, p. 4. This province, with Hong Kong and 
Canton (now Guangzhou) as its port outlets, has traditionally been a source of 
emigrant workers to Southeast Asia, Australia and the United States. 
42 She also notes, however, that 'no dialect group had a monopoly of any one 
occupation': Cronin, The Chinese community', p. 6. 
43 Cronin, The Chinese commimity', pp. 4-5. 
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alderman in 1878 primarily because he was unable to galvanise the support 
of eUgible Chinese voters.44 
The second issue is that local newspapers, as they became 
increasingly strident in their criticism of Chinese immigration from about 
1876 onwards, frequently portrayed the Chinese as low-class degenerates, 
riddled with diseases and intent only on plimdering the wealth of 
Queensland. The Cooktown Courier, for example, asserted that many of the 
immigrants 'in their own country would rank as slaves',45 while The 
Cooktown Herald propagated the rumour that 
... a large proportion of the arrivals here are 
recruited from the criminal class and that, in 
fact, the Chinese government is making 
Queensland a place of banishment for its 
convicts. 46 
There is, needless to say, no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 
the Chinese arriving at Cooktown were from the criminal classes. Indeed, 
the overwhelming evidence is that most were agricultural labourers 
(peasants) from provincial agrarian villages, with a lesser number of semi-
skilled, more urbanised workers from Canton and its surrounding 
districts.47 There is also no evidence to suggest that the Chinese 
Government was in any way involved in the passage of its citizens to 
Australia. Indeed, the official policy of the Ching Djmasty towards 
emigration had long been one of prohibition. It was only in 1860, under 
pressure from Western demands for Chinese labour to assist in the 
development of the colonies, that the Peking Convention made it legal for 
the recruitment of labourers in treaty ports.48 
It also seems probable that very few of the Chinese who flooded 
into Far North Queensland between 1875 and 1877 were 'slaves' as such, 
although a number of the domestic servants of wealthier merchants, for 
example, could well have been. The majority, however, were certainly 
44 An earlier editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 30 January 1878, p. 3 decried the 
possibility that 'Chinese voters ... will most likely exercise a marked influence on 
the result'. 
45 The Cooktown Courier, 15 March 1876, p. 2. 
4i CHPRA, 16 May 1877, p. 2. 
47 See, for example, Cronin, "The Chinese community', pp. 4 and 8. 
^ See Choi, Chinese migration, pp. 14-5. 
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indentured labourers, whose passage to Cooktown had been paid by a 
Chinese finsmcier or merchant, either in Canton, Hong Kong or Cooktown.49 
The confusion between slaves and indentured labourers, at least in the 
minds of the white community in Cooktown, may have arisen over the fact 
that under Chinese law 
[s]laves and all other menials form a distinct 
class ... with only this difference between them, 
that the former are involuntary and permanent 
members of it, while the latter are voluntary and 
temporary. Both are Tsien, mean or servile, as 
opposed to Liang, the respectable and free citizen.^o 
Age, Sex and Marital Status of the Community 
As indicated earlier at Table 5.7 (see page 209), data on 'age' was 
amongst the least available information within the Cooktown sample 
register, a situation exacerbated by the imder-representation of women and 
children. Fortunately, very good data on age distribution is available in the 
1876 and 1881 census returns, notwithstanding that the Cooktown 
subdivision included the relatively small settlements of Laura and 
Normanby River — which were probably closer in their age/sex structure to 
the Palmer River than Cooktown.^i 
Accepting, though, the subdivision statistics as reasonably 
representative of Cooktown itself, Figure 5.4 (on next page), shows — not 
unexpectedly for a 'frontier' community — that Cooktown and its environs 
had a markedly higher proportion of adults in the 25-44 age bracket than 
the Queensland average, and a markedly lower proportion of children. 
49 See the discussion in Cronin, 'The Chinese community', pp. 7-8, including mention 
that 'most of the contracting ... for the Queensland goldfields seemed to be in the 
hands of a 'coalition' firm in Cooktown, called Hopkee'. 
^" See G. Jamieson, Chinese family and commercial law, Vetch and Lee, Hong Kong, 
1970, p. 139. 
"^ At the 1876 census, the combined population of Laura and Normanby River was 151 
persons: see QVP, 2, 1877, p. 456. 
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Figure 5.4 - Comparative Age Distributions -
Cooktown subdivision and Queensland in 1876 
(excluding adults 65 years and over) 
40 T 
30 - • 
% 20 - -
10 - • 
' I Cooktown 
• Queensland 
Source: Census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 353. 
By 1881, as can be seen at Figure 5.5 (on next page), the Cooktown 
subdivision was still at5T)ical of Queensland. The proportion of the 
population in the 25-44 age bracket had, however, declined from 50.9 to 41.6 
per cent (against the Queensland average of 36.1 per cent), while the 
proportion of children imder fifteen conversely had increased from 17.1 to 
26.0 per cent (against the Queensland average of 39.4 per cent). 
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Figure 5.5 - The Changing Age Distribution in 
Cooktown subdivision 1876-1881 
(showing also the Queensland-wide distribution in 1881) 
40 T 
30 • -
% 20 • -
10 • • 
~ ' ^ ^ Cooktown 1876 
-O Cooktown 1881 
Queensland 1881 
Sources: Census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 353 and QVP, 2, 1882, pp. 913 and 1132-3. 
What Figm-es 5.4 and 5.5 do not show, of course, is the substantial 
gender imbalance in the Cooktown subdivision, particularly in the early 
years of settlement. Anecdotal accounts suggest that the population of 
Cooktown in its first year or so was almost exclusively male, with the only 
females being a handful of wives, the occasional storekeeper or publican, 
and a smattering of barmaids and prostitutes.^^ Even at the census of 1876, 
by which time Cooktown and its adjoining settlements had been underway 
for over two years, the proportion of males to females in the subdivision was 
in the ratio 76:24, compared to the Queensland average of 60:40.^^ 
Moreover, in the 20-45 age bracket, as can be seen at Table 5.12 
(on next page), the ratio was more often greater than 80:20. 
52 
m 
As mentioned previously, Holthouse's assertion that Cooktown had 'ninety-four 
licensed hotels, with as many brothels' is unfounded: Holthouse, River of gold, 
p. 141. 
Calculated from the census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 353. As at late May 1875, 
the only Chinese female in Cooktown was the recently-arrived wife of the merchant 
Wing On, who had himself arrived earlier from Millchester: The Cooktown Courier, 
22 May 1875, p. 2. 
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Table 5.12 - The Ratio of Males to Females 
in the Cooktown subdivision in 1876 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
<%Qfmalefi) 
73.3 
79.1 
83.8 
89.8 
84.6 
(^ oi males) 
63.1 
65.3 
71.8 
70.0 
71.3 
Source: Census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 353. 
By the census of 1881, the Cooktown subdivision ratio had fallen to £u-oxuid 
67:33, an improvement of some nine percentage points since 1876 but still 
almost 10 per cent higher than the Queensland average.54 
A nmnber of adult males in Far North Queensland at that time 
were, of course, married men who had left their wives and families in the 
south (or in China), while they tried their luck at the Palmer. Others would 
have proceeded alone on the basis of bringing their families to Cooktown 
once they themselves were established. In 1876, for example, as shown at 
Table 5.13, married men imaccompanied by their families constituted 28 per 
cent of all European males in the Cook district (which encompassed the 
Palmer and Hodgkinson goldfields, as well as the Cooktown subdivision).^^ 
By 1881, the figure had fallen to 23 per cent. 
Table 5.13 - Marital Status of European Males 
in the Cook District 1876-1881 
(by percentage of total male population) 
Never married 
Married accompanied 
Married unaccompanied 
Total married 
Married Queensland-wide 
1876 
60.8 
11.2 
28.0 
39.2 
27.1 
1881 
63.6 
13.4 
23.0 
36.4 
24.0 
Sources: Census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, pp. 353 and 437 and QVP, 2,1882, pp. 913 and 974. 
54 
55 
Calculations derived from census statistics in QVP, 2, 1882, pp. 913 and 1132-3. 
Such statistics were not compiled for the Chinese population of the district. 
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The sociological impUcations for Cooktown of having such an 
at5T)ical community in terms of age structure, gender and marital status 
would have been considerable. The preponderance of single or 
unaccompanied male adults, as discussed earher in Chapter 4, meant that 
the focus of Cooktown's early business community was on meeting the 
service needs of a large number of often temporarily-accommodated 
residents and transients en route to the Palmer. Much of the town's early 
business structure, therefore, came to be based around an extravagsmt 
jumble of small stores, dining rooms, hotels, stables, billiard saloons and 
boarding houses, few of which had any prospect of surviving once the flow of 
Europeans to the Palmer petered out. 
The male-dominated society of the early town was undoubtedly 
also more boisterous and less law-abiding than its southern counterparts. 
In the absence of a sizeable body of children, there would have been less 
community interest in education and health, and facilities for the 
entertainment of families. The scarcity of women, in a familial context, 
would have abetted the transience of the population and stymied the 
development of a sense of neighbourhood and community spirit. Although 
the number of mixed marriages cannot readily be ascertained, it does seem 
that community social values became sufficiently ambivalent that a small 
number of European women (some albeit of doubtful repute) married 
Chinese men.^^ 
Occupations within the Community 
The final element to be discussed under community structure is 
the occupations of those resident between 1873 and 1885. As shown at 
Table 5.7 (at p. 209), data on occupation was available for almost half the 
individuals listed in the Cooktown sample register which, together with the 
census statistics of 1876 and 1881, has enabled some useful analysis of the 
workforce, in particular. The main dilemma, from an anal3i:ical perspective. 
^^ Ah Chgm, for example, took out a prohibition order on publicans against the supply 
of alcohol to his wife, Mary Ann: see The Cooktown Courier, 24 July 1875, p. 2. The 
Cooktown Courier, 16 January 1878, p. 2 similarly noted that 'Sarah Jane Lawson, 
a female of exceedingly bad character, preferred a change of assault against Ah Foo, 
the Chinaman with whom she lives ... [but the charge was] not proceeded with as 
she was dnmk and unruly'. The impression from anecdotal accounts is that the 
number of European women married to or living with Chinese men at any one time 
was probably around ten. 
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has been in grouping the various occupations so that they not only reflected 
contemporary values, but also facilitated some meaningful comparisons 
with occupational data in the 1876 and 1881 census statistics. 
The eventual approach taken, shown at Figure 5.6, was firstly to 
separate completely the groupings for Europeans and Chinese, on the basis 
that they were two quite separate workforces and business communities. 
The various occupations were then grouped, as shown previously at Table 
5.5 (at p. 207), into eight categories (broadly corresponding to those used in 
the 1876 and 1881 census returns) which could in turn be considered as 
three separate streams, namely manual, white-collar and mercantile. 
Figure 5.6 - Occupational Groupings used 
in the Cooktown Sample Register 
2. Unskilled 
manual 
3. Semi-skilled 
manual 
4. Artisan 
1. Unemployed 
5. Basic white collar 
6. Managerial 
white collar 
7. Professitmal 
white collar 
8. Self-employed 
mercantile 
Note: Separate structures were used for the European and Chinese communities. 
The perceived advantage of this approach is that while a vertical 
hierarchy of occupations can be seen to exist within the streams, the 
horizontsd hierarchy between streams is purposely less clear. The issue, 
does not arise, therefore, as to whether a well-established artisan is of a 
higher occupational status than a merchant employing three people, or a 
newly-arrived accountant. Indeed, it is only in terms of an analysis of 
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occupational mobility (which was attempted in the sample register) that the 
need then arises to consider whether a move from one stresun to zmother 
would have been seen at the time as a forward or backward step. 
From the sample register, as shown at Figure 5.7, it can be seen 
that (for the European community) the largest proportion of the workforce 
was in the self-employed mercantile category (storekeepers, grocers, 
publicans, carriers, auctioneers etc), followed at a distant second by artisans 
(blacksmiths, bakers, saddlers, carpenters, tentmakers, bootmakers etc), 
with unskilled manual workers almost non-existent.57 
Figure 5.7 - Occupational Structiu'e of the Exu-opean Workforce 
in Cooktown 1873-1885 
(by percentage of the workforce, not population) 
Professional 6% unskilled manual 1 % 
Managerial white collar 6% 
Basic white collar 7% 
Semi-skilled manual 
7% .... ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Mercantile 56% 
Artisans 17% 
Source: Calculations derived from Cooktown sample register. 
In the years between 1874 and 1877, however, as can be seen at 
Table 5.14 (on next page), the proportion of self-employed merchants and 
the like was even higher, constituting close to two-thirds of the workforce in 
the town. 
^^ Almost every able-bodied unskilled worker was, of course, at the goldfields in the 
early years of Cooktown, which created an acute labour shortage in the town. A 
number of editorials in The Cooktown Herald in late 1875, for example, called upon 
the Government to ensure that a share of the incoming immigrants to Queensland 
were apportioned to Cooktown, especially female domestic servants: see CHPRA, 
25 September 1875, p. 2 and 6 November 1875, p. 2. 
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Table 5.14 - Occupational Structure of the Em-opean Workforce 
in Cooktown 1874-1877 
(by percentage of the workforce, not population) 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
ManvusA 
4.3 
6.7 
3.6 
5.5 
Artisati 
14.5 
19.4 
14.1 
17.2 
coBstr 
6.9 
5.4 
6.1 
4.7 
whi te <»>llar 
3.7 
4.1 
6.4 
6.6 
Brofessloxtal 
5.9 
5.4 
6.7 
6.6 
Wbtc^niSe 
64.7 
59.0 
63.1 
59.4 
Note: Figures for unskilled manual workers not included as their numbers were consistently 
less than one per cent. 
Source: Cedculations derived from Cooktown sample register. 
Obviously, it is accepted that the Cooktown register sample may 
be biased towards the town's merchants, because of their greater public 
exposure and hence more frequent recording in newspapers and petitions, 
for example. Table 5.15, however, shows that the calculations fi-om the 
register sample are broadly supported by the 1876 and 1881 census 
statistics for the Cooktown subdivision. The other interesting trend fi-om 
Table 5.15 is that as the proportion of merchants in the Cooktown 
subdivision declined over the period, the workforce elsewhere in Queensland 
was shifting quite rapidly fi'om a preponderance of skilled and semi-skilled 
manual workers to a more even balance with those engaged in commerce 
and transport. 
Table 5.15 - Comparative Structure of the Cooktown and Queensland workforces 
in 1876 and 1881 
(by percentage of the workforce, not population) 
197? 
Cooktown register sample 
Cooktown subdivision 
Queensland 
1881 
Cooktown register sample 
Cooktown subdivision 
Queensland 
Senti-slcLDedi \ 
ViaA speiisane 
17.7 
24.1 
55.8 
26.4 
27.7 
40.3 
Whifcf collar 
12.5 
15.1 
14.6 
13.6 
15.9 
15.5 
Frof<9H$iQnal 
6.8 
4.0 
3.5 
5.4 
4.0 
6.9 
M^rcBfiiil^ 
63.0 
56.8 
26.1 
54.6 
52.4 
37.3 
Note: Figures for unskilled manual workers for Cooktown subdivision and Queensland 
purposely excluded for comparative purposes. 
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Sources: Calculations for Cooktown subdivision and Queensland derived from census statistics 
as published in QVP, 2,1877, pp. 353 and 421, and QVP, 2, 1882, pp. 913 and 975. 
Anecdotal evidence similarly supports the contention that the 
European workforce of Cooktown comprised £m overabundance of self-
employed and small-scale merchants and other service providers.^^ Yet the 
town had no industries, such as metal fabrication, coach or wagon building, 
or shipbuilding.^^ It also had no processing plants, such as sawmiUing or 
tanneries, or in support of the various fisheries industries operating in 
northern waters.^ There was also no concerted effort made to develop 
Cooktown as the nodal point, in terms of tertiary services, for either Far 
North Queensland or adjacent areas of Papua New Guinea or further afield 
in the Southwest Pacific.^! In essence, Cooktown in the 1870s was largely a 
collection of shops. 
Overlaying (or underl5rtng) the European business community, 
especially in the years 1875 to 1878, was that of the Chinese.^2 According to 
the Cooktown sample register, the majority of Chinese were either 
storekeepers or market-gardeners. Indeed, the only exceptions in the 
register were two Chinese publicans, two physicians and a small number of 
carriers, artisans, fishermen, laundrjmaen and cooks.^ -^  Moreover, Figure 
5.8 (on next page), shows that in the peak years 1877-78 the Chinese 
59 
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^^ See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 7 November 1874, p. 2 noting that 
'already there are more stores than the business of the town warrants'. 
The failure of Cooktown to diversify from its narrow role of a service centre for the 
Palmer is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 'Small Town in a Large Colony". 
Note, however, that the Chinese in Cooktown constructed at least two junks for 
employment by them in the Torres Strait fisheries: see The Cooktown Courier, 
2 March 1878, p. 3. 
Cooktown was the home port, though, for some thirteen boats and 450 men 
employed in the beche-de-mer industry in the late 1870s: see G.C. Bolton, 
A thousand miles away: a history of Queensland to 1920, Jacaranda Press, 
Brisbane, 1963, p. 76. 
^1 Bums Philp, for example, chose Thursday Island rather than Cooktown as its base 
in the late 1870s for the extension of its interest into the pearlshelling industry of 
Torres Strait and trade to the New Guinea coast and into the South Pacific: see 
K Buckley and K. Klugman, The history of Burns Philp, Bums Philp, Sydney, 1981, 
p. 52. 
^2 It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that the twelve or so major Chinese traders may 
well each have had an annual turnover of around £12,000 in the peak years 1876-
78: see footnote 64 to Chapter 4 on page 233. 
The discussion earlier in this chapter suggested that the Chinese workforce 
comprised 5% merchants, 20% mercantile assistants, 70% domestic servants, 20% 
market-gardeners, 3% fishermen, 7% water-carriers, 7% firewood-vendors and 16% 
carriers/packers. 
63 
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constituted around 20 per cent of those directly engaged in mercantile 
occupations in the town. In reality, given the under-representation of 
Chinese in the sample, the proportions in the years 1874-79 were probably 
at least five to ten percentage points higher. Significantly also. Figure 5.8 
shows that by about 1884 the Chinese business community had largely quit 
the town. 
Figure 5.8 - The Proportion of Chinese in Mercantile 
Occupations in Cooktown 1873-1885 
1875 1876 
Source: Calculations derived from the Cooktown sample register. 
As for the other elements already discussed, the at3T)ical 
composition of Cooktown's early workforce would also have impacted on 
community development, including probably the engendering of somewhat 
ambivalent views as to the subordination of civic interests to commercial 
imperatives. Rather than prolonging that discussion at this point, it would 
seem more useful now to examine cormnunity lifestyle in the formative 
years of Cooktown, against the background of community structure as 
discussed to date. 
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Health and Mortality 
Life in Cooktown in the 1870s was certainly not for the faint-
hearted or those of feeble constitution. A number of residents died from 
sunstroke,^'* At least six women and children drowned, while another 
woman was taken by a crocodile after a boating mishap.^^ A young boy died 
within three minutes of being stung by jelly fish as he swam within metres 
of the main wharf.^^ Two-metre brown snakes, 'as thick as a man's arm', 
were often found in backyards and outbuildings,^'' while rats fi-equently 
reached almost plague proportions with reports of them 
... infesting houses and eating food off the dining 
room table while the family were clearing away 
the plates.^8 
In addition to such 'natural' hardships, the people of the town 
suffered badly fi-om attacks of dysentery and malaria, periodic epidemics of 
measles, isolated cases of tj^jhus and leprosy, and the threat of smallpox 
being introduced via Chinese immigrants.^^ In the month of April 1874 
alone, twelve people were also committed to the lunatic asylum at 
Rockhampton, 'due mainly to intemperance'.''^ Table 5.16 (on next page), 
summarising cases treated at the Cooktown hospital during October 1875, 
^^ Editorials in the local newspapers routinely exhorted men working in the sun to 
wear a hat: see, for example, The Cooktown Courier, 19 January 1876, p. 2. It was 
noticeable, though, that many residents - and particularly new comers - persisted in 
wearing clothes more suited to an English autumn. 
^^ See CHPRA, 19 August 1874, p. 4 and The Cooktown Courier, 31 October 1874, p. 2 
and 12 November 1879, p. 2. There were numerous sightings over the years of a 5-6 
metre crocodile resident near the river mouth: see, for example, The Cooktown 
Courier, 27 September 1876, p. 2. Large sharks were also often caught near the 
main wharf: see, for example, CHPRA, 9 January 1875, p. 2 reporting the catching 
of a five-metre shark. 
See The Cooktown Courier, 8 January 1879, p. 3. 
See, for example, CHPRA, 25 August 1875, p. 2 reporting the killing of a two-metre 
brown snake behind the Customs building. Carpet snakes, frequently in excess of 
230 cm, were also common: see, for example, CHPRA, 10 October 1874, p. 2. 
The Cooktown Courier, 5 July 1876, p. 3. More exaggerated reports, typically 
written by the correspondent to The Townsville Times, claimed that 'rats run up 
and down the streets and have ... taken complete possession of the town': see The 
Cooktown Courier, 22 January 1876, p. 3. 
The first suspected case of smallpox occurred on the SS Mecca, which arrived at 
Cooktown in late December 1876. The captain voluntarily agreed to quarantine the 
ship and its passengers on the north shore of the Endeavour River for twenty-seven 
days: see The Cooktown Courier, 10 January 1877, p. 3. 
•^0 CHPRA, 6 May 1874, p. 3. See also the report that 'Hannah Beseley died ... from 
excessive drinking": The Cooktown Courier, 6 February 1875, p. 3. 
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shows the prevalence of fever-related illnesses (and, by today's standards, 
some rather strange medical diagnoses). 
Table 5.16 - Summary of Cases Treated at 
Cooktown Hospital in October 1875 
17 intermittent fever 
6 dysentery 
3 poverty of blood 
2 indigestion 
2 typhus fever 
1 famine fever 
i rheumatic fever 
1 constipation 
1 inflammation of the brain 
1 congestion of the lungs 
1 heat disease 
1 bronchitis 
Source: CHPRA, 3 November 1875, p. 2. 
The prevalence of fever and the general ill-health of the 
community, particularly during the wet season, gave credibility to the 
popular viewpoint that the tropical areas of northern Australia were 
unsuited to European habitation.''^ Certainly, it was widely accepted that 
... even if he could drag out an existence for a 
score of years ...[the white settler] could not 
work and more especially, could by no means 
perform manual labour. ^ 2 
Conventional wisdom, couched loosely around Darwin's theory of 
the adaptability of species to an environment, also held that the effects on 
Europeans of the tropical climate would be irreversible by the third 
generation.73 In the interim, according to the contemporary view, the white 
settler 
... could not multiply there unless he fathered 
a coloured brood; and that if he did produce 
^1 These views held sway, even in medical circles, until the early twentieth century: 
see, for example, the discussion in P. Courtenay, The white man and the Australian 
tropics: a review of some opinions and prejudices of the pre-war years' in Lectures 
in North Queensland History, 2nd series, James Cook University of North 
Queensland, Townsville, 1975, p. 59. 
'^ 2 As quoted by R.W. Cilento, The white settlement of tropical Australia' in P.D. 
Phillips and G.L. Wood (eds.). The peopling of Australia, Dawsons, London, 1968, 
pp. 229-30. 
"^^ See the discussion in L.H. Harloe, 'White man in tropical Australia', BA (Hons) 
thesis, James Cook University, Townsville, 1987, pp. 15-6. 
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£my white children they would be sickly, fi'ail 
and sterile.^'^ 
In reality, of course, living in Cooktown in the 1870s was probably no more 
injurious to one's health than living at the time in Brisbane or Sydney (with 
the risk of malaria probably counter-balanced by the likelihood of 
contracting typhus or bubonic plague, for example, in the south).''^ 
In the chmate of contemporary opinion, however, it was widely 
considered essential for men, women and children to spend at least several 
weeks each year in the south, with 'a change of air to brace up their systems 
again'.^^ The local pohce inspector, for example, Thomas Clohesy, went 
south in February 1876 'to improve his shattered health', and was ordered 
by doctors to spend three months on leave in northern Victoria or Tasmania 
and on no account to return to northern Queensland.^^ It was also not 
uncommon for the local newspapers in Cooktown to report, almost on a 
weekly basis, another merchant 'selling up and going south in consequence 
ofbadhealth'.78 
Interestingly, though, both Cooktown newspapers, fi-om about 
November 1875 onwards, railed constantly against any suggestion that the 
town was an inherently unhealthy place to live. In part, they were simply 
countering the 'propaganda' fi-om their rivals in TownsviUe, who delighted 
in publishing rumours that 'two-thirds [of the population of Cooktown] are 
sick with ... fever'.''9 Largely, however, it was because both newspapers had 
come to the view — presumably through their exposure to lessons fi-om 
overseas — that the problem more correctly related to the 'want of pure 
^4 Cilento, The white settlement', p. 230. 
^^ Brisbane had periodic outbreaks of typhoid fever in the 1870s and 1880s: see 
M. Cannon, Australia in the Victorian age: life in the cities. Penguin, Ringwood, 
1988, pp. 155-6 and the photograph opposite p. 154 showing 'some of the thousands 
of rats killed in Sydney slums after outbreak of bubonic plague'. It should also be 
remembered that many of the 'natural' hardships in Cooktown, such as crocodiles, 
snakes and stingers, are sm integral part of living anywhere in North Queensland, 
even today. 
^^ See the editorial in CHPRA, 22 December 1875, p. 4 noting the departure for the 
south by the SS Leichhardt of 'a great many ... who were judging by their looks in 
great want [of recuperation]'. 
^^ See CHPRA, 26 February 1876, p. 2. For those suffering from malaria, it may well 
have been that a further attack could have proved fatal. 
^^ See, for example, the reported departures in The Cooktown Courier, 26 June 1875, 
p. 3 and 22 December 1875, p. 2. 
'^^ See, for example, the response in The Cooktown Courier, 22 January 1876, p. 3. 
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water and the total absence of drainage' in the town.^ An editorial in The 
Cooktown Courier, for example, asserted that 
... to an unprejudiced mind it seems monstrous 
that, because a person is sick, the only chance 
for recovery is a journey south. We have many 
times before this ... endeavoured to impress 
upon [our readers that the solution lies in] . . . 
healthy sanitation ... and a never fgdling water 
supply.^i 
In the event, as was discussed in Chapter 4 under the heading 
Tublic Works', Cooktown's municipal council took steps in 1877 to eliminate 
the open sewer adjacent to the whsirf area. A town water supply, however, 
did not eventuate until the late 1880s. In the interim, the 'Rose Swimming 
and Shower Baths' offered enclosed bathing facihties in the Endeavour 
River 'free from alhgators, snakes and fish' at 3s 6d per week.^^ Chemists 
and druggists also offered a variety of quaint (and quacldsh) remedies, such 
as Elliott's Champagne Quinine Wine (for malaria, diarrhoea and 
rheumatism) and Rose's Phosphodyne (for a range of afflictions including 
fever, defective memory and impotency).^^ 
The undoubted improvement in the standard of health and 
sanitation in Cooktown in the first decade or so of settlement is difficult to 
quantify. Infant mortality rates were not compiled, while the raw statistics 
for births, deaths and marriages for the Cooktown subdivision provide little 
scope for meaningful analysis. The fact, for example, that the total number 
of deaths recorded in Cooktown between 1874 and 1876 was three times the 
number of births is unexceptional, given that miners and others from the 
Palmer River goldfields tjrpically comprised aroimd 90 per cent of patients 
admitted to the Cooktown hospital.^ The fact that the annual birth rate 
^^ See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 13 November 1875, p. 2. 
*1 The Cooktown Courier, 24 November 1875, p. 2. 
°* See the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 10 October 1874, p. 2. Cannon 
asserts that by the 1880s, colonial bathing habits had completely broken away from 
the English example, partly because of the hotter climate but also because of easy 
access to beaches and rivers: see Cannon, Life in the Cities, pp. 163-5. 
See the advertisements in CHPRA, 11 August 1875, p. 3 and 18 August 1875, p. 4. 
8"* Deaths totalled 436; births 140: see birth and death statistics in QVP, 1875-77. An 
editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 30 September 1876, p. 3 claimed that only 2 per 
cent of current hospital patients were fi'om the town, while the hospital annual 
report for 1876 stated that Cooktown residents comprised only twenty-seven of the 
327 admissions for the year: CHPRA, 17 January 1877, p. 2. 
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fi-om 1877 onwards was relatively low and that the total number of births 
closely proximated the annual number of deaths are similarly unexceptiongd 
and probably reflected both the dearth of young married females and an 
adult population of relatively young average age. 
Education in the Town 
The somewhat inauspicious start to the government-funded 
primary school, with a six-month delay in construction and vague 
accusations of the embezzlement of subscriptions, was discussed in some 
detail in Chapter 4 under the heading 'Government Buildings'. When the 
school opened in January 1875 with eighty students of both sexes, the 
principal noted that 'the attainments of the children are very low'.^s He also 
estimated that at least another 120 children of school age (between eight 
and thirteen years) were living within two miles of the school but had not 
been enrolled.^ 
Over the years to 1884, annual enrolments fluctuated fi-om a high 
of 324 in 1878 to a low of 212 in 1881.^^ Average daily attendances were 
uniformly high and often better than 90 per cent, which was an impressive 
record considering that the legislative requirement was only that children 
between the ages of six and twelve years had to attend sixty days each half 
year.^ The daily attendance average for boys was marginally better than 
that for girls, presumably reflecting the greater priority given by parents to 
the education of boys and the reality that girls were probably required 
occasionally to stay at home and care for younger children in the absence or 
illness of their mother.^^ 
°^ See CifPRA, 27 January 1875, p. 2. A number of the children, of course, would 
have had no formal schooling in 1874. 
®^ Judging from the school statistics of 214 children for the first term of 1874, it would 
seem that most of the 120 subsequently enrolled: see Queensland Department of 
Instruction, Annual Return for School No. 177 Cooktown State 1877, EDU/AB 177, 
QSA. 
if Figures derived from successive enrolment returns: see Queensland Department of 
Instruction, Annual Returns for School No. 177 Cooktown State 1877-84, 
EDU/AB 177, QSA. In 1885, a separate school was commenced for girls and infants. 
^ As discussed in The Cooktown Courier, 12 January 1876, p. 2. Somewhat 
inexplicably, the visiting school inspector in both April and October 1877 noted in 
his reports that 'attendance very irregular': see QVP, 1, 1877, p. 1116. 
^9 The average daily attendances for boys and girls across the years 1877-84 were 81.3 
and 77.8 per cent respectively: calculated from the Annual Returns 1877-1884, 
EDU/AB 177, QSA. 
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Almost all the children were Europeans, with no indication fi-om 
the available records that a single Aboriginal child was enrolled across the 
period. There were, however, seven Chinese boys enrolled in 1875 (at least), 
who the Principal described as 'among the very aptest and quickest' and 
whose progress had been 'extraordinarily rapid'.^o The subjects taught at 
the school included reading, writing, grammar and analysis, mental 
arithmetic, geography, etymology, Latin and Green roots, Latin and French 
phrases, and map drawing, with each school year concluding in a public 
examination of students by the headmaster.^^ 
It is evident, though, that not all parents in Cooktown were 
satisfied with the public school system. In 1874, before the opening of the 
government primary school, eighty-six students had been enrolled at the 
two day schools run privately by a Mr Livingstone and Mrs Siebold (the 
latter charged Is 6d per week for a 'large' child and one shilling for a 'small' 
child).92 Once the government school opened, the number of children 
attending private schools declined to thirty in 1875, but then rose again to 
nearly sixty in 1877.^^ The break-up of student numbers at the various 
private schools is not recorded, but in 1875 the latter included Mrs Deakin 
O'Reilly's day and boarding school, and Mesdames Rowland and Hartley's 
school for young ladies, which offered 'French, music, drawing and all 
branches of thorough English education'.^^ j ^ 1877, Mr O'Brien's 'evening 
school for young men' offered the standard subjects of a classical education, 
including French, Greek and Latin.^^ 
While the social background of children attending the private 
schools is not recorded, it would seem obvious to expect that their parents 
were well-to-do citizens of the town or district. There is similarly no 
indication in the available source material of the educational opportunities 
(or lack thereof) open to the children of Cooktown beyond primary school. It 
^^ See CHPRA, 10 November 1875, p. 2. 
^^ See, for example, the report in The Cooktown Courier, 16 December 1876, p. 3. 
^ See their respective advertisements in The Cooktown Courier, 8 August 1874, p. 2 
and 22 August 1874, p. 2. The attendance taken from school statistics in QVP, 2, 
1876, p. 358. 
93 See the statistics in QVP, 2, 1876, p. 686 and 1, 1878, pp. 1018-9. 
9"* See the advertisements in The Cooktown Courier, 24 November 1875, p. 2 and 27 
November 1875, p. 2. Mrs O'Reilly's advertisement hailed that she was a member 
of the French Academy of Music. 
9^ See the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 15 August 1877, p. 2. 
239 
is presumed that the options for secondary education at that time were 
limited to boarding school attendance in Rockhampton or Brisbane, or 
perhaps Charters Towers. Finally, it is interesting to note — as a reflection 
of contemporary social values — that the Cooktown committee agitating 
(successfully) for the establishment of a separate state school for girls, 
argued in 1882 in a letter to the Secreteuy for Public Instruction that 
... mixed schools where [children] are not even 
taught by one of their own sex ... are objectionable 
in any part of the colony, how much more is the 
objection intensified when apphed to the far north 
of Queensland.^ 
The Other Civic Institutions 
The relatively-quick progress made by the town in the construction 
of three churches, a masonic lodge and a school of arts building was 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 4 under 'special-interest' buildings. 
While it is not intended to repeat that discussion, several additional 
observations can be made about the institutions of Cooktov^m in the context 
of community lifestyle. The first is that religious observance did not play a 
major part in the lifestyle of early Cooktown. Many of the small 
storekeepers and artisans, for example, traded seven days a week in the 
early months of the settlement.^^ Indeed, it was not until about 1876 that 
the Sabbath came generally to be observed as a non-working day £uid, even 
in late 1877, a Chinese hawker trading on a Sunday received only a caution 
from the local magistrate.^^ 
Certainly, Church of England and Presbyterian services were 
conducted by lajnmen on a reasonably regular basis (sometimes combined) 
from early 1874.^9 But attendances rarely exceeded 100 people and neither 
9^ Letter from James Dick, Secretary of the Cooktown Girls School Committee, to the 
Secretary for Public Instruction, 5 May 1882, EDU 637, QSA. It would appear that 
previous requests had been turned down on the grounds that a minimum of 200 
girls were needed before consideration would be given to a separate school. 
Cooktown at the time of Dick's letter had only 95 girls enrolled. 
®^  See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 16 January 1878, p. 3 
noting that 'for a long time business was so very brisk ... that the entire seven days 
of the week hardly sufficed to transact our business'. 
98 See CHPRA, 26 September 1877, p. 2. 
99 See the account of a Church of England meeting 'for the purposes of forming a 
church' in CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 3. 
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faith was able to secure the services of a resident clergjmian in the first year 
of settlement.ioo There is no record of Roman CathoUc services being 
conducted prior to the arrival of Father MacGuinness in November 1874, 
fully a year after the first settiers.^^i Even though his services were 
subsequentiy weU attended, gmecdotal accounts suggest that Catholics in 
Cooktown were in the minority. ^ 2^ Indeed, census data shows that around 
22 per cent of Cooktown's population in 1876 was Irish-bom (see Figure 5.3 
at page 217). 
The seeming apathy of the Cooktown community towards religious 
observance is not easily explained. In part, it obviously reflected the 
absence of resident clergymen (which in itself is somewhat inexplicable). It 
also seems probable that for many of the early settlers, in the absence of the 
usual framework of familial and societal expectations, rehgious observance 
had temporarily at least become subordinated to more material 
considerations. 
It also seems that several of the other civic institutions in early 
Cooktown, while estabhshed with impressive speed and objectives, were in 
fact barely viable in terms of their membership and wider community 
support. Numerous early meetings of the hospital committee, for example, 
lapsed for want of a quorum.i^^ A meeting called by the headmaster of the 
primary school in July 1876, to elect a school committee of seven, attracted 
only one Chinese and seven European parents fi-om a school parent 
population of 147 couples.^^^ 
1^^ The first permanent Church of England minister arrived in February 1875: see 
CHPRA, 24 February 1875, p. 2. Presbyterian services were at that time still being 
conducted by visiting ministers: see The Cooktown Courier, 23 January 1875, p. 2. 
For the record, the first Church of England minister was Reverend Tripp, who died 
shortly after his arrival in May 1874, having been 'severely indisposed' for the 
duration of his short stay: CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 2. 
101 See the report of his arrival in CHPRA, 25 November 1874, p. 2. 
102 Of the first eighty students enrolled in the primary school in 1875, for example, 
sixty eight were Church of England, ten were Roman Catholic and two were 
Presbyterian: see CHPRA, 27 January 1875, p. 2. 
103 See, for example, The Cooktown Courier, 8 May 1874, p. 2. At the elections for the 
hospital committee in January 1877, The Cooktown Courier, 23 January 1878, p. 3 
similarly noted that 'there was some difficulty in making up the full number ... as 
many of those first proposed decUned to act'. 
104 The seven Europeans and several others not present were elected to the committee, 
while the lone Chinese parent was pointedly overlooked: see The Cooktown Courier, 
5 July 1876, p. 2. 
M l 
The Cooktown School of Arts, which opened in February 1876 with 
the aim of providing a library amd reading room for interested subscribers, 
was similarly supported by only a small proportion of the community.ios 
Nine of its twenty-four conunittee meetings in 1877 lapsed for wsmt of a 
quorum, while its annual report tabled in January 1878 noted that 
... the affairs of the Institution [have] continued 
in a very languishing state which can ... be 
accounted for by the many changes that [have 
taken] place among the residents.106 
The Catholic Church's St Marys Mutual Improvement Society, which 
conducted monthly debates on such topical subjects as 'are women eligible 
for the leading public professions of the colony?' and 'are women entitled to 
equal political privileges with men?', reduced its subscription fees for 1878 
from twenty shillings to ten in a bid to bolster its flagging membership 
beyond thirty-four. 107 
The local chapter of the masordc lodge, which held its first meeting 
in May 1874, similarly failed to hold or broaden its membership over the 
following three years, with the masonic hall falling into disuse and disrepair 
by 1878.108 The point being made is that many of Cooktown's early 
institutions — with the partial exception of the churches — were not widely 
supported by the community. Indeed, their membership — or at least their 
leadership — was typically drawn from a narrow and well-to-do stratum of 
society, which usually seemed more interested in rephcating the perceived 
accoutrements of'civilised society' than in meeting the more basic needs of 
the community-at-large. That is not to suggest, of course, that Cooktown 
was probably any different in that regard fi-om most other emerging towns 
in Queensland. In Cooktown's case, however, the inability of its institutions 
to galvanise public support was yet another factor working against the 
concept of cormnunity. 
105 Its inaugural meeting, for example, attracted only 20-30 persons: see The Cooktown 
Courier, 24 July 1875, p. 2. 
106 p^ published in The Cooktown Courier, 12 January 1878, p. 3. 
10*7 See its annual report in The Cooktown Courier, 19 January 1878, p. 3. 
108 See The Cooktown Courier, 5 October 1878, p. 2. 
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Entertainment 1870s-style 
Holthouse's account of early Cooktown in River of gold leaves one 
with the clear impression that the main leisure preoccupations of men in 
the town were drinking, gambhng and the frequenting of dance halls and 
brothels. That image of Cooktown, as an Australian version of the 
American 'Wild West', may have existed in the minds of many European 
miners at the Palmer, whose isolation and arduous lifestyle may 
understandably have made them rather desperate for entertainment and 
the mere sight of a white woman. As discussed in Chapter 4, however, the 
number of entertainment-seeking transients in Cooktown on any one day 
across the peak years 1874 to 1877 probably rarely exceeded 200.109 
Moreover, not all the transients and only a small proportion of the single or 
unaccompanied male residents of the town would have frequented the hotels 
and 'night spots' of the town on a regular basis. 
That is not to understate, of course, the role of hotels, billiard 
rooms and dance halls as forms of entertainment in early Cooktown. What 
they constituted, though, was the very visible and very profitable 
component of the entertainment industry of Cooktown, which had littie to 
do with the leisure pursuits of the majority of residents. Indeed, the focus of 
the residents tended to be on more mundane activities such as race 
meetings, regattas, cricket matches and performances by visiting troupes. 
The local jockey club, for exEunple, held its first meeting on 20 May 
1874 (the same day that elders of the Church of England were meeting to 
discuss the formation of a church).iio Initially, an improvised race-course 
was established some eight kilometres south of the town on the northern 
banks of the Annan River, although its distance from town was obviously 
seen as a deterrent to spectator attendance.m By August, a new venue had 
been located within three kilometres of the town, on the southern banks of 
the Endeavour River, which The Cooktown Herald described as 
... a fine oval course with but httle clesuing 
required, a splendid straight of 350 yards 
109 Based on the estimate at Figure 4.2 (see p. 150) that the daily average peaked at 
138 in 1875. 
110 See CHPRA, 20 May 1874, p. 2. 
111 See The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1874, p. 3. 
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and ... pleasant shady places for [sic] 
picnicing.112 
Even before the opening of the new course, though, Cooktown was 
gripped 'with a racing mania', n^ Almost weekly, small crowds gathered to 
witness and wager substantial sums on two-horse races, either at the 
Annan track or along the Palmer road, with the principals putting up sums 
ranging fi-om £20 to £100 a side.n^ The first meeting at the new course, 
held on a Tuesday, comprised six events with a total prize money of £100 
and reportedly drew a crowd of 500 spectators.n^ 
Over the following four or so years, race meetings went from 
strength to strength. In July 1875, for example, a two-day progam 
comprised thirteen races with total prize money of £450, while gate-takings 
and nomination fees for the Easter meeting in 1876 totalled £793.n^ 
Interestingly, meetings from late 1875 onwards included a growing number 
of Chinese, who it was noted 'were not above entering into the monetary 
mysteries [of bettingl'.n^ Certainly, in the case of the Chinese, it is and was 
convenient to attribute their interest in horse-racing to the gambling 
aspects of the sport. 
Less easy to ascribe are the motives of the Europeans. Cynics, and 
church leaders in Cooktown who saw race meetings regularly drawing 
crowds several times the size of their congregations, would no doubt have 
contended that the chief attraction to Europeans was also the gambling 
aspects of the sport, a situation compounded by the relative affluence of the 
community and the 'easy-come easy-go' attitude of many Palmer miners. 
The Cooktown Herald, though, saw far nobler motives, asserting that horse-
112 CHPRA, 23 September 1874, p. 2. By 1877, with the expansion of the town, the 
race committee needed approval to retain their site: see Cooktown Jockey Club 
Committee to Secretary of Lands Department, in-letter 5348/77 of 1877, LAN/A54, 
QSA. 
11^ See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 12 September 1874, p. 2. 
IW See, for example. The Cooktown Courier, 12 September 1874, p. 2. 
115 See The Cooktown Courier, 17 October 1874, p. 3 and CHPRA, 21 October 1874, 
p. 2. 
116 See The Cooktown Courier, 21 July 1875, p. 3 and CHPRA, 1 April 1876, p. 2. 
11'^  See The Cooktown Courier, 18 March 1876, p. 2. The Christmas meeting in 1878 
included a special event 'for hacks the bona fide property of and to be ridden by 
Chinese, twice around the course': see the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 
20 November 1878, p. 2. 
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racing — like cricket and athletics — epitomised the transfer of English 
values and traditions to a new conmiunity, noting that 
... in all English communities, that of sport 
shines pre-eminent... [and] we are glad that 
even here in the north beneath a tropical sun 
men are found true to their national instincts.n^ 
Clearly, that sentiment apphed to the Cooktown cricket club, 
which played its first match in early July 1874.n^ The condition of the 
ground, described as 'only lately cleared [and] a little rough causing the ball 
to fly in unpleasant proximity to the batsman's face', may have contributed 
in the second game played to the rather dismal first innings scores of all out 
for 16 and 5 respectively.i^o It seems, however, that cricket in Cooktown 
never achieved a popular following and, indeed, remained the preserve of an 
Enghsh public school-t5T)e minority.i^i 
Similarly, the several annual regattas, conducted on occasions 
such as the Prince of Wales' birthday and New Years Day, and tj^jically 
including sailing, sculling and punt races, usually featured as the key 
participants the same well-to-do minority.i22 That presumably — as in the 
case of cricket — was because only those with an English public school-tjrpe 
background had the skills necessary to participate. Without belabouring 
the point too far, the same privileged minority — while ostensibly working 
for the good of the community — in practical terms also excluded 'the 
masses' from most other forms of entertainment they organised by the cost 
of admission. The one guinea entrance fee to the Fire Brigade Ball on New 
Year's Eve in 1877, for example, would effectively have limited attendance 
to the same socially-homogeneous minority.i^^ 
118 Editorial in CHPRA, 24 June 1874, p. 3. 
119 See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 3. Only fourteen members 
turned out for the game, however, barely enough to put two batsmen, two umpires 
and a fielding side onto the ground. 
12ft See the reports in The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 3 and 18 July 1874, p. 3. 
121 Those plajdng in the match between 'the banks and civil service versus the 
mercantiles' in February 1879, for example, were largely the influential and well-to-
do citizens of the town: see The Cooktown Courier, 8 February 1879, p. 2. 
1® See, for example, the reports in The Cooktown Courier, 9 May 1874, p. 2 and 4 
December 1875, p. 3. 
12S See the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 23 December 1877, p. 3. The other 
inhibiting factor, of course would have been the dress requirements. 
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Indeed, for the bulk of the Cooktown community, the only 
organised leisure activities - apart fi-om race-going - seem to have been their 
occasionsd attendance at carnivals £md performances by visiting troupes. 
Over 500 residents, for example, reportedly attended the carnival in 
November 1877, organised by the committee of the Fire Brigade to celebrate 
the Prince of Wales' birthday.i24 Admission was one shilling for adults, 
children being admitted fi-ee, with advertised activities including a 
procession, children's and men's sports (but nothing for women), target 
shooting, swings, fireworks, quoits, a lottery and tents available for picnic 
parties.1^5 
The performances of entertainers and troupes, who visited 
Cooktown as part of their tour schedule to north Queensland, were typically 
very well attended. Noteworthy in 1874 alone were Albertini the magician, 
who charged two shillings for front seats and one shilling for back seats at 
his performances at the Leichhardt Hotel in May 1874;i26 the Lingard Star 
Combination Troupe, a group of ventriloquists and vocalists, who visited en 
route from Cardwell in October 1874;i27 and the Great Variety Troupe, 
which included Miss Carry Dearlove dancing and singing, £md Fred Loyola's 
'daring feats on the trapeze', in late November 1874.128 
Finally, it should be said that very little is recorded of the 
entertainment activities of the Chinese commimity in Cooktown, apart from 
their supposed preoccupation with gambling. Editorials in the IOCEJ 
newspapers, particularly from about 1877 onwards, periodically denounced 
the prevalence of Chinese gambling houses in the town, with claims that 
individuals were occasionally losing as much as £200 in a single night of 
fantan.129 How many such establishments were supposedly operating at 
any one time, and the number of patrons attracted to them, is not recorded. 
The Cooktown Courier also implied more than once that local police were 
being paid to turn a blind eye to Chinese gambling,i^o The other possibility. 
12"* See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 10 November 1877, p. 3. 
12^ See the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 31 October 1877, p. 2. 
^ See his advertisements in The Cooktown Courier, 9 May 1874, p. 2. 
127 See the advertisement in CHPRA, 21 October 1874, p. 2. 
128 See the advertisement in The Cooktown Courier, 28 November 1874, p. 2. 
129 See, for example. The Cooktown Courier, 21 February 1877, p. 2 and CHPRA, 
19 September 1877, p. 2. 
1^ 0 See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 21 February 1877, p. 2. 
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not mutually exclusive of the first, is that the authorities tolerated the 
situation on the basis of the 'devil they knew'.i^i 
Law and Order in Early Cooktown 
Certainly, some accounts of the early days of the town imply that 
law and order was almost non-existent. Holthouse in River of gold, for 
example, asserts that 
[not] a day passed without the mud of Charlotte 
Street being churned up by strugghng bodies 
locked in deadly combat... [while] drunken 
diggers were robbed in the streets in broad 
daylight.132 
Others similarly claimed that 
[all] the scum of Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane 
were gathered here, thieves, pickpockets, card-
sharpers and loafers of every description. 1^ 3 
There is little evidence, however, either in contemporary 
newspaper accounts or in the statistics from the local court of petty sessions 
to suggest that Cooktown was crime ridden to the extent intimated by 
Holthouse or that offenders were not being brought to justice. There are, for 
example, very few editorial comments in the local newspapers of early 
Cooktown on the issue of law and order nor any suggestion that it was 
unsafe to venture onto the streets by day or by night. The only reference 
found for the year 1874 related to a series of violent arguments between 
certain female residents of the town, whose 'language ... would shock the 
ears of a Dover fish-fag'.i^^ Moreover, The Cooktown Courier specifically 
reported that the St Patrick's Day race meeting in March 1875 had 'not a 
fight or drunken man to be seen'.^^ 
1^ 1 The police did, however, make periodic raids on Chinese gambling dens. The chief 
offender after one such raid was sentenced to three months imprisonment in the 
Rockhampton gaol: see The Cooktown Courier, 21 April 1877, p. 3. 
132 Holthouse, River of gold, pp. 55-6. 
133 George Pugh quoted in A. Musgrave, The history of the Cooktown district' in 
Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, 40, 4, March 1955, p. 235. 
194 CHPRA, 16 September 1874, p. 2. 
1®^  Editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 20 March 1875, p. 3. 
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Statistics of criminal proceedings and cases before the local 
magistrates court for the period 1874-82, as shown at Figure 5.9 (below), 
also indicate that almost half the cases brought before the court were the 
result of summons action, rather than arrest, suggesting that the ofiences 
involved posed no particular threat to peace and good order (and probably 
involved residents rather than transients). The statistics also show that the 
conviction rate was generally only around 30 per cent, suggesting perhaps 
that magistrates were not overly-concerned with the level of crime in the 
town. 
Figure 5.9 - Summary of Criminal Proceedings in Cooktown 1874-1882 
800 -• 
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500 -• 
No. 400 - • 
300 -• 
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- • Total convictions 
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Note: The range has purposely been limited to 1882. After that date, the increasing presence 
of Aborigines in the town (and their arrest and conviction for relatively minor offences) 
skews the results quite disproportionately. 
Source: Statistics taken from crimintd proceedings returns in successive issues of QVP, 1875-83. 
It is obvious fi-om Figure 5.9 that the peak years in terms of 
criminal proceedings were 1874-78, which in itself is unsurprising. Figure 
5.10 (on next page) shows that within those peak years, however, the most 
common convictions in 1874, 1875 and 1876 were for drunkenness and 
offences against the person (most usually assault). That presumably was a 
248 
reflection of the somewhat boisterous nature of a frontier society where 
disagreements were often settled by resort to physical violence.i^^ By 1877, 
though, the number of convictions for both drunkenness and offences 
against the person were proportionately in decline, reflecting the growing 
maturity of the community and the lesser number of Europeans by then on 
the Palmer. Across the years 1876 to 1878, however, the nmnber of 
convictions for offences against property (steaHng, embezzlement, 
misappropriation) rose shguply, presmnably reflecting the more 
materigdistic basis of the community in Cooktown. 
Figure 5.10 - Swnmary of Convictions in Court of Petty Sessions 
Cooktown 1874-1882 
% 20 
Offences against property 
Offences against person 
Drunkenness 
1881 
1882 
Note: The proportions shown are the percentages horizontally, that is, each segment represents 
the convictions for that year as a percentage of the total convictions for that offence across 
the years 1874-1882. The reason for calculating the proportions horizontally is that it then 
enables meaningful analysis across the period. 
Source: Figures calculated by the author on the basis of statistics taken from criminal proceedings 
returns in successive issues of QVP, 1875-83. 
It is £dso interesting to look at the penalties handed down by the 
courts, as a reflection of contemporary commimity values. On that basis, 
Table 5.17 (on next page) shows a selection of the penalties imposed by the 
magistrates' court in Cooktown between 1874 and 1877. While it is by no 
l i f Although it is largely beyond the scope of this study, it is possible — where the 
records exist — to use the example of court cases to illustrate particular aspects of 
society: see, for example, C.T. Stannage, The people of Perth: a social history of 
Western Australia's capital city, Perth City Council, Perth, 1979 and R. Silerman, 
Law and urban growth: civil litigation in Boston trial courts 1880-1900, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1981. 
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means comprehensive, it shows that drunkenness was regarded as the least 
serious offence, with steahng the most serious of the cases before the court 
(obviously murder, manslaughter and rape would have been treated even 
more seriously). Noteworthy also are the pengdties imposed on Chinese for 
opium smuggling and keeping a gambling house. 
Table 5.17 - An Example of Penalties Imposed by the Magistrates' Court 
Cooktown 1874-1877 
Offence 
drunkenness (first offence) 
allowing pigs to stray into main street 
disposing of dead horse within town limits 
dnmkenness (second offence) 
participate in illegal gambling (Chinese) 
using indecent language (European) 
furious riding in main street 
using obscene language (Chinese) 
assault 
selling liquor without a licence 
smuggling opium 
indecent exposure 
keeping a gambling house (Chinese) 
stealing (2 bags of rice) (Chinese) 
stealing (watch and chain) (Chinese) 
unlawful possession (2 horses) (European) 
stealing (one horse) (European) 
Penalty 
5s 
5s 
5s 
10s 
10s 
20s or 3 days imprisonment 
£2 
£2 or 7 days imprisonment 
£5 or 14 days imprisonment 
£15 
£50 or 6 months imprisonment 
7 days with hard labour 
3 months imprisonment 
6 months with hard labour 
12 months with hard labour 
12 months imprisonment 
2 years with hard labour 
Source: Derived from court reports in The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, 1874-1877. 
Despite the sometimes harsher penalties imposed on Chinese 
offenders, it does seem that the Chinese community in Cooktown was 
reasonably well protected by the police and courts. In September 1875, for 
example, a European charged with stealing a horse from a Chinese market-
gardener was sentenced to two years gaol with hard labour.^37 j^fi^ 
Cooktown Courier in February 1876 also noted that a Chinese man 
assaulted in the town for no apparent reason by a European 'ran away and 
137 See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 25 September 1875, p. 3. 
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showed [his cut hand] to Mr St George [the Police Magistrate]', suggesting 
that the Chinese conmiunity had reasonable faith in him at least.^^^ From 
mid 1877 onwards, Chinese offenders appearing before the criminal assizes 
of the North Queensland circuit court also had the option of a jury 
comprising six Europeans and six Chinese.^^^ 
Community Interest in Civic Affairs 
Against that background of conmiunity lifestyle, and the earlier 
discussion of community structure, it now seems appropriate to address 
briefly community dynamics, that is, the extent of interest and involvement 
by the community in civic affairs and the occupational background of 
community leaders. 
The Cooktown sample register, it will be recalled from Table 5.7 
(at page 209), provided some useful statistics on 'civic involvement', based 
on the number of residents who held civic office in the town or were 
members of a variety of committees. Indeed, Figure 5.11 (over) shows that 
around fifty such residents participated in some form of civic involvement 
each year between 1874 and 1879.^ 40 
13S j'fi^ Cooktown Courier, 19 February 1876, p. 3. There is also considerable evidence 
to show that the Chinese business community used the civil jurisdiction to settle 
commercial disputes and recover goods or moneys: see, for example, The Cooktown 
Courier, 15 March 1876, p. 2. 
139 ^ee CHPRA, 6 June 1877, p. 2. 
140 Data thereafter was less comprehensive mainly because of the dearth of newspaper 
records, which typically provided most of the details in the earlier years between 
1874-79. Other indices, based on a wider array of sources, are less affected by the 
unavailability of local newspaper records after 1879. 
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Figure 5.11 - Summary of Residents Involved in Civic Affairs in Cooktown 
1874-1879 
(showing actual number per year) 
No. 20 
Unofficial committee-person 
Official committee-person 
Civic office fioiders 
1879 
Note: A number of individuals were involved in several committees, as well as holding 
a civic appointment. The low figures for civic office holders in 1874 and 1875 are 
because Cooktown did not have a municipal council until 1876. 
Source: Data derived from the Cooktown sample register. 
Superficially, at least. Figure 5.11 would seem to suggest that the 
total number of citizens involved in civic affairs in the town grew steadily, 
albeit somewhat unevenly, across the period. Moreover, the listing of 
committees, operating in Cooktown at some time across the period 1874-79 
shown at Table 5.18 (over) would broadly seem to confirm that Cooktown 
acquired a t5rpical range of community-based organisations within its first 
five years. 
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Table 5.18 - The Committees in Cooktown 1874-1879 
(not all were necessarily in operation across the period) 
Official 
hospital 
primary school 
cemetery 
fire brigade 
school of arts 
volunteer corps 
Unofficial 
jockey club 
cricket club 
masonic lodge 
progress association 
temperance society 
licensed victuallers 
chamber of commerce 
carriers association 
railway league 
amateur histrionics club 
prospecting association 
Source: Primarily derived from The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, 1874-1879. 
In fact, the sub-totals at Figure 5.11 (on previous page) reflect the 
far more complex reality of a town whose early civic affairs were often a 
shambles. In 1874, for example. Figure 5.11 shows a reasonable number of 
residents involved in both official and unofficial committees; there were, 
however, only two office holders — the police magistrate and one justice of 
the peace — in a community of around 2000. The 1875 figures show the 
addition of two more justices (and reflect a changeover of magistrates). By 
that time, though, public disillusionment with the affairs of the town saw 
the number of residents involved in official committee work decline from 
thirty to ten (as reflected in the second row of Figure 5.11). 
By far the worst years, however, were 1876 to 1878. The front row 
of Figure 5.11 reflects the increase in civic office holders fi-om 1876 onwards 
to a bottom line of around twelve, reflecting the creation of an aldermanic 
body of seven, together with a judiciary of one magistrate and about four 
justices. In 1877 and 1878, however, it can be seen (again from the front 
row of Figure 5.11) that the turnover of such office holders took the total 
number of individuals holding civic office during each year to over twenty. 
At the same time, as can be seen from the rear row of Figure 5.11, public 
interest in unofficial committee work dechned from thirty-six people in 1875 
to only nine in both 1877 and 1878. 
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Indeed, of the years illustrated at Figure 5.11, the most 'normal' or 
most desirable in terms of civic affairs is 1879. There, the number of office 
holders had fallen to sixteen reflecting a turnover of only four of the twelve 
incumbents. A broad range of residents had also become involved in official 
committee work, while public interest in unofficial committee work had 
similarly increased fi-om nine to twenty-six persons. By 1879, though, as 
will be discussed shortly, much of the damage fi-om the earlier years was 
almost irreversible. 
The obvious question is what caused the unfortunate situation of 
1875 to 1878? The first reason, as discussed in previous contexts, is that the 
community seemed largely indifferent to civic matters, despite the best 
efforts of both local newspapers to galvanise pubhc interest in the affairs of 
the town. The Cooktown Courier, for example, in an editorial of June 1874 
railed that 
... we feel bound to remonstrate against the 
apathy and want of public spirit displayed by 
the people of Cooktown in regard to matters 
affecting their interests.^'^i 
The Cooktown Herald, in the lead-up to the first elections for aldermen in 
June 1876, similarly noted that Very little signs of interest are manifest'. ^ '^  
The second reason would seem to relate simply to the transient 
nature of the population. As discussed earlier in this chapter the population 
turnover across the years 1875 to 1879 was often in excess of 50 per cent 
annually. Compounding the problem was the fact that even those 
remaining often left the town for weeks on end, to pursue business 
opportunities elsewhere or to recuperate in the south. In 1877, for example, 
three sitting aldermen 'temporarily* left Cooktown for several months, to set 
up new businesses elsewhere in Far North Queensland, throwing the affairs 
of the municipal council heavily onto those remaining (who all then had to 
attend every meeting to ensure a quorum).^'*^ 
l**! The Cooktown Courier, 20 June 1874, p. 3. 
142 CHPRA, 17 May 1876, p. 2. 
143 See the editorial comment in The Cooktown Courier, 28 July 1877, p. 3. 
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The third reason, and probably the most significant, is that 
Cooktown across the years 1875 to 1878 was wracked by several intense 
personahty clashes. The mildest of them centred on those involved in the 
administration of the hospital. At least two medical superintendents 
resigned over zdlegations of mismanagement; another was sacked for 
allegedly embezzling fees, while the secretary in 1875 stood accused of 
misappropriating stores.^^4 The situation was such that by early 1876 an 
editorial in The Cooktown Courier noted that 
... it seems to be almost chronic now that the 
annual meeting of the Hospital subscribers 
should be the scene of... [such] recriminations. ^ 5^ 
Problems at the hospital, however, never led to the depths of 
rivalry as occurred between the senior management of The Cooktown 
Courier and The Cooktown HeraldA^^ Their problems started when an 
employee of The Courier attempted to sabotage the print-run of The Herald 
by pouring paste over typeset, claiming in the subsequent court action that 
it was done as a practical joke.^ '^ '^  Over the subsequent months and years, 
their rivalry intensified both in editorial attacks on each other and in actual 
fisticuff's.^'^ The climax occurred in March 1876 when an alleged agent of 
one up-ended a bucket of excrement over the other in the main street.^^^ 
Even their clashes, however, paled into relative insignificance 
compared to the bitter dispute between Clay Brooks, the town clerk, and 
William Simpson, an aspiring and eventual alderman. Over the space of 
three years, Simpson appeared in court no less than eight times, either as 
the accused or plaintiff in cases of assault or abusive language involving 
Brooks or his associates, with convictions being recorded against him on 
144 See, for example, reports in CHPRA, 10 February 1875, p. 2 and 2 October 1875, 
p.a 
145 The Cooktown Courier, 26 January 1876, p. 2. 
M« More correctly, the rivalry was between W. Bailey, the owner/editor of The 
Cooktown Herald and W.P. Morgan, town solicitor and lessee of The Cooktown 
Courier. 
1*^ In the event, the offender was only reprimanded: see CHPRA, 25 November 1874, 
P- 2-
141 See the report in CHPRA, 23 February 1876, p. 2 of Bailey and Morgan engaging in 
'a quarter hour of public fisticuffs'. 
14i The offender was sentenced to eighteen months gaol: CHPRA, 15 March 1876, p. 2. 
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four occasions.!^ Once Simpson was elected to the council in February 
1877, his verbgd attacks on Brooks (and anyone who sided with him) were so 
disruptive that the council effectively ceased to function. After one 
particularly fiery meeting, The Cooktown Herald reported that 
... the scene enacted [at the recent council 
meeting] was the most disgracefiil it has 
ever been our lot to chronicle or to witness. 
[The ongoing ruction between]... Simpson 
and Clay Brooks ... will tend to the entire 
destruction of the usefulness of the municipal 
institution in Cooktown.^^^ 
When Simpson eventually left Cooktown in July 1877, 'one 
alderman cracked two bottles of champagne to celebrate'.^^^ Simpson's 
possible vindication was that Brooks was sacked in late 1877 and a year 
later, as shop assistant in Cooktown, was sentenced to three months gaol 
for stealing a roll of fabric. ^ ^^  The tragedy of their intense rivalry was that 
... intelligent and capable men will [be so 
disheartened by their behaviour that they 
will] shrink from undertaking municipal 
du t i e s . 154 
Certainly, statistics from the Cooktown sample register, as shown 
at Figure 5.12 (on next page), indicate that a surprising number of 
individuals retired completely fi-om public life fi-om about 1878 onwards. 
For a number of them, it must be presumed that their disinchnation to 
serve further, either on the council or within an official committee, related 
to disenchantment. It probably can also be safely assumed that at least 
150 See The Cooktown Courier, 15 September 1875, p. 3 and 25 October 1876, p. 3 and 
CHPRA, 10 January 1877, p. 2 and 28 March 1877, p. 2. 
151 CHPRA, 17 March 1877, p. 2. 
152 CHPRA, 4 August 1877, p. 2. 
153 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 18 December 1878, p. 3. 
154 See The Cooktown Courier, 3 January 1877, p. 3. 
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some of the disgruntled would not have been above some sniping fi-om the 
sidelines, thus further undermining the concept of community.^^^ 
Figure 5.12 - Svunmary of Individuals in Cooktown Retired from 
Public Office 1875-1883 
(showing cumulative totals still resident) 
No. 
Previous official committee person 
Previous mayor or alderman 
1882 
1883 
Source: Data derived from Cooktown sample register. 
Finally, of course, it is necessary to look at the part played by the 
Chinese in Cooktown in civic affairs. Contrary to some accounts of early 
Cooktown, it seems that many of those in the Chinese business community 
were almost model citizens. Three Chinese merchants, for example, were 
amongst the earliest subscribers to the hospital construction fund, with one 
of their donations (of two guineas) entitling its subscriber — had he wished 
— to stand as a committee-person.^^^ Another Chinese merchant made an 
155 
156 
The Cooktown progress association, for example, was specifically set up because of 
disenchantment with the municipal council. Moreover, the public letter calling for 
its establishment was signed by twelve prominent citizens, seven of whom were 
previous aldermen or sitting justices: see The Cooktown Courier, 30 May 1877, p. 3. 
But see the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 28 July 1877, p. 3 complaining that 
the effect was 'to foment a jealousy and course of misunderstanding' which ran 
contrary to the interests of the community. 
See CHPRA, 30 April 1874, p. 3. In 1877, for example, only seventeen persons were 
eligible to stand. 
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unsolicited donation to the hospital of mattresses and pillows.1^7 Indeed, 
after the Chinese community had even made generous donations to the 
Roman Catholic church building fund, The Cooktown Herald pondered 'how 
many Cathohcs [in Cooktown] would subscribe to the building of a joss 
house?'i58 
Despite such civic generosity, it is evident that the Chinese in 
Cooktown were never really accepted into the Europeans' concept of 
community, nor does it seem that the Chinese pauiicularly wanted to be. 
Delegations of prominent Chinese citizens, for example, were usually 
invited to meet visiting dignitaries at the wharf upon their arrival in 
Cooktown.^^9 But the same Chinese merchants were noticeably absent from 
the civic receptions held over dinner later that night.i^^ 
There is also only the one report, mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, of individual Chinese nominating to stand as aldermen or on 
official committees. In part, their efforts may have been thwarted by the 
view put forth by The Cooktown Courier that most of the Chinese ratepayers 
in the town were business entities, rather than individuals, which thus 
conferred no eligibility even to vote.^^^ It seems more likely, though, that 
most of the Chinese residents were simply not interested in trying to gain 
entry to the European-based community, or in supporting any individual 
who did.^^2 
The Business Background of Community Leaders 
Statistics derived from the Cooktown sample register and 
summarised at Table 5.19 (on next page) show that, on a numerical basis, 
157 See The Cooktown Courier, 19 September 1875, p. 2. Note also that the Chinese 
business community offered several times in 1875 to build and support a hospital 
for Chinese patients if the authorities would provide the land, an offer not taken up: 
see CHPRA, 18 September 1875, p. 2. 
158 See CHPRA, 13 November 1875, p. 2. 
159 See, for example, the report of the visit by the Governor of Queensland: The 
Cooktown Courier, 21 March 1877, p. 3. 
1"0 See, for example, the report of the banquet for the Colonial Treasurer and Post-
Master General: The Cooktown Courier, 21 November 1877, p. 3. 
161 Editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 31 January 1877, p. 3. 
1"^ Sea Wah, the Chinese publican who nominated as an alderman in the February 
1877 elections was married to a European woman, which may have alienated him 
from his countrymen. 
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over 50 per cent of the civic office holders and committee-persons in 
Cooktown between 1874 and 1885 were self-employed merchants or 
businessmen. 
Table 5.19 - Summary by Occupation of Office Holders and Committee-
persons in Cooktown 1874-1885 
(as percentage of the occupations shown, based on total numbers) 
Occupation 
Artisans 
Basic white collar 
Managerial white collar 
Professional 
Mercantile 
Mayor or 
Aldermen 
20.2 
0.9 
18.4 
10.5 
50.0 
Official 
Committee-
person 
6.3 
3.1 
15.0 
15.8 
59.8 
Unofficial 
Committee-
person 
7.8 
8.9 
4.4 
22.2 
56.7 
Average 
11.4 
4.3 
12.6 
16.2 
55.5 
Source: Data derived from Cooktown sample register. 
Given, however, that the proportion of merchants and the like was 
typically close to 60 per cent of the Cooktown workforce, it could be argued 
that the figures at Table 5.19 are hardly surprising. Accordingly, Table 5.20 
shows the same basic data rearranged to reflect the proportion of office 
holders and committee-persons within the v£uious occupational groupings. 
It shows that, on a proportional basis, the most influential group in the 
town's affairs was the professional class, followed by white collar workers 
and managers. 
Table 5.20 - Siunmary by Occupation of Office Holders and Committee-
persons in Cooktown 1874-1885 
(as percentage of the occupations shown, but based on the 
proportion of office holders within each occupational grouping) 
Occupation 
Artisans 
White collar (combined) 
Professional 
Mercantile 
Mayor or 
Aldermen 
18.4 
29.8 
34.7 
17.1 
Official 
Committee-
person 
12.2 
25.7 
45.3 
16.8 
Unofficial 
Committee-
person 
5.9 
17.1 
60.9 
16.1 
Average 
12.2 
24.2 
47.0 
16.6 
Source: Calculated from the figures at Table 5.19 indexed by averages derived from Table 5.15 
(Comparative Structure of the Clooktown Workforce). 
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Again, it could be argued that those figures are hardly surprising, 
especially in relation to the professional class. What Tables 5.19 and 5.20 
also show, however, is an inkling of Cooktown's social class structure vis-a-
vis civic involvement. There was, for example, a higher proportion of 
professionals involved on 'unofficial' committees — which included the 
cricket and jockey clubs, and the temperance and amateur histrionic 
societies — than in the hurly-burly of the municipal council. Conversely, 
there was a higher proportion of artisans — with a presumed reputation for 
being solid, trustworthy businessmen — involved in the council than on 
unofficial committees.^^^ 
That social division, in normsd circumstances, would probably not 
be a bad thing, given that successful businessmen could reasonably be 
expected to be more pragmatic in dealing with the affairs of council than 
solicitors, doctors or ministers of religion. In Cooktown's case, it was 
unfortunate that the business community was so riven by personal 
animosities. 
Finally, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, an attempt was 
made in the Cooktown sample register to analyse occupational mobility, 
with the object of determining whether there was a quantifiable 
relationship between it and civic involvement. Was there any evidence, for 
example, that individuals aspiring to public office were primarily those in 
the business community who were 'upwardly mobile' and may have been 
using public office as a means of improving their business interests? 
Conversely, were there some who saw a successful business career as an 
entree to public office, with its perceived enhanced status within the 
community? 
In the event, the statistics were inconclusive, largely because 
occupations as listed in the various sources were described in too little detail 
to enable any meaningful analysis of mobility either within or between 
occupational groupings. Similarly, anecdotal evidence was too sparing to 
enable any reasonable conclusions to be drawn. 
1"*^  It must be said, though, that artisans — particularly those in well-established 
businesses with perhaps one or two assistants or apprentices — probably had more 
time for council affairs than, for example, a busy doctor or solicitor. 
260 
Advancing the Interests of the Town 
In their favour, the early residents of Cooktown had the unifying 
reality of being part of an Anglo-Saxon-Celtic outpost on the edge of 
'civilisation'. The dsuigers and hardships they faced daily, in the form of the 
environment, the weather emd the threat of attack by Aborigines, would 
have resulted in some sense of community in the face of a common peril. In 
addition, once the Palmer River goldfields were proved, the flood of new 
arrivals through the port of Cooktown and the export of a fortune in gold 
would have reinforced to the people of the town the economic importance of 
their community, not least in the context of the wider development of 
Queensland. 
Notwithstanding such potential bonds, it is evident from the 
discussion in this chapter that the divisive effects of a highly transitory 
population, together with what seems to have been the extremely 
materiahstic outlook of its oversized business community, mihtated against 
the early development of the concept of community. That situation was 
then compounded by an influx of Chinese settlers and a series of intense 
rivalries between key personalities within the European community. The 
result was that the early residents of Cooktown were never particularly 
successfiil in transforming themselves into a cohesive and constructive 
community, able to advance the interests of the town. 
That is not to deny, of course, that a number of Cooktown's early 
residents undoubtedly saw their medium-to-long term future in the town, 
and that they worked hard to establish the infrastructure, services and civic 
institutions usually associated with a viable urban development. The point 
being made, however, is that Cooktown's business community seemed 
blinkered by its preoccupation with the town's role as the service centre for 
the Palmer River goldfields. Moreover, that preoccupation stymied the 
development of a civic leadership, and a civic vision which may have focused 
more attention and resources on Cooktown's longer-term viability. 
Against that background of a divided community, lacking civic 
cohesion and vision, the next chapter examines the structural links between 
Cooktown and the rest of Queensland, £uid the town's success or otherwise 
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in accessing government expenditure for the typical range of works and 
services necessary for urban development. 
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CHAPTER 6 - SMALL TOWN IN A LARGE COLONY 
Cooktown in the 1870s, as has been discussed in previous 
chapters, was a business-oriented township, blighted by a transitory 
population and riven by a series of personal rivalries involving several key 
members of the civic community. The people of the town were also seriously 
divided over the issue of Chinese immigration. In addition, it seems that a 
certain proportion of the community professed no particular allegiance 
either to the town or to Queensland, with The Cooktown Courier noting in 
late 1876 that 
... many of our local readers ... teU us that they are 
not Queenslanders and are not personally interested 
in the welfare of the colony, i 
The reahty was, of course, that the township of Cooktown was 
geographically part of the colony of Queensland, notwithstanding the 
suggestion by the Governor of New South Wales at the time of Queensland's 
separation that Cape Palmerston (south of Mackay) might be a convenient 
northern boundary for the new colony.^ Cooktown also had far stronger 
legislative, commercial and probably cultural hnks with Brisbane, and the 
other main centres in Queensland, than it had with either Sydney or New 
South Wales. Moreover, whether its residents liked it or not, the 
development of Cooktown was largely dependent upon the largesse of those 
in Brisbane who controlled the colonial purse-strings of Queensland. 
Needless to say, many of the civic-minded residents of Cooktown 
were initially sceptical that a bureaucracy located some 1600 kilometres to 
their south would be particularly sympathetic to the interests of the 
The Cooktown Courier, 11 December 1876, p. 3. Presumably, the inference was that 
such residents were from New South Wales, or perhaps Victoria, and saw their 
residency in Cooktown as a short-term expediency. 
Sir William Denison's intention, it was claimed by the Cooktown Herald and 
Palmer River Advertiser (CHPRA), was that the new colony of Queensland should 
be only the temporary administrator of the far north, "holding it till the people came 
who were to inhabit it': editorial in CHPRA, 16 September 1874, p. 2. 
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fledgling settlement, if only because of'the tyranny of distance'.^ 
Throughout 1874 and 1875, in particular, such scepticism was fuelled by 
what many residents saw as the bias of southern legislators and 
administrators against the north, not least over the allocation of funds for 
public works programs. Compounding the perceived injustice was their 
belief that Far North Queensland, and Cooktown especially, contributed 
more than a fair share of the general revenue of the colony, mainly in the 
form of customs duties. 
Given that background, it is hardly surprising that much of the 
primary source material on early Cooktown — in the context of its role as a 
newly-established township in Queensland — seems predominantly about 
the attempts by the town to secure an equitable share of government 
resources. Indeed, the associated issues of municipal government and 
parliamentary representation were fundamentally linked to the issue of 
resource expenditure vis-a-vis the civic advancement of the town. 
Obviously, however, there are some broader issues. How 
important, for example, and how enduring was the revenue contribution of 
Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields to the wider, economic 
development of Queensland? Similarly, what role did Cooktown and the 
goldfields play in attracting immigrants and investment capital to 
Queensland in the 1870s and early 1880s? Against those questions are the 
important issues of whether Cooktown and its hinterland were in fact ill-
served by the authorities in Brisbane and whether the long-term viability of 
Cooktown especially was jeopardised by the level of government spending 
on infrastructure development and public works generally. 
This chapter addresses those issues by examining the economic 
nexus between Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields, and then the 
economic importance of both in the wider context of Queensland's overall 
development in the 1870s and 1880s. It makes the point that although the 
direct economic contribution of Cooktown and the Palmer to the wider 
development of Queensland should not be over-stated, an important aspect 
The opening of the track from Cooktown to the Palmer River diggings is often cited 
as an example of government enterprise in the development of the goldfields of Far 
North Queensland. There had been, however, very little interest shown by the 
government in the physical development of mining townships at, for example, the 
Gilbert River or Georgetown. 
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was the optimism they inspired, and the catalj^ic effect they had, upon the 
Queensland economy in the 1870s and early 1880s. 
The chapter also addresses Cooktown's move to municipal 
government and parhamentary representation, within the context of the 
community's efforts to achieve what was perceived to be an equitable share 
of government resources. It concludes, after analysing the 'balance sheet' of 
revenue versus expenditure, that the people of Cooktown probably had some 
justification in feeling 'hard done' by successive governments. Indeed, the 
prevailing sentiment — which carries forward into the next chapter — was 
that the town had a fiiture, and needed only a fair share of outside help to 
achieve it. 
The Economic Nexus between Cooktown and the Pahner 
In many contemporary discussions of the economic importance of 
Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields, the assumption seemed to be 
that the two were synonymous, at least in economic terms.'* Yet the two 
locations were some 200 kilometres apart by road (see Map 6.1 over), 
Ballarat, in contrast, only some eighty kilometres fi-om the Victorian 
coastline, would rarely have been linked in an economic sense with the ports 
of either Geelong or Melbourne. 
See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 4 October 1876, p. 2 urging 
the expenditure by the government of at least £100,000 for roads and bridges 
between Cooktown and the Palmer on the basis that 'our contribution to the general 
revenue is ... nearly £100,000 per annum'. 
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Map 6.1 - Cooktown and the Palmer River Goldfields Settlements 
M x) a v bM< 
PALMER RIVER GOLDFIELDS 
Source: N. Eirkman, The Palmer River goldfield' in KH. Kennedy (ed.). Readings in North 
Queensland Mining history, James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 
1980, p. 112. 
The essential difference would seem to be that Cooktown was 
estabhshed for the sole purpose of providing a point of access (and market 
outiet) for the Palmer River goldfields, whereas Geelong and Melbourne 
were towns in their own right well before the discovery of gold in the 
Victorian hinterland in the early 1850s. The other key difference was that 
Ballarat and Bendigo, for example, similarly became service centres in then-
own right and attained town status within a year or so of the arrival of the 
first gold-miners into the area. The Palmer River goldfields, by contrast, 
failed to sustain any permanent settiement larger than the makeshift 
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townships of Palmerville, Ma3^own, Byerstown and Lukinville (see Map 6.1 
on previous page).^ 
The reasons behind the impermanence of the Palmer townships 
are probably several. Obviously, the alluvial nature of the goldfields meant 
that the workforce was constantly shifting in pursuit of new workings.^ The 
opening of new fields elsewhere also drew off many European miners, who 
seemed easily lured by the prospect of'greener pastures'.'' The other 
important factor was that the Palmer River goldfields were at the extreme 
limits of the European fi-ontier in northern Queensland, with little 
likelihood that the Palmer would prove to be the stepping-ofiF point for 
undeveloped areas of the hinterland further inland.^ Accordingly, there was 
little incentive for the government to provide good access roads into the 
area, as the first link in a transportation network radiating further inland. 
There was similarly little incentive for the government to put in 
place the physical infrastructure at the Palmer itself, as the basis of a 
possible regional hub. Likewise, there would have been little inclination on 
the part of commercial firms to set up businesses at the Palmer in the 
expectation of being able to expand their market base into adjoining areas .^  
It probably does seem reasonable, therefore, for Cooktown and the Palmer 
River goldfields, despite the physical distance between them, to be 
considered as an economic entity in any consideration of their contribution 
to the wider development of Queensland. 
For a good account of the physical development of the Palmer mining settlements 
see N. Kirkman, The Palmer River goldfield' in KH. Kennedy (ed.), Readings in 
North Queensland mining history, James Cook University of North Queensland, 
Townsville, 1980, pp. 112-44. 
The distance between Lukinville and Byerstown, the eastern and western ends 
respectively of the Palmer River goldfields, was some 120 kilometres. The main 
goldmining centre of Ballarat, by contrast, was in the Buninyong Range only some 
ten kilometres south of the town. 
The opening of the Hodgkinson goldfields in mid 1876, for example, resulted in an 
exodus of European miners from the Palmer and Etheridge fields: see, for example, 
the report of the Etheridge goldfield warden in the Annual Report of the 
Department of Mines for 1877, as tabled in Votes and proceedings of the Legislative 
Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2, 1878, p. 311. 
That was in marked contrast to Bendigo, for example, which became the nodal point 
for Victoria's development of the Murray Valley basin. 
See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 5 December 1874, p. 3 complaining that 
not a single bank had established a branch or agency at the Palmer, fully a year 
after the opening of the goldfields. 
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That consideration does, however, have perhaps two qualifications. 
The first, as discussed in Chapter 2, is that the raison d'etre of Cooktown as 
the port for the Palmer did not go unchallenged in the early years of the 
town, with Weary Bay, CEU-dwell, Cairns and even Townsville at times being 
touted as preferred points of access. Certainly, once the Hodgkinson 
goldfield was opened in mid 1876 (some eighty kilometres southeast of the 
Palmer), the bulk of its trade was with Port Douglas and Cairns.^^ 
The second qualification is that from about 1876 onwards, as the 
output fi-om the Palmer peaked, certain voices within the Cooktown 
community attempted to downplay the town's dependency upon the Palmer. 
An editorial in The Cooktown Courier of early 1876 for example, asserted 
that 
... although to a very great extent dependent on the 
success of the Palmer ... [the town] has within itself, 
as the centre of a rising and prosperous population, 
all the elements attendant upon the formation of one 
of the most important ports along the northeast coast 
of Australia. ^ 1 
The Economic Importance of Cooktown and the Palmer 
How best to measure the economic importance of a town or region 
is a moot point. Obviously, the clear distinction needs to be made between a 
town or region's contribution to colonial product, which is the sum of private 
and public product, and government revenue — the latter being the figure 
which determines the amount, apart fi-om loans and deficits, the 
government had available for expenditure.^^ 
In Cooktown's case, contemporary accounts tended to focus — 
mistakenly in an economic sense — on gold production and customs 
^^  See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 11 August 1877, p. 3 
estimating that 'only one-twentieth of our revenue is derived from duties collected 
on Hodgkinson goods'. 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 22 January 1876, p. 2. 
2^ The key difficulty in analysing a town's contribution to colonial product is the 
dearth of available statistics. 
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revenue.^3 indeed, both The Cooktown Courier and The Cooktown Herald 
dihgentiy reported customs receipts on a fortnightly basis throughout most 
of 1874 and 1875, while the official returns of annual gold production on the 
Palmer were fi-equently a source of lengthy editorial comment.^'* The 
comparative statements showing the share of revenue collected at the 
various Queensland ports were a source of similar editorial comment, with 
The Cooktown Courier in October 1878, for example, asserting that the 
figures for the previous quarter illustrated that 
... we axe again entitled to claim for ourselves the 
position of being the second port in the colony 
[after Brisbane].^^ 
Newspaper editorials were also quick to correct any perceived 
understatement in the official returns. The Cooktown Herald in April 1874, 
for example, claimed that customs duty on five-sixths of the goods imported 
to Cooktown was typically paid at either Brisbane or Rockhampton, and 
that 
... if the duty paid on them were but added to the 
revenue collected here ... we might reasonably 
place the total [for the first two weeks of April 
1874] at £8000 [rather than £2140].i6 
A similar editorial theme was that thousands of ounces of gold 
were smuggled out of the country by departing Chinese, thus resulting in an 
®^ Some emphasis was also given to shipping numbers and cargo tonnages. Those 
statistics were somewhat meaningless, however, in a comparative context with 
other ports, given that some ships destined for southern ports dropped off only a 
handful of passengers and cargo, against others destined exclusively for Cooktown. 
The available records do not show sufficient cargo details, in particular, to enable 
any meaningful comparisons. 
^* See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 2 noting that the town 
'should see some return in the form of roads' for the £2140 in customs receipts 
collected in the first two weeks of April. See also the editorial in The Cooktown 
Courier, 1 January 1876, p. 2 noting that gold production for 1875 had increased 
41,383 ounces over the previous year, while customs revenue had increased from 
£22,951 to £49,524. 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 18 October 1878, p. 2. 
1^ CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 2. 
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understatement of actual production figures.^'' Newspapers also lambasted 
the government for its charge of one shilhng and six-pence per ounce of gold 
conveyed under police escort from the Palmer River to Cooktown. The basis 
of their criticism was that many miners were reputedly sending their gold to 
Georgetown to evade the tax, with the result that Cooktown was missing 
out on '[the] credit for the amount which the district really produces'.^^ 
Notwithstanding such concerns for the accuracy of the official 
figures, it is evident that — between 1874 and 1877 in particular — the 
Psdmer River goldfields provided a significant contribution to economic 
growth in the colony.^^ In the space of those five years, the Pahner 
produced 839,000 ounces of gold, valued at nearly £3 million.20 That was 28 
per cent more than the Charters Towers' fields had produced in six years 
and 25 per cent more than Gjnnpie had produced in ten years.2i Indeed, as 
can be seen at Figure 6.1, the Palmer River between 1873 and 1879 was 
clearly the richest gold discovery in the first twenty-five years of 
Queensland. 
19 
"^^  See, for example, the assertion in The Cooktown Courier, 27 June 1877, p. 3 that the 
456 Chinese passengers departing for Hong Kong on the SS Zamboanga were 
probably smuggling out at least 500 ounces of gold. The irony was that no duty was 
payable on gold declared for export; the legislation simply required that exports be 
declared to the Collector of Customs. 
^^ See The Cooktown Courier, 20 June 1874, p. 3. 
That contribution, however, needs to be seen in the context of the contributory 
input from other sectors, including the pastoral, agricultural, fishing, 
manufacturing and transport industries, for example. Indeed, across the period 
1861-90, it was the expansion of the pastoral industry in Queensland which played 
a key role in overall economic growth: see J.R. Laverty, 'The Queensland economy 
1860-1915' in D.J. Murphy (ed.). Prelude to power: the rise and fall of the Labor 
Party in Queensland, 1815-1915, Jacaranda Press, Milton, 1970, p. 29. 
See QVP, 2, 1886, p. 263. 
21 QVP, 2, 1886, p. 263. 
20 
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Figure 6.1 - Gold Production in Queensland 1867-85 
(showing total annutJ production stratified into the major fields) 
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Source: Data derived from Annual Reports of the Queensland Department of Mines as published in 
successive issues of QVP, 1878-85. Figures for 1867-76 derived from a variety of sources 
including The Cooktown Courier and CHPRA, as well as extrapolations based on the returns 
in QVP, 1, 1906, pp. 1186-7. 
In the longer term, however, the significance of the Palmer River 
goldfields pales somewhat. Figure 6.2 (over), for example, extending the 
illustration of gold production in Queensland out to 1905, shows that the 
output fi-om the Palmer River was eventually dwarfed by that of Charters 
Towers and 'other fields' in the 1880s and 1890s. Indeed, the aggregates 
from the fields at Charters Towers and Gympie surpassed the Palmer River 
in 1885 and 1887 respectively.^2 
22 See QVP, 2, 1886, p. 263 and QVP, 3, 1891, pp. 647-8. 
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Figure 6.2 - Gold Production in Queensland 1866-1905 
(showing total production by five-yearly periods stratified into the major fields) 
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Source: Data derived from Annual Report of the Queensland Department of Mines for 1905 
as published in QVP, 1, 1906, pp. 1186-7. 
Moreover, many contemporary newspaper accounts, citing the 
cash value of the gold which passed through Cooktown, gave the impression 
that the total amoiuit was being added directly to the coffers of the 
Queensland economy.23 As was discussed in Chapter 4, though, under the 
heading 'The Quantification of Commercial Activity, it is evident that only 
around 5 per cent of the value of each ounce of gold produced at the Palmer 
found its way into the general revenue of the colony, in the form of customs 
duty on goods imported through Cooktown.24 Moreover, Figure 4.7 (at page 
166) suggested that close to 50 per cent of the value of each Chinese-
produced ounce of gold went directly to China and that an additional 22 per 
cent ended up in the hands of a Chinese financier or merchant in Cooktown. 
Indeed, by applying the estimates at Figures 4.6 and 4.7 (at pages 
165 and 166 respectively) to the known yields of gold fi-om the Palmer, it 
can be seen from Figure 6.3 (over) that only around 40 per cent of the total 
value of production across the years 1874 to 1885 remained in European 
23 
24 
See, for example, the editorial discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 2 January 1875, 
p. 2 citing the value of gold produced in 1874 as £514,000. 
Figure 4.6 (at page 165) put the customs duty component of European-produced 
gold at 6.5 per cent, while Figure 4.7 (at page 166) estimated the same component 
for Chinese-produced gold at 4.4 per cent. 
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hands. Within that 40 per cent was the government's share of 5.1 per cent 
of the total, in the form of customs duty to the value of around £250,000. 
Chinese interests, by comparison, ended up with around £3 milhon of the 
total value of £5.02 million.25 
Figure 6.3 - The Monetary Share of Gold Produced on the Palmer River 
Goldfields 1874-85 
(by percentEiges of the 1.256 million ounces produced, valued at £5.02 milUon) 
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15.7% Chinese miners 
6.4% Chinese-owned shipping company 
15.2% Cooktowrvtjased Chinese supplier 
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5.1% customs duty 
5.3% Cooktown-based European supplier 
12.5% Cooktown-based European 
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1% Palmer-based European 
supplier 
4.4% Cooktown-based Chinese carrier 
Source: Calculated by applying the estimates at Figures 4.6 and 4.7 to the total yield 
from the Palmer River between 1874-85 (as listed In successive issues of QVP), 
indexed by the productivity ratios for European and Chinese miners as shown 
at Figure 4.5. 
So those in Cooktown who continued to talk up the raw figures for 
gold production, as an indicator of the town's economic importance within 
the colony, were — with the admitted benefit of hindsight — basically 
wrong on two counts. The first is that gold production needed to be seen, 
not simply against the value of gold mined elsewhere in the colony, but in 
the overall context of public and private product.^^ The second is that 
25 
26 
Calculated on the basis that Chinese interests, as shown at Figure 6.3, accounted 
for 58.1 per cent of the cost components of the total production of 1.256 million 
ounces (valued at about £5.02 million in total, at the sale price of £4 per ounce). 
It can be argued, of course, that without the benefit of the economic statistics and 
analyses so readily available today, it was probably reasonable for 'boosters' in 
Cooktown to use gold production as an indicator of the town's relative economic 
importance. 
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actual government revenue from gold production was considerably less than 
newspaper editorials, at least, fi-equently suggested. 
It is similarly evident that a niunber of other economic statistics 
for either Cooktown or the Palmer pale somewhat when considered in the 
wider context. An editorial in The Cooktown Courier of October 1876, for 
example, asserted that 
... our contribution to the general revenue is ... 
nearly £100,000 per annum [and that with other 
revenue added for licences etc]... we are contri-
buting more than one-fifth of the whole direct 
revenue of Queensland. ^ 7 
In reality, customs revenue in Cooktown never exceeded £70,700 per annmn 
nor more than 13.2 per cent of the Queensland total (see Figure 6.4 over). 
When licence fees for the Palmer, Etheridge and Hodgkinson goldfields were 
added in the peak year of 1877, the combined customs and licence revenue 
came to £78,644, representing 14.5 per cent of the Queensland total for the 
same revenue sources.^8 
Moreover, when viewed across the years 1874 to 1885, it can be 
seen fi-om Figure 6.4 (over) that customs revenue collected at Cooktown 
averaged around 8 per cent of the Queensland total and was declining to 
under 5 per cent by the mid 1880s. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 
7, the major factor in Cooktown's surge in revenue production between 1875 
and 1879 was not because of the wealth of gold being shipped out from the 
Palmer River. Rather, it was because of the influx of Chinese, and their 
ongoing resupply through the port of Cooktown. Once that flow subsided, in 
part because of the agitation of certain elements within the Cooktown 
community, the revenue production of Cooktown declined in parallel. 
2'^  See The Cooktown Courier, 4 October 1876, p. 2. 
The combined value of goldfields licences and customs revenue for Queensland in 
1877 was £543,667: see QVP, 2, 1878, p. 306. 
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Figure 6.4 - Customs Revenue in Cooktown 1874-84 
(in value terms and as a percentage of the Queensland total) 
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Source: Data derived from annual returns in successive issues of QVP, 1875-85. 
What the foregoing analysis suggests is that the economic 
contribution of Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields to the wider 
development of Queensland should not be over-stated. In direct financial 
terms, the importance of Cooktown and its hinterlsuid was short-lived and 
progressively eroded by the more systematic exploitation of gold deposits 
elsewhere in the colony. Equally, however, what should not be under-rated 
is the signific£ince of the Palmer River goldfields in terms of the optimism 
they inspired within Queensland and, indeed, the catalytic effect they had 
upon the overall Queensland economy in the 1870s and early 1880s. 
The Catalytic Importance of Cooktown and the Pahner 
Certainly, it has been conventional wisdom that while the 
discovery of gold at Gympie in 1867 rescued the aihng Queensland economy 
from severe recession, it was the discovery of alluvigJ gold in Far North 
Queensland in the early 1870s which climaxed public optimism and set the 
stage for the boom of the 1870s and 1880s.29 The Cooktown Courier in early 
March 1875, for example, contended that the discoveries at the Palmer had 
'raised the colony of Queensland ... in European estimation and very 
29 See, for example, T.A. Coghlan, Labour and industry in Australia, Vol. 3, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1918, p. 1633 and Laverty, The Queensland economy' 
p. 30. 
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materially improved the value of Queensland seciuities'.^o The Cooktown 
Herald similarly asserted that 
... if the American estimate [based on the Califomian 
experience] is correct, the simple annoiuicement of the 
discovery of gold in this district was worth a large stun 
of money to Queensland. ^ ^ 
Nevertheless, the relative importance of gold-mining — as has 
been discussed earlier — needs to be considered in the context of the wider 
economic development of Queensland. Similarly, because the Queensland 
economy was at an earlier stage of development than the southern colonies, 
economic development in Queensland was more dependent upon (and more 
influenced by) primary industries, with Butlin's thesis of the importance of 
urban growth not readily applicable to Queensland until the late 1880s.^^ 
The geography of Queensland, the decentralisation of its population and the 
lack of a centralised transport and communications system further militated 
against urban concentration, while elevating the relative importance of 
mining, agriculture and the pastoral industry compared to the southern 
colonies.^3 
The rapid inflow of British investment capital similarly needs to 
be seen in a context wider than its acknowledged link to the gold discoveries 
in North Queensland. Clearly, the reports fi-om the Palmer contributed 
significantly to the highly optimistic view held in London of the colony's 
potential. But it was not until afl:er 1879 (by which time the Palmer was 
effectively in decline) that a plentiful supply of British capital began to flow 
into Queensland, made available fi-om the British loan market as a result of 
the changed investment climate in the West Indies.^"^ Butlin also contends 
that it was primarily the sustained gold production of the 1850s £uid 1860s 
in Victoria which encouraged the influx of British capital to Australia and 
that, by the mid 1870s, it was the wool boom rather than gold which had 
^ The Cooktown Courier, 6 March 1875, p. 2. 
^ CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 3. 
See Laverty, The Queensland economy', pp. 29 and 31. 
See Laverty, The Queensland economy*, p. 35. 
See G.P. Taylor, 'Business and pohtics in Queensland, 1859-1895' in The New 
Zealand Journal of History, 1, 1, April 1967, pp. 77-8. 
32 
33 
U 
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'assume[d] a controlling position in Austrahan external economic 
relations'.^^ 
Another dimension is the role of the gold discoveries in attracting 
immigrants to Queensland. Again, conventional wisdom is that the Palmer 
River gold-rush not only attracted to Queensland a large number of 
Chinese, and Europeans from elsewhere in Australia, but was important 
also in drawing a considerable niunber of prospective residents to the colony 
from Great Britain and Ireland.^ The Cooktown Herald in July 1874 noted 
that 
[t]here is no influence ... that will so rapidly draw 
a large population to a country ... as the discovery 
ofgold.37 
The fact that Queensland's population increased from some 
125,000 in 1871 to 181,288 by 1876, and that the population of North 
Queensland increased across the same period from the low hundreds to in 
excess of 19,000, would seem to support such view.^^ What is less clear, 
though, is how many of the immigrants to Queensland were actually 
destined for the goldfields. Most of the 20,654 Chinese who disembarked at 
Cooktown between 1875 and 1877 were headed for the Palmer River.^^ But 
given that no ships from Europe berthed at Cooktown before November 
1881, it is difficult to estimate how many of the 31,204 immigrants from 
Great Britain and Ireland, who arrived in Queensland between 1874 and 
1878, made their way north to the Palmer."^ 
m 
^^ N.G. Butlin, Investment in Australian economic development 1861-1900, Cambridge 
University Press, London, 1964, pp. 32-35. 
See, for example, Butlin, Investment in Australian economic development, p. 27 
noting that almost all of the increase in Australia's population between 1861 and 
1890 was attributable to immigration from Great Britain and Ireland. See also 
J.R. Laverty, 'urban development' in W.H. Richmond and P.C. Sharma (eds.), 
Mining and Australia, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1983, p. 123 
noting that 'Queensland ... also experienced the demographic quickening that gold 
engendered'. 
I CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 3. 
See population statistics tabled by the Registrar-General in QVP, 2, 1874, p. 7 and 
QVP, 2, 1876, pp. 376, 812 and 819. 
The total derived from 'immigration to Cooktown' statistics in successive issues of 
QVP, 1876-78. 
The total derived from 'immigration to Queensland' statistics in successive issues of 
QVP, 1875-79. 
3S 
m 
40 
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It is axiomatic that a percentage of them would have headed for 
the Palmer, although how many had left their homeland with the specific 
intention of doing so is unknown. It is similarly imclear how many of those 
who immigrated with the intention of proceeding to the goldfields changed 
their minds once they arrived in Brisbane and were confi-onted with the 
physical realities of the Queensland environment.^! It is reasonable to 
assume that a fair proportion of each arriving ship-load would have been 
seeking more traditional employment. 
Indeed, in reporting the assimilation of a group of recent arrivals 
via the immigration depot in Townsville, The Cooktown Herald in July 1875 
gave no indication that any were interested in employment in the 
Palmer/Cooktown area, despite the plea that '[this district] would be glad to 
take a fair share of every instalment of such arrivals'.42 That appeal 
probably related primarily to the shortage in Cooktown of single females for 
emplojnnent as domestic servants; nevertheless, editorials in the Cooktown 
newspapers throughout 1875 and 1876 continued to press the government 
'for our quota' of immigrants, suggesting perhaps that very few of those who 
entered Queensland via other ports were subsequently trans-shipping to 
Cooktown.43 
Clearly, it is necessary in this context to differentiate between 
immigrants destined for Cooktown and those heading for the Palmer. It 
may be, therefore, that the Palmer had a higher proportion of recent 
immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland than did Cooktown. The figtn-es 
at Table 6.1 (over) show that the combined European population of the 
Palmer and Hodgkinson goldfields varied across the period 1874 to 1881 
from a low of 1099 to a high of 3600. Accepting that the proportion of the 
goldfields workforce bom in the British Isles was around 54 per cent at the 
^^ A number of immigrants also took advantage of the assisted-scheme offered by 
Queensland and used it as a convenient entry point to the southern colonies. 
Although the extent of remigration was also dependent upon local employment 
conditions, the overall loss was not of great significance: see Coghlan, Labour and 
industry, p. 1292-4. 
42 CHPRA, 7 July 1875, p. 2. 
' An ongoing complaint by the local newspapers throughout the mid 1870s was that 
the government needed to do more to encourage single females to seek employment 
in Cooktown as domestic servants: see, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 
6 November 1875, p. 2. See also CHPRA, 6 November 1875, p. 2 noting that 'we 
trust that the claims of Cooktown will not be neglected by the government'. 
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1876 census and 40 per cent at the 1881 census,^^ it can be seen from 
column (d) that the British Isles-bom were probably at their peak of around 
1900 in 1877. 
A fair percentage of that number, however, would have been 
resident in Queensland or one of the southern colonies for at least one year. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that the proportion of newly-arrived 
immigrants (that is, having arrived in Australia within the previous twelve 
months) would not have exceeded 50 per cent of the British Isles-bom 
population in any one year. On that basis, colunuis (e) (f) and (g) show 
respectively the probable maximum number of recently-arrived innnigrants 
from Great Britain and Ireland at the goldfields, the total number of such 
immigrants arriving in Queensland and the percentage of the former 
against the latter. The outcome suggests that less than 20 per cent (and 
more hkely only around 10 per cent) of immigrants from Great Britain and 
Ireland headed for the goldfields of Far North Queensland upon their 
arrival in Queensland.'*^ 
Table 6.1 - The Estimated Niunber of Immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland 
at the Palmer River and Hodgkinson Goldfields 1874-81 
Years 
m (a) : 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
Average 
Eiirop>ean 
Population *1 
(b) 
2330 
2100 
3400 
3600 
1782 
1422 
1363 
1099 
1967 
Proportion of 
British Isles-bom 
at the goldfields *2 
(0 
59.3% 
56.6% 
53.9% 
51.1% 
48.3% 
45.6% 
42.9% 
40.2% 
49.7% 
Number of 
British Isles-
bom at the 
goldfields *3 
(d) 
1382 
1189 
1833 
1840 
861 
648 
585 
442 
1098 
Number of 
recently-arrived 
British Isles-bom 
at the goldfields *4 
(e) 
691 
595 
917 
920 
431 
324 
293 
221 
549 
Number of 
British Isles 
immigrants 
to Qld *5 
(0 
8854 
5871 
5540 
4834 
6105 
3150 
3404 
4289 
5256 
Column (e) 
as 
percentage 
of(f) 
(g) 
7.8% 
10.1% 
16.5% 
19.0% 
7.1% 
10.3% 
8.6% 
5.2% 
10.5% 
Notes: 1. Data derived from'population of the goldfields'statistics in successive issues of QVP, 1875-82. 
2. Figures for 1876 and 1881 from census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 505 and QVP, 2, 1882, 
p. 975. Remaining figures derived by extrapolation. 
3. Calculated by multiplying column (b) by (c). 
4. Derived on the basis that 50 per cent of column (d) may reasonably have arrived from their 
44 
45 
See census statistics in QVP, 2, 1877, p. 505 and QVP, 2, 1882, p. 975. 
That assessment also sits reasonably with anecdotal evidence which would seem to 
suggest that 'new chums' were very much in the minority: see, for example, the 
report in CHPRA, 12 December 1874, p. 3 noting the arrival of new miners who, 
'judging from their heavy clothing ... [had only recently arrived in Queensland]'. 
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homeland within the past twelve months. 
5. Data derived from "immigration to Queensland' statistics in successive issues of QVP, 1875-82. 
That assessment does not, nor is it meant to, refute the opening 
proposition that the Palmer River gold-rush attracted immigrants from 
Great Britain and Ireland to Queensland. Rather, it reinforces the view 
that the Palmer River goldfields were seen as epitomising the economic 
potential of Queensland, as well as the perceived improved standard of 
living possible within the Australian colonies. Coming on top of the 
Queensland Government's extremely active progr£im of encoiu-aging 
immigration, including by a range of financial inducements,'*^ the Palmer 
River gold discoveries were probably seen by a number of prospective 
immigrgints as the icing on an already attractive cake. 
The Move to Municipal Government 
Against that background, the settlement of Cooktown progressed 
steadily across the years 1874 and 1875 from a revenue-collecting port of 
access for the Palmer to a fledgling township. Such progress, however, was 
largely fortuitous and more the result of a burgeoning but unstructured 
business community than any sense of civic purpose. Indeed, the extent of 
civic indifference would have to rate as one of the key features of the history 
of early Cooktown, with The Cooktown Herald noting in late 1875 that 
... it would be a source of great gratification to us 
if we could only discover what is the cause of the 
peculiar apathy that exists among the Cooktown 
public regarding ... [a municipality].^'^ 
Cooktown was not alone, though, in its indifference towards 
municipal affairs. The Municipal Institutions Act of 1864, based upon the 
similar New South Wales legislation of 1858, left the initiative for the 
incorporation of a town or rural community with its prospective 
46 
47 
See the comment by W.R. Johnston, The call of the land: a history of Queensland to 
the present day, Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1982, p. 90 that 'Queensland was the 
leading immigration colony in the 1870s and 1880s, mainly because the government 
was so actively seeking migrants and offering so many inducements'. 
CHPRA, 13 October 1875, p. 2. As will be seen in the paragraphs that follow, that 
statement has a certain irony given that it was The Cooktown Herald which so 
strongly denounced the idea of a municipality throughout most of 1874. 
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ratepayers.'*8 Brisbane itself, for example, had become incorporated in 1859, 
followed in 1860 by Rockhampton, Toowoomba and Ipswich, in 1861 by 
Maryborough and Warwick, in 1863 by Gladstone, Dalby and Bowen, and in 
the late 1860s by Mackay and Townsville. As at 1875, however, several 
towns with a history longer than Cooktown's, notably Gympie, Bundaberg 
and Charters Towers, remained unincorporated. 
In Cooktown's case, its early reluctance to seek mimicipal status 
seems to have several strands. As mentioned already, many within the 
community appe£u-ed largely indifferent to civic advancement. In part, that 
probably stemmed from a well-foimded scepticism that the township might 
not survive beyond 1874.4^ It also derived, perhaps in a related way, from 
the preoccupation of many residents with their business affairs, with The 
Cooktown Courier noting in late 1874 that 
... we fear that everybody is at present too busily 
engaged in their private business to give any 
time to the public.^ 
Of those who were interested enough to consider the prospects of a 
municipality, three concerns were commonly voiced in any discussion of the 
issue. The first was that incorporation was having somewhat mixed 
successes elsewhere, with the insolvency of the Sydney corporation and 
similar problems in Brisbane and Bundaberg, in particular, frequently cited 
as the fate awaiting Cooktown.^^ The second concern was that 
incorporation would result in the immediate imposition of direct taxes on 
every household and business in the township, typically at the annual rate 
^° Under the legislation, the government could incorporate a municipality if it received 
a petition from at least 100 residents, provided a covmter-petition with a greater 
number of signatures was not received. For a comprehensive account of the history 
of local government in Queensland, see J.R. Laverty, 'An historical survey of local 
government in Queensland' in J.D. Tucker et al. Local government in Queensland, 
Vol. 1, Australian Institute of Urban Studies, Canberra, 1981, pp. 73-104.. 
^ See, for example, a letter to the editor in The Cooktown Courier, 9 May 1874, p. 3 
suggesting the issue of business licences rather than land sales, at least 'until we 
see whether southern prognostication of Cooktown being abandoned within a few 
months is verified'. 
^° The Cooktown Courier, 31 October 1874, p. 3. 
^^ An editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 18 July 1874, p. 3, for example, asserted that 
'the examples of Sydney, Brisbane and Maryborough do not prejudice us in favour of 
mayors and aldermen'. 
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of one shilling in the pound on the assessed value of every property.52 The 
Cooktown Herald in July 1874 wsu-ned its readers that 
... under municipal government, every store, house, 
[and] poor men's humpy ... will all be taxed to carry 
on - what we consider would be a white elephant -
the Cooktown Corporation. ^ ^ 
The third and undoubtedly the main concern was the perception 
that incorporation would allow the government to abrogate its financial 
responsibilities towards the township.^'* In this regard, Cooktown was not 
alone in its suspicion that one of the aims of colonial administrations in 
encouraging the devolution of government to the local level was 'to divest 
themselves of the trivia of troublesome local works and services'.^^ 
Certainly, The Cooktown Herald was of the view that 
... the government would be only too glad to throw 
us on oiu" own hook as it would relieve them of 
considerable anxiety and much expense.^ 
In reality, the intention under both the Municipal Institutions Act 
of 1864 and the Local Government Act of 1878 (and the Divisional Boards 
Act of 1879) was that the fiuictions and powers of municipal authorities 
would be limited strictly to local works and services, and that they would 
not, for example, be responsible for education or police, although they would 
® The other major source of income, conveniently overlooked by municipal critics, was 
that the government would pay a subsidy or 'endowment' of rate revenue for the 
first fifteen years (diminishing in five-yearly intervals): see Laverty, 'An historical 
survey*, p. 76. The Municipalities Act of 1861 also granted councils an endowment 
of half of the proceeds of the sale of crown land within the municipality 
(subsequently abolished by the Municipal Endowments Act of 1876, but replaced 
with a more generous general rate endowment). For a more detailed discussion of 
local government legislation, see G. Greenwood and J.R. Laverty (eds.), Brisbane 
1859-1959: a history of local government, Brisbane City Council, Brisbane, 1959 
and J.R. Laverty, 'The History of Municipal Government in Brisbane 1859-1925', 
PhD thesis. University of Queensland, 1968. 
^ CHPRA, 8 July 1874, p. 3. 
^* Largely because of the failure of the 'voluntary* method of incorporation, no doubt 
partly because of this concern, the Queensland government introduced legislation, 
namely the Local Government Act of 1878 and the Divisional Boards Act of 1879, 
which widened both the scope and appeal of local government, but also did away 
with the voluntary principle of incorporation: see Laverty, 'An historical survey', 
p. 79. 
" See Laverty, 'An historical survey", p. 74 noting also that 'colonial governments also 
saw ... [it] as a means of limiting the operation of the notorious roads and bridges 
Member'. 
Sfi CHPRA, 8 July 1874, p. 3. 
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be required to appoint a local board of health and meet the expenses it 
incurred.57 For the business community of Cooktown, with its trading links 
to the Palmer vitally dependent on road conununications, the prospect that 
local authorities might be made responsible for the fimding and upkeep of 
roads and bridges to the Palmer was not an attractive proposition.58 
Throughout most of 1874, therefore. The Cooktown Herald — as 
the defacto mouthpiece of the business community — vociferously 
denounced calls by the more civic-minded The Cooktown Courier for the 
formation of a mimicipality. The Cooktown Herald's suggestion, based 
loosely on the experiences of Melbourne in the 1850s, was for a 'committee 
of improvement', which would pass resolutions to a yet-to-be-appointed local 
member for presentation to parliament.^^ In the view of The Cooktown 
Herald 
... we shall obtain more attention fi-om the government 
by aid of an Improvement Committee than we ever 
would under a mimicipality.^^ 
By late 1874, however. The Cooktown Herald was changing its 
tune. That presumably was because the experience of the first year of 
settlement, in terms of the allocation of government expenditure, had led 
many residents to believe that the Government's only real interest in 
Cooktown related to the collection of revenue.^^ In December 1874, The 
Cooktown Herald rather cautiously contended that 
... [a]lthough municipalities have not been very 
successful in Queensland, we believe now if we 
^^ See Laverty, 'An historical survey*, pp. 75 and 78. 
®® Another issue, which was to become a real bone of contention over the years to 
follow, was that the Cooktown hospital serviced the entire Cook District, including 
the Palmer River goldfields. Under local government devolution, the authorities in 
Cooktown would become responsible for the costs of treating infectious disease 
patients (if the area was 'declared' under the relevant Health Act), while other 
treatment would be funded by public subscriptions and an associated government 
subsidy. See, for example, the discussion in Greenwood and Laverty, Brisbane 
1859-1959, pp. 232-7. 
®® See the discussion in CHPRA, 29 July 1874, p. 2 noting that in Melbourne, the 
rapid progress in public works development 'was brought about by the energetic 
action of private individuals acting on the government'. 
CHPRA, 8 July 1874, p. 3. 
• See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 25 November 1874, p. 2 asserting that 
'[t]he government have done nothing for us .... [They are] [alnxious only to collect 
the revenue of the town'. 
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had one in Cooktown it would be better for the 
inhabit£uits.^2 
What also seems to have been emerging within the community at 
about that time was an appreciation that the business commiuiity's focus on 
its trading hnks with the Palmer was proving to be somewhat at the 
expense of public works and services in Cooktown. Dining the visit by the 
Colonial Treasurer in October 1874, for example, a deputation of residents 
— mainly businessmen — raised such issues as an upgraded road to the 
Palmer, the connection of the telegraph line via the goldfields, the extension 
of the wharves in Cooktown and a plea to reduce the gold escort fee to six-
pence per ounce.^ By late 1875, though, residents of the town were 
bemoaning the fact that they still had no fire brigade, their side streets were 
still imsurfaced, there was no system of drainage in the town and the 
general standard of health continued to be jeopardised by the lack of fi-esh 
water.^ "* 
The year 1875, therefore, saw both local newspapers progressively 
canvassing support for a municipahty. Increasingly also, editorials began to 
highlight what they saw as the widening gap between the revenue 
generated by the town and the expenditure allocated to the district by 
govemment.^5 Although its views are not specifically recorded, the business 
community had presumably come to the view that its interests would 
similarly best be served by decisions on civic infrastructure and services 
being made at the local level. In what was a complete tiun-around fi-om a 
year earlier, the business community's faltering standard-bearer announced 
in late 1875 that 
... the formation of a Municipality will do more to 
advance the true interests of Cooktown in a year 
than could have been hoped for from the govem-
men in five.^^ 
62 CHPRA, 9 December 1874, p. 2. 
^^ See the report of discussions in The Cooktown Courier, 17 October 1874, p. 4. The 
need for a time gun for example, rated ninth on a list of fourteen items, with a 
water supply for the town at number thirteen. 
°^ See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 20 October 1875, p. 2. 
®^  A not infrequent theme was also that, in the absence of municipal status, the 
proceeds of all land sales were going directly to the government: see, for example, 
CHPRA, 10 February 1875, p. 2 and The Cooktown Courier, 21 July 1875, p. 3. 
®* CHPRA, 25 December 1875, p. 2. 
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In a further irony, it was the editor of The Cooktown Herald, 
W.H.L. Bailey, who was the co-organiser in late October 1875 of the petition 
seeking the town's incorporation as a mimicipality.^^ Within the space of 
several days, the petition had the necessary minimum of 100 signatures (of 
prospective ratepayers) and was forwarded to the Executive Council,^ with 
The Cooktown Courier noting on 20 November 'no counter-petition in 
hand'.^^ The reasonable expectation would have been that, barring 
luiforeseen complications, Cooktown would be proclaimed a municipality 
three months after the petition's receipt by the Executive Coimcil. 
In the event, Cooktown was not proclaimed a municipality luitU 3 
April 1876.70 In the interim, Cooktown seems once again to have lapsed 
into civic inactivity. The Cooktown Courier, clearly conscious that 
aldermanic elections would need to be held within three months of the date 
of proclamation, attempted in January 1876 to arouse public interest in the 
town's imminent elevation to municipal status.7^ Two months later, with 
almost a touch of despair. The Cooktown Courier noted that 
it is about time that some stir was made as to 
who would be the most fit and proper nine 
persons to commit our destiny to.72 
Eventually, and seemingly prompted by the Police Magistrate in 
his capacity as Retin-ning Officer, council elections were set for Monday 5 
Jime 1876. Three weeks beforehand, with the closing date for the 
nomination of candidates imminent, The Cooktown Herald noted that 'very 
little signs of interest are manifest'. 73 By the due date, nineteen residents of 
69 
°^ The other co-organiser was Henry Milford, a solicitor: see CHPRA, 27 October 
1875, p. 2. 
6^ An editorial in CHPRA, 27 October 1875, p. 2 noted that 'without the sUghtest 
trouble ... [the organisers] obtained one hundred and thirty-five of the most 
influential signatures in town'. 
See The Cooktown Courier, 20 November 1875, p. 2. As mentioned previously, the 
petition could be negated by a coimter-petition signed by more individuals. 
'^ See Queensland Government Gazette, Vol. 18, 1876, p. 768. The delay presumably 
was simply the result of minor administrative hold-ups over the Christmas/New 
Year period. 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 14 January 1876, p. 2. 
^2 The Cooktown Courier, 4 March 1876, p. 2. 
CHPRA, 17 May 1876, p. 2. Under Part 3 Section 15 of the Act, candidates were not 
required to lodge a deposit but needed to be nominated by five eligible voters, as 
well as providing a written statement to the returning officer signifying their 
willingness to serve if elected. 
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Cooktown had nominated for the nine positions available; all bar one were 
merchants or tradesmen, the one exception being a solicitor. 74 Under the 
electoral regulations, the nineteen names were listed alphabetically on the 
ballot paper, with electors required to mark their nine preferences by 
scoring out ten other names. 75 
On the day of the elections, it seems that only about seventy-five 
electors (from a resident population of around 2200) cast their vote. 76 All 
the winning candidates received more than forty-two individual votes. 77 
The Returning Officer, Howard St George, caused something of a stir by 
refusing to accept the votes of an unrecorded but significant number of 
residents, on the basis that they were not duly registered on the electoral 
roll. At the official declaration ceremony, Howard St George publicly 
regretted that he had been obliged to refiise so many votes but explained 
that 
... it was the Act, which had compelled him to 
do so [and that] he was not accountable for 
the stringency of that Act. 78 
In the months that followed, Cooktown's municipal affairs 
stumbled often and made particularly rocky progress.79 As has been 
discussed in earher chapters, the bitter rivalry between the Town Clerk and 
the aspiring alderman William Simpson led not fi-equently to council 
meetings in late 1876 and early 1877 ending in uproar.^ More generally, 
council affairs were plagued by mismanagement, occasional suspicions of 
embezzlement and some questionable public works priorities. In early 1879, 
The Cooktown Courier — in an editorial critical of Alderman Hodel for 
having authorised the employment of labourers on roadworks about the 
•^4 See CHPRA, 3 June 1876, p. 2. 
®^ The instructions for voting were published in both local newspapers. The Cooktown 
Herald, in commenting on the requirement to score out ten names, noted that 'a 
mistake here will be fatal': see CHPRA, 3 June 1876, p. 2. 
•" Derived by dividing the total votes cast (664) by nine, and allowing for a small 
number of informal votes: see the poll results in CHPRA, 7 June 1876, p. 2. 
*' A notable loser was William Simpson who, as discussed in Chapter 5, was later to 
prove extremely disruptive to Council proceedings. 
*7 See CHPRA, 7 June 1876, p. 2 noting that 'many were consequently disfranchised 
who really had the required qualifications'. 
The financial affairs of the council between 1876 and 1885 are addressed in more 
detail in Chapter 7. 
See the discussion under the heading 'Community Interest in Civic Affairs' in 
Chapter 4. 
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town, without the approval of council and without there being funds 
avEulable to pay them — lamented that 
[t]he Municipal Council of this town has rendered 
itself famous among the municipalities of Queens-
land for doing some of the most extraordinary 
things that could possibly be conceived.^! 
Certainly, one of the most contentious issues in Cooktown's 
municipal affairs in the late 1870s was the relative priorities afforded to 
street formation over public health. The view of the business community 
seems to have been that well-surfaced streets, with properly-constructed 
kerbs and gutters were important in presenting to prospective residents a 
favourable image of Cooktown as a place to settle or transact business.^^ 
The view of the 'man in the street', as championed by The Cooktown 
Courier, in its repeated calls for a permanent water supply, was that 
... [we] are decidedly inclined to prefer the spectacle 
of a sound, healthy man stumbling along a rough 
street, to watching a string of coffins borne noise-
lessly over the most splendidly made roadway in 
Queensland.^ 
Another vexed but less contentious issue related to the steadily 
growing Chinese population in the town.^ Item three on the agenda of the 
first working meeting of the new council, for example, was a notice of 
motion to the effect that 'every Chinaman not legitimately engaged in 
business shall be removed without the Municipal boundary'.^ In the event, 
the motion never came to a vote. Nevertheless, the first three by-laws 
passed by the council in July 1876 were regulations to prevent Chinese 
market-gardeners and water carriers from encroaching upon or befouling 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 11 January 1879, p. 3. By that time, the government had 
introduced the Local Government Act of 1878, which empowered the government to 
annex neighbouring areas to a municipality. It was not until the following year 
that the Divisional Boards Act of 1879 compulsorily instituted local government 
throughout Queensland. For a useful discussion of the expansion and consolidation 
of local government from 1878, see Laverty, 'An historical survey*, p. 79. 
At the first working meeting of the new council, for example, the first item on the 
agenda was 'upgrading the main street': see The Cooktown Courier, 24 June 1876, 
p. 3. 
83 The Cooktown Courier, 27 September 1876, p. 2. 
"* The issue of Chinese immigration, not only to Cooktown but also in terms of its 
impact on Queensland, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
See Th^ Cooktown Courier, 24 June 1876, p. 3. 
0 ^ 
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the town's water supplies, to prohibit Chinese hawkers and fishermen from 
working on the Sabbath, and to make Chinese dwelhngs and market-
gardens rateable even if not situated on town allotments.^ 
Beyond those two main issues, much of the focus of the municipal 
council in its early years was on obtaining a fair share of the works and 
services expenditure allocated by the government in Brisbane. In that 
regard, the council soon found itself in competition with the Cooktown 
Progress Association, which had been formed in early 1877 'to consider only 
such subjects as are beyond the province of the Council'. ^ 7 in reahty, the 
Progress Association had been formed by disgrimtled residents and business 
men in an attempt to usurp the fiinction of the council in representing the 
interests of the town to Brisbane.^ 
As it turned out, the influence of the Progress Association was 
short-lived, seemingly because the Cooktown public had the maturity to 
realise that 
... in a small community ... two bodies, professing 
the same creed ... is like a house divided against 
itself, which cannot stand. ^ ^ 
For Cooktown's critics in Brisbane, though, the rivalry between the two 
organisations would have reinforced their views of a town disunited and 
unlikely ever to develop into a cohesive community. Ostensibly, however, 
the problem of competing voices was about to be remedied by the 
Government's widening of parliamentary representation to include the 
newly-formed district of Cook. ^ ^ 
^^ See The Cooktown Courier, 15 Ju ly 1876, p. 3. 
•' See the a ims as reported in The Cooktown Courier, 30 May 1877, p . 3. 
°® In a scathing attack on the leading figures within the association, after they had 
presented themselves as a deputation to the visiting Attomey-Greneral in January 
1877, The Cooktown Herald asserted that 'they exhibited an amount of arrogance 
and cheek unprecedented in the emnals of Australian history': CHPRA, 13 January 
1877, p. 3. 
See the editorial in CHPRA, 4 July 1877, p. 2. See also The Cooktown Courier, 
27 June 1877, p. 3 noting that 'public support to the Progress Association has been 
meagre in the extreme'. 
The district boundaries encompassed Cooktown, the settlements at Normanby 
River, Laura and Maytown, and the Palmer River and Hodgkinson goldfields. 
89 
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Parliamentary Representation for Cooktown and the Palmer 
A motion recommending the appointment of a local member for 
Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields was tabled in Parliament by 
W. Hodgkinson, member for the Burke district, on 11 Jime 1874.^1 The 
motion was carried but appropriate legislation was not presented to 
Parliament until the June session of 1875, provoking The Cooktown Herald 
to complain that 
... a little place hke Ravenswood ... now has a 
member to represent it.... It is monstrous 
that the district of Palmer and Cook, 
containing a population of at least 5000 
whites should be left without a representative.^^ 
The concern of both The Cooktown Herald and The Cooktown 
Courier was that, without a local member, Cooktown would have to continue 
representing its views to Parhament via petitions and deputations, and 
during visits to the town by government ministers and officiEds. The specific 
concern was that those avenues of representation had not proved effective in 
the past. Moreover, all three provided considerable scope for exacerbating 
disunity and divisions within the Cooktown community. 
In April 1874, for example, one of the town's more civic-minded 
citizens, William Pocock, had raised the issue of land improvements with 
the Under-Secretary of Works, during a private visit to Brisbane.^^ His 
action was promptly denounced by a public meeting in Cooktown, on the 
basis that he had no authority to represent the views of the community and, 
indeed, that the view he espoused was not shared by the community-at-
large.^'* William Simpson, in typically aggressive fashion, also took 
umbrage that the Under-Secretary had even consented to receive the 
'deputation', contending that 
91 See QVP, 1, 1874, p. 278. 
92 See the editorial in CHPRA, 12 December 1874, p. 2. 
93 WiUiam Pocock raised with the Under-Secretary the issue of whether the 
government intended to make some provision in the forthcoming land sale to 
compensate individuals for the cost of improvements erected on building allotments 
about to be auctioned: see the editorial discussion in CHPRA, 8 April 1874, p. 3. 
9* Pocock's recommendation was that any improvements valued at £50 or more should 
be compensated. The view of the majority at the public meeting was that any 
improvements, regardless of value, should be compensated: see CHPRA, 22 April 
1874, p. 3. 
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I object to any pubhc officer allowing himself 
to be made the tool of a class that forms 
itself into deputations.^^ 
A nvimber of other deputations, supposedly representative of the 
Cooktown community, met with similar outrage. In January 1877, a 
deputation of leading citizens' presented itself to the visiting Attorney-
General with a string of recommendations and priorities for pubhc works 
and services in the town, which flew in the face of the list being presented 
by the recently-established municipal council.^ The Cooktown Herald 
slammed the 'unofficieJ' list as 'not worth the paper they are written on',^7 
while The Cooktown Courier — agreeing that the unofficial deputation 'was 
improperly organised' — lamented that 
the want of unity and united action is the most 
fatal grievance in this community at the present 
time.98 
Visits to Cooktown by government ministers and officials were also 
viewed with a healthy degree of scepticism by the community-at-large. The 
civic reception for the visiting Attorney-General in January 1877, for 
example, was a select gathering of only seventeen, which The Cooktown 
Herald noted comprised 'six officials, three lessees of The Cooktown Courier 
and eight citizens'.^ Many of the promises and utterances of visiting 
politicians and officials also failed to materialise once they returned to 
Brisbane.^^^ Conversely, visiting parliamentarians and officials would often 
talk only in generalities during their brief stay, usually excusing their lack 
of commitment on the basis of their not wanting to intrude on the 
responsibilities of Euiother minister or department. After the visit by the 
Minister for Works in December 1875, The Cooktown Herald opined that 
... we think that the Cooktown citizens should 
have received some more tangible pledge ... 
than was afforded by the vague generalities 
9^ Letter to the editor in The Cooktown Courier, 18 April 1874, p. 3. 
96 See The Cooktown Courier, 17 January 1877, p. 2. 
9? CHPRA, 13 January 1877, p. 2 
9^ The Cooktown Courier, 17 January 1877, p. 2 
m 
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CHPRA, 17 January 1877, p. 2. 
Several months after the visit by the Colonial Treasurer and Postmaster-General, 
for example, The Cooktown Courier, 13 April 1878, p. 2 noted that 'many matters 
promised by the Ministers ... remain in abeyance'. 
290 
that made up his Cooktown dehverances.^^i 
Against that backgromid, the news in July 1875 that approval had 
been given for parliamentary representation for the district was greeted in 
Cooktown as 't£u-dy justice'.^^^ The sense of relief was somewhat short-lived 
when it became apparent that finding a suitable local member might not be 
easy.i^"' In part, that was because members of parliament at that time were 
unpaid, effectively ensuring that the only candidates were hkely to be 
'gentlemen of position'.i^ The added difficulty was that most of the ehgible 
candidates in Cooktown were pre-occupied with their business interests, 
with The Cooktown Herald noting that 
... we are quite certain that none of... our merchants 
and professional men ... would feel inclined to abandon 
the more substantial gains of their several callings for 
the fleeting honor [sic] and problematic advantage of a 
seat in the Assembly. ^ ^^  
Almost by default, therefore, the mantle of preferred candidate 
settled 'on some gentleman astride the constituency', namely in the person 
of William Murphy, a Brisbane-based solicitor who had stood unsuccessfully 
in previous Assembly elections. ^ ^ By late March 1876, two months before 
the scheduled elections. The Cooktown Courier noted that 'we seem to be 
dwindling down to but few aspirants' and that 'Mr Murphy will have a quiet 
walk over'. 1^ 7 ^^ .^he last moment, John Jones, a Cooktown-based 
auctioneer threw his hat into the ring, allegedly backed by a clique opposed 
to the Cooktown-based interests behind William Murphy.^^^ In the event, 
Murphy defeated Jones by seventy-three votes, 350 to 277.^^^ 
Once in office, Murphy proved an utter disappointment to the 
majority of his constituents. Probably the major criticism of his 
101 CHPRA, 4 December 1875, p . 2. 
102 CHPRA, 7 July 1875, p. 2. 
103 In la te 1875, The Cooktown Courier, 22 December 1875, p . 2 noted t h a t '[still] no-
one before t h e consti tuency' . 
IW^ See The Cooktown Courier, 30 October 1875, p . 2. 
105 CHPRA, 22 December 1875, p . 2. 
106 CHPRA, 22 December 1875, p . 2. 
10^ The Cooktown Courier, 22 March 1876, p . 2. 
10® See the editorial in CHPRA, 3 June 1876, p. 2. 
109 From the returns as pubhshed in CHPRA, 3 June 1876, p. 2. 
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performance was that he not only knew very little about the district, but 
made practically no attempt to improve his knowledge or take into account 
the various issues confi-onting his constituents."^ The Cooktown Herald in 
late 1876, only six months after Murphy's election to office, contended that 
'he has evidently no sympathy with anything one mile beyond the boundgu-y 
of Brisbane',111 while The Cooktown Courier (with a smug sense of 
hindsight) asserted in January 1877 that 
Murphy ... knows nothing about this district 
... and when electors chose so complete a 
stranger to represent them, they ought to 
have foreseen the result, n^ 
The second criticism of Murphy was that he consistently failed to 
act upon representations put to him by his constituents. In October 1876, 
the president of the Cooktown hospital committee, Callaghan Walsh, felt 
obliged to lead a private deputation to Brisbane, to plead for additional 
funding, because 'our member does not bother himself about it'.^i^ 
Similarly, the mayor of Cooktown, Hector Menzies, at a public meeting in 
April 1878, said that 
... he regretted that the district was not better 
represented in Parliament. Had Mr Murphy 
done his duty, he would have seen that his 
constituents were not neglected, ^ i"* 
A somewhat back-handed compliment was an editorial in The 
Brisbane Courier of early February 1877 complaining that Murphy 'gdways 
had motions on the paper for something for Cook' and that '[m]embers on 
both sides of the House protested against his never-ceasing demands'.n^ 
Although that view seems at odds with the criticisms from his detractors in 
Cooktown — and is not obvious from a cursory analysis of parliamentary 
proceedings — a possible explanation may relate to the fact that Murphy 
not infrequently tabled requests before the House seemingly of his own 
110 From the available records, it seems that Murphy made only one brief visit to 
Cooktown during his three years of office: see CHPRA, 20 May 1876, p. 2. 
111 CHPRA, 25 November 1876, p. 2. 
112 The Cooktown Courier, 3 January 1877, p. 3. 
113 See The Cooktown Courier, 28 October 1876, p. 2. 
11* As quoted in The Cooktown Courier, 27 April 1878, p. 3. 
US ^ reproduced in The Cooktown Courier, 7 February 1877, p. 3. 
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volition or in response to the representations of minority interests within 
the district. 
In September 1876, for example, and only three months into his 
term of office. Murphy put in a bid to the parhsimentary loan estimates 
committee for £3000 for a railway survey fi-om Cooktown to the Palmer, n^ 
The request had not come from the Cooktown council, which subsequently 
expressed concern at the idea, with one aldermen questioning 'what was the 
good of... a railway survey while the town was perishing for want of 
water?'.ii7 Similar opposition came from The Cooktown Courier, with an 
editorigd expressing concern that 'the cost will be to the detriment of our 
roads'.ii^ 
The obvious question would seem to be who were the minority but 
influential interests pushing for a railway survey? One likely possibility is 
that they were part of the same Cooktown-based business clique which was 
allegedly behind Murphy's initial endorsement. According to an editorial in 
The Cooktown Herald, that clique centred on two prominent Cooktown 
businessmen, James Baird and Frederick Beardmore, both import agents 
and auctioneers, whose businesses were heavily reliant on trade with the 
Palmer. 119 The imphcations are that even afl^r Cooktov^m achieved 
representation at the parliamentary level, the broader interests of the town 
continued to be jeopardised by disparate and competing voices. 
The other dimension which came to impact on parliamentary 
representation for Cooktown in the late 1870s was the emergence of a 
'Northern party, pledged to secure a more equitable distribution of 
government resources for North Queensland. In the December 1878 
elections, the Cook district, under electoral redistribution legislation of 
1877, returned two members both committed to the policies of a 'northern 
116 See The Cooktown Courier, 27 September 1876, p. 2 and QVP, 1, 1877, p. 167. 
11'^  As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 30 September 1876, p. 3. 
11® The Cooktown Courier, 27 September 1876, p. 2. Th£ Cooktown Herald, still the 
defacto mouthpiece of business interests generally, gave qualified support to the 
proposal on the basis that '[Murphy] is obviously up with the times ... [and] knows 
our wants are similar [to those elsewhere]': CHPRA, 23 September 1876, p. 2. 
119 See CHPRA, 3 June 1876, p. 2. 
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compact'.i20 Differing stances on the issues of northern separation, Chinese 
immigration, and expenditure on public works and services, however, 
quickly led to fractures within the compact and saw Cooktown increasingly 
at odds with its northern neighbours. For a short while at least, though, 
some of the interests of Cooktown and the Palmer were knowingly 
subordinated to the 'greater good' of Northern solidarity. 
An Equitable Share of Government Resources 
For the residents of Cooktown, their probable first indication of the 
likely battle ahead for a fair share of government expenditure on pubhc 
works and services came in May 1874, when the published parliamentary 
loan estimates for 1875 omitted any mention of Cooktown. Although the 
more civic-minded citizens were somewhat affi-onted by Premier 
Macalister's assertion that he was prepared to spend money 'as soon as the 
place gave indications of its permanency', the general view of the Cooktown 
community seemed to be that the Government would ultimately 'do the 
right thing' by the town.i^i 
Two months later, local newspapers were still couching their 
editorial comments towards the Government in amicable terms. The 
Cooktown Courier in late June 1874, for example, prefaced its plea for more 
to be done on the roads wdth the acknowledgment that 'no doubt the 
government have acted very fairly by us, all things considered'.i22 It also 
seems that business and civic leaders, conscious of the competing claims of 
other coastal settlements to be considered as the access point for the 
Palmer, were loath to jeopardise Cooktov^oi's claims by placing unwanted 
demands on the Government. 123 
1^ 0 See The Cooktown Courier, 4 December 1878, p. 2. The members were John Walsh 
and F.A. Cooper. William Murphy did not seek re-election, claiming that he was 
making a stand against the government's position in allowing the introduction of 
Chinese to Queensland: see his statement in The Cooktown Courier, 12 October 
1878, p. 2. 
1 ^ See the discussion in CHPRA, 13 May 1874, p. 3. 
The Cooktown Courier, 20 June 1874, p. 3. 
See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1874, p. 2 prefacing its support 
for the establishment of a district court with the comment that 'we are not inclined 
to urge our wants on the attention of the government with too much pertinacity or 
in too great haste'. 
122 
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From about July 1874 onwards, however, the mood in Cooktown 
became less conciliatory £uid, indeed, tinged with cynicism over what was 
seen as the Government's readiness to exploit the collection of revenue 
through the port, with little return in the form of civic expenditure. An 
editorial in The Cooktown Courier of early July 1874 noted that the 
Government had been quick to appoint a collector of customs and sell land, 
but 'they have not shown a corresponding zeal in carrying out public 
works'.i24 Two weeks later, another editorial picked up the theme — which 
was to become central to the community's perceived sense of injustice in the 
years to follow — that the Government was callously 'making the most they 
could out of the townspeople'.i^s 
The move to municipal government, therefore, as well as 
parliamentary representation for the district, clearly need to be seen in the 
context of the community's attempt to secure a better deal for Cooktown and 
the Palmer fi-om the authorities in Brisbane. News of the approval for a 
local member, for example, was greeted by The Cooktown Courier with the 
expectation that 
... now we have the means ... of securing that 
share of public consideration and expenditure 
to which we are justly entitled. 1^6 
What the community saw as its priorities for government spending 
was far less clear. As discussed previously, there were competing demands 
between those who saw the first priority as road communications to the 
Palmer, against those arguing for road formation within Cooktown. There 
were also those who saw the priority as a water supply for the town, as well 
as other infrastructure relating to drainage and sanitation. In the years 
between 1874 and 1877, however, when the Palmer River goldfields were at 
their peak, the state of the roads between Cooktown and the Palmer was 
obviously critical to the economic viability of both locations. The Cooktown 
Herald's call, therefore, in March 1874 for the formation of a good dray road 
to the Palmer as 'one if not the most important matter to all' was probably 
well-founded. 127 
124 The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1874, p. 2. 
125 See The Cooktown Courier, 18 July 1874, p. 3. 
12^ The Cooktown Courier, 12 January 1876, p. 2. 
127 CHPRA, 25 March 1874, p. 2. 
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It is also evident that the road between Cooktown and the Palmer 
was often in a far worse state them officials in Brisbane could ever imagine, 
notwithstanding that several thousand pounds had been spent on 'district' 
roads by June 1875 (see Table 6.2 at page 303). In April 1874, when the 
road was little more than a track, five horses were reportedly stuck in one 
bogged section 'so bad that men find it next to impossible to ... even relieve 
them of their packs'.i^s In March 1877, after several thousand pounds had 
been spent upgrading the road, several teams were reportedly bogged on the 
approaches to Maytown, with the expectation being that the wagons 'are 
likely to remain in the same condition for many weeks to come'. 129 A yeau" 
later, the mail coach running between Cooktown and the Palmer capsized 
on the way up breaking one of its wheels, had great difficulty crossing the 
Normanby River and capsized again on the way down.i^ 
Under such conditions, it is perhaps understandable that carriers 
had little compunction in charging what seemed to be exorbitant rates of 
carriage between Cooktown and the Palmer.i^i Certainly, some carriers 
would have exploited the situation to their advantage. At times, however, 
the state of the roads all but precluded the carriage of goods, resulting in 
severe shortages on the goldfields and 'crushing prices [being] charged for 
the absolute necessaries'.i^^ A not infrequent outcome was that hundreds of 
European miners, 'broken in spirit and in constitution, left the district never 
to retum'.i33 Many of the ongoing calls for additional funding for the 
Cooktown-Palmer road, therefore, need to be seen against that background, 
where business and civic leaders in Cooktown perceived that continuing 
problems of accessibility — particularly for goods and reef-drilling 
machinery — would eventually stifle the Palmer's long-term prospects. 
Militating against their demands for further funds, though, were 
several factors. The first was that a sizeable proportion of the initial 
funding for the Cooktown-Palmer road was wasted on a route, surveyed by 
A.C. Macmillan, which detoured unnecessarily 'more than 100 miles among 
128 CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 3. 
1 ^ CHPRA, 14 March 1877, p. 2. 
1^ 0 The Cooktown Courier, 1 May 1878, p. 3. 
l^'l Costs varied from a high of £200 per ton in the wet season of February 1874 to £70 
a ton in 1875: see, for example, W.H. Corfield, Reminiscences of Queensland 1862-
1899, Frater, Brisbane, 1921, p. 51. 
1^ 2 See the editorial discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 21 November 1874, p. 3. 
1^^ The Cooktown Courier, 21 November 1874, p. 3. 
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swamps and sandhills'.i^ Indeed, no sooner was the road opened than 
eighty kilometres of it was abandoned in favoiu- of a shorter route, surveyed 
by Sub-Inspector Douglas.i^^ The second factor was that the business 
interests in Cooktown calling for an improved road to the Palmer were 
competing for fiinds with those in Cooktown supporting a railway line to the 
goldfields which, by some accoimts, would do away with the need for a 
road.i^ It was understandable, therefore, that those controlling the purse-
strings in Brisbane would have some hesitation in responding too liberally 
to the persistent calls to spend more money on the Cooktown-Palmer road. 
On several other issues, however, the people of Cooktown felt that 
they were being done an injustice by the authorities in Brisbane. In 
relation to the hospital, for example, the Cooktown community claimed that 
it consistently received less government funding than hospitals elsewhere 
treating a similar number of patients each year.^37 'phe fact that the 
majority of Cooktown's patients were from the Palmer River or Hodgkinson 
goldfields, and included a sizeable proportion of Chinese, was reasonably 
seen by the Cooktown administrators as 'a burden ... for which we should 
receive an extra consideration from the government'.!^ In the event, the 
Government was not particularly forthcoming, while the problem 
progressively diminished with the demise of the goldfields.i^^ 
The residents of early Cooktown felt themselves similarly shghted 
over the mail service to the town, an issue which seemed to take up an 
inordinate amount of editorial space in local newspapers in 1874 and 1875. 
1^^ See CHPRA, 10 October 1874, p. 2 asserting that '[a] large sum of money has been 
spent... and wasted'. See also CHPRA, 24 October 1874, p. 2 noting that 
Mr Macmillan [the surveyor of the original road and subsequently the oflficer-in-
charge of the road-works party] has pinned his faith to the original road and will 
not depart fi-om it, come what may'. 
135 See CHPRA, 10 October 1874, p. 2. 
13^ See the report of the meeting of railway supporters in The Cooktown Courier, 
27 April 1878, p. 3. See also William Murphy speaking in Parliament to his 
proposal for a railway survey, asserting that 'it would not be long before railways 
superseded ordinary roads altogether': QPD, 20, 1876, p. 1396. 
1^' See the discussion, for example, in The Cooktown Courier, 6 December 1876, p. 3 
comparing the patient statistics of the colony's hospitals £ind concluding that 
'Cooktown ought to have received £1200 instead of £800 voted'. But note the earlier 
comment, at footnote 58 on page 282, differentiating between the costs to be borne 
by local authorities, public subscription and government subsidy. 
1^^ See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 3 November 1875, p. 2. 
As mentioned previously, Chinese merchants in Cooktown were particularly 
generous in their donations towards the upkeep of the hospital and, indeed, at one 
stage offered to construct emd run a separate hospital for Chinese. 
13i 
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The crux of their complaint was that no sooner had the township been 
provided with a weekly mail service to the south than the authorities in 
Brisbane cut it back to a fortnightly run.i^o The reason for the reduced 
service was that the authorities had renegotiated the mail service contract 
— without discussing it with Cooktown — and had effected a supposed 
savings of £5000 per year by cutting Cooktown (and presumably some other 
intermediate ports) back to a fortnightly visit.I'^i 
What irked the residents of Cooktown was that G3mipie, which 
they considered their equal, had been accorded a bi-weekly mail service 
within the first year of the discovery of gold there.1^2 What irked even more 
was that the ship providing the northern mail service steamed passed 
Cooktown each week on its way to Torres Straits ports, but was only 
permitted to stop in Cooktown on every other trip.!43 
The lease of the Cooktown wharves was a situation which — to the 
municipal council at least — similarly smacked of favouritism and 
government injustice. The wharves had been constructed with government 
funding in 1874 and then leased by open tender to business interests in the 
town, with the proceeds going to the government. With the incorporation of 
the town in 1876, the municipal council requested that the lease proceeds be 
paid instead to the council.!^ That request was declined by the authorities 
on the seemingly reasonable basis that the Government wanted to retain 
control of the assets, with a view to keeping the wharves and their 
approaches in good repair. 145 Two years later, however, the Government 
conceded to the Mackay municipal council, reportedly in identical 
circumstances, the revenue from the lease of their wharves having, in the 
meantime, done nothing towards the upkeep of the wharves in Cooktown.i46 
Residents of Cooktown were equally miffed that even after some 
fifteen months of settlement, the Government was still declining to extend 
140 See The Cooktown Courier, 10 October 1874, p. 2. 
1*^ See The Cooktown Courier, 8 April 1876, p. 2 for the explanation offered by the 
visiting Post-master-General. 
142 See The Cooktown Courier, 10 October 1874, p. 2. 
l'^ ^ See The Cooktown Courier, 17 October 1874, p. 2. 
14* The Cooktown Courier, 18 October 1876, p. 2. 
M& See the editorial discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 31 August 1878, p. 2. 
The Cooktown Courier, 31 August 1878, p. 2. 146 
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to the township the jurisdiction of the district court in civil cases, 
necessitating the referral to Townsville of any case in which the sum 
claimed exceeded £30.i47 Cooktown was also unable to get any government 
funding assistance for the maintenance of its cemetery, notwithstanding 
that many of the individuals buried there had died at the Cooktown hospital 
having come from the Palmer River. The Cooktown Courier noted that 
... no other [place] in Australia numbers 
amongst its dead so many from the most 
distant parts of the world.i48 
Throughout the late 1870s, Cooktown was also unable to convince 
the authorities in Brisbane to send any of the newly-arriving immigrants 
from Great Britain and Ireland to the town, despite the assurances of 
business and civic leaders that married couples and single females would 
quickly find gainful employment. 149 Although it is not recorded, the view of 
the authorities was presumably that other towns in Queensland had a 
higher priority than Cooktown as prospective centres of settlement. 
Indeed, successive governments throughout the 1870s did the 
barest minimum to facilitate or encourage any form of settlement in 
Cooktown, let alone as it related to the settlement there of Chinese.i^^ In 
April 1877, for example, government officials ordered a total of some 2,500 
Chinese arrivals into quarantine on Fitzroy Island — a barren outcrop some 
eight kilometres from Cooktown — as a precaution against smallpox. 
During their several weeks of enforced stay on the island, at the height of 
the wet season, the Government provided them with no facilities, other than 
a boatload of timber and tents for about one third their number.i^i The 
Cooktown Herald noted that 
... not a single preparation in the way of 
building, clearing the ground, laying it 
out in cantonments or other preparations 
has [sic] been made'. [It] is a striking 
14" See the editorial discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 5 December 1874, p. 2. 
1** The Cooktown Courier, 8 August 1877, p. 3. 
149 The Cooktown Courier, 4 September 1878, p. 2. 
1^ 0 The issue of Chinese immigration is addressed separately in Chapter 7. 
1^ 1 The captain of one of the ships involved, Galley of Lome, had earlier threatened to 
disembark his Chinese passengers at Cooktown in defiance of the authorities, 
reportedly through 'motives of humanity': see the editorial in CHPRA, 21 April 
1877, p. 2. 
299 
example of "man's inhumanity to man". 1^2 
The residents of Cooktown also considered that the authorities in 
Brisbane treated the town rather poorly in relation to the competition 
between it and Cairns, Port Douglas, Townsville and Cardwell. It may well 
have been that an objective study would have shown that each of those 
towns had a more sustainable future than Cooktown, or that Cairns, for 
example, was better situated as the point of access and market outlet for the 
Hodgkinson goldfields than Cooktown.i^^ Many of the decisions made in the 
mid to late 1870s regarding those towns, though, seem to have been based 
on the i>ersonal whims of ministers or in response to the lobbying of vested 
interests.!^ Moreover, many importsuit decisions were taken with 
effectively no pubhc input or debate, £uid no prior consultation with the local 
authorities hkely to be affected by the decisions. 
The arbitrary announcement by the Government in April 1877, for 
example, that it intended to re-route the Palmer River gold escort via the 
Hodgkinson to Cairns, was accordingly greeted with dismay and disbehef by 
residents in Cooktown. 1^5 Their concern was not only that Cooktown would 
lose the credit for gold exported through the port, but that the move would 
undermine the nexus between Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields in 
the minds of potential investors and businessmen. 
In the absence of a study or debate which may well have shown 
that it made economic sense to divert the escort to Cairns, rumours 
abounded in Cooktown attributing a range of motives to the Government. 
They included that the Attorney-General had bought land at Cairns and that 
the authorities were hoping to push up bids at the forthcoming land sales in 
Cairns. 1^ Eventually, the Government decided not to proceed with 
153 
CHPRA, 21 April 1877, p. 2. It was also not the case that this was some unforeseen 
exigency, given that the first serious smallpox scare arose in December 1876 and 
that discussion on a suitable quarantine station had been ongoing since that time: 
see, for example. The Cooktown Courier, 10 January 1877, p. 3. 
One of the matters to be addressed in Chapter 7 is that feasibility studies on several 
of the key issues confi-onting Cooktown and the Palmer in the late 1870s would 
almost certainly have resulted in a different course of action to that pursued at the 
time. 
1 ^ It is not being suggested, of course, that the political influence of vested interests 
was a phenomenon confined to the 1870s or 1880s. 
1^^ See the editorial discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 4 April 1877, p. 2. 
^°° See the report of a public meeting held in Cooktown over the issue in The Cooktown 
Courier, 7 April 1877, p. 3. 
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its plan, but not before it had caused considerable anguish in Cooktown and 
reinforced the community's sense of injustice, with The Cooktown Courier 
echoing the sentiment 
... what have we done to merit this treatment 
at the hands of the govemment?i57 
A yeajc earlier, the Government had displayed a similar bias — at 
least in the mind of the Cooktown community — towards the initial 
development of the settlement itself at Cairns (or Trinity Bay as it was first 
called). The view of business and civic leaders in Cooktown, as espoused by 
The Cooktown Courier, was that 'before any other port is opened [in the 
North] ... consideration should be extended to those already formed'.i^^ 
What irked Cooktown even more was the perception that Cairns was 
receiving far more funding than Cooktown had in its early days and, indeed, 
that 
... the government have thought fit... to foster 
[Cairns] in a most unprecedented manner, 
just as if the annihilation of Cooktown was 
their chief object.i^^ 
Despite the litany of Cooktown's perceived injustices, it is not 
being suggested that the town was above reproach in its dealings with the 
authorities in Brisbane. Much of the mismanagement and ineptitude which 
so often characterised the conduct of municipal affairs in Cooktown in the 
late 1870s carried through to the town's dealings with Brisbsuie. In late 
1876, for example, the municipal council forwarded a submission to 
Brisbane requesting that a water catchment reserve be proclaimed in the 
foot-hills of Mount Cook. The submission was duly returned in February 
1877 on the basis that it not only failed to specify the boundaries of the 
reserve but did not establish any connection, real or potential, between the 
reserve and the water supply of the town.i^o 
1^ "^  The Cooktown Courier, 4 April 1877, p. 2. 
1®® The Cooktown Courier, 16 August 1876, p. 3. 
1^ 9 The Cooktown Courier, 16 August 1876, p. 3. 
In reporting the exchange of correspondence, The Cooktown Courier, 10 February 
1877, p. 2 attributed the problem to 'the incompetence of the Municipal 
Corporation'. 
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A number of the requests for fimding forwarded to the authorities 
in Brisbane in the late 1870s similarly did little to enhance the credibihty of 
the town's administration. Probably the most glaring example was a 
request in September 1876 for £1500 for the formation of a road from the 
town centre to Finch's Bay, a popular swimming spot on the ocean side of 
the town. 1^ 1 After the local member had argued the case in parliament on 
the basis that 'some means should be provided by which the people could 
renovate their health by frequent visits ... to the best bathing place of the 
district', an exasperated colleague asked 'if there was to be any end to the 
demands of the honourable member?'!^^ 
As it turned out, the road to Finch's Bay paled into insignificance 
alongside the £105,000 or so eventually spent by the Government on the ill-
fated railway line from Cooktown to Laura in the early 1880s. The saga of 
that largely-wasted expenditure is also in effect the saga of the demise of 
Cooktown, an issue addressed fiirther in Chapter 7. What seems relevant to 
this discussion is how successful or otherv^dse Cooktown had been in 
obtaining its fair share of government resources up to that point. Indeed, 
was there an element of guilt — of making amends for past injustices — in 
the Government's eventual decision to fund the Cooktown railway? 
Certainly, almost every public meeting in Cooktown from about 
1875 onwards, regardless of the issue, and almost every editorial in the local 
newspapers on the subject of government expenditure, articulated in 
varying degrees of detail (and accuracy) the perceived ^balance sheet' of 
revenue generated by the town versus government expenditure. At a public 
meeting in Cooktown in late 1876, for example, one well-respected resident 
of the town contended that 
[t]he revenue from this port during the last 
two years had been £200,000 and the 
expenditure had not been more than 
£25,000.163 
The Cooktown Herald noted that the request was being made simply 'for the 
convenience of bathers': CifPiJA, 23 September 1876, p. 2. 
1 5 See QPD, 20, 1876, pp. 1397 and 1400. 
As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 11 October 1876, p. 3. Table 6.6, to follow, 
suggests that the balance sheet as at 30 June 1876 was more likely revenue of 
£125,000 against expenditure of £50,000. 
188 
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The perception within the Cooktown community that the balance 
sheet was firmly tilted in the Government's favour was a source of 
considerable agitation. Public meetings were called specifically 'to express 
the disgust of the people at the paltry amounts doled out by the government 
for the Cooktown and Palmer districts'. 1^4 A not uncommon theme at such 
meetings was the view expressed by The Cooktown Courier that 
... the district has hitherto proved a milch 
cow of wonderful fecundity, [which has] 
required no nourishment from the south 
to sustain it.i^^ 
The problem, though, with many of the 'balance sheets' used at 
public meetings or in editorials was that they usually excluded the salaries 
of government officials Euid many of the less obvious administrative costs 
associated with day-to-day government business. Critics of the Government 
therefore, t5T)ically cited a balance sheet for Cooktown and the Palmer River 
based on an annual revenue contribution of around £60,000 but, in their 
calculations under expenditure, considered only those funds allocated to 
public works.!66 The 'official' balance sheet, however, as tabled in 
parliament for the period to 30 June 1875 shows revenue of £60,067 against 
expenditure of £58,027 (see Table 6.2 over). 
164 See CHPRA, 30 June 1877, p. 2. 
165 The Cooktown Courier, 17 May 1879, p. 2. 
See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 30 October 1875, p. 2 
noting that 'hitherto we have had some little difficulty in ... obtaining such a share 
of expenditure, warranted by the very large revenue generated by the district'. 
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Table 6.2 - The Official Statement of Revenue and Expenditiure for 
Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields to 30 Jime 1875 
(from first settlement/opening to June 1875) 
Revenue 
customs 
licences 
gold receipts 
revenue 
wharves 
court of petty sessions 
Total 
44,551 
3,884 
4,740 
5,653 
835 
404 
£60,067 
Expenditure 
exploration 
police 
stores 
customs & harbours 
wharves 
survey 
buildings 
roads & bridges 
goldfields 
postal 
telegraph 
Total 
3,054 
18,049 
2,994 
2,769 
3,769 
1,024 
5,054 
8,280 
5,583 
3,446 
4,005 
£58,027 
Note: 
Source: 
A footnote to the original table advised that the statement did not include 
'departmental expenses, administration of justice, conveyance of mails 
nor interest on public debt'. 
QVP, 2, 1875, p. 917. 
Several of the expenditure figures in Table 6.2 seem abnormally 
high. The figure for exploration, for example, must have included the 
expedition costs of William Hann and his party in 1872 (and perhaps 
Dalrymple's expedition, as well as that of Bartley Fahey's from Normanton 
to the Mitchell River). Similarly, the police costs of £18,049 and that of 
'goldfields' for £5,583 must surely have included every policeman who ever 
accompanied any expedition north of Cardwell, as well obviously as Howard 
St George's expedition of October 1873. 
In the more usual sense of operating costs. Table 6.3 (over) 
suggests that government expenditure (less public works and municipal 
loans) in Cooktown throughout the 1870s and early 1880s was about £8,000 
per year (see column r). 
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Obviously, it is not being suggested that the figures in Table 6.3 
are exact to the last pound. It also seems probable that the figures do not 
reflect some expenditure — perhaps £2000 at most — which occurred in late 
1873 and may not be included in 1874/75 totals. To widen the scope of the 
table to include the Palmer River, it would be necessary to add probably 
another £1500 per year for the salaries and costs of the gold warden and 
police stationed at the Palmer River goldfields.^^^ 
In a similar exercise. Table 6.4 (over) shows government 
expenditure on public works and services in Cooktown, including 'district' 
roads, across the period 1873 to 1885. In this case, there is no discernible 
yearly average. To widen its scope to include the Palmer, it would probably 
be necessary to add another £750 at most to the cumulative total to cover 
the cost of residential and working accommodation for the gold warden and 
police stationed at the goldfields, as well as a small amount for the limited 
public works and services provided by the government at the goldfields. 
There are no readily available statistics or records to substantiate the Palmer River 
costs. But included in the 'costs' would, for example, be the outfitting costs of police 
uniforms, weapons and horses, and subsequent sustenance (fodder etc) costs. 
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Finally, Table 6.5 shows an estimate of the revenue generated by 
Cooktown and the Palmer River across the period 1873 to 1884. It is an 
estimate only in the sense that the revenue from gold escort fees has been 
calculated on the basis of half of all gold produced at the Palmer River 
goldfields being conveyed by pohce escort to Cooktown, and that no accomit 
has been taken of the proceeds from the lease of the wharves in Cooktown or 
various other miscellaneous licence fees.^^^ If anjiihing, therefore, the 
figures at Table 6.5 are likely to understate slightly the total revenue 
generated. 
Table 6.5 - Government Revenue from Cooktown and the Palmer River 
goldfields 1873-85 
1873/74 
1874/75 
1875/76 
1876/77 
1877/78 
1878/79 
1879/80 
1880/81 
1881/82 
1882/83 
1883/84 
1884/85 
Totals 
Customs 
revenue *1 
(rooo) 
18.4 
23.2 
54.7 
70.3 
70.7 
50.2 
51.1 
44.9 
40.6 
37.0 
32.4 
27.3 
520.8 
Licences 
revenue *2 
(rooo> 
2.0 
3.2 
7.4 
6.6 
4.9 
4.2 
3.6 
2.6 
1.6 
0.9 
0.2 
0.1 
37.3 
Escort fees 
*3 
(FOOO) 
2.2 
5.6 
9.4 
7.5 
6.7 
4.5 
3.4 
2.5 
1.9 
1.4 
0.9 
0.4 
46.4 
Total 
revenue 
(irooo) 
22.6 
32.0 
71.5 
84.4 
82.3 
58.9 
58.1 
50.0 
44.1 
39.3 
33.5 
27.8 
604.5 
Cmnulative 
revenue 
(£•000) 
22.6 
54.6 
126.1 
210.5 
292.8 
351.7 
409.8 
459.8 
503.9 
543.2 
576.7 
604.5 
604.5 
Notes: 
Source: 
1. Includes only revenue collected at Cooktown. 
2. Includes revenue from miners and business licences only, 
for the Palmer River and (Dooktown. 
S. Calculated on the basis that half of all gold produced was 
conveyed by police escort at the fee of Is 6d per ounce. 
Data derived from annual statistics in successive issues of QVP, 
1874-85. 
Using the data from Tables 6.3 to 6.5, it then seems possible to 
construct an indicative balance sheet for Cooktown and the Palmer River 
across the period 1873 to 1884. Obviously, the expenditure side of the 
balance sheet, to be a more accurate reflection of the true situation, would 
1S8 It is not possible from the available official records to differentiate escort fees paid 
on the Palmer-Cooktown route, against all other escort fees in the district. The 
figure of'one half is an assessment based broadly on anecdotal accounts. No 
detailed statistics are readily available for wharf lease receipts or other 
miscellaneous fees. 
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need to show not only the cost of salaries and expenditiu-e on public works 
in Cooktown and the Palmer, but the amortised costs incurred by the 
authorities in Brisbane (and possibly elsewhere in Queensland) in providing 
the range of government services to the district. Examples would include 
postal and telegraph services, land administration, and the headquarters 
cost component of the police, customs and education departments, as well as 
the judiciary. 
Putting aside those 'external' costs, which it is accepted could be 
not insignificant, the indicative balance sheet at Table 6.6 (below) suggests 
that the government was profiting fi-om Cooktown and the Palmer River 
goldfields to the value of around £40,000 per annum between 1875 and 
1880. Moreover, by 1883, Cooktown and the Psdmer River goldfields had 
'profited' the government probably in excess of £400,000. Indeed, it was 
only the expenditure by the government of over £100,000 in the years 1883 
to 1885 on the Cooktown-Laura railway line that reduced the sum to aroimd 
£328,000 by mid 1885.^ 69 
Table 6.6 - An Indicative Balance Sheet for Cooktown and the Palmer 
River Goldfields 1873-85 
(showing government revenue against expenditure) 
1873/74 
1874/75 
1875/76 
1876/77 
1877/78 
1878/79 
1879/80 
1880/81 
1881/82 
1882/83 
1883/84 
1884/85 
Revenue *1 
(£*000) 
22.6 
32.0 
71.5 
84.4 
82.3 
58.9 
58.1 
50.0 
44.1 
39.3 
33.5 
27.8 
Expenditure *2 
(£'000) 
4.4 
13.9 
13.9 
21.6 
14.4 
13.9 
17.1 
10.7 
12.0 
13.6 
71.5 
68.5 
Cumulaitve 
Balance *3 
(FOOO) 
+18.2 
+36.3 
+93.9 
+ 156.7 
+224.6 
+269.6 
+310.6 
+349.6 
+381.0 
+406.7 
+368.7 
+328.0 
Notes: 1. Data derived from Table 6.5. 
2, Data derived from Tables 6.3 and 6.4 with £1500 per year added for 
Palmer River salaries and £60 per year for public works expenditure 
at the Palmer River. An amount of £2000 also added to 1873/74 
169 Superficially, the large sum expended by the government on the Cooktown-Laura 
railway line seems to have been motivated at least partly by a recognition that the 
district had been dealt with somewhat shabbily over the previous decade. That 
issue is, however, addressed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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figures to cover possible unaccounted expenditure from Table 6.3. 
Note that Table 6.4 included expenditure for FY85/86 which has not 
been included here. 
3, Positive values show excess of revenue over expenditure. 
Obviously, however, the simplistic revenue figm-es of even £40,000 
per year and £400,000 across the decade need to be kept in perspective. 
Indeed, in the wider context of revenue collection across the colony, the 
figures pale somewhat. In the financial year 1875/76, for example, total 
revenue receipts for Queensland were £1,263,269, of which customs revenue 
comprised £494,710.^''^ In general terms, therefore, the revenue generated 
annually by Cooktown and the Palmer River constituted less than 5 per cent 
of the Queensland total.^^^ 
The View of the Community 
For the residents of Cooktown, the issue was not the size of their 
contribution to the Queensland total, but their perception — given the 
important catalytic effect the PeJmer goldfields had had on the Queensland 
economy — that Brisbane had not given them 'a fair deal'. Moreover, they 
were disappointed that successive governments had generally failed even to 
acknowledge that the district had made a positive contribution to the 
colonj^s finances. 
Throughout the 1870s, therefore, Cooktown toyed with the notion 
of separation from the south, primarily in the context of a better financial 
deal for the district. Cooktown was never, though, the driving force behind 
the North Queensland sepsiration movement. ^ ''^  Indeed, its support seemed 
driven more by its concern for where 'the capital of the north' would be, 
together with some sympathy for the argument that the government of a 
colony 'as large as the United Kingdom and France put together' could not 
hope to exercise its power across such an expanse of country.^''^ 
I'^ O See QVP, 2, 1877, p. 22. 
^^^ Even in 1876, for example, at the peak of the Palmer, total revenue was around 
£80,000, against the Queensland total of £1.2 million, a proportion of 6.6 per cent. 
-"* In the mid to late 1870s, most of the agitation for separation came from Bowen: 
see, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 24 June 1876, p. 3 
discussing the circular received fi-om the Separation League of North Queensland in 
Bowen. 
^^^ See, for example, the advocacy of Cooktown as the potential capital in CHPRA, 
17 October 1874, p. 2 and the 'tyranny of distance' discussion in CHPRA 
16 January 1875, p. 2. 
310 
Certainly, given the choice, it seems probable that Cooktown's 
preference would have been for financial rather than territorial separation. 
Indeed, after the failure of the proposed Financial Separation Bill of 1877, 
which promised 'an equitable adjustment of the receipts and expenditure of 
the colony ,^ 74 Cooktown's support for any broader form of separation wained 
noticeably. Despite further occasional calls for separation from various 
interests within Cooktown, usually in response to some perceived 
government injustice, the consensus seems to have been that Cooktown 
would fare even worse under a capital in Townsville or Bowen.^^5 As the 
economic importance of Cooktown and the Palmer waned in the late 1870s 
and early 1880s, particularly in relative terms to Townsville, the consensus 
against separation strengthened even further. 
What emerged in its place, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, was a 
conviction that Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields had a viable and 
enduring future as part of Queensland, provided that investment capital 
could be attracted to the area and that durable lines of communications 
were put in place between Cooktown and its hinterland. The fact that a 
large sum of money would be needed to fimd the necessary infrastructiu-e 
was, so the argument went, the inevitable consequence of government 
neglect in the past. Indeed, by the late 1870s, the prevailing view of the 
stalwarts in Cooktown was that 
... had the government only fostered this district 
in the manner they should have done ... our gold-
fields would be developed, and would be emplojdng 
thousands of men today ... and our revenue would 
have maintained its standard for all futurity.^^^ 
^^ '* Cooktown's support even for financial separation was qualified by the demand that 
the expenditure of revenue would need to be devolved to local bodies: see the 
discussion in The Cooktown Courier, 8 August 1877, p. 3. 
^'^^ The Cooktown Courier had consistently argued against separation on the basis that 
if the new capital was in either Townsville or Bowen, even fewer resources would be 
made available to Cooktown: see, for example, The Cooktown Courier, 22 November 
1876, p. 3. 
^^^ See the speech by Alderman Hodel at a public meeting in Cooktown in February 
1879 as reported in The Cooktown Courier, 22 February 1879, p. 2, as well as the 
similar speech by J. Macrossan MLA at a civic banquet in Cooktown in November 
1877 as reported in The Cooktown Courier, 21 November 1877, p. 3. 
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CHAPTER 7 - BOOM TO BUST 
The extremely optimistic views of Cooktown's potential, as 
espoused by its business and civic leaders in the mid to late 1870s, were 
arguably imexceptional in the sense that it would have been sm-prising for 
any newly-established commimity in Queensland or Austraha at that time 
not to have professed some sense of destiny for its town. Moreover, most 
casual observers would probably have expected a certain degree of 
exaggeration, or at least a sanguine viewpoint, in any local pronoiuicements 
as to the longer-term viability of such a town. 
In Cooktown's case, however, the hyperbole in relation to the 
town's progress and its prospects seemed at times to stem from perceptions 
of importance somewhat removed from reality. The Cooktown Herald in 
September 1876, for example, sweepingly asserted that the town lias, in the 
space of three years, made more progress ... than any other new port in the 
world'.^ The Cooktown Courier in December 1879 similarly seemed to be 
stretching its credibility, even allowing for the journalistic style of the day, 
when it contended that 
... the wonderful stride that has been made during 
the past six years by a place previously quite 
unknown ... is probably without parallel in the 
history of civilization.^ 
The other noticeable feature of the rhetoric coming from business 
and civic leaders in Cooktown in the late 1870s was that the focus of their 
optimism changed almost on a yearly basis. After it became apparent, for 
example, that the alluvial workings at the Palmer were in decline, business 
leaders in Cooktown began extolling the untapped wealth of deep-reef 
mining, as well as the coal and tin resources of the district. When it then 
became obvious that the further exploitation of those resources was being 
st5Tnied by the lack of machinery, the focus of the business community 
switched to the need for investment capital. When the injection of limited 
capital failed to provide the panacea, their attention settled finally on the 
^ The Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advertiser (CHPRA), 2 September 1876, 
p. 2. 
n 
The Cooktown Courier, 24 December 1879, p. 2. 
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requirement for a railway line from Cooktown to the Palmer. Overlaying 
the shiftiing focus of business and civic leaders across the late 1870s and 
early 1880s were the starkly-divided views of the European commimity on 
the role of Chinese immigrants in the development of Far North 
Queensland. 
Against that background of often exaggerated rhetoric and 
seemingly-confused strategic priorities for the development of the region, it 
could be argued that successive governments in Brisbane were prudent in 
not committing large sums to Cooktown and the Padmer in the late 1870s. 
Conversely, it perhaps could be argued that the authorities in Brisbane 
should have taken a more interventionist role in the development of the 
region, rather than leaving it in the hands of patently inept locals. In the 
event, the only major initiative of the Government was the funding of the 
railway line from Cooktown to Laura — an initiative which, with the 
admitted benefit of hindsight, was doomed even before it began. 
What is less clear is why the Government eventually agreed in 
1882 to allocate over £100,000 to that ill-fated venture, having resisted local 
pressure to do so for at least the previous five years. Did the Government 
really believe that the Cooktown railway would be a paying concern? If it 
did, why had the Government waited until the district was effectively on its 
knees before it provided the funding? Or was it simply that the authorities 
in Brisbane finally caved in to the unrelenting hyperbole emanating from 
the business community in Cooktown? 
It will be argued in this chapter that approval for the railway hne 
from Cooktown to Laura was primarily the result of bureaucratic inertia. 
Yet even the most basic feasibility study would surely have revealed that 
the project was ill-conceived and unlikely to succeed. Cooktown, though, 
was a long way from Brisbane, and the authorities there no doubt had more 
pressing issues nearer to their doorstep. Moreover, it was probably easier to 
let the funding proceed, than face yet another round of harping from 
Cooktown that it had been poorly treated over the years by Brisbane, and 
deserved some recompense for the contribution it had made to Queensland's 
coffers since 1873. 
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An alternative scenario, as has been mentioned in previous 
chapters, is that had the town's leadership been less obsessed with the 
commercial nexus between Cooktown and the Palmer, the £100,000 or so 
spent on the railway could probably have been available in earlier years for 
the establishment of an industry or service — such as fish processing or a 
timber mill — which offered Cooktown £ind the region some better prospect 
of surviving in the longer term. As will be discussed shortly, though, 
business and civic leaders in Cooktown seemed particularly blinkered in 
their consideration of ways to diversify the local economy. 
Indeed, what emerges in this chapter is that influential figures in 
Cooktown — primarily service providers — were less interested in the civic 
advancement or long-term viability of the town than they were in ensuring 
a continuous flow of visitors and supphes through the town. Their approach 
to diversification, therefore, centred largely on talking up the prospects of 
the region, with the aim of attracting a continuing throughput of new 
arrivals, be they intending residents, would-be miners or agricultural 
labourers, and with little regard for whether they were Europeans, Chinese 
or South Asigms. Needless to say, an economy based on a collection of stores 
had little prospect of surviving in the long-term. 
The Initial Discoveries 
During the first two years of Cooktown's existence, the local 
newspapers rightly reported the alluvial gold deposits at the Palmer in 
glowing terms. The Cooktown Herald in August 1874 noted that 'one and 
all say ... [the Palmer] is the richest and largest gold field ever opened in 
Queensland'.'^ Cooktown itself was similarly described in effusive terms, 
with The Cooktown Herald contending in January 1875 that 
... no other town in any of the Australian colonies 
can bear any comparison with Cooktown in the 
rapid progress it has made since its first settlement.^ 
Throughout those same years, the loced newspapers were quick to 
attribute any slackening in alluvial yields at the Palmer to temporary 
3 CHPRA, 5 August 1874, p. 4. 
* CHPRA, 3 January 1875, p. 2. 
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difficulties imposed by the wet season. ^  Moreover, any reports in southern 
papers which suggested that the future of the Padmer was questionable, or 
that miners were deserting the fields, were forcefully rebutted. When The 
Brisbane Courier reported in early July 1874 that a number of disgruntled 
miners had returned south from the Palmer, The Cooktown Courier — in an 
effort to counter any adverse pubhcity reaching overseas readers — 
reported that 
... we shudder to think what an opinion Europe 
will form of us .... [So] we have sent copies of our 
Courier to all the crowned and uncrowned heads 
of Europe, and two extra to the Bank of England.^ 
By mid 1875, however, the local newspapers were somewhat 
cautiously floating the idea that the alluvial deposits at the Palmer were 
probably not inexhaustible and that the long-term future of the goldfields 
more likely lay in its reefs.'' In August 1875, the manager of the newly-
formed Palmer Quartz Crushing Company was publicly predicting that 
... the alluvial will be exhausted in ... about four 
years but [with its] reefs ... North Queensland is 
destined to become a great rich reefing coimtry. ^  
With typical extravagance, and based on little more than the 
superficial assessment of miners with experience on the Victorian goldfields, 
the local newspapers were soon 'talking up' the prospects of reef-mining at 
the Palmer.9 By December 1875, The Cooktown Herald was predicting that 
'the Palmer reefs will prove of wonderful value [and] bespeak a glorious 
future for the North'. ^ ^ In March 1876, The Cooktown Courier declared, 
without any real foundation, that 
7 
° See, for example, the report in CHPRA, 22 April 1874, p. 3 noting that 'owing to the 
continual wet weather ... the [Palmer] river is still unworkable'. 
^ The Cooktown Courier, 18 July 1874, p. 3. 
In October 1874, The Rockhampton Bulletin had somewhat uncharitably suggested 
that 'the workings are shallow and must soon be exhausted ... [while] there is as yet 
no report of deep ground being discovered: see CHPRA, 31 October 1874, p. 2. 
•8 As reported in CHPRA, 7 August 1875, p. 2. 
Although some selected pieces of quartz were 'dolly-crushed' in the interim, the first 
machine-crushing of quartz at the Palmer did not take place imtil early 1877: see 
CHPRA, 13 January 1877, p. 2. 
10 CHPRA, 6 November 1875, p. 2. 
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... we have no hesitation whatever ... in stating 
that . . . this portion of North Queensland possesses 
the largest and generally richest qu£irtz region yet 
discovered in any part of Australia, if not the world. ^ ^ 
The Official Reports from the Goldfields 
Clearly, the local newspapers and the business community in 
Cooktown reahsed they were on reasonably safe groimd when their 
pronoimcement and predictions were broadly supported by the official 
statistics showing annual gold production at the Palmer increasing from 
58,829 ounces in 1873 to 250,400 ounces in 1875.^2 Thereafter, however, as 
gold production at the Palmer declined over the following five years at the 
rate of about 30,000 ounces per year, the local newspapers obviously found 
it difficult to continue being effusive in the face of raw data to the contrary, 
although that did not stop the ever-ebulhent Cooktown Courier from 
asserting in late 1878 that 
... we have every hope and good reason for anticipating 
that next year's report... will prove a much more 
satisfactory one, judging from recent discoveries.^^ 
From 1877 onwards, though, the annual reports of successive 
wardens at the Palmer River goldfields presented statistical evidence, 
backed by professional judgment, that the Palmer was in steady decline. 
The 1877 report, for example, stated that in relation to the alluvial deposits, 
'many of the Chinese find it difficult to eke out a scanty living', while quartz 
mining 'despite the high average of stone crushed ... has not been deemed 
sufficiently remunerative to ... allure many men to engage in reefing'.^'* 
Two yeEirs later. Warden Sellheim opened his report with the 
comment that 'I regret to inform you that. . . the hopes that were entertained 
at the beginning of the year have not been realised'.^^ He then went on to 
11 The Cooktown Courier, 18 March 1876, p. 2. 
12 Data derived fi-om Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 (see page 278). 
1^ The Cooktown Courier, 10 August 1878, p. 2 in response to the report from the 
Palmer that gold production was down 16,000 ounces over the same period in 1877. 
1* See the report in Annual Report of the Department of Mines for Queensland 1877 in 
Votes and proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Queensland [QVP], 2,1878, 
pp. 311-2. 
IS See his report in QVP, 2, 1880, pp. 599-600. 
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report that 'reefing has been in anything but a flourishing condition', i^ 
Three years later again, in 1882, Warden Hodgkinson similarly attributed 
the ongoing decline in production to 'the natural result of an exhaustion of 
the repeatedly worked alluvial [deposits]'.!'' In 1883, the Undersecretary for 
Mines in his overview of the annual report noted that 
[t]he warden's report [for the Palmer] is rather 
depressing and shows a continued falling off of 
production, population and revenue, in conse-
quence of the exhaustion of the alluvial fields 
and also want of capital to develop the reefs.i^ 
Certain influential voices in Cooktown — most notably the 
business clique of James Baird, Frederick Beardmore, Francis Hodel, 
Edmund Power, William Hartley, and the brothers Callaghan and John 
Walsh — chose to ignore the official reports coming from the Palmer, or at 
least adopted a much more sanguine view of the prospects for the region. 
The local member, John Walsh, blithely told Parliament in June 1879 that 
the district 'had passed through the worst ordeal' and predicted that Cook 
would yet be 'the most important district in the colon/.i^ Extraordinarily, 
he also told Parliament a month later that 
... he could now produce figures to show ... beyond 
doubt... that the Palmer and Hodgkinson gold-
fields were merely in their infEincy.^ o 
The local newspapers were also initially loath to acknowledge any 
permanent decline in jdelds from the Palmer or that the dechne was 
impacting on conmaerce in Cooktown. Their usual explanation was that any 
falling off in trade was simply attributable to 'the expected slackness 
incidental to the wet season'.^i When the downturn continued across the 
following dry season as well. The Cooktown Courier bravely suggested that 
the slackening in trade 'we regard as nothing more serious than the 
recurring ebb of the incoming tide'.^ 
16 QVP, 2, 1880, pp. 599-600. 
1*^  See his report in QVP, 1883/84, p. 1551. 
1^ See his report in QVP, 3, 1884, p. 172. 
1^  Quoted in The Cooktown Courier, 25 June 1879, p. 2. See also Queensland 
Parliamentary Debates (QPD), 29,1879, p. 375. 
As quoted in The Cooktown Courier, 19 July 1879, p. 2. 
See The Cooktown Courier, 8 January 1876, p. 2. 
The Cooktown Courier, 3 January 1877, p. 3. 
2^  
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By early 1878, however, after two years of steady decline 'both in 
the mercantile and mining interests of this district',23 the Cooktown 
community seemed generally ready to acknowledge that simply talking up 
the prospects of the region was unlikely to remedy the situation. The 
dilemma was that few could agree even on the cause of the decline. A yeau* 
later. The Cooktown Courier was still trying to galvanise the conmiunity 
into addressing the question, with its editorial of mid April 1879 noting that 
... the continual falling off... in our population 
and the great depression now existing ... in 
conunercial circles leads us naturally to the 
consideration of what has caused the same.24 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the downturn in the 
region's viabihty came to be attributed across the late 1870s and esu-ly 
1880s to a number of causes. Undoubtedly, the most contentious in the mid 
1870s was that of Chinese inunigration and the role that the Chinese had 
and should play in the development of Far North Queensland. 
The Chinese Question 
For the first fifteen years or so of Queensland's existence, the 
presence in the colony of a small niunber of Chinese was simply not an 
issue. Most of the 3305 Chinese enumerated at the 1871 census, for 
example, were small storekeepers, market-gardeners or hawkers, generally 
notable for their industry, frugality and law-abiding behaviour.25 Many of 
them had probably come via the gold-rushes in Victoria or New South Wales 
or, more likely, were the kin of those that had.^^ Moreover, the number of 
Chinese in Queensland had increased by only one or two hundred each year 
23 At a public meeting called in late March 1878, Howard St George noted that '[a] 
great depression exists at present': see The Cooktown Courier, 23 March 1878, p. 3. 
2* The Cooktown Courier, 19 April 1879, p. 3. 
In 1871, there were a total of 28,351 Chinese in the Australian colonies, of whom 
only 44 were females: see Table 2.1 in C.Y. Choi, Chinese migration and settlement 
in Australia, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1975, p. 22. 
See the discussion of kin-oriented migration in Choi, Chinese migration, pp. 13-4. 
But note also Choi's contention that unaccompanied or single males typically only 
stayed for short periods, usually one or two years, albeit that it was not uncommon 
for them then to remigrate one or more times. 
m 
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over the previous decade, notwithstanding the discovery of gold at Gympie 
in 1867.27 
Accordingly, when Queensland introduced its first gold-mining 
legislation, The Gold Fields Act of 1874, it contained no provisions intended 
to restrict Chinese immigration to the colony, such as capitation taxes or 
discriminatory licence fees.28 In part, that was probably in recognition also 
of the failure of Victoria's restrictive legislation of 1855, which was 
circumvented by the landing at Guichen Bay in South Australia of almost 
15,000 Chinese immigrants in 1857, who avoided the capitation fee of £10 
by proceeding overland to the Victorian goldfields.29 The Queensland 
authorities sdso were perhaps influenced by the fact that the repeal of 
restrictive legislation in Victoria and New South Wales in 1865 and 1867 
respectively had resulted in no appreciable change in Chinese immigration 
to those colonies.30 
It is also evident that the Queensland Government's lack of 
concern was shared, initially at least, by the Cooktown community. The 
Cooktown Herald, reporting the arrival of 100 or so Chinese in mid July 
1874 via the SS Boomerang, noted that 'we are pleased to see [these] new 
arrivals'.^i Almost a year later, the same newspaper was stiU speaking 
favourably of the Chinese, contending that 'their presence ... has added 
much to the dignity and importance of the port in its commercial relations 
with Singapore and Hong Kong'.32 The Cooktown Herald was also adamant 
2' In 1868, for example, the number of Chinese miners at the Gympie goldfields was 
only arovmd 600: see H. Holthouse, Gympie Gold, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1973, p. 106. 
2° From 1859 until 1874, goldmining in Queensland was administered under 
legislation inherited from New South Wales: see the discussion by N. Kirkman, 
The Palmer River Goldfield' in K.H. Kennedy (ed.), Readings in North Queensland 
mining history. Vol. 1, James Cook University of North Queensland, Townsville, 
1980, p. 120. 
See, for example, the account in J. Lyng, Non-Britishers in Australia: influence on 
population and progress, Macmillan, Melbourne, 1927, p. 159. It would of course, 
have been much more difficult to reach the Palmer River goldfields via an adjoining 
colony. 
See, for example, the discussion in Choi, Chinese migration, p. 23 noting that the 
Chinese population in both colonies continued to decline after the repeal of 
legislation. It could be argued, of course, that the two colonies had felt it safe to 
repeal their legislation because of the downwards trend. 
^1 CHPRA, 15 July 1874, p. 2. 
See CHPRA, 28 April 1875, p. 2. 
29 
30 
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that the presence of Chinese at the Palmer would not be to the detriment of 
Europeans, noting in August 1875 that 
... there [does not] seem to be the slightest 
reason to fear that. . . Chinese immigration 
will have the effect of denjdng a single white 
man from the Palmer.^^ 
The views espoused by The Cooktown Herald were, of course, 
largely those of the European business commimity in Cooktown, which 
benefited from the throughput of arriving Chinese, and their subsequent 
resupply. In October 1877, The Cooktown Courier — which by then had 
become virulently anti-Chinese — noted scathingly that 'we are all living on 
the Chinese, both storekeepers and working people [alike]'.^^ More 
accurately, though, the Europeans who benefited were not the small 
storekeepers and merchants, but those who facilitated the trade of Chinese 
merchants in the town, such as customs and import agents — the likes of 
Frederick Beardmore, James Baird and William Hartley — certain artisans, 
and those European carriers and packers engaged in the Palmer trade.^^ 
The wider community did benefit, however, from the willingness of 
Chinese to engage in the mundane occupations of 'hewers of wood and 
drawers of water', as well as providing the town with a ready supply offish, 
poultry and fresh vegetables.^ The visiting correspondent to the popular 
Vagabond ioumal, sent to Cooktown in late 1877 to investigate 'the Chinese 
question', reported to his readers that 
... [the situation in Cooktown] has been totally 
misrepresented in Brisbane, Sydney and 
Melbourne. The Chinese ... [as menial labourers] 
are indispensable in the district.^^ 
Certainly, the apparent adaptability of Chinese labourers to the 
climate and conditions of North Queensland, against the perceived 
33 CHPRA, 18 August 1875, p. 2. 
34 The Cooktown Courier, 27 October 1877, p. 3. 
35 See, for example, the criticism in The Cooktown Courier, 3 November 1877, p. 3 
asserting that Chinese immigration resulted in 'a short-lived ... prosperity that 
benefited only a section of the community*. 
See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 21 October 1876, p. 2 lamenting that 
those tasks had fallen to the Chinese because the European population was 'too 
busy [with their business affairs] to do these things themselves'. 
As quoted in The Cooktown Courier, 31 October 1877, p. 3. 
3fi 
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unsuitability of Europeans for work in the tropics, was an underljdng tenet 
of the pro-Chinese argument. As early as 1874, The Cooktown Herald was 
asserting that 'we are no advocate for Chinese immigration ... but we would 
wilhngly see coolie labor [sic] introduced ... to cultivate this land'.^^ 
The pro-Chinese lobby — Beardmore, Baird, Power, Hodel, 
Hartley, the Walshes and W.H.L. Bailey of The Cooktown Herald — was 
very conscious, though, of the concerns that Chinese labourers would 
undermine the pay and working conditions of Europeans. The Cooktown 
Herald, therefore, periodically attempted to assuage such concerns by 
pointing out that 'were the Chinese ousting Europeans from employment or 
in competition with them for wages ... there might be some slight cause for 
complaint'.39 After the ASN Company began employing Chinese labourers 
on their steamers in 1878, The Cooktown Courier suggested that a line 
should be drawn across Queensland, 'prohibiting the Celestials from leaving 
the North' while creating in North Queensland a class of lower-paid Asiatic 
labourers.40 
By the time that suggestion was made, however, a line could well 
have been drawn down the main street of Cooktown, so deeply was the 
European community divided over the Chinese question. Apart from 
William Morgan, one of the town's solicitors and editor of The Cooktown 
Courier, those opposed to the Chinese were a loose-knit group, with few 
leading personalities. Some, such as Samuel Samper, Michael Wholohan, 
Adolphus Norrie and Joseph Josephson, were small-scale merchants or 
publicans, whose trade had suffered with the decline in European miners 
passing though the town.^i Others were ex-miners, who supposedly had 
been forced from the Palmer by the Chinese influx. Indeed, those speaking 
out against the Chinese at public meetings were often individuals who 
previously had professed no public identification with the anti-Chinese 
38 
m 
CHPRA, 7 October 1874, p. 2. The same editorial argued that Chinese labourers 
were much preferred to South Sea Islanders, who 'are of very little use, idle, lazy 
and revengeful'. 
See CHPRA, 1 December 1875, p. 2. As has been mentioned previously, Chinese 
labourers were employed by the Cooktown council on roadworks within the town: 
see The Cooktown Courier, 28 April 1877, p. 3. But that situation arose only 
because of the scarcity of European labourers: see The Cooktown Courier, 21 April 
1877, p. 3. 
4^ The Cooktown Courier, 24 September 1879, p. 2. 
*1 See also the discussion and identification of those in the anti-Chinese lobby in 
Kirkman, The Palmer River goldfield', p. 128. 
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lobby, but were moved by the occasion (or the alcohol consumed before-
hand) to offer their viewpoint. 
That is not to suggest that the anti-Chinese lobby was 
disorganised or lacking in ideological zeal. Nevertheless, public meetings in 
the late 1870s, called to address the issue, often degenerated into uproar, 
with nominated speakers not infrequently being forced to resiune their seats 
because of the heckling and jeering directed at them.42 Some meetings 
ended in violence £md at one, in November 1877, demonstrators burned and 
stoned an effigy of W.H.L. Bailey, the proprietor of The Cooktown HeraldA^ 
For those opposed to Chinese immigration, there were basically 
three issues. The first was their belief that the Chinese were plundering 
the resources of Queensland. The Cooktown Courier, in March 1876 
typically asserted that 'their departure is signalised by so much material 
wealth departed, never to retum'.44 On that issue, as was addressed in 
Chapter 6, the criticism of the Chinese in Far North Queensland was well-
founded. The point needs to be made, however, that there was no legislation 
in Queensland at that time which either prohibited or inhibited the export 
of gold to China or anjrwhere else. 
The second accusation was that the Chinse enjoyed the same 
privileges as any European resident of Queensland, but failed to contribute 
either an equitable share of the burden or towards the development of the 
colony generally. The Cooktown Courier, in August 1875, asserted that 'if 
these men are to come here as equals ... why should they not bear their 
equal share of the State burden?'^^ A similar editorial in November 1877 
complained that 'not an ounce of gold obtained by the Chinese has been 
invested in the colony in any shape or form'.^^ 
*2 See the report of a meeting in The Cooktown Courier, 24 October 1877, p. 3 with the 
editorial asserting that 'the deplorable proceedings on Monday ... will remain a blot 
in the annals of Cooktown'. 
*3 See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 10 November 1877, p. 3. 
** The Cooktown Courier, 15 March 1876, p. 2. See also The Cooktown Courier, 
3 November 1877, p. 2 asserting that '[every] ounce of gold obtained by the Chinese 
... has all found its way to China'. 
^ The Cooktown Courier, 4 August 1875, p. 3. 
*^ The Cooktown Courier, 3 November 1877, p. 3. 
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Certainly, as has been discussed in previous chapters, Chinese 
financiers and merchants had almost exclusive control over the commercial 
transactions involved in the movement of Chinese miners to Australia and 
their subsequent day-to-day sustenance at the Palmer. Moreover, there is 
little evidence to suggest that any of the proceeds remained in Australia, 
with the obvious exception of the small proportion expended on the 
construction or purchase of commercial and residential premises in 
Cooktown itself. 
The accusation that the Chinese failed to pay their fair share of 
taxes, though, seems largely unfounded. Obviously, popular reports of gold 
wardens rounding-up dozens of unregistered Chinese miners at a time and 
'impounding' them until their licence fees were paid,^^ would have added to 
the contemporary perception that the majority of Chinese miners were 
delinquent tax-payers. 
Table 7.1 (over), however, shows that a total of nearly 50,000 
miners' licences were issued on the Palmer River goldfields between 1874 
and 1885, representing an 'issue rate' of 84.6 per cent (that is, licences 
issued against the estimated number of miners). Moreover, columns (d), (e) 
and (f) of Table 7.1 suggest that over 44,000 hcences were granted to 
Chinese miners, representing an issue rate across the period of 84.0 per 
cent. The issue to the Chinese of that number of miners' licences, together 
with the revenue generated from business licences and escort fees, and local 
government rates and land taxes on owned or rented properties, as well as 
customs duties paid on the substfmtial volume of Chinese imports, would 
seem to rebut the accusation in question. 
4"^  See, for example, W.R.O. Hill, Forty-fwe years experiences in North Queensland, 
Pole, Brisbane, 1907, p. 68. 
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Table 7.1 - Miners* Licences Issued at the Palmer River Goldfields 
1874-1885 
Years 
<a) 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1881 
1882 
1883 
1884 
1885 
Total 
Total 
Licences 
Issued 
(b) 
2976 
4102 
10131 
9187 
5962 
5013 
3960 
3425 
2184 
1456 
1007 
541 
49,944 
Estimated 
Number of 
Miners 
(c) 
3520 
7060 
9900 
13250 
8880 
5220 
4140 
3303 
1437 
946 
765 
582 
59,003 
Licences 
Issued to 
Chinese 
(d) 
1158 
2608 
9321 
8962 
5620 
4815 
3789 
3286 
2088 
1362 
948 
467 
44,424 
Estimated 
Number of 
Chinese Miners 
(e) 
1500 
5400 
9000 
13000 
8500 
5000 
3950 
3148 
1330 
842 
699 
500 
52,869 
Issue Rate 
to Chinese 
(f) 
77.2% 
48.3% 
103.6% 
68.9% 
66.1% 
96.3% 
95.9% 
104.4% 
157.0% 
161.8% 
135.6% 
93.4% 
84.0% 
Notes: Figures in columns (b), (c) and (e) derived from oflicial statistics as 
published in successive issues of QVP, 1875-86, as at 31 December 
for each year. 
Figures in column (d) calculated by deducting the number of licences 
issued to Europeans from the figures in column Cb). The number of 
European licences derived by applying an assumed 'issue rate ' of 90% 
to the official estimate for the number of Europeans at the goldfields. 
That is, the assumption is being made — based on loose anecdotal 
evidence — that around 90% of all European miners at the goldfields 
had a current miner's licence. 
Figures in column (f) calculated by dividing column (d) figures by (e). 
It is interesting to note that across the period 1881 to 1884 (where 
the "issue rate' exceeded 100%), the official estimates of the number 
of Chinese at the Palmer were obviously under-stated. 
The third claim of the anti-Chinese lobby was that European 
miners were being forced from the goldfields (and indeed from Far North 
Queensland) by the Chinese. The Cooktown Courier in October 1876, for 
example, asserted that 'where the Chinese get a footing, we Europe£uis go to 
the wair.'*^ The associated argument was that had the Chinese been 
48 The Cooktown Courier, 21 October 1876, p. 2. 
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excluded from the Palmer River, the wealth of the goldfields would have 
kept thousands of European miners in steady emplojnnent for many years."^^ 
The basis of their argument was the fact that by 1877 the 
population of the Palmer River goldfields was comprised almost entirely of 
Chinese, while the number of European miners had fallen from a high of 
over 2000 in 1874 to less than 300.50 The reality was that none of the 
European miners had been physicsdly forced from the Palmer; rather, they 
had wilhngly deserted their claims for rushes elsewhere, such as the newly-
discovered Hodgkinson goldfields. It is also questionable whether European 
miners — unlike the Chinese — would have been prepared anyway to 
return to their abandoned claims on the Palmer and patiently rework them 
several times over, for often diminishing retums.^^ Accordingly, the notion 
that the Palmer's potential of some 1.2 million ounces of gold could have 
been recovered by a lesser number of Europeans seems largely specious. 
Nevertheless, it suited European miners — resentful at the 
success of the systematic and laborious methods employed by the Chinese — 
simply to complain that they had been forced out. In a similar way, it 
sometimes suited the anti-Chinese lobby in Cooktown to portray the 
Chinese as a wretched, inferior class, threatening the social order of white 
Australia. That said, the class issue per se was not a major factor in the 
ongoing debate in Cooktown in the late 1870s.^2 One particularly rabid 
editorial in The Cooktown Courier in February 1877, however, questioned 
... on what principle of equity or fair play are we 
compelled to admit this ... swarm of the very 
lowest classes of a race ... which has sunk into 
^^ See, for example, The Cooktown Courier, 3 November 1877, p. 3. 
® In 1877, according to the Annual Report of the Department of Mines for 
Queensland, the total European population at the Palmer River was 800, against a 
Chinese population of 15,000: see QVP, 2, 1878, p. 311. 
^^ For a good account of the mining methods of the Chinese, see N. Kirkman, 'Chinese 
miners on the Palmer' in Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, 13, 
2, May 1987, p. 52. 
Much of the vitriolic hostility twards the Chinese, over perceived threats both to 
labour standards and social order, seems to have arisen in the early 1880s and via 
the Southern press, rather than in Cooktown. See, for example, the discussion in 
W.R. Johnston, The call of the land: a history of Queensland to the present day, 
Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1982, p. 73. 
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the very putrescence of a rotten civilization? 
[TJheir presence taints the whole community ....^3 
The class issue was also not a major factor, ostensibly at least, in 
the legislation introduced by the Queensland Parliament in 1876 to take 
account of the influx of Chinese to the Palmer. The amendments of May 
1876 to the Customs Duties Act, increasing the duty on rice from £2 to £7/6/8 
per ton, were argued as revenue-raising measures, rather than any attempt 
to restrict Chinese immigration.54 Moreover, even though Chinese 
merchants in Cooktown petitioned Parliament to repeal the increased duty, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the legislation had any direct effect 
on Chinese immigration.^ 
The second piece of legislation introduced in 1876 was more 
controversi£d. The proposed Chid Fields Act Amendment Act of 1876, 
introduced into Parliament on 24 July 1876, increased the miners licence 
fee for Asian and African ahens from ten shillings to £3, and for business 
licences from £4 to £10.^ The discriminatory nature of the proposed 
legislation provoked considerable outcry, with The Cooktown Herald 
pointing out that '[underl existing treaties ... all men are equal before the 
law'.57 Even the usually gmti-Chinese Cooktown Courier felt obliged to 
counsel that 
[i]t would be well if the Legislature would pause 
before they ... commit themselves to a course as 
repugnant to the British Constitution and British 
Justice, as it would be to common sense.^^ 
In the event, the legislation failed to receive the assent of the 
Queensland Governor who, acting on instructions from London, reserved 
^ The Cooktown Courier, 17 February 1877, p. 2. 
^ See QPD, 1876, 20, p. 362. 
^^ The petition was rejected on the basis that it untruthfully (in the view of 
Parliament) asserted that the Chinese were 'already oppressed': see the discussion 
in QPD, 1876, 20, pp. 514-7. See also the view that by mid 1877 'the increased rice 
tax was having its effect on the diet and health of the miners': Kirkman, 'Chinese 
miners on the Palmer', p. 57, although establishing a link between that effect and 
the rate of immigration is more difficult. 
*° In introducing the bill. Minister for Works Thorn claimed it 'was to compel Asiatic 
aliens to contribute more than they did at the present time to the revenue for the 
rights they enjoyed': see QPD, 1876, 20, p. 371. 
See CHPRA, 5 May 1875, p. 2 for an earlier denunciation of any proposal to 
increase the fees for Chinese. 
®^ The Cooktown Courier, 6 September 1876, p. 3. 
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the biU.59 Undeterred, the Queensland Government resubmitted the 
legislation in 1877, having made some minor changes on the advice of 
Premier Parkes of New South Wales.^ It also submitted a second equally 
discriminatory bill. The Chinese Immigrants Regulation Bill of 1877, which 
provided for a capitation fee of £10 to be levied on all arriving Chinese 
immigreuits, aimed 'at regulating and repressing the undue immigration of 
Chinese to the Northern shores of Australia'.^^ 
With some obvious reluctance, the Imperial Government 
sanctioned both bills in October 1877.^2 jn conveying the Queen's Assent to 
the Governor of Queensland, however, the authorities in London stated 
their view that 
... the true solution ... is to be found in the recognition 
of Chinese immigration, under careful regulations ... 
rather than its discouragement by penal legislation.^^ 
In Cooktown, the news that both bills had been approved was met with 
mixed reactions. The Chinese businessmen in the town petitioned the 
Emperor of China, albeit without success, seeking to draw his attention to 
their belief that the legislation constituted a breach of the Treaty of 
Tientsin, concluded in 1860 between China and England.^^ The Cooktown 
Herald, as could be expected, described the legislation as 'iniquitous, 
tyrranical and unjust' and predicted 'the most baneful... [consequences]'.^^ 
60 
®^  In a letter to the Governor, Lord Carnarvon suggested that the next session of the 
Queensland Parliament may like to recommend 'provisions which ... will appear less 
directly and exclusively aimed at the subjects of a friendly Power': see QVP, 1, 
1877, p. 815 and the discussion in R.L.. Tomkys, Queensland immigration 1859-
1901, MA thesis, University of Queensland, 1930, p. 89. 
See the discussion in Tomkys, Queensland immigration, p. 89 of the action taken by 
the Queensland Government in aproaching Victoria and New South Wales for 
support after the Imperial Government refused to accede to the 1876 legislation. 
^^ See the remarks by Premier Douglas, in introducing the bill, in QPD, 1877, 23, 
p. 343. 
°* The attitude of the British Government towards the Chinese question in Australia 
was greatly resented not only in Queensland but also in the other Australian 
colonies as an interference in a purely Australian affair. Certainly, it gave some 
impetus to the convening of the inter-colonial conference held in Melbourne in 1880 
to discuss the issue of Chinese immigration to Australia: see the discussion in 
Lyng, Non-Britishers in Australia, p. 162. 
See letter Sir Michael Hicks-Beach to Governor Sir A.E. Kennedy in QVP, 2, 1878, 
p. 37. 
^ See the discussion by K Cronin, The Chinese community in Quensland, 1874-1900' 
in Queensland Heritage, 8, May 1878, p. 10. 
®^  See CHPRA, 19 September 1877, p. 2. 
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The Cooktown Courier, as similarly expected, was concerned that the 
measures would be insufficient to slow the influx of Chinese.66 
Whether or not the legislation was actually successful in 
restricting Chinese immigration to Cooktown, or in discouraging the 
Chinese from working as miners, is difficult to substantiate. Certainly, the 
consensus in Cooktown several years later was that the legislation of 1877 
marked the downwards turning point in the fortunes of the town, 
attributable to 'the final check ... given to Chinese immigration'.^^ By early 
1878 it was being reported that '[t]he Chinese have disappeared in large 
numbers of late' from the Palmer.^^ 
Immigration records of Chinese arrivals at Cooktown between 
January 1875 and December 1878, as illustrated at Figure 7.1 (over), would 
also seem to corroborate the perceived nexus between the legislation and 
the decline in Chinese immigration to Far North Queensland. Indeed, apart 
from the erratic nature of the influx, due in part presumably to the need to 
avoid the November typhoon season in East Asian waters, the most obvious 
trend in Figure 7.1 is the virtual curtailment of Chinese immigration after 
July 1877. 
°^ The Cooktown Courier, 4 July 1877, p. 3 asserted that 'the measure [only] half goes 
far enough'. 
®' See, for example, editorials in The Cooktown Courier, 19 April 1879, p. 3 and 
24 September 1879, p. 2, both bemoaning — in a considerable shift of opinion from 
1877 —that 'from the day the poll tax was introduced we have gradually gone down 
hill'. 
® The Cooktown Courier, 6 February 1878, p. 3. 
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Figure 7.1 - Chinese Immigrant Arrivals in Cooktown 1875-1878 
(showing total numbers per quarter) 
No. 
1875 1876 1877 1878 
Years 
Source: Data derived from official immigration returns in successive issues of QVP, 1875-79. 
Whether or not the falling away of arrivals from July 1877 
onwards can be directly attributed to the two restrictive bills of 1877 is less 
clear. The bills, for example, were not assented to until October 1877. Yet 
Figure 7.1 suggests that the decline began at least three months before that 
date. Indeed, given the lead-time that would have been necessary to ready 
ship-loads of immigrants from Hong Kong, it seems probable that the 
decline effectively began around April 1877. 
It could be argued, of course, that April 1877 was just the time 
when the Queensland Government was in the process of revising the 1876 
version of the legislation, and that Chinese financiers and merchants in 
Cooktown and Hong Kong 'saw the writing on the wall' and took steps to 
curtail further immigration ahead of the referral of the legislation to 
London. The counter to that proposition is that the Chinese in Cooktown or 
elsewhere would have had no real idea that the legislation would be 
assented to at its second submission. Moreover, the trend in the last 
quarter of 1876 — when the first round of legislation was on its way to 
London — was a three-fold increase in immigration over the June to August 
quarter. 
An alternative explanation for the decline, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 4, is that the Palmer River goldfields were on the point of being 
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unviable — in terms of the productivity of individual miners — by around 
late 1876.69 It seems possible, therefore, that regardless of (or coincidental 
with) the legislation of 1876 and 1877, Chinese financiers and merchants in 
Cooktown and Hong Kong had separately made the decision by early 1877 
to cut back or stop the flow of indentured Chinese labourers to Far North 
Queensland. Whilst no direct evidence has been found to support this 
contention, its possibility needs to be seen in the context that Chinese 
immigration to the Psdmer — unlike that of Europeans — was largely in the 
hands of a small business clique, and that the Chinese financiers and 
businessmen involved would have been unlikely to have continued investing 
once it became evident that individual miners were increasingly unable to 
meet the repayment terms of their indenture.^^ 
Another explanation, not mutually exclusive of the previous one, is 
that many of the Chinese immigrants who arrived at Cooktown in early 
1877 were perhaps free men, rather than indentured labourers. Whilst 
there is little evidence to support it, this interpretation would postulate that 
the influx of indentured labourers in fact began to dechne from the first 
quarter of 1877 and that as many as 5000 of the individuals who arrived in 
Far North Queensland in the first six months of 1877 were free men, lured 
by the earlier reports from the Palmer and not privy to the business records-
type information available to the influential Chinese clique in Cooktown.''^ 
The significance of this possible explanation is that it may help 
explain why the 'balance sheet' of Chinese arrivals and departures through 
Cooktown fails to tally with the corresponding estimates of the number of 
Chinese present at the goldfields, particularly during late 1877 and 
throughout 1878. Figure 7.2 (over) for example, shows that until the end of 
1877, the cumulative balance of Chinese entering and leaving via Cooktown 
approximates the several estimates of the number of Chinese present at the 
See Figure 4.5 at page 160 and its associated discussion, contending that by 1876 
the average yield per Chinese miner had fallen to around 20 ounces per year. 
'® A counter proposition could be that unscrupulous Chinese financiers would not be 
unduly worried if indentured labourers were unable to repay their stake, given that 
the debt with interest would pass to their families in China. 
A report in The Cooktown Courier, 14 March 1877, p. 2 noted that 'Captain O'Neill, 
of the Killarny, states that... there were any amount of Chinese waiting for 
steamers to come to this port'. The inference would seem to be that those awaiting 
passage were free men, rather than indentured labourers whose movement would 
have been pre-arranged by their financiers. 
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various goldfields in Far North Queensland.72 From January 1878 onwards, 
however, the gap widens to suggest that around 4000 Chinese immigrants 
who had entered the colony via Cooktown were no longer present at the 
goldfields. 73 
Figure 7.2 - The Chinese Population at the North Queensland Goldfields 
1876-1879 
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1. Cumulative balance of Chinese calculated from immigration returns of arrivals 
and departures through Cooktown, together with a 'starting balance' of 1500 
from southern ports. 
2. Number of Chinese at the goldfields derived from estimates provided by various 
goldfields wardens, as reported in AnnuEd Mining Reports. Note that the numbers 
are for all occupations, not just miners. 
3. Note that the graphs do not reflect the relatively small number of Chinese who 
arrived at the goldfields either overland or from southern ports nor the number 
of Chinese who were resident in Cooktown itself across the period. 
Source: Data derived from official immigration returns and Annual Mining Reports in 
successive issues of QVP, 1877-79. 
Given that indentured Chinese miners would have been unlikely 
to quit the goldfields to seek employment elsewhere, without the sanction 
and ongoing support of their Cooktown or Hong Kong-based financier, it 
seems possible that many of the 'missing* 4000 or so immigrants were 
perhaps free men who may have arrived in early 1877. Presumably, they 
72 
78 
Note 3 to Figure 7.2 makes the point that the graphs do not reflect the relatively 
small number of Chinese who arrived at the goldfields either overland or from 
southern ports, nor the number of Chinese (on average about 1500) who were 
resident in Cooktown across the period. 
The Cooktown Courier, 5 January 1878, p. 3 reported that 'a considerable number 
have gone seawards to Southern Ports. Large numbers have also gone South 
overland'. 
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would have found it easier than indentured workers to move from the 
goldfields in pursuit of alternative employment in coastal centres or in 
Brisbane.'''* Importantly also, it could well have been this group of Chinese 
— permeating southwards in search of work — which galvanised the anti-
Chinese movement in other Queensland towns and cities from the late 
1870s onwards. 
Somewhat paradoxically, at the very time that the anti-Chinese 
movement was gaining impetus elsewhere in Queensland, its strength in 
Cooktown began to ebb. In part, that was because the anti-Chinese lobby in 
Cooktown saw the legislation of 1877 as having been successful in meeting 
their calls to curtail fiuther Chinese immigration to Far North Queensland. 
In part also, however, was the growing perception within the town that 'as 
the Chinese began to leave ... our trade and importance just as rapidly 
decreased'.^s By late 1879, even the previously anti-Chinese The Cooktown 
Courier was admitting that 
[wjhen the Chinese were allowed to come without 
restriction our revenue was greater ... but from 
the day the poll tax was levied we have gradually 
gone down hill.''^ 
Late 1877 and 1878, therefore, saw the emergence of the view in 
Cooktown that rather than restrict Chinese immigration and discourage the 
Chinese from goldmining, the Government should have heeded the earher 
and ongoing calls from a wide cross-section of the Cooktown community 
simply to exclude the Chinese from new goldfields for a period of three or 
five years after their discovery.''^ The several public meetings held in 
Cooktown across that period were largely not about the residual 8000 or so 
Chinese stiU present in Far North Queensland, but over the issue of 
"^ Several hundred Chinese, for example, were reportedly employed in tin mining near 
Cairns by early 1879: see The Cooktown Courier, 17 May 1879, p. 2 asserting that 
"fifty Europeans [in that industry] would be more remunerative to the district than 
200 Chinese'. 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 19 April 1879, p. 2. 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 24 September 1879, p. 2. 
Kirkman, for example, notes that 'the legislation of 1877 ignored one of the most 
important demands of the European mining population and the community as a 
whole: the exclusion of Chinese fi-om new goldfields': Kirkman, 'The Palmer River 
goldfield', p. 129. 
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repealing the legislation of 1877 in favour of that which excluded the 
Chinese from new goldfields for three years.^s 
In the event. The Gold Fields Act Amendment Act of 1878, 
repealing the increased charges for mining licences, was genersdly hailed 
with satisfaction in Cooktown, as was the new provision prohibiting the 
issue of miners licences to Chinese for any goldfield within three years of its 
discovery.''^ As it became evident, however, that the strength of anti-
Chinese feeling in southern Queensland (and the southern colonies) was 
continuing to grow, and that Parliament was unlikely to repeal the poll tax 
on new arrivals, the business community in Cooktown gradually resigned 
itself to the appreciation that other measures would be needed to resurrect 
the failing fortunes of the town.^o 
Diversifying the Cooktown Economy 
What those 'other measures' should be was largely an 
imponderable to the business community of the town. Some individuals 
obviously beheved that it was the responsibility of the Queensland 
government to come to the financial rescue of the town, as it supposedly had 
to Townsville and other coastal ports.^^ Others seemed to beheve that the 
commercial advantages of the port were so obvious that it was only a matter 
of time before multi-national businesses, such as the Netherlands India 
Steam Navigation Company, transformed Cooktown into 'the Singapore of 
the South Pacific'82 and that, accordingly, it was only necessary for those in 
80 
®^ See, for example, the reports of meetings in The Cooktown Courier, 27 October 
1877, p. 3; 1 May 1878, p. 2 and 31 August 1878, p. 2. 
^^ See, for example, Kirkman, The Palmer River goldfield', pp. 129-30 and Annual 
Report, Department of Mines in QVP, 1879, 2, p. 382 noting that the issue of miners 
rights to Chinese increased from 345 in the period January to July 1878 to 5404 in 
the period July to December 1878. That figure approximates the estimate of 5620 
licences issued to Chinese miners in 1878 from Table 7.1 at page 323. 
By the early 1880s, for example, the strength of anti-Chinese sentiment in Brisbane 
was such that the Premier was popularly able to proclaim his intention 'to make it 
ten times more difficult for the Chinese to come here': see QPD, 1883-84, 41, p. 345. 
"^ As has been discussed previously, the perceived sense of injustice over government 
expenditure in Cooktown vis-a-vis other towns in Queensland was an ongoing 
theme from civic and business leaders throughout the mid to late 1870s: see, for 
example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 8 January 1879, p. 2. 
® See, for example. The Cooktown Courier, 28 July 1875, p. 3 and CHPRA, 13 June 
1877, p. 2. 
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the town 'to hold our own until the era of commercial prosperity dawns on 
US'.83 
Others, however, were of the view that it was up to the business 
community itself to take the initiative and that it was 'to European 
enterprise that we now [must] look to for advancement'.^ The underlying 
tenet was that Cooktown's commercial destiny was as a service centre for its 
hinterland, with the prosperity of the town dependent upon the flow of trade 
and workers through its business centre. Rarely did any serious thought 
seem to be given to the establishment of industries or even processing works 
within Cooktown itself. That presumably was because most of the town's 
business and civic leaders — Baird, Beardmore, Hodel, Hartley, Hector 
Menzies, the Walsh brothers and Andrew Thredgold, for example — were 
merchants or artisans whose entrepreneurial vision was conditioned (and 
tunnelled) by the boom years of the mid 1870s. 
The notion of European 'enterprise', therefore, was typically 
advanced in the context that more needed to be done to explore gmd exploit 
the untapped resources of inland Cape York Peninsula. Local editorials 
frequently exhorted the business commimity in Cooktown to sponsor 
exploration parties into the 'large auriferous-looking and conterminous area 
of countr)^ to the north of the Palmer River.^s Other editorials, citing the 
American experience, urged the government to take on the responsibility of 
sending 
Botanists, Geologists and Naturalists to prospect 
the country and report on it. . . [with a view to 
their reports being] made available to every 
settler.^ 
The reality was that in the mid to late 1870s any prospector worth 
his salt was engaged in his own exploration work either at the Palmer or 
Hodgkinson, and was unlikely to be interested in the relatively paltry sums 
^ See The Cooktown Courier, 13 March 1878, p. 2. 
^^ See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 8 January 1879, p. 2 noting 
also that 'our meiin importations have almost altogether ceased since the stoppage 
of Chinese immigration'. 
®^ See, for example, the early calls in CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2 and The Cooktown 
Courier, 9 May 1874, p. 3. 
See, for example, CHPRA, 29 April 1874, p. 2 and The Cooktown Courier, 20 May 
1874, p. 2. 
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being offered by potential sponsors in Cooktown to look elsewhere.^^ There 
was also an understandable reluctance on the part of even sponsored 
prospectors to declare the results of their finds, at least until they had taken 
the opportunity to glean what they could while their luck or rations lasted. 
Similarly, it was not until 1879 — seven years after William 
Hann's official geological survey from Georgetown towards Coen — that the 
Government authorised its official geologist, Robert Jack, to re-survey the 
area between Cooktown and Princess Cheu-lotte Bay to the northwest.^ In 
the intervening years, the Government was presumably of the view that the 
exploration and exploitation of Far North Queensland was proceeding 
satisfactorily without its involvement. Indeed, the instructions to Robert 
Jack — couched only in general terms — gave no indication that the 
Government was placing particular store in his survey, let alone that the 
future of Cooktown possibly hinged on its results. 
Perhaps in part because of the lack of detailed surveys, but 
certainly in the tradition of their earlier reporting on the Palmer, the 
newspapers in Cooktown were quick to pin their hopes on the scantiest 
evidence of new mineral discoveries. As early as 1875, The Cooktown 
Herald was reporting the discovery of coal 'in abundance [and] within easy 
reach' of the town, which an unidentified but 'distinguished geologist has 
declared to be the best as yet discovered in the colon/.^^ 
By 1876, as the Palmer gold yields showed some sign of 
slackening, the hyperbole over the coal deposits supposedly located within 
thirty kilometres of Cooktown stepped up several notches. The Cooktown 
Courier, without the slightest geological evidence, asserted that 'we have 
large coal deposits [whose] immense importance ... cannot be too highly 
estimated'.^^ The Cooktown Herald, in a similar vein, contended that 
°' James Venture Mulligan, for example, who led six expeditions into the region 
between 1873 and 1876 was sponsored by miners on the Etheridge for his first 
expedition and by the Government for £500 on his fifth, but never by the Cooktown 
business community (although he did receive £180 by way of public subscription 
from the residents of Cooktown to blaze a trail from Cooktown to the Hodgkinson: 
see CHPRA, 29 March 1876, p. 3). 
See the account in R.L. Jack, Northmost Australia, Vol. 2, Robertson and Company, 
Melbourne, 1922. 
See CHPRA, 14 July 1875, p. 2 and 23 October 1875, p. 2. 
The Cooktown Courier, 21 June 1876, p. 2. 
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... it is abundant and almost at our doors. [Moreover, 
it is] a material of infinitely more power in inducing 
a steady trade and a solid welfare to any community 
than gold.9i 
By 1879, many in the Cooktown business community were pinning 
their hopes for the town on the prospect of nearby coal deposits providing an 
unlimited source of fiiel for the passing steamer trade, as well as ready 
power for the quartz-crushing machinery being ordered for the Palmer 
reefs.^2 The advocates of a railway line between Cooktown and the Palmer 
River — notably Andrew Thredgold, Hector Menzies, Edmund Power, 
Ulrich Mader, William Hartley and Charles Walsh — similarly argued that 
the presence of coal deposits astride the proposed route provided further 
justification for the line and, indeed, that transporting coal by rail for 
shipment from Cooktown 'would prove a most profitable speculation'.^^ 
As it turned out, a detailed survey by Robert Jack in September 
1879 put paid to any expectations that coal was to be found in the area in 
commercial quantities. After his report was received by the local 
authorities. The Cooktown Courier advised its readers that 
... it is much to be regretted that nothing better 
than an eight-inch coal seam ... has yet been 
discovered.^4 
The possibility of commercial deposits of tin being found in the 
vicinity of Cooktown was treated by the local newspapers with similar 
enthusiasm. After the initial discovery of stream tin at Byerstown in late 
1876, The Cooktown Courier asserted that the find was 'irrefragable proof of 
the existence of stanniferous country on the Palmer'.^^ When four tons of 
ore were transported to Cooktown for on-shipment to Sydney for processing. 
The Cooktown Courier predicted even more confidently that 
... here then is a source of prosperity, which if 
developed, will more than counterbalance the 
91 CHPRA, 1 January 1876, p. 2. 
9^ See, for example, the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 25 August 1879, p. 3. 
9^ The Cooktown Courier, 25 August 1879, p. 3. The argued nexus between coal 
mining and the Cooktown-Maytown railway is discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
94 The Cooktown Courier, 24 September 1879, p. 2. 
95 The Cooktown Courier, 4 August 1877, p. 3. 
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loss of the Chinese trade, which just now weighs 
so heavily on our pessimists.^^ 
The problem with tin-mining, as developers soon found, was that 
the costs of transporting and processing the ore exceeded the sale price for 
refined tin of aroimd £40 per ton. After paying packers £56 per ton to move 
the ore from the tin-fields to Byerstown, developers then had to pay carriers 
£6 per ton for its transportation to Cooktown, followed by £1 per ton by ship 
to Sydney, leaving them 'on the wrong side of the ledger' even before the 
costs of mining and processing were added.^'' The lesson drawn by the 
business community in Cooktown was not that a processing facility should 
be established on-site or at Byerstown, but that 
... all that we need are road expenditure, capital 
and population to develop what must ultimately 
be one of our principal exports.^^ 
The Cooktown commimity also seemed to have httle interest in 
establishing a sawmill in the town, notwithstanding the fact that stands of 
cedar and sandalwood had earlier been located nearby.^^ In mid 1875, 
sawmilling machinery reportedly destined for Cooktown was diverted at the 
last minute by its owners to the Daintree River.^^ Thereafter, Cooktown 
was largely dependent on the Daintree mill for its sawn timber. Somewhat 
surprisingly, given the frequent shortages of timber in the town, the 
business community made no further attempt either to acquire its own miU 
or encourage the systematic exploitation of local timber resources.^^^ 
Civic and business leaders similarly took few practical steps to 
encourage the development of agriculture in the vicinity of the town. As 
discussed previously, Chinese market gardeners had established a fringe 
industry of supplying the town with fresh fruit and vegetables by early 
1874. But apart from that, no serious attempts were made or encouraged in 
^^ The Cooktown Courier, 1 August 1877, p. 3. 
"" See, for example, the report in The Cooktown Courier, 12 September 1877, p. 3. 
^ See the editorial in CHPRA, 10 October 1877, p. 2. 
99 See, for example, the report of 100,000 feet of cedar being shipped south in October 
1874, with the expectation that a further half million feet would follow before the 
end of the year: CHPRA, 28 October 1874, p. 2. 
1^^ As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 24 July 1875, p. 2. 
The notable exception was that a group of Chinese shipbuilders constructed a 50-
ton fishing boat from local Oregon pine in 1877: see CHPRA, 30 May 1877, p. 2 
noting that the vessel was to be employed in the beche-de-mer trade. 
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terms of the cultivation of sugar, coffee, tea, rice or other tropical produce, 
despite not infrequent assertions in the local newspapers to the effect that 
... our soil is pronounced magnificent... [and] the 
labour question can be settled by the importation 
of coolies from India.^^^ 
Without belabouring the point too far, it also seems that the 
business community in Cooktown did little to develop the town as a home-
port for the beche-de-mer industry. It is acknowledged that some thirteen 
boats emplojdng over 450 men were operating from the Endeavour River in 
the mid to late 1870s.^^^ But the extent of the relationship seems largely to 
have been that Cooktown was simply a victualhng point £md transhipment 
port for produce, rather than a home-port in the sense of a base providing 
processing facilities for produce, as well as a repair and refurbishment 
capability for the vessels and equipment involved.^^ 
The Transition to Reef Mining 
Against that backdrop of assorted ventures and opportunities, 
mooted at various times as having the potential to rescue the Cooktown 
economy from the doldrums of the late 1870s, was the overlaying and 
widely-held belief in Cooktown that when the alluvial gold at the Palmer 
was finally exhausted, the longer-term fiiture of the goldfields lay in reef-
mining. As early as February 1875, the local newspapers were extolling 'the 
unlimited ... wealth in our reefs', with The Cooktown Herald tjTDically 
reporting that 
... we have every confidence in sajdng that the reefs 
of the Psdmer ... will equal anything that has ever 
been tried in Australia.^^^ 
1^ 3 See, for example, the editorial in CHPRA, 11 November 1874, p. 2. A typical theme 
in later years was that the labour issue could be resolved by diverting the attention 
'of the immense hordes of Chinese ... from mining to agriculture': see, for example, 
CHPRA, 1 August 1877, p. 2. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 under the heading 'Exploitation on the Sea Frontier". 
104 There is also no readily-available evidence to suggest that fishing vessels were 
owned or operated by businessmen in Cooktown, although it would seem probable 
that at least some were. 
CHPRA, 6 February 1875, p. 2. 
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In large part, that optimism seemed to stem from the experiences 
of the Victorian goldfields and at Gympie, where reef-mining eventually 
proved more profitable and more enduring than the initial alluvial finds. 
There were, however, no comprehensive (or even localised) geological 
surveys carried out at the Palmer during the 1870s, nor any serious 
evidence produced as to whether the geological structure of the region bore 
any similarity to that of successfiil reef-mining areas elsewhere in 
Australia. Until the results of the first commercial quartz-crushing were 
made public in February 1876, most of the local optimism seemed based on 
a combination of wishful thinking and the questionable results of the 
crushing by dolly of selected pieces of gold-bearing quartz.^^ 
Nevertheless, as early as mid 1874, a number of European miners 
on the Pahner had begun stockpiling mined quartz in anticipation of the 
eventual arrival of crushing machinery at the goldfields.^^^ Most of that 
activity, though, was by individual miners who were unable to sluice for 
alluvial gold because of the lack of water at the height of the dry season. In 
order to generate some income until the arrival of the wet season, those 
miners had resorted to shallow reef-mining and the dolly-crushing of 
selected rocks within the limits of their claims.1^8 
Indeed, until amended legislation was passed by the Queensland 
Parliament in January 1875, large-scale reef claims (as opposed to 
individual alluvial claims) could not be registered until fifty tons of quartz 
had been crushed — a clearly impossible pre-requisite on new goldfields 
such as the P£dmer.^09 Once that legislative hurdle was overcome, a 
number of reef claims were registered at the Palmer, with The Cooktown 
Herald reporting in September 1875 that they 'are rapidly raising stone in 
anticipation of the arrival of machinery'.^^^ 
Im jr, May 1875, for example, gold-laden quartz samples were displayed in a shop 
window in Cooktown, in an effort to sell shares in the Scotia reef at the Palmer: 
see the report in CHPRA, 22 May 1875, p. 2. 
^^' See, for example, the report in The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 3. 
••O® The Cooktown Courier, 11 July 1874, p. 3 confidently reported that 'what they 
crushed was picked quartz ... but even so it showed what kind of reefs had been 
found'. 
108 IJ^ October 1874, miners at the Palmer petitioned the Government over the issue: 
see The Cooktown Courier, 17 October 1874, p. 4. The amended clause permitted 
registration of a reef claim after six months of bona fide work: see The Cooktown 
Courier, 23 January 1875, p. 2. 
UO CHPRA, 18 September 1875, p. 2. 
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Very few of the reef-mines at the Palmer, however, were large 
enough — or indeed rich enough — to generate from their own resources the 
working capital necessary for more systematic development. ^ ^^  Some local 
mining companies — financed through share floats — were established, as 
will be discussed shortly. But unlike Gympie and Charters Towers in the 
1880s, where miners and local businessmen actively supported reef-mining 
companies, there was only ever luke-warm interest in the Cooktown 
business conununity in providing the capital necessary to introduce the 
essential quartz-crushing machinery to the Palmer.^^2 i^ part, that was 
probably because the Cooktown community simply did not have the 
available funds. It also seems, though, that many small-scale developers at 
the Palmer, and businessmen in Cooktown alike, seemed to think (or 
expect) that southern or overseas investors would flock to the area, sharing 
their optimism, and that all the risks associated with the introduction of 
reefing machinery would be borne by others.i^^ 
When it eventuated that most investment capital required some 
form of local risk-spreading, typically in the form of the taking up of shares 
in a registered company, the Cooktown business community was somewhat 
less forthcoming in its enthusiasm. Similarly, offers such as that from a 
southern-based entrepreneur to arrange for the acquisition £uid conveygmce 
to the Palmer of a quartz-crushing battery valued at £2000, in return for a 
partnership with six locals prepared to subscribe £250 each, usually met 
with only luke-warm response. ^ ^^  
That is not to deny that a considerable amount of investment 
capital did eventually flow into the region, linked largely to the acquisition 
of reef-mining machinery. ^ ^^  But in the critical years of the mid to late 
1870s, the Cooktown business community was only marginally successful in 
^^^ See, for example, J.R. Laverty, IJrban development' in W.H. Richmond and P.C. 
Sharma (eds.). Mining and Australia, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 
1983, p. 126. 
See, for example, the discussion of Gympie and Charters Towers in A.L. Lougheed, 
The Brisbane stock exchange 1884-1984, Boolarong, Brisbane, 1984, pp. 13-4, 29 and 
35. 
The Cooktown Herald, for example, commented in disparaging terms on one 
capitalist 'who ... wanted a guarantee of so much stone to be raised before he would 
risk bringing a machine [to the Palmer]': CHPRA, 9 September 1874, p. 2. 
11* See the offer reported in CHPRA, 14 April 1875, p. 2. 
11^ By 1880, for example, there were 25 steam-engines, 175 stamp-heads and 300 
sluices in Far North Queensland, valued at £70,500: see QVP, 1, 1885, p. 1085. 
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attracting investment capital to the Palmer. In part, that was because of 
somewhat naive commercial expectations, as mentioned already. In part 
also, it was because Cooktown and the Palmer were competing with lower-
risk investment opportunities elsewhere in Queensland and the southern 
colonies.11^ In addition, it was because several early investment ventures 
went rather badly wrong. 
Most notable was the failure of the Palmer Quartz Crushing 
Company. It was a loccd venture, initiated in March 1875 on the premise 
that a group of twenty shareholders, contributing £1000 by way of £50 
subscriptions, could import a four-stamp quartz-crushing battery from 
Melbourne or Sydney and then support its upkeep at the Palmer until the 
first profits were re turned. ^ '^'' By August 1875, its locally-appointed 
directors were forced to report to shareholders that the costs involved had 
been seriously underestimated and that a public float would be needed to 
raise another £2000."8 
A month later, the directors were able to report that all the shares 
had been taken up and that the salaried manager — a Mr Love, who had 
made several trips back and forth between Cooktown and the southern 
colonies at company expense — was now about to organise local carriers to 
transport the expected machinery from Cooktown to the Palmer River. 
After a series of inexplicable delays, the onset of the wet season st5miied any 
possibility that the still-awaited machinery could be transported to the 
goldfields before about March the following year. 
By then, however, the company was on the verge of insolvency 
and, by June 1876, was in financial ruin. The unfortunate consequence, as 
pointed out by The Cooktown Herald, was that the town's first attempt to 
float a company should result in failure 
11^ See, for example, Butlin's discussion of the impact of the wool boom in N.G. Butlin, 
Investment in Australian economic development 1861-1900, Cambridge University 
Press, London, 1964, p. 35. It was also because British investment capital did not 
start to flood into Queensland until the late 1870s and early 1880s: see the 
discussion in G. Blainey, The rush that never ended: a history of Australian mining, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1993, p. 97. 
11'^  See the first mention of the proposal in CHPRA, 10 March 1875, p. 2. 
See The Cooktown Courier, 25 August 1875, p. 3. 118 
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... since failure at the outset... will most assuredly 
militate very strongly against the prosperity of the 
district at large.^^^ 
In early 1876, the St George and Albion Company similarly 
followed the Palmer Quartz Crushing Company into financial ruin. ^  20 
Obviously, not all local initiatives resulted in failure, nor was the 
enthusiasm of local investors seemingly dented by the several endeavours 
which did fail.^^i Nevertheless, it does appear that the generally poor 
performance of locally-initiated ventures reinforced to the Cooktown 
business community that 'we must necessarily look to the older established 
colonies for assistance'. ^ 2^ The underlying sentiment seemed to be that the 
likely financial saviours of the Palmer River goldfields would prove to be 
London or southern investors 'who [would] find in Cooktown ... ample scope 
for the profitable investment of their surplus capital'.i23 
Even when such investment capital was forthcoming, however, it 
is evident that investors and the Cooktown business community alike 
seriously underestimated the practical difficulties of transporting quartz-
crushing machinery between Cooktown and the Palmer. In mid 1875, a 
flurry of local editorials reported the pending arrival of several crushing 
machines from southern ports, with confident predictions that 'the prospect 
of a large increase in our export of gold draws nearer ... as the machinery ... 
will soon be erected'.^24 j ^ ^he event, it was not until February 1876 that 
the first quartz-crushing machinery commenced operation at Edwardstown 
(on the eastern-most edge of the Palmer), and almost a year later again 
before machinery was operating at the Palmer proper. ^  25 
119 CHPRA, 25 December 1875, p. 2. 
1^^ See the report of the meeting of disgruntled shareholders in CHPRA, 9 February 
1876, p. 2. 
1^ 1 See the report in September 1876, for example, that fifty-seven of the seventy-two 
£25 shares in the Lord Nelson Gold Mining and Quartz Crushing Company were 
taken up within days of the public float being announced: The Cooktown Courier, 
6 September 1876, p. 3. 
122 See The Cooktown Courier, 8 January 1876, p. 2. 
123 CHPRA, 12 September 1877, p. 2. The reahty was, of course, that in the 1870s, 
investors typically would only provide capital to projects which had already shown 
promise through locally-supported endeavours. 
124 See, for example, CHPRA, 10 July 1875, p. 2 and The Cooktown Courier, 21 July 
1875, p. 3. 
125 See CHPRA, 23 February 1876, p. 2 and 13 January 1877, p. 2. 
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In part, the difficulties related to conveying heavy and 
cumbersome machinery over narrow and irregular tracks by bullock-
wagons, a near impossible task during most of the wet season.i26 The added 
difficulty, particularly in the boom months of 1875 and early 1876, was that 
carriers were demanding rates per ton — typically £u-ound £70 — which 
were almost prohibitive in terms of transporting a 25 or 30 ton piece of 
machinery to the Palmer.i27 The associated problem was that even at those 
rates, many carriers could not be induced to transport machinery, 
preferring instead loads which could be man-handled on or off a wagon in 
the event of a broken wheel or the wagon becoming bogged.i28 
The result was that an eunount of machinery never got beyond 
Cooktown.129 Moreover, that which ultimately reached the Psdmer usually 
did so at an exorbitant cost to its owners, with obvious implications for 
profits. Some of the early 5delds from stock-piled quartz were among the 
richest of any goldfield in Australia to that time.^^o g^t the average 5rield of 
around three ounces per ton in 1878 — while still marginedly better than 
Charters Towers — was not sufficiently lucrative to warrant the outlay of 
around £2000 per machine in transportation costs alone between Cooktown 
and the Palmer.^^i Indeed, while remoteness, difficulty of access and the 
hostile environment clearly and adversely affected reef mining at the 
Palmer, the conclusion to be drawn is that the Palmer reefs were simply 
neither sufficiently extensive nor rich to attract the capital needed for 
successful long-term reef mining. 
126 In the dry season of 1877, however, the scarcity of water and lack of grass made it 
'next to impossible to procure cartage' at the Palmer: CHPRA, 7 July 1877, p. 2. 
12'^  One of the problems facing the Palmer Quartz Crushing Company was that carriers 
wanted £900 to move one machine to the Palmer: CHPRA, 3 November 1875, 
p. 2. 
121 "py^ g other dimension is that a number of carriers preferred shorter haul tasks to 
fields other than the Palmer: see the complaint in The Cooktown Courier, 5 
September 1877, p. 3. 
129 See the report, for example, of a Hodgkinson-bound traction engine which, aft^r 
numerous delays on the road from Cooktown, was eventually 'returned to Cooktown 
for shipment to Port Douglas, whence it will be forwarded to its destination': The 
Cooktown Courier, 23 January 1878, p. 3. 
1^^ The Alexandra mine on the Palmer, for example, returned a yield of 524 ounces of 
gold for 82 1/2 tons of quartz crushed, an avereige of over six oimces per ton: see 
The Cooktown Courier, 25 September 1878, p. 2. 
131 See the editorial in The Cooktown Courier, 9 October 1878, p. 2 following the visit 
by John Macrossan MLA to the Palmer. Earlier in 1878, Hodgkinson reef-mines 
were returning an average of two ounces per ton, while those at Charters Towers 
were consistently averaging under two oimces per ton: see The Cooktown Courier, 
23 January 1878, p. 3 and 30 January 1878, p. 3. 
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The Cooktown to Palmer Railway Line 
From about late 1878, therefore, earlier calls from the business 
community in Cooktown for a railway line extending towards the Palmer 
were augmented by the justification that the viabihty of reef-mining was 
critically dependent upon a cheaper mode of transportation between 
Cooktown and the goldfields. In arguing in Parliament on 10 July 1879 for 
a Cooktown-Palmer railway, the local member — John Walsh — based his 
case solely £u-oimd the future prospects of the goldfields, boldly predicting 
that 
... it would be more profitable than any railway 
to the interior of the country at the present time.^^^ 
When the idea of a railway line to the Cooktown hinterland had 
first been mooted two years beforehand, however, its justification had been 
much less certain. The then loced member, William Murphy, had based his 
request to Parliament for £3000 for the survey of a line between Cooktown 
and Byerstown primarily on the precedent that Parliament had already 
approved funding for similar surveys in other districts and 'our wants are 
similar to those elsewhere'.^^^ 
The fact that Murphy had not consulted with his constituents 
before raising the issue in Parliament caused some consternation in the 
Cooktown business community, an omission compounded by the view of 
those who argued that the priority was not a railway but '[the] formation of 
good and permanent roads, with easy gradients'.^34 Perhaps because of the 
differing local views on the need or otherwise for a railway, and presumably 
so as not to jeopardise the separate vote for road formation, the argument to 
the Government in the ensuing months turned primarily on the assertion 
that since Parliament had approved over one million pounds on six new 
railway lines elsewhere in the colony, Cooktown reasonably deserved 
similar treatment. ^ ^^  
132 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 19 July 1879, p. 2. 
1 ^ As reported in CHPRA, 23 September 1876, p. 2. 
134 See CHPRA, 26 August 1876, p. 2. 
13® See, for example, CHPRA, 1 September 1877, p. 2. 
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By early 1877, as the alluvial output of the Palmer passed its peak 
and as the commercial prosperity of Cooktown began to fade, an increasing 
number of small businessmen in the town began to voice their concerns that 
the slowdown was attributable to the prevailing exorbitant rates of cartage 
between Cooktown and the Palmer.^^^ Moreover, their view — as expressed 
in a petition to Parliament in June 1877 — was that a railway line between 
Cooktown and Byerstown would not only substantially reduce the cost of 
transporting goods to the goldfields 'but also yield a profit on the outlay'.i37 
A month later and some nine months after the issue was first 
raised by the local member, Parhament approved the allocation of £3000 for 
the survey of a prospective line between Cooktown and Byerstown.^^s Nine 
months later again, with no activity by the Government in the interim, the 
mayor of Cooktown — then Hector Menzies — convened what was to be the 
second in a series of public meetings aimed at prompting the authorities 
into action. 
That meeting, like the first in June 1877, attempted to provide 
justification for a railway on the basis of a detailed but hastily-prepared cost 
analysis. The risk in that approach — with the benefit of hindsight — is 
that the published calculations would not only have been open to detailed 
scrutiny by the authorities in Brisbane but, over time, would also have 
exemplified the fading commercial fortunes of the town. The June 1877 
report, for example, asserted that each week some 430 tons of goods were 
transported inland from Cooktown and that 500 individuals left Cooktown 
destined for the goldfields.^39 gy April 1878, the estimate of freight was 
down to 110 tons per week, while the number of potential passengers had 
decreased to the point of not being included in the calculations.^^^ 
Almost a year later, with still no action on the survey, a group of 
civic-minded supporters formed the Cook and Burke Railway League, 
13S 
189 
13^ See, for example, CHPRA, 14 March 1877, p. 2. 
13*^  See CHPRA, 16 June 1877, p. 2. 
See QVP, 2, 1877, p. 167. 
See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 13 June 1877, p. 3. Its conclusion was that 
the railway would return £57,200 per year, less operating expenses estimated at 
around £7,000. 
1"*" See the report in The Cooktown Courier, 27 April 1878, p. 3. Its conclusion was that 
the railway would return a profit of £14,500 per year, less operating expenses of 
£7,000. 
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Eirguing that 'our greatest faults hitherto have been the want of energy 
combined with unit/.i4i The local member, John Walsh, was clearly 
unimpressed, advising a civic deputation in April 1879 that 
... it was no use them going in for absurd requests, 
such as the railway. The proposed railway would 
be looked upon down South as a perfect swindle.^^^ 
Even though Walsh was personally sceptical of the need for a 
railway, it does seem that he was prepared to push the proposal in 
Parliament, arguing it — as mentioned previously — on the basis that 'he 
could now produce figures to show ... beyond doubt... that the [reef mines 
at] Palmer and Hodgkinson goldfields were merely in their infancy^.^'^ 
Parhament, however, was obviously unconvinced of his argument, declining 
to include any expenditure in the August 1879 loan estimates (yet allocating 
£390,000 for railway construction at Townsville and Charters Towers). '^*'* 
Not surprisingly, the Government's lack of support caused an 
uproar in the Cooktown business community. In the subsequent exchange 
of telegrams between Walsh and the mayor of Cooktown, then Andrew 
Thredgold, it was decided to seek a supplementary bid, adding the 
justification of the supposed coal deposits located between Cooktown and 
the Palmer.14^ After a flurry of hurried survey work and more telegrams, 
culminating in Jack's advice that the coal seam was no larger than eight 
inches, Walsh advised the town that 'this precludes any possibility of 
getting [the] railway this session'. ^ ^ 
Walsh was able, however, to obtain a conditional pledge from the 
Government that £30,000 would be made available for construction to 
commence in 1880, provided that commercially-viable deposits of coal were 
located in the meantime.^'^'^ It is also evident that Walsh's patience with his 
constituents was by that time at a low ebb. In informing a public meeting in 
Cooktown of the allocation of £30,000, Walsh told his audience that 
1"*! The Cooktown Courier, 22 March 1879, p. 2. 
1*2 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 19 April 1879, p. 3. 
141 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 19 July 1879, p. 2. 
l"^ As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 6 August 1879, p. 2 and 13 August 1879, p. 2. 
1*^ See The Cooktown Courier, 30 August 1879, p. 2. 
1"*^  As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 27 August 1879, p. 2. 
l*"^  The Cooktown Courier, 3 September 1879, p. 2. 
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... he was so ashamed [of the contents of their petition 
to Parhament] ... that he could not ask for it to be read. 
[Furthermore]... he was not their delegate to be ordered 
about but would do what he thought best.^ '*^ 
Needless to say, the mutual lack of confidence between Walsh and 
his constituents resulted in further delays, and periods of inactivity as the 
Cooktown business commimity slid further into economic decline. In 
December 1879, the survey towards Byerstown was abandoned, as it had 
become obvious that the route would involve costly bridge-work and the 
traverse of extremely rugged terrain.^'*^ After further delays, a more 
practicable route via the Normanby River was agreed, taking the line to 
Laura and then towards Maji^own. The pledge of £30,000 had meanwhile 
lapsed, in the absence of any attempts by the Cooktown community to prove 
the existence of coal deposits astride the proposed route. 
Eventually, in October 1882, plans for the first section of railway 
between Cooktown and Laura were approved by Parhament and £100,000 
allocated for its construction.^^o ^ year later, the Government called for 
tenders, ultimately awarding the project to George Bashford in February 
1884.1^^ The section to Laura was officially opened on 8 October 1888, only 
days before the Minister for Railways conceded in Parliament that there 
was little likelihood of the remaining sections ever being completed.^^^ 
Indeed, the Cooktown-Laura section was effectively defunct before it was 
completed, with its only real traffic having been the workers and materials 
used in its construction. 
1*® As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 13 September 1879, p. 2. 
1*9 See the discussion in J. Kerr, 'North Queensland mining railways' in Kennedy, 
North Queensland mining history, p. 277. Note, however, that a report in The 
Cooktown Courier,11 December 1879, p. 2 claimed that the main reason for the 
abandonment of the route to Byerstown was that the opening of Cairns and Port 
Douglas 'had brought the Hodgkinson within comparatively easy access of the coast' 
via those centres. 
1®^  See the discussion in QPD, 38, 1882-83, pp. 968-9. 
1^ 1 For a good account of the project, see J.W. Knowles, The Cooktown railway, 3rd 
edition, Australian Railway History Society (Queensland Division), Brisbane, 1984. 
For correspondence relating to the first section of the railway, see Treasury 
Department, in-letter 4093/84 of 1884, TRE/A27, Queensland State Archives. 
152 See QPD, 55, 1888-89, pp. 780-6. 
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The View from Brisbane 
Obviously, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to question why 
the authorities in Brisbane agreed to allocate over £100,000 to the 
Cooktown-Laura railway, having resisted persistent calls for funding for the 
project over the previous five years. Certainly, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the Government seriously believed that a railway line to Laura 
— or even to Maytown — would revive the sagging fortunes of either the 
Palmer River goldfields or Cooktown. 
Indeed, given that the problems of the mid to late 1870s had 
related primarily to the transportation costs of getting machinery and goods 
to the Palmer (and further distributed within the sizeable length and 
breadth of the goldfields), it is difficult to believe that the authorities in 
Brisbane could seriously have thought that a railway line to Laura — only 
part of the way to the Palmer and constructed a decade later — would have 
had any relevance to the earlier problem. 
Moreover, even the most cursory examination of such statistics as 
passenger arrivals and departures, cargo tonnages, customs receipts, gold 
production, business licences issued, sales of crown land, school enrolments 
and hospital admissions, over the period 1875 to 1882, would have indicated 
to any Brisbane-based bureaucrat or parliamentarian that Cooktown by 
1882 was effectively a dying town. Furthermore, there were no serious 
proposals forthcoming from the business community in Cooktown 
to suggest that a railway line to Laura had any real prospect of reviving the 
commercial viability of the town or its hinterland. 
The most obvious explanation would seem to be that funding for 
the railway came about simply through the process of bureaucratic inertia. 
That is, the railway was eventually approved as the final step in a 
bureaucratic process begun half a dozen years earlier, when the issue was 
first put forward by the local member for loan estimates consideration. 
Because all the intervening steps had been completed — the survey CEu-ried 
out, plans drawn up and cost estimates produced — it was arguably 
inevitable that the project would eventually be approved. 
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That explanation, however, seems somewhat simplistic. It also 
probably takes insufficient accoimt of the pohtical dimensions of 
government decision-making, particularly for something as vote-catching as 
railway construction. Yet it is not clear from the available evidence what, if 
any, the political considerations involved ui the fimding of the Cooktown 
railway may have been. It seems unhkely, for example, that the 
Government approved the expenditure as a sop to the Northern separatist 
movement. Nor does it seem that the Government was pork-barreUing the 
Cook electorate, or tr3dng to win the support of local members on another 
issue or in terms of the balance of power. In advising the Government's 
pledge of £30,000 in late 1879, John Walsh reported to his constituents that 
the 'government do not require our support... but are anxious to act fairly 
for Cook'.i53 
Clearly, the possibility cannot be discounted that the Government 
approved the funding primarily on the basis that it represented simply an 
equitable distribution of expenditure between the various districts. The 
fimding decision was also made at the time when the Queensland 
Government's development strategy was focused heavily on railway 
construction, not only in terms of infrastructure development but also in the 
context of the associated boost to immigration and land settlement^54 
Butlin contends that not infrequently 
... hnes were extended in an atmosphere almost of 
desperation to provide the communication facilities 
necessary for development and to attract population. 
[Moreover] ... there was little question of fixing a final 
destination ... [rather] building was to continue as far 
inland as resources would permit.^^^ 
There is also some evidence to suggest that Parliament was 
swayed by the views of John Macrossan, a long-time supporter of the North 
Queensland mining industry and then Government minister, who asserted 
in October 1882 that '[there] was no more important district [than Cook] in 
the whole of Queensland'.^^ Less easily explained would be why the 
153 As reported in The Cooktown Courier, 3 September 1879, p. 2. 
15* See Butlin, Investment in Australian ... development, p. 358. 
WB Butlin, Investment in Australian ... development, pp. 331-2. 
1S6 QPD 38^ 1882-83, pp. 968-9. See also the view that Macrossan's resignation from 
the ministry in early 1883 'no doubt influenced the downgrading of the Cooktown 
railway's priority': Kerr, 'North Queensland mining railways', p. 277. 
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Government had waited at least five years before deciding to act.i^^ 
Another explanation, not exclusive of any already discussed, is that the 
Government eventually approved the £100,000 expenditure largely to rid 
itself of the constant complaining from Cooktown that the town had been 
unfairly treated by the authorities in Brisbane. 
From Boom to Bust 
In the event, the demise of the Cooktown to Laura railway came to 
sjmibolise the demise of Cooktown itself. Its proponents were largely the 
European merchants and sutisans of the Cooktown business community, 
whose blinkered vision saw only the possibility that a railway would revive 
the flow of visitors and supplies through the town. But having blamed their 
failing fortunes on everything from the curtailment of Chinese immigration 
to the lack of investment capital, the railway was their last card. Once it 
had been played, and once it became evident that even a railway was not 
about to revitalise the town's commercial prosperity, Cooktown was 
effectively spent. 
The unfortunate aspect — in terms of the long-term future of 
Cooktown — is that the town was seemingly never able to attract civic and 
business leaders with a broader vision than that possessed by the small-
scale European traders and artisans who t3^ified its business community in 
the mid to late 1870s. That presumably was because the entrepreneurs of 
the day — with occasional exceptions such as Robert Towns, and some in 
Charters Towers — were to be found in Sydney and Melbourne, and the 
other capitals, rather than small towns on the eastern seaboard.^^^ 
Moreover, the colonigd administration in Brisbane had neither the 
experience nor probably the inclination to take a more interventionist role 
in the structural viability of fledghng townships in the colon3^s northern 
reaches. 
Similarly, because the business community of the town comprised 
mainly small-scale traders and artisans, no-one — with the probable 
exception of several of the key Chinese merchants — had the capital 
157 jji t-j^ g early 1880s, investment capital from Britain was far more readily available 
than it had been in the early to mid 1870s: see Butlin, Investment in Australian ... 
development, p. 350. 
158 There undoubtedly was a number of Chinese entrepreneurs in Cooktown. But they 
had little interest in the longer term viability of the town. 
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necessary to develop the resources of the region. The business commimity 
at large also had very little experience in dealing with financial institutions 
or 'big business' elsewhere. Accordingly, Cooktown was not able easily to 
attract outside investors to the region nor, indeed, to access finance for use 
by local developers. The result was that once the initial boom of the early 
1870s began to wane, the Cooktown business community was ill-equipped to 
arrest the town's economic decline. By 1885, twelve years after the first 
settlers had arrived, Cooktown's economy had gone 'from boom to bust'. 
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CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS 
This study does not pretend to be a comprehensive history of the 
first decade or so of Cooktown. A reader from the modem-day town may 
therefore be disappointed that its thematic approach somewhat clouds the 
chronology of progress more evident in the narrative-type histories of some 
Queensland towns. Others, with a genealogical interest in certain of the 
town's early personalities, may similarly find that the study dwells only 
fleetingly on the day-to-day lifestyle and achievements of its early citizens. 
Quite deliberately, though, this study is less about Cooktown as a 
local history, than an examination of the relationship between the town and 
its hinterland, and the role of both in the wider development of Queensland 
in the 1870s and early 1880s. In that context, its focus has been on the 
extent to which the traditional themes of local, regional and Queensland 
history have fitted the Cooktown experience, with the view being to 
establish where the town's early history either supports or challenges the 
current interpretations. 
Overlaying that focus has been the central hypothesis of the study, 
relating to the demise of the town in the late 1870s and the associated 
issues of why it failed to diversify, why successive governments in Brisbane 
failed to detect the dechne until it was almost a fait accompli and why 
business and civic leaders in Cooktown continued to talk up the town's long-
term prospects. Before addressing those key questions, it would probably be 
useful to summarise the findings in relation to the traditional 
interpretations. 
Early Race Relations 
A central argument of Chapter 3 is that an escalating cycle of 
racial conflict was underway in Far North Queensland long before the first 
white settlers arrived at Cooktown in October 1873. Accounts of such pre-
settlement racial conflict have obviously been mentioned by a number of 
earlier researchers. But the assertion made in this study is that whereas it 
was the settlers in many other 'frontiers' in Australia who were responsible 
for dispossessing local Aborigines of their land and livehhood, it was largely 
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the explorers of Far North Queensland — beginning with Captain Cook in 
July 1770 — who 'set the stage' for the racial conflict which was ultimately 
to result in the destruction of Aboriginal society in the Cooktown-Palmer 
River area. 
Moreover, Chapter 3 points out the irony that the esirly explorers 
should have posed no direct or lasting threat to the Aboriginal people. 
Unlike the later miners and settlers, who had a marked impact on the 
traditional lifestyle of the local Aboriginal groups — at least in the vicinity 
of Cooktown and the Palmer River, and along the route in between — by 
scattering native game, monopolising or befouling water sources and 
depleting plant life, the impact of the explorers should have been minimal. 
Yet the pre-settlement history of race relations in the Cooktown area is a 
litany of violent, usually one-sided clashes and gross abuses by white 
explorers of the Aboriginal system or reciprocity. 
Stepping forward to the post-settlement period, several 
commentators — principally Noel Loos and Henry Reynolds — have noted 
that as thousands of European and Chinese miners flooded into the 
Cooktown-Palmer River area from late 1873 onwards, the ensuing racial 
conflict was more violent, and with an Aboriginal response more purposeful, 
than arguably anywhere else in Australia.^ This study, while supporting 
the assertion, advances the possibility — again in support of the pre-
settlement 'setting the stage' argument — that the intensity of racial 
violence in the Cooktown-Palmer River was attributable in part to the 
imusually long period of intermittent pre-settlement contact, spanning close 
to 100 years, which may have led local Aborigines to beheve that they — 
unlike Aborigines elsewhere in Australia — were able to keep the invading 
whites from their traditional lands. 
That is not to deny, of course, the explanation advanced by Loos 
that it was the terrain of the dense tropical rainforest to the east of the 
Great Dividing Range which facilitated Aboriginal resistance, by providing 
a refuge against the superior technology and political organisation of the 
See, for example, N. Loos, 'A chapter of contact: Aboriginal-European relations in 
North Queensland 1606-1991 in H. Reynolds, Race relations in North Queensland, 
James Cook University, Townsville, 1978, p. 8 and H. Reynolds, The other side of 
the frontier: Aboriginal resistance to the European invasion of Australia, Penguin, 
Ringwood, 1982, p. 198. 
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white invaders.2 Certainly, the central conclusion of Chapter 3 is that 
racial conflict in the Cooktown area needs to be seen in the context of a self-
perpetuating but ultimately one-sided cycle of violence, exacerbated by the 
prevailing European notions of racial superiority and by the relative 
vulnerability of white and Chinese trespassers to Aboriginal 'guerilla' 
tactics. 
It should also be said that the 'setting the stage' argument is not 
meant to imply that responsibility for the destruction of traditional 
Aboriginal society in the Cooktown-Palmer area should be attributed to the 
early explorers, rather than the later settlers and miners. Nor is it meant 
to suggest that the settlers and miners in Far North Queensland were in 
some way less blameworthy than say early settlers on the Darling Downs 
were for the destruction of Aboriginal society there. Indeed, whereas 
pastoralists elsewhere often had compelling reasons to attempt some degree 
of harmonious relations with local Aborigines,3 the miners of Far North 
Queensland had neither the need of Aboriginal labour nor any location-tied 
sense of vulnerability in relation to themselves, their stock or their 
property. In consequence, their reaction towards the local Aborigines was 
often amongst the most brutal in Australia. 
That leads to the third traditional interpretation, as raised in the 
introductory chapter, that the number of Aborigines, Europeans and 
Chinese killed in racial conflict in the Cooktown-Palmer area numbered in 
the high hundreds, if not thousands. Chapter 3 refutes many of the gross 
exaggerations of losses on both sides, perpetuated primarily by Hector 
Holthouse in River ofgold.'^ It also refutes the equally fanciful accounts of 
the violation of white women by Aborigines, as well as the alleged 
cannibahstic preference of Aborigines for Chinese rather than European 
miners. 
The conclusion in this study — supporting the 1982 assessment by 
Noel Loos — is that more whites and Chinese died in Cooktown from 
2 Loos, 'A chapter of contact', pp. 16-7. 
3 See, for example, the discussion of the harmonious relations established by the 
Archer brothers of Eidsvold in W.R. Johnston, A new province? The closer 
settlement ofMonto, Boolarong, Brisbane, 1982, p. 3. 
* See H. Holthouse, River of gold: the story of the Palmer River gold rush, Angus and 
Robertson, Sydney, 1967. 
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sickness and accidents in each year from 1874 to 1879 than died in total at 
the hands of Aborigines in the hinterland during the whole of the 1870s. 
The number of Aborigines directly killed by whites and native pohce in the 
1870s was similarly not as high as many accounts have suggested. That is 
not to understate the profound impact that the loss of around 250 men, 
women and children would have had on the tribal groups hving astride the 
route between Cooktown and the Palmer. But, as argued in Chapter 3, the 
greater losses were to occur over the following three decades, as local 
Aborigines were decimated by exposure to European and Chinese diseases, 
while others fell prey to the ills of alcohol or opium addiction. 
One positive note from the analysis in Chapter 3 — if indeed one 
can attribute gmything 'positive' to the destruction of traditionsd Aborigingd 
society — is that the intensity of racial conflict in the Cooktown-Palmer 
River area lends further weight to the modem view of a white invasion of 
Australia, against the earher notion of terra nullius. A second is that the 
analysis of race relations in this study may go some way tow£u-ds 
moderating the Boys Own-type accounts of the demise of Aborigines at the 
hands of'heroic' white explorers and prospectors, perpetuated in River of 
gold. 
The Raison D'etre of a Frontier Mining Town 
The popular perception has been that the township of Cooktown 
was established, on the instructions of the authorities in Brisbane, as the 
service centre and market outlet for the Palmer River goldfields. The 
analysis in Chapter 2, however, suggests that the Queensland Government 
initially saw Cooktown as a temporary resupply point for the Palmer River 
goldfields, largely via the route marked out by the explorer Wilham Hann in 
late 1872. Certainly, it seems that a key element in the Government's 
despatch of an expedition to the Endeavour River in October 1873 was to 
open a track from the coast to the Palmer in order to avoid an embarrassing 
repeat of what occurred at Canoona in 1858, where thousands of would-be 
miners had been left stranded when their money and rations ran out. 
One of the consequences was that the physical location of 
Cooktown had httle to do with the suitability of its site for settlement or of 
the immediate region to sustain a township. In that regard, Cooktown was 
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little different from a number of other coastal towns in Queensland. The 
site of Townsville, for exEunple, was selected primarily on the basis 'that it 
offered the best and quickest route ... to the interior and a reasonable 
harbour*.^ And Gladstone, like Cooktown, suffered severely in its early 
years from a lack of fresh water.^ 
Cooktown's tenuous raison d'etre also meant that the early 
settlement struggled to survive, as monsoonal rains in early 1874 cut its 
road links to the Palmer, and as vested interests elsewhere pressured the 
Government to consider alternative points of access. Those very pressures, 
of course, were because the likes of Cairns, Port Douglas and Smithfield 
were also struggling to survive.'' Townsville similarly had a precarious 
early existence.^ Newly-established coastal towns in the other colonies 
frequently faced similar difficulties, with early businessmen in Bunbury in 
Western Austraha, for example 'struggl[ing] to find solid foundations on 
which to build predictions of a prosperous future'.^ 
Chapter 2 concludes, therefore, that while Cooktown's tenuous 
raison d'etre may well have contributed to its early precarious existence, the 
town was not unique in the uncertainty over its future. Indeed, Cooktown 
was probably no different from a host of other Australian coastal towns, 
established in the nineteenth century, which struggled in their formative 
years to attract recognition and fimding from their respective colonial or 
state capital. 
The associated view has been that coastal and frontier mining 
towns like Cooktown struggled to survive not least because of the 
unwilhngness of successive governments in Brisbeme to promote regional 
development. That view, of course, is not confined to Queensland. Garden's 
study of Albany, for example, discusses 'the perceived centralist tendencies 
of the Western Australian Government' and the town's attempt in the 1860s 
5 See D.M. Gibson-Wilde, Gateway to a golden land: Townsville to 1884, James Cook 
University, Townsville, 1984, p. 32. 
* See L. McDonald, Gladstone: city that waited, Boolarong, Brisbane, 1988, p. 107. 
^ See D. Jones, Trinity Phoenix: a history of Cairns and district. Cairns Post, Cairns, 
1976, p. 116. 
^ Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 57. 
^ See A.J. Barker and M. Laurie, Excellent connections: a history of Bunbury Western 
Australia 1836-1990, City of Bunbury, Bunbury, 1992, p. 104. 
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to separate and become part of South Austraha. ^ ^ Disgruntled residents of 
Bunbury, during the same period, similarly adopted the attitude that 'a 
government raising revenue from dues ... should be ploughing that revenue 
[back] into appropriate improvements'. ^ ^ 
The ansdysis in Chapter 6 supports the view of the early Cooktown 
community that their region contributed more to the colonial coffers than it 
received back by way of government expenditure. But there is little 
evidence to suggest that successive Queensland governments were 
deliberately biased against regional development or against development in 
Far North Queensland. More likely, it seems, is that the authorities in 
Brisbane were simply cynical as to the longer-term viability of frontier 
mining towns, having already experienced the demise of several such eeu'lier 
towns. It is also evident that Cooktown suffered because of'the tyranny of 
distance' between it and a bureaucracy located some 1600 kilometres to its 
south. For the authorities in Brisbane, the development needs of a distant 
Cooktown were not a high priority. 
The Process of Small Town Urbanisation 
Closely allied to the issue of the raison d'etre of the early 
settlement has been the traditional view that Cooktown started hfe as a 
fledgling township, with a typical range of government representation and 
services, and that the town's growth was in broad conformity with patterns 
of urbanisation elsewhere. What emerges from Chapter 4 is that the 
Government initially saw the town primarily as the entry point at which to 
extract duty and taxes on goods destined for the Palmer. Government 
expenditure, therefore, tended to relate to revenue collection, such as 
customs, and harbour and wharfage facilities. Moreover, the majority of 
early settlers were service providers — publicans, storekeepers, carriers, 
import agents and the like — which resulted in the town developing more as 
a business centre than a residential community. 
In that regard, the large number of hotels in early Cooktown — 
typically in the ratio of one hotel to every 45 residents — could be cited as 
evidence of its business focus and the role it played as an entertainment and 
1^ See D.S. Garden, Albany: a panorama of the sound from 1827, Nelson, West 
Melbourne, 1977, p. 155. 
11 Barker and Laurie, A history of Bunbury, p. 122. 
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service centre for the Palmer. Yet other studies suggest that a number of 
contemporary Australian towns had a similarly large ratio of hotels to 
residents. In Narrandera, for example, there was one hotel for every fifty 
people at the 1881 census.^^ And Broken Hill had forty-seven hotels within 
two years of its establishment in 1886.^3 
The paucity of churches in early Cooktown, as opposed to the 
number of recreational facilities, could similarly be cited as evidence of the 
town's focus on materiahsm, and the preoccupation of its residents with 
sport and entertainment rather than traditional family values. Again, other 
studies suggest that Cooktown was not that different from a number of 
towns elsewhere. Townsville, for example, had no resident clergjmian for its 
first two years.^'* In Albany, 'it was many years before a church of any 
denomination was established'.^^ And Lillydale, in Victoria, once had three 
racecourses within the town and another seven in the surrounding 
district. ^ ^ 
Indeed, the main differences between Cooktown and towns 
elsewhere in Queensland and Australia, in terms of small town 
urbanisation, seem to relate not so much to the physical dimensions of 
growth but to the social aspects of community development. In Cooktown, 
for example, there was a noticeably marked gender imbalance, particularly 
in the early years of settlement. It could be argued, of course, that a male-
dominated society was only to be expected in any newly-established frontier 
town. Yet in Townsville, that was not the case. Gibson-Wilde points out 
that a number of married miners moved their families there before setting 
ofifadone for goldfields elsewhere.^'' 
The studies of Gladstone, Bunbury and Albany, as already cited, 
similarly give no particular indication that their early communities were 
male-dominated to the extent that Cooktown's was. The reason, in 
Cooktown's case, seems to relate primarily to the contemporary perception 
12 See B. Gammage, Narrandera Shire, Narrandera Shire Council, Narrandera, 1986, 
p. 131. 
13 See G. Blainey, The rise of Broken Hill, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1968, p. 27. 
1* Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 67. 
16 Garden, Albany, p. 89. 
1® See M. Aveling, Lillydale: the Billanook country 1837-1972, Gray Hunt, Carlton, 
1972, p. 44. 
1*^  Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 136. 
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of the town as a resupply port of uncertain tenure, rather than a fledgling 
settlement offering challenges and new opportunities for young families. 
The associated aspect, as will be mentioned again shortly, was the 
extremely high turnover of the town's population. The main consequence of 
both gender imbalance and population turnover, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
was that the town's early focus remained transfixed on short-term business 
opportunities, at the expense of the development of neighbourhood and 
community spirit. 
The introductory chapter also mentioned the traditional view that 
early settlers in Cooktown attempted to rephcate building design from their 
home counties in the United Kingdom, and adopted a number of English 
customs and practices, such as the use of stone channelling and kerbs. To 
some extent, it would be surprising if the early residents had done 
otherwise. In general terms, however, the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests 
that many of the dwellings erected in Cooktown in the early 1870s in fact 
reflected some adaption to the physical environment, most notably in 
relation to verandahs and the raising of buildings on wooden stumps.^^ The 
extensive use of stone for roadworks in the town also seems to have been 
largely a matter of making the best use of an available local resource, rather 
than a deliberate attempt to replicate urban infrastructure from England. 
The Wider Role of Mining Towns 
It has been almost conventional wisdom that the Palmer River 
gold-rush not only attracted a large number of Chinese to Queensland, and 
Europeans from elsewhere in Australia, but was important also in drawing 
a considerable number of prospective residents to the colony from Great 
Britain and Ireland. The fact that Queensleind's population increased from 
some 125,000 in 1871 to 181,288 by 1876, and that the population of North 
Queensland increased across the same period from the low hundreds to in 
excess of 19,000, would seem to support that view. 
Certainly, most of the 20,654 Chinese who disembarked at 
Cooktown between 1875 and 1877 were headed for the Palmer. The 
£uialysis in Chapter 6, though, suggests that of the 31,204 immigrants from 
13 The hospital in Townsville in 1868 was similarly constructed 'with three-metre wide 
verandahs ... [and] raised ridge-capping to allow the passage of breeze into the 
ceiling*: Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 99. 
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Great Britain and Ireland who arrived in Queenslsmd between 1874 and 
1878, less than 20 per cent (and more likely only around 10 percent) headed 
for the gold-fields of F£ir North Queensland upon their arrival. That 
assessment does not refiite the opening proposition. Rather, it reinforces 
the view that the Palmer River gold-fields — coming on top of the 
Queensland Government's extremely active program of encouraging 
immigration — were seen as epitomising the economic potential of 
Queensland, as well as the perceived improved standard of living possible 
within the Australian colonies.^^ 
The relatively-small proportion of European immigrants who 
headed for Far North Queensland upon their arrival also highlights the 
reality that most of the early settlers in Cooktown, and would-be miners 
destined for the Palmer or Hodgkinson gold-fields, journeyed there from 
elsewhere in Queensland or Australia. The other important issue, obscured 
in simple population statistics, is the extremely high turnover of the 
population of Cooktown in the 1870s. The analysis in Chapter 5 suggests 
that between 1875 £md 1879, the turnover rate averaged around 50 per cent, 
going as high as 63 per cent in 1878. The point made in the study is that a 
community in which half of the population turned over each year could 
hardly be expected to develop easily any sense of cohesion or civic pride. 
In addition to the interpretation regarding the role of Cooktown 
and the Palmer River gold-fields in attracting immigrants to Queensland 
has been the associated view that the discovery of gold in Far North 
Queensland fuelled public optimism and contributed significantly to the 
economic development of Queensland in the 1880s. Chapter 6, to the 
limited extent that it addresses that issue, makes the point that while the 
reports from the Palmer contributed importantly to the highly optimistic 
view held in London of the colon/s potential, the rapid inflow of British 
investment capital to Queensland in the 1870s and 1880s needs to be seen 
in a context wider than its acknowledged links to the gold discoveries of 
North Queensland. 
Less developed, however, have been views on the extent to which 
the discovery of gold was successfiil in attracting investment capital to 
1^  Whether the Australian colonies actually provided an improved standard of living is 
questionable: see S. Fitzgerald, Rising damp: Sydney 1870-90, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 1987, pp. 223-9. 
360 
Cooktown, and through Cooktown to the Palmer River and Hodgkinson 
gold-fields. Chapter 7 concludes that in the critical years of the mid to late 
1870s, the Cooktown business commimity was only marginally successful in 
attracting investment capital to the Palmer. In part, that was because of 
the relative scarcity of investment capital in the 1870s. In part also, it was 
because of somewhat naive commercial expectations and because Cooktown 
and the Palmer were competing with lower-risk investment opportunities 
elsewhere in Queenslsuid and the southern colonies. It was also because 
several early investment ventures went rather badly wrong, through a 
combination of mismanagement, and investors and the Cooktown business 
community alike seriously underestimating the practiced difficulties of 
transportation between Cooktown and the gold-fields. 
The Issue of Chinese Immigration 
Overlaying many of the other interpretations relating to Cooktown 
and the Palmer have been the traditionally-held views on the Chinese 
presence in Far North Queensland during the 1870s and 1880s. Probably 
the most common assumption has been that the 20,000 or so Chinese 
miners who flooded into the region between 1874 smd 1877 not only rapidly 
denuded the Palmer of its alluvial gold, but took back to China the bulk of 
the gold they won, with little or no return to the people or government of 
Queensland. The analysis in Chapter 6 broadly supports that 
interpretation. Of the estimated 1.25 million oimces of gold mined at the 
Pedmer River between 1874 and 1885, around 60 per cent — or £3 milhon of 
the total value of £5.02 million — ended up in Chinese hands. Moreover, 
only a small fraction of that £3 million probably remained in Queensland, 
mainly in the form of rates and taxes paid on commercial and residential 
properties in Cooktown. 
What seems less appreciated is the extent of the Chinese presence 
in Cooktown itself, and the role of Cooktown's Chinese business community 
in the 1870s. The largely-unrecorded (and certainly under-rated) role of the 
Chinese in Cooktown is due in large part to the reality that the town's eeirly 
history was reported and recorded through Western eyes. The fact, 
therefore, that probably around one third of those living in Cooktown across 
the peak years 1875-78 were Chinese has almost slipped through the pages 
of the town's early history. 
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Yet the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that a large proportion of 
Cooktown's trade in the mid to late 1870s was in Chinese hands, with some 
35 per cent of the annual turnover generated by the Pahner River gold-
fields going to Chinese merchants in Cooktown, with an additional 30 per 
cent being shared by European and Chinese carriers. Indeed, the major 
European traders in Cooktown in 1877 probably received only some 3 per 
cent (or £15,000 in value) of the annual Palmer trade, while the smaller 
European merchants and storekeepers in Cooktown were by then largely 
confined to trade within the town and meeting the entertainment and 
resupply needs of visitors. 
The Chinese commimity in early Cooktown also had a virtual 
monopoly over the supply of locally-grown fiiiit and vegetables, as well as 
poultry and pigs, the local fish market and the provision of fresh water and 
firewood to the European inhabitants of the town. Their employment and 
specialisation in those industries, however, was largely because these were 
tasks and occupations seen by Europeans as beneath their dignity or the 
worth of their labour. It also related to the perceived adaptability of 
Chinese labourers to the climate and conditions of North Queensland, 
against the perceived unsuitability of Europeans for work in the tropics. It 
was seen by the white community of Cooktown as only reasonable, 
therefore, that the Chinese should be 'the hewers of wood and carters of 
water'. 
That racist-derived sentiment impacted on two further traditional 
interpretations regarding the Chinese. The first has been the view that if 
the Chinese had been excluded from Far North Queensland, a lesser 
number of Europeans could have gained remunerative employment on the 
gold-fields for many more years, thereby prolonging the commercial viability 
of Cooktown. Certainly, it is true that by 1877 the population of the Palmer 
was comprised almost entirely of Chinese. But, as discussed in Chapter 7, 
the reality was that none of the European miners had been physically forced 
from the Palmer. Rather, they had willingly deserted their claims for 
rushes elsewhere. Moreover, it is questionable — given the contemporary 
attitudes towards menial labour — whether European miners, unlike the 
Chinese, would have been prepared to return to their abandoned claims on 
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the Palmer and rework them several times over, for typically diminishing 
returns. 
The second related view has been that the anti-Chinese sentiment 
which evolved in Cooktown (and other northern towns) during the 1870s 
and early 1880s was an important factor in the development of unionism 
and union attitudes in Australia, as well as in Austraha's post-Federation 
restrictive immigration pohcy. The analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that 
while the broader interpretation is undoubtedly correct, the views within 
Cooktown itself, particularly in the late 1870s, were much more ambivalent. 
There were, for example, occasional outbursts in the local 
newspapers portrajdng the Chinese as a wretched, inferior class, 
threatening the social order of white Australia. There were similar 
concerns periodically expressed that Chinese labourers would undermine 
the pay and working conditions of Europeans. The underlying appreciation, 
however, particularly by around 1879, was that the conunercial prosperity 
of Cooktown in the mid 1870s had largely been founded on Chinese 
immigration and the subsequent resupply of Chinese miners at the Palmer. 
The antipathy, therefore, of the business conununity in Cooktown 
— as Chinese immigration slowed to a trickle by late 1877 — was directed 
less at the Chinese, than at the authorities in Brisbane for having 
introduced (at that stage an3rway) restrictive immigration legislation, rather 
than having heeded the earlier calls from a cross-section of the community 
simply to exclude the Chinese from new gold-fields for a period of at least 
three years after their discovery. The attitude of the European community 
in Cooktown in the late 1870s and early 1880s towards the Chinese 
residents of the town, and towards the Chinese generally, was far more 
benevolent than the virulent anti-Chinese sentiments which developed 
elsewhere in Queensland and in the southern colonies in the 1880s. 
The Development of a Queensland or National Ethos 
The many hardships endured by the early settlers of Cooktown, 
and would-be miners en route to the Palmer, have traditionally been seen as 
epitomising — and contributing to the development of— the pioneering 
spirit and reputation of early Australians. Contemporary newspaper 
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accounts frequently lauded the 'heroic exploits' of local individuals, typically 
in the context of their battle against the harsh terrain, murderous 
Aborigines or simply the elements.20 The supposed bravery and 
determination of European settlers and miners, against the portrayal of 
Aborigines as cowardly and devious — and the Chinese as insidious, 
exploitive and immoral — has similarly been a feature of such 'popular' 
histories as River of gold. The conclusion of this study, to the extent it 
addresses the issue, would be that the pioneering view often aggrandises 
the exploits of European explorers, prospectors and settlers at the expense 
of Aborigines. It also frequently under-rates the role and contribution of 
women. 
That is not to deny, of course, that Far North Queensland in the 
1870s was any place for the faint-hearted or those of feeble constitution. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the hardships of life even in the relative sanctuary 
of a frontier town such as Cooktown were considerable. The point needs to 
be made, however, that life anywhere in Australia in the mid-nineteenth 
century was much more violent and more dangerous in terms of diseases, 
illnesses and accidents than it is today. Avehng in her study of Lillydale, 
for example, notes that 'the times were violent to a degree we tend to forget 
today'.^i Gammage makes the simileu point in his study of Nguremdera — a 
place hardly renowned for a violent past — noting that between 1878 and 
1882, the number of deaths in the town accounted for 18 per cent of its 
population at the 1881 census.^ 
The view of early settlers and miners as 'hardy pioneers' also does 
not sit easily with the now well-accepted fallacy that the tropical areas of 
northern Australia were unsuited to European habitation. Again, that is 
not to deny the injurious impact in those days of the likes of dysentery, 
malaria and dengue fever. Nevertheless, the image of hsu-dy pioneers is 
somewhat eroded by the prevaihng opinion that it was essential for men, 
women and children to spend at least several weeks each year in the south 
'to brace up their systems'. The final point to be made, without belabouring 
2^ To an extent, that was probably because 'emphasis on the glorious ... helped the 
settlers to cope with the rigours of frontier conditions': J.R. Laverty in his review of 
D. Hamer, New towns in the new world: Images and perceptions of the nineteenth-
century urban frontier, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990 in Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 40, 2, 1994, p. 279. 
21 Aveling, Lillydale, p. 44. 
22 Gammage, Narrandera Shire, p. 132. 
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the issue too far, is that most such brave pioneers were in Cooktown or Far 
North Queensland for the primary purpose of msiking their fortune, or at 
least making money more quickly than they could have elsewhere. What is 
being suggested is simply that if the label of'pioneer' is used in the context 
of early Cooktown, it needs to be applied judiciously, both in terms of the 
deeds done and the motives for them. 
A second traditional interpretation has been that most of the early 
European business-people in Cooktown, as well as white miners, operated 
as individuals or perhaps in partnership with one other, with the popular 
notion being that the practice derived from the evolving ethos of being one's 
own boss, as opposed to an employed 'wages man'. As indicated in the 
introductory chapter, that explanation seems somewhat too idealistic. 
In part, the practice probably had some derivatory connection to 
the regulations relating to the granting of alluvial mining leases on the 
Queensland gold-fields. As discussed in Chapter 2, each miner could claim 
an area forty feet by forty feet and retain 'ownership' as long as he or she 
continued to work the claim. Obviously, there were some advantages in a 
group of miners working as partners or as small companies — as occurred 
on both the Gympie and Charters Towers fields — in terms of the 
efficiencies of group labour and being better able to deter claim-jumpers. A 
good deal of the early investment in reef mining elsewhere also came from 
groups of miners working in partnerships or small companies, with early 
share-dealings in Gympie and Charters Towers, for example, often 
expressed as quarter, eighth, twelfth etc share of a mine. 
The disadvantages were that if the group concentrated its efforts 
at a single site, its other claims could legally be 'jumped' by outsiders if left 
imworked for more than twenty-four hours. Partnerships were also liable to 
disputes, not least over the division of labour and its profits. Prospectors 
similarly usually operated alone, or with a single 'mate', again on the basis 
that if they struck it rich, the proceeds would be theirs alone. On the 
Palmer, the high costs of reef-mining, together with the relative paucity of 
payable reefs, fiirther militated against collective enterprise. 
In Cooktown itself, a large proportion of Europesui businesses 
were also single-proprietor enterprises, or small concerns employing 
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perhaps one or two assistants, or run as family businesses. In early 1874, 
for example, only twelve of the 118 (edmost exclusively European) 
businesses in the town were described as 'large stores', probably employing 
several persons and typically run by a manager on behalf of a Brisbane or 
southern-based parent company. 23 The reasons for the seemingly-
disproportionate number of small businesses are unclear. One possible 
explanation is that their proliferation reflected the 'get rich quick' mentality 
so pervasive in early Cooktown, which often stemmed from individuals — 
with minimal capital and expertise — whose intention was simply to make 
as much money as possible in the shortest time, before returning south. 
Such individuals had little interest in partnerships or joint ventures, simply 
because that would have committed them and their limited resources to 
stay in the town. 
The consequence, both in relation to mining and small businesses 
in Cooktown, was that individuals were usually unable to attract the capital 
— or the economies of scale — necessary to operate successfully either as a 
more permanent reef-miner on the Palmer or as a medium-size business-
person in Cooktown. By 1877, therefore, four years after first settlement, 
Cooktown was still largely a collection of small shops. So in Cooktown's 
case, at least, the ethos of'individualism' — if it can be said to have ever 
existed as such — facilitated the eventual demise of the town. 
The Structural Viability of Coastal Towns 
The discussion on small businesses in early Cooktown leads 
usefully to the traditional interpretation that those who profited most from 
the discovery of gold at the Palmer River were not the prospectors or 
miners, but those engaged in the service industries — the storekeepers, the 
publicans and the carriers operating both at Cooktown and on the gold-
fields. The comment made in the introductory chapter was that while the 
assumption is no doubt correct, no serious attempt seems ever to have been 
made to quantify the turnover involved or, indeed, to establish how criticad 
the service industries were to the structural viability of Cooktown. 
The analysis in Chapter 6 confirms that those who profited most 
were in the service industries. Figure 6.3 at page 272 of Chapter 6, for 
la See Table 4.12 at page 176 in Chapter 4. 
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example, suggests that European and Chinese miners ended up with less 
than 18 per cent of the value of gold mined at the Palmer between 1874 and 
1885, compsu-ed to almost 70 per cent to the service industries. Moreover, 
the break-up within that 70 per cent was 17 per cent to carriers, 26 per cent 
to Cooktown or Palmer-based merchants, 16 per cent to China-based 
suppliers or financiers, and 11 per cent to merchants or suppliers elsewhere 
in Australia. In terms of racial division, Europeans in Cooktown won only a 
quarter of the 70 per cent which went to the service industries. 
The more detailed analysis in Chapter 4 similarly confirms 
contemporary accoimts that there was generally more to be made from the 
carrying trade than there was from prospecting, particularly in the years 
1875-76. In 1876, for example, the 130 or so bullock-dray teams plying the 
route between Cooktown and the Palmer probably each earned a gross 
yearly average of £530 (against the set up cost of probably around £400); 
the eighty or so horse-wagon teams probably each earned a gross yearly 
average of £265 (against a set-up cost of around £175), while the 570 or so 
pack-horses would each have earned £25 (against a purchase cost of around 
£12).24 In many cases, stock losses through disease, injuries and attacks by 
Aborigines could well have reduced gross profits by at least 50 per cent. 
As Figure 6.3 suggests, however, the merchants and other small 
business-persons in Cooktown and at the Palmer benefited from the Palmer 
trade even more than the carriers (26 per cent of the total across the years 
1874 to 1885, against 17 per cent for carriers). Chapter 4 suggests that 
across the peak years 1876-78, the twelve major Chinese traders in 
Cooktown each had an annual turnover of at least £12,000, whereas the four 
or five major European traders were by 1878 competing for a toted of only 
around £8,000. Indeed, by 1877, the European merchants and storekeepers 
in Cooktown were leirgely confined to trade within the town, and meeting 
the entertainment and resupply needs of visitors, who numbered by then 
around 100 per day. 
That leads to the final traditional interpretation, namely that 
Cooktown's viability was inextricably linked to the viability of the Palmer 
River gold-fields and that once the Palmer slid into decline, Cooktown 
followed suit. As evidenced by the conclusions in the preceding paragraph. 
2* See the discussion at page 172 of Chapter 4, and footnote 70. 
367 
though, it can be seen that the European merchants and storekeepers were 
in trouble — because of the commercial dominance of the Chinese — as 
early as 1876-77. That was because the European business community had 
been established in the formative years of 1874 and 1875 on the basis of 
meeting the service needs of a large number of temporarily-accommodated 
residents, a daily transient population of aroimd 100 white males and being 
involved in meeting the resupply requirements of a predominantly-white 
group of miners at the Palmer. By 1877, as the transient population became 
increasingly dominated by the Chinese and as the white business 
community s share of the Palmer trade fell from 14.5 per cent in 1875 to 3.2 
per cent in 1877, many white businesses went to the wall. 
Beyond that time-frame, the commercial demise of Cooktown 
certainly parallelled that of the Palmer. The analysis in Chapter 4 suggests 
that by 1880 the annual turnover in trade generated by the Palmer had 
fallen to less than £130,000 from a high of almost £320,000 in 1877. By 
1884, the total was down to less than £35,000. In the absence of other 
industries or services being established in Cooktown or its hinterland, the 
remaining European and Chinese businesses in the town slid steadily 
further into decline. 
The associated issue is why Cooktown failed to diversify as a 
market outlet or service centre for other industries or settlements. The 
analysis in Chapter 7 points out that Cooktown had no sawmill, no 
engineering or processing industries, no mining industries other than gold, 
no agricultural or pastoral industries, and failed even to develop the town as 
a home port for the beche-de-mer or pearl-shelling industries. Yet similar 
towns elsewhere seemed to manage the transition much more successfully. 
By 1882, for example, Townsville had diversified into the sugar-cane euid 
pastoral industries, had a boiling-down works, soap-making factory, 
brewery and two sawmills, and was home port to a beche-de-mer fleet.^^ 
Cairns had established its own sawmill by 1877.^^ And within a decade of 
its establishment, Narrandera had two coach-building factories, a brewery 
and a viable sawmill.27 
25 See Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, pp. 113-5, 129-30, and 166. 
26 See Jones, Trinity Phoenix, p. 129. 
2'^  See Gammage, Narrandera Shire, p. 139. 
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The explanation advanced in Chapter 7 is that Cooktown was 
seemingly never able to attract civic and business leaders with a broader 
vision than that possessed by the small-scale European traders and eutisans 
who typified its business community in the mid to late 1870s. Similarly, 
because the business commimity of the town comprised mainly small-scale 
traders and artisans, no-one — apart from several of the key Chinese 
merchants, who presumably had little interest anyway in 'boosting' the 
town to non-Chinese — had the necessary capital or business acumen to 
develop the resources of the town or the region. 
That is not to understate, of course, the difficulties which 
Cooktown would have faced in diversifying into other long-term industries 
or services. The viability of processing industries, such as engineering and 
sawmilling, would have been dependent on local demand which, in turn, 
would have required the continuing success of mining at the Palmer. And, 
as wiU be discussed later in this chapter, it is problematic whether the 
region actually had the potential to sustain diversification beyond alluvial 
mining. 
Some Additional Interpretations 
Obviously, it is a moot point as to how accurately the 
interpretations just discussed actually reflect the themes of regional, 
Queensland and national history which traditionally have been applied to 
Cooktown. Certainly, there is no definitive list. And another resesu-cher 
may well have a quite different perspective. However, as discussed in the 
introductory chapter, the aim has been to group some of the more obvious 
interpretations under a number of broad headings, primarily to facilitate 
the comparative evaluation of early Cooktown and similEu* small towns 
elsewhere in Queensland and Australia.^3 
As foreshadowed in the introductory chapter, there have also been 
several additional interpretations emerge during the course of this study 
which might have wider significance elsewhere. The three selected for brief 
discussion are the incompetence of early civic leaders, the divisiveness 
within Cooktown's early conununity, and seeing history through the eyes 
£md words of a contemporary middle class. 
2fi See, for example, the discussion of the need for comparative evaluation in Johnston, 
A new province, p. viii. 
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The Incompetence of Early Civic Leaders 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the municipal affairs of Cooktown in 
the mid to late 1870s were plagued by mismanagement, ineptitude, 
occasional suspicions of embezzlement and some questionable public works 
priorities. The reasons for it are less clear, other than simply sheeting the 
blame upon the elected civic officials. One explemation, as raised in Chapter 
6, is that many of those best qualified to deal with the affairs of the town 
were too busy with their own business interests to volunteer their services 
for the good of the community. A similar situation apparently prevailed in 
early Albany, with Garden noting 
[plerhaps the community lacked natural leaders 
because the [key traders]... were too busy with 
their own affairs.29 
But in towns elsewhere, that was not necessarily the case. In 
Townsville, for example, the key merchants reportedly 'combined with a 
remarkable unity to further the development of the town'.30 And in 
Gladstone, many of those elected to public office in the 1870s were 'key 
[business]men in their own right'.3i It does seem that in Cooktown, 
however, there was almost an extreme preoccupation within the business 
community in profit-making, resulting in the affairs of the town being 
largely left in the hands of a 'second eleven'. 
A further explanation, as discussed in Chapter 5, might be sought 
in the occupational background of those elected to public office in Cooktown. 
Table 5.19 at page 258 suggested that between 1874 and 1885, 55 per cent 
of all office-holders were merchants or small business-persons, 16 per cent 
were professionals, 13 per cent were white-collar managers, 12 per cent 
were artisans and 4 per cent were white-collar staff. Yet that cross-section 
seems reasonably typical of civic office-holders in other Australian towns at 
the time. In Bunbury, for example, five of the first fifteen councillors were 
artisans, while another three were storekeepers.32 In Townsville, seven of 
the ten mayors between 1864 and 1884 were merchants.33 In Narrandera, 
29 Garden, Albany, p. 99. 
30 Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 135. 
31 McDonald, Gladstone, p. 199. 
32 Barker and Laurie, A history of Bunbury, p. 114. 
33 Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 135. 
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forty-one of the forty-five aldermen elected to office between 1885 and 1901 
were businessmen.34 And in Gladstone, the majority of aldermen were 
storekeepers, tradesmen of various kinds and publicans.35 Moreover, it 
seems reasonable to expect — as pointed out in Chapter 5 — that successful 
businessmen would have been as solid, trustworthy and pragmatic in 
mimicipal affairs as they presumably were in their own business affairs. 
Another explanation, which seems more likely, is that the 
extremely high rate of population turnover in Cooktown — which was 
similarly reflected in the turnover of civic office-holders — contributed 
significantly to the collective incompetence of the town's civic leadership. As 
discussed already, the general population turnover in Cooktown across the 
years 1875 to 1879 was often in excess of 50 per cent annually. And it was 
not unusual for those remaining — including municipal office bearers — to 
leave the town for weeks on end, either in pursuit of business opportimities 
elsewhere or to recuperate their health in the south. So it was perhaps 
hardly surprising that the municipal council often had difficulties even in 
raising a quorum, let alone achieving continuity in forward-planning and 
decision-making. 
The conclusion would seem to be, therefore, that the collective 
ineptitude of early civic leaders was partly the result of the selection 
process, and partly the result of the town's extremely high population 
turnover. The extent to which a similar combination of factors may have 
existed in other Australian towns, resulting in civic incompetence on a 
similar scale, cannot easily be deduced. But the fact that most municipal 
office-holders were unpaid — as were parliamentary representatives at the 
time — certainly suggests that those involved in the civic advancement of 
the town were not necessarily the best available for the job.3^ 
The Divisiveness within Cooktown*s Early Community 
An associated issue, and one which certainly would have impacted 
on the performance of the town's office-holders, was the reality that 
Cooktown across the years 1875 to 1878, in particular, was wracked by 
3* Gammage, Narrandera Shire, p. 133. 
3® McDonald, Gladstone, p. 199. 
38 That is not to deny, of course, that a similar situation does not apply even today, in 
terms of the capabilities of those in the public and private sectors. 
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several intense personahty clashes, as well as the chasmic division between 
its European £md Chinese commimities. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
personahty clashes centred on the administration of the hospital, and 
between the town clerk and Wilham Simpson, an aspiring and eventual 
aldermgm. There was also a damaging rift between the municipal council 
and the Cooktown Progress Association. On the Chinese issue, the division 
existed not only in a physical and racial sense between the two 
communities, but also between those in the European business community 
who favoured Chinese immigration, against those who were vehemently 
opposed, tjTjically on the grounds of race and a concern for European rates 
of pay and standards of living. 
Yet it is evident that other small Australian towns suffered 
similar ructions and divisions. In Bunbury, for example, the town was spht 
in the 1850s between two groups vying for the ear and support of Perth.37 
The history of Albany is similarly dotted with disputes and factional 
alignments, seen as typifying the fate of small and isolated communities.33 
Gladstone's local government was effectively defunct from 1869 until early 
1872 because of a personal vendetta involving several aldermen.39 And in 
1883, Narrandera's 300 or so Chinese lived in a separate encampment to the 
white township, with a major source of irritation to the Europeans being the 
dozen white women married to Chinese.^o 
Moreover, it does seem from almost any reading of the history of 
small towns in Australia that vendettas, family feuds and wider divisions 
are not uncommon in many such communities, often stretching back and 
over several decades or generations. Similarly, the assimilation or even 
acceptance of minority ethnic groups into the general community is often 
more difficult and more pronounced in smaller towns than in larger cities. 
What does not seem to have been developed, in a comparative sense, is the 
effect that such divisiveness has had on the development of community in 
small Australian towns and, indeed, its effect on civic advancement in an 
Edready struggling town such as Cooktown in the late 1870s. 
3'^  See Barker and Laurie, A history of Bunbury, p. 126. 
3S See the discussion in Garden, AZ6any, pp. 102-3. 
3^ See McDonald, Gladstone, p. 199. 
*0 See Gammage, Narrandera Shire, pp. 141 and 145. 
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History through Middle Class Eyes 
A third important theme to emerge from this study is the extent to 
which the surviving records of early Cooktown provide a very narrow and 
middle class perspective of the town's formation and the development of its 
community. The local newspaper accounts, for example, provide reasonable 
coverage of the important or interesting day-to-day events and activities. 
But they are very much reported from the perspective of an educated, 
middle class, European male, whose views conform closely to that of'the 
establishment'. Minority groups in the town — most notably the Chinese, 
and fringe Aborigines — rate barely a mention. Similarly, the reader gets 
very little insight of the lifestyle, working conditions, family situation or 
broadly-held views of the labouring class within the town. And women and 
children — unless they were the families of the town's well-off residents — 
may well have not existed. 
Surviving official correspondence between Cooktown and the 
authorities in Brisbane — as well as government publications and records 
— also relate largely to the activities and interests of the town's more 
prominent citizens or business-persons. Much of the early correspondence, 
for example, relates to such matters as disputes over building allotments, 
the need for a hospital, school, cemetery or race-track — and the lobby 
groups involved — or requests for additional government services or 
personnel. Again, there is very little that can be gleaned to better 
appreciate the lifestyle of those who comprised the bulk of the population. 
The counter, of course, is that it was the middle-class residents of 
the town who were the decision-makers and those most responsible for the 
town's transformation from a fledgling settlement to municipality in the 
space of three years. So an analysis of their views and decisions is arguably 
more important than a better understanding of the masses. The point being 
made, however, is that history seen only through middle class eyes, and 
within the prevailing paradigm of middle class social values and outlook, 
fails to provide a comprehensive appreciation of community life in colonial 
Australia. 
To that end, it undoubtedly is a truism to say that the better 
histories of Australian towns are likely to be those which have drawn on a 
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wide variety of source materials, reflecting a broad cross-section of the 
community under analysis. Moreover, first or even second-hand oral 
accounts are probably hkely to provide a broader perspective than many 
written accounts. It seems important, therefore, that historians should 
become more pro-active in encouraging the collection and preservation of a 
wide range of primary source material, not least for fiiture generations, and 
to ensure that situations hke Cooktown's — where most of the early 
material has been lost or destroyed — become the exception rather than the 
rule. 
The Hypothesis of the Study 
The central argument of this study, as outlined in the introductory 
chapter, has been that Cooktown's demise in the late 1870s and early 1880s 
was exacerbated — if not caused — by a self-serving group of Iwosters' who, 
under the guise of civic and business community leadership, not only talked 
up the prospects of the town and its hinterland but did so at the expense of 
the diversification of Cooktown's economy. The contention is that many of 
the 'boosters', having achieved a degree of social respectabihty in Cooktown 
considerably beyond their prospects elsewhere, attempted to perpetuate 
their status by replicating in later years the small-business 'boom' of the 
early 1870s. Moreover, because their vision was so tunnelled by self-
interest, they failed to develop — or even tried to develop — other industries 
or services which may have ensured the longer-term viability of the town. 
Attempting to prove that hypothesis has not been as easy as first 
imagined, not least because of the paucity of primary source material, 
especially in relation to the various individuals involved. It is also the case 
that the demise of an early Austrahan frontier township such as Cooktown 
obviously involved a more complex interplay of reasons than can be found in 
a single explanation. It is also easy to be wise — or critical — with the 
benefit of hindsight. And superimposing the collective wisdom of a 
subsequent 120 years onto a situation which existed in the 1870s probably 
denigrates unfairly the bulk of the people who were trying to do their best 
within the limits of their experience, and in a male-dominated, Victorian-
era society on one of the remotest edges of white civihsation in Australia. 
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The question could also well be asked, given the environmental 
conditions and natural resources of the region, whether diversification was 
indeed a viable possibihty. Recent studies, under the auspices of the 
Queenslgmd Government's 1994/95 Cape York Peninsula Land Use Strategy 
(CYPLUS) project, have contended that the region contains significant 
mineral deposits^i, as well as commercially-viable timber resources.'*^ 
Associated studies, though, have concluded that 'the overall low soil fertility 
[of the region] probably limits the range of plant communities'.'*3 Moreover, 
at a sjonposium on Cape York Peninsula, conducted by the Royal Society of 
Queensland in 1979, the lead speaker asserted that 
the present undeveloped nature of Cape York 
Peninsula can be traced mostly to two factors 
which have placed some enormous difficulties 
in the way of those seeking to exploit it — a 
protracted and severe annual drought, and the 
poverty of almost all its sods."*^ 
The point being made, however, is that regardless of the potential 
difficulties, very few efforts were made even to try to diversify the town's 
economy. Moreover, it does seem that Cooktown in the early to mid 1870s 
was more sharply business-oriented than most comparably-sized towns 
elsewhere in Queensland and Australia. In a number of other towns, 
anecdotal accounts suggest that a fair proportion of early residents — 
although attracted primarily by business opportimities — had tj^Dically 
moved with their families and with the intention of setthng probably for 
several years at least.^s So the business focus of such towns typically 
became subsumed within the wider development and interests of the broad 
community. 
•*! T.J. Denaro, Cape York Peninsula land use strategy: project NR04 mineral resource 
inventory, Queensland Department of Minerals and Energy, Brisbane, 1994, p. 4. 
^2 B. Wannan, Survey afforest resources of Cape York Peninsula, Office of the Co-
ordinator General of Queensland, Brisbane, 1995, p. 47. 
*3 R.F. Isbell, Soil landscapes of Cape York Peninsula, Office of the Co-ordinator 
General of Queensland, Brisbane, 1995, p. 9. 
^ B. Rigsby, 'Introduction to the symposium', quoting P. Stanton, in N.C. Stevens and 
A Bailey (eds.). Contemporary Cape York Peninsula, Royal Society of Queensland, 
St. Lucia, 1980, p. 3. Note also that a more recent publication. Far North 
Queensland Regional Planning Advisory Committee, FNQ 2010: a balanced future 
— a regional growth management framework for Far North Queensland, 
Queensland Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning, Brisbane, 
1995, does not even include Cooktown as part of Far North Queensland. 
^^ In Townsville, as already cited, a number of married miners moved there with their 
families in the mid to late 1860s: see Gibson-Wilde, Townsville to 1884, p. 136. 
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Yet in Cooktown — as discussed in Chapter 5 — most of the early 
residents were single or unaccompanied European men, whose aim was to 
make 'a quick buck' before returning south.'^ Moreover, many of those early 
businessmen, because they had no intention of staying long in the town, 
made little attempt to expand their businesses or turn their profits into 
more substantial premises or conunercial endeavours. Early Cooktown was, 
therefore, largely a collection of small shops and one-person or family-run 
businesses, with practically no industries and very little invested capital. 
And, as discussed in Chapter 6, civic indifference would have to rate as one 
of the key features of the history of early Cooktown. 
During the first year or so of settlement, though, there does seem 
to have emerged an appreciation within the Cooktown community that the 
town's focus on its trading hnks with the Palmer was proving to be at the 
expense of public works and services in Cooktown. There also seems to 
have emerged a certain resentment towards the authorities in Brisbane, 
based on the perception that the Government's only real interest in the 
town related to the collection of revenue. The year 1875, therefore, saw a 
perceptible change of attitude within the business community of Cooktown, 
towards the view that the interests of the town — or at least its businesses 
— would be best served by the development or upgrading of its civic 
infrastructure and services. The underljdng sentiment was that by creating 
a favourable impression of Cooktown, more residents might be encouraged 
northwards, as well as other 'hopefuls' who might transit the town bound 
for its hinterland. 
It also seems likely, as discussed in Chapter 5, that the early civic 
and business leaders in Cooktown — or those most outspoken on the issue 
of civic advancement — were not necessarily either the most successfiil 
businessmen, or the best quahfied to advance the interests of the town. 
Those individuals — most notably Edmund Henriques, the Brodziak 
brothers, Charles Bouel and Maurice Fox — were usually too engrossed in 
the successful pursuit of their own business affairs to have the interest or 
time to devote to the affairs of the town.'*^ Indeed, those who did volunteer 
"^^ Table 5.12 at page 226 suggested that the male to female ratio was often greater 
than 80:20. 
*' The corollary is that those successful businessmen or government officials who did 
volunteer to serve often were not particularly effective, because of competing 
pressures or enforced absences on private or official business elsewhere. 
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their services to municipal affairs seem often to have been 'the second 
eleven', who saw civic development as one means of reviving the slowly 
flagging fortunes of their own businesses. 
Once they were appointed or elected to civic office, however, they 
then found that the position brought with it a degree of socied respectabihty 
and responsibility beyond that which they probably could every have 
achieved or aspired to in a larger town or city elsewhere in Queensland. Yet 
that status was dependent upon the continued viability of Cooktown 
(though not necessarily their own business). So the 'boosters', as discussed 
in Chapter 7, continued to talk up the prospects of the town and the Palmer 
River and Hodgkinson gold-fields, and to agitate for the accoutrements of 
'civilised societ/ in the form of paved roads, bridges, botanical gardens etc, 
in an attempt to encourage a continuing flow of new arrivals to and through 
the town.48 
The unfortunate aspect is that because many of the boosters were 
'second eleven' grade, they lacked the foresight, business acumen or broader 
vision to readise that the commercial viability of Cooktown would 
necessitate the diversification of its economy beyond its singular reliance on 
the prosperity of the Palmer River gold-fields. Throughout the late 1870s 
and early 1880s, therefore, no serious moves were made to identify or 
develop an alternative and long-term industry or service for the region. 
Instead, the boosters pinned their hopes on the opening of a railway line 
between Cooktown and its hinterland. When that venture failed — as any 
feasibility study would have predicted — the boosters had played their last 
card. 
What is less clear is why successive governments in Brisbane seem 
to have been willing to believe — or at least not to dismiss — the continuing 
hjTDerbole coming from Cooktown's civic and business leaders throughout 
the late 1870s and early 1880s. It is similarly unclear — other than the fact 
that the loan msu-ket was much more buoyant in the 1880s than earlier — 
why the authorities in Brisbane eventually agreed to the expenditure of 
4® See also the view that the idealism of boosters 'amounted collectively to a powerful 
vision of a new urban world in the process of being created free of the evils of the 
old': D. Hamer, New towns in the new world: images and perceptions of the 
nineteenth-century urban frontier, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1990, p. 62. 
377 
over £100,000 on the ill-fated Cooktown to Laura railway hne, having 
resisted the pleas and demands of Cooktown's boosters over the previous 
five or more years. 
The most obvious explanation, as discussed in Chapter 7, is that 
approval for the railway was primarily the result of bureaucratic inertia, 
within the context of Queensland's overall development strategy at that 
time, with its focus on railway construction, immigration and land 
settlement. There is also the tinge of a suspicion, as also mentioned in 
Chapter 7, that the authorities eventually agreed to the expenditure simply 
to rid themselves of the constant harping from Cooktown that it had been 
poorly treated over the years by Brisbane. 
Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the money was largely 
wasted, with the line to Laura effectively defunct even before it was 
completed. That raises the issue of whether the Queensland Government 
should have played a more direct and more interventionist role in both 
regional development and in facilitating the structural viability of frontier 
towns such as Cooktown. With the admitted benefit of hindsight, it is 
evident that if the authorities in Brisbane had taken a closer interest in the 
proposed Cooktown-Laura railway, they might have saved much wasted 
expenditure. 
The corollary is that had the £100,000 been put towards the 
establishment of an industry or service which offered some prospect of 
surviving in the longer-term, the early history of Cooktown might have been 
remembered for something more glorious than going from 'boom to bust' in 
the space of little more than a decade. 
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